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ABSTRACT 
 
The ECOWAS and AU peace and security legal frameworks have attracted little study 
amongst international law scholars despite its far-reaching normative innovations and 
implications for Africa, the UN Charter-based law of humanitarian intervention and 
international law in general. With the exception of a couple of writers, the few studies that 
exist have dismissed such provisions as article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act and article 10 
and 25 of the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution 
Peacekeeping and Security Protocol (MCPMRPS) as illegal treaties because of their 
incompatibility with articles 2(4), 24(1), 53(1) and 103 of the Charter. None of these studies 
examined the theoretical basis of these treaties and at a time the world is in search of a legal 
framework for the operationalisation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), it has become 
imperative to undertake an interrogation of the theoretical underpinnings of these treaties. My 
study tested the legal validity of the AU/ECOWAS intervention instruments using two 
theoretical frameworks: transformations of world constitutive process of authoritative 
decision and the illegal international legal reform theories. It also examined the validity of the 
treaties under conventional and customary international law. The thesis advanced three main 
arguments: 
First, I argued that there are four constitutive processes in the international legal order. The 
UN was designed to establish a system with effective hierarchical institutions of decision 
making where unilateral acts would be unnecessary and so illegal. The UNSC failed in its 
duty as the authoritative decision-maker saddled with the responsibility of maintaining 
international peace and security and protecting human rights. On this basis the unilateral 
interventions treaties established by AU/ECOWAS are valid. Secondly, I argued that in a 
legal system such as the UN Charter-based system that poorly approximates justice and 
where there are few prospects for legal reform, a unilateral act of illegal international legal 
reform aimed at bringing about moral improvement in the law is permissible. The 
AU/ECOWAS treaties constitute illegal international legal reform because they seek to 
improve the law of humanitarian intervention to prevent future mass atrocities. Thirdly, I 
argued that under treaty law, there are several grounds for holding the AU/ECOWAS laws 
valid, basically because they constitute treaty-based interventions for which UNSC 
authorization is not required. I conclude that the fundamental assumptions on which the 
Charter was based have been radically altered and African states can plead change of 
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circumstances to obviate the application of the full weight of the Charter framework. Based 
on the above conclusions, I proposed the AU/ECOWAS treaty regimes for a theory of 
regional responsibility to protect as a theoretical framework for the operationalisation of the 
R2P in Africa. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
 
Following the atrocities that characterised the 1990s, the controversial doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention and the use of force to protect human rights were tackled by the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). The African Union 
(AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have reenacted the 
principle of collective security.  But the old debates remain.  The tension between sovereignty 
and human rights protection, the legality of unauthorised regional humanitarian intervention 
and the legitimacy of the international legal order have been recurrent themes. Africa‘s 
conflict zones have provided the cases for assessment of UN human rights protection 
capacity and the result has been dismal.  The AU and ECOWAS treaties pose a new 
challenge to the UN Charter law on humanitarian intervention and may well be the paradigm 
for future action on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). 
1.2 AIMS  
 
The aim of this research is to analyse the legal validity of the treaty provisions of the AU and 
ECOWAS on humanitarian intervention under current international law.  Further, the 
research aims to consider how the legal and theoretical framework they provide could be 
adapted to form an alternative strategy for the implementation of the responsibility to react 
component of R2P in Africa.  Against the background of the UN Charter prohibition of the 
use of force in article 2(4), the vesting of primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security in the Security Council under article 24, the requirement of 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorisation for any regional organisation‘s 
enforcement action under article 53, and the restriction upon UN members from entering into 
treaties inconsistent with their Charter obligations in article 103; the research examines 
through case study of humanitarian intervention and theory of international law, the legality 
of the treaties and the moral and legal theories underpinning their validity.   
 
 
2 
The research analyses specific provisions of the AU Constitutive Act
1
 - article 4(h) 
and (j); and articles 3 and 4 of the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) 
Protocol which deals with humanitarian intervention.
2
  Under the ECOWAS regime, I am 
concerned with articles 4(e), (g) and 58 of the ECOWAS Revised Treaty,
3
 paragraphs 18, 46 
and 52 of the ECOWAS Framework for the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security; and articles 10, 22 and 25 of the 
ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, 
Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security.
4
  Using the arguments on the legal status of the 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention under Charter law and customary international law as 
background, the thesis will examine whether there exists a gap between the lex lata and lex 
ferenda in regional practice of humanitarian intervention and international law that these 
specific treaty provisions seek to bridge.  
Since the AU Act and the ECOWAS Revised Treaty came into force there have been 
doubts about their legal validity.
5
 For example, article 4 of the AU Act provides: the Union 
shall function in accordance with the following principles: 
                                                          
1
 The Constitutive Act of the African Union (hereafter AU Act) was adopted on 11 July 2000 in Lome, Togo 
and by virtue of article 28 of the Act came into force on 26 May 2001 by deposit of instruments of ratification 
by two-thirds of members of the OAU. As of August 2003, all 53 Member states have ratified the Act available 
at <http://www.african-union.org/root/au/AboutAu/Constitutive_Act_en.htm> (accessed on 28 May 2010). 
2
 The African Union Peace and Security Council Protocol (AUPSC Protocol hereafter) was adopted pursuant to 
article 5(2) of the AU Act which empowers the AU to establish such organs as it deems necessary. See article 
5(2) AUPSC Protocol. The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the 
African Union adopted at the 1
st
 Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union on 9th July 2002 in 
Durban.South.Africa.available.at<http://www.africa-
union.org/root.au/organs/psc/Protocol_peace%20and%20security.pdf> (accessed on 31 May 2010). 
3
 The Economic Community of West African States Revised Treaty (hereafter ECOWAS Revised Treaty) was 
adopted on 24th July 1993 at Cotonou in Benin Republic. See 
<http://www.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=treaty&lang+en> (accessed on 31 May 2010). (hereafter ECOWAS 
Revised Treaty).  
4
 At a meeting of Heads of State in Abuja between 30-31 October 1998, ECOWAS adopted the Framework 
Establishing the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and 
Security, reprinted in Jeremy I Levitt (ed) Africa: Selected Documents on Constitutive, Conflict and Security, 
Humanitarian, and Judicial Issues (2003) 287  (hereafter the ECOWAS Framework). See also Protocol Relating 
to the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security 
adopted at Lome, Togo on 10 December 1999 which entered into force upon adoption, (hereafter the ECOWAS 
MCPMRPS Protocol). Available at <http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=ap101299&lang=en> 
(accessed on 2 June 2010). 
5
 See for example, David Wippman ‗Pro-democratic intervention in Africa‘ in Peacemaking from the South: 
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(h) The right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the 
Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes 
against humanity; 
(j) the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace 
and security. 
The AUPSC Protocol also provides that in discharging its duties, the Council shall inter alia 
be guided by  
the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly 
in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity 
in accordance with Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act.
6
 
the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace 
and security in accordance with Article 4(j) of the Constitutive Act.
7
 
Under the ECOWAS treaty regime, the ECOWAS Revised Treaty provides for the 
‗maintenance of regional peace, stability and security through the promotion and 
strengthening of good neighbourliness‘8 and article 58 deals with regional security 
arrangements
9
 under which members are to maintain regular consultations between national 
border agencies,
10
 establish local and national joint commissions to look into problems 
between neighbouring states,
11
 encourage cooperation and exchange between communities, 
towns and regions,
12
 organise meetings between ministries on inter-state relations,
13
 employ 
good offices, mediation, conciliation and other peaceful means of dispute resolution where 
                                                          
6
 AUPSC Protocol, article 4(j). 
7
 Ibid.  See also AUPSC Protocol, article 4(k). 
8
 See ECOWAS Revised Treaty, article 4(e). 
9
 By virtue of article 58 (2) member states undertake to cooperate with ECOWAS to establish and strengthen 
mechanisms for the timely prevention and resolution of intra-state and inter-state conflicts. For an assessment of 
ECOWAS security arrangements and peacekeeping operations in West Africa, see Robert A Mortimer 
‗ECOMOG, Liberia, and regional security in West Africa‘ in Edmond J. Keller & Donald Rothchild (eds) Africa 
in a New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security (1996) 149-164;  Margaret 
Aderinsola Vogt ‗The involvement of ECOWAS in Liberia‘s peacekeeping‘ in Edmond J. Keller & Donald 
Rothchild (eds) Africa in a New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security 
(1996) 165-183 (hereafter Vogt ‗The involvement of ECOWAS in Liberia‘s peacekeeping‘). 
10
 See ECOWAS Revised Treaty, article 58 (2)(a). 
11
 See ECOWAS Revised Treaty, article (2)(b). 
12
 See ECOWAS Revised Treaty, article 58(2)(c). 
13
 See ECOWAS Revised Treaty, article 58(2)(d). 
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necessary,
14
 and to provide election observers on the request of a member state.
15
 
Specifically, it provides for ‗the establishment of a regional peace and security observation 
system and peacekeeping forces where appropriate.‘16 
It was on the basis of the above that the ECOWAS Framework and Protocols were 
both adopted.
17
  ECOWAS has the right to intervene militarily in the internal affairs of a 
member state if the situation threatens to trigger humanitarian disaster, poses a threat to sub-
regional peace and stability or in response to an overthrow or threatened overthrow of a 
democratically elected government.
18
  The legal implications of these provisions for the 
theory and practice of humanitarian intervention (in Africa in particular and the world in 
general) have attracted little academic attention, especially from non-Africa international law 
scholars.
19
  This however does not diminish the broader implications, as they raise 
fundamental normative and practical questions engaged in this thesis. 
1.3 Research Questions 
 
(i) Are the AU Act and ECOWAS Revised Treaty and Protocol granting the 
AU/ECOWAS a right of regional humanitarian military
20
 intervention valid in 
                                                          
14
 See ECOWAS Revised Treaty, article 58(2)(e). 
15
 See ECOWAS Revised Treaty, article 58(2)(g). 
16
 See ECOWAS Revised Treaty, article 58(2)(f). 
17
 See ECOWAS Framework op cit note 4.  See Jeremy Levitt ‗The evolving intervention regime in Africa: 
from basket case to market place?‘ (2002) 96 ASIL Proceedings 136 at 139 (hereafter Levitt ‗Evolving 
intervention‘). 
18
 See article 25 of ECOWAS MCPMRPS Protocol.  
19
 B S Chimni ‗Third World approaches to international law: A manifesto‘ in Anthony Anghie, Bhuprinder 
Chimni, Karin Mikelson, Obiora Okafor (eds) The Third World and International Order: Law, Politics and 
Globalization (2003) 50, describing the scant regard paid to third world scholarship and interests in the 
development of international law.  See also Michael Byers & Simon Chesterman ‗Changing the rules about 
rules? Unilateral humanitarian intervention and the future of international law‘ in J L Holzgrefe & Robert O 
Keohane (eds) Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas (2003) 191 (hereafter Byers 
& Chesterman ‗Changing the rules about rules‘), asserting that important works of African writers are 
disregarded. 
20
 The term ‗Humanitarian Military Intervention‘ (HMI) was adapted from Nsongurua J Udombana ‗When 
neutrality is a sin: The Darfur crisis and the crisis of humanitarian intervention in Sudan‘ (2005) 27 Human 
Rights Quarterly 1149 at 1151 note 13. In this thesis, I use the term ‗Regional Humanitarian Military 
Intervention‘ (hereafter RHMI) to mean military interventions by regional organisations (including sub-regional 
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international law in view of the prohibition of the use of force by article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter?  This question arises from the conflict between article 2(4), 2(7) of the 
Charter
21
 and article 4(h), (j) of AU Act, article 25
22
 (which empowers ECOWAS 
acting through the Mediation and Security Council and ECOMOG to conduct military 
operations to enforce sanctions, peacekeeping operations, humanitarian intervention to 
support humanitarian purposes).
23
  Of significance is article 10(c) of the ECOWAS 
MCPMRPS Protocol which gives the body power to use force to intervene in the 
internal affairs of member states when certain conditions are met.
24
  I will examine the 
arguments on the legality of humanitarian intervention below, but suffice it to mention 
here that many scholars agree that besides the exceptions in article 51 relating to self-
defence and UNSC action under chapter VII of the Charter, use of force in the internal 
affairs of a state without its consent is illegal and a violation of its sovereignty.
25
 But 
what happens when a state consents to future interventions by entering into a treaty like 
the AU Act and the ECOWAS Revised Treaty and Protocol?
26
  Can a regional 
organisation rely on such treaty to intervene?
27
  Is UNSC authorisation still required not 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
bodies) while ‗unilateral humanitarian intervention‘ is used to denote military interventions not authorised by 
the UNSC. 
21
 ‗All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations.‘ See article 2(4), Charter of the United Nations, signed on 26 June 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, TS No 
993 3 Bevans 1153. 
22
 See also paragraphs 18(i) and 46 of ECOWAS Framework. The Framework provides for military intervention 
by ECOWAS when: (1) a situation threatens to trigger humanitarian disaster, (2) a situation poses a serious 
threat to peace and security in the region and (3) in response to the overthrow or threatened overthrow of a 
democratically elected government.  See Levitt ‗Evolving intervention‘ op cit note 17 at 139. 
23
 See paragraph 52 of ECOWAS Framework. 
24
 The listed conditions are (1) where there is a threat of a humanitarian disaster or a serious threat to peace and 
security in the subregion; (2) where there have been serious and massive violations of human rights and the rule 
of law; and (3) where there has been an overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected 
government. 
25
 Bruno Simma ‗NATO, the UN and the use of force: Legal aspects‘ (1999) 10 EJIL 1 at 2 (hereafter Simma 
‗Use of force‘); Case of Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States of America), Merits, Judgment of June 27, 1986, ICJ Report 14. 
26
 Simma ‗Use of force‘ op cit note 25 at 2-4 arguing that states cannot contract out of the norm of nonuse of 
force at the regional level.  
27
 David Wippman ‗Treaty-based intervention: Who can say no?‘ (1995) 62 University of Chicago Law Review 
605 at 620 (hereafter Wippman ‗Treaty-based intervention‘), highlighting the views of critics who claim that 
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withstanding such intervention treaties? What happens when a state decides to 
withdraw its membership from these organisations at the point of intervention? Which 
regime regulates the relationship – is it the Charter law of nonuse of force or the 
regional customary law doctrine of intervention? It has been argued that nonuse of 
force is now a norm of jus cogens and as such cannot be derogated from
28
 even via a 
treaty arrangement.
29
  However, I will argue that while this may be so, the doctrine of 
Regional Humanitarian Military Intervention (RHMI) codified in AU and ECOWAS 
laws represent a change in the normative character of the principle of nonuse of force 
and thus constitutes a new regional customary international law in Africa
30
 since a third 
exception to the nonuse of force rule includes developments in customary international 
law which may modify article 2(4).
31
 But does it include regional customary 
international law? I interrogate whether the AU/ECOWAS practice satisfies the criteria 
for the formation of a new rule of regional customary international law. 
(ii) By entering into treaties whose provisions are contrary to article 53(1) of the UN 
Charter, did AU/ECOWAS countries violate their Charter obligations under article 
103?  The AU/ECOWAS treaties appear to violate international law in this respect, but 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
‗any treaty purporting to authorise states to use force against another state without its contemporaneous consent 
necessarily violates article 2(4) and therefore also article 103 of the UN Charter‘ and so void.  
28
 On the nature of norms of jus cogens, see article 53 and 64 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
signed at Vienna on 23 May 1969 and entered into force on 27 January 1980, U.N.T.S. 1155, 331. 
29
 See Wippman ‗Treaty-based intervention‘ op cit note 27 at 611 discussing the ‗freedom-to-contract‘ and ‗Jus 
Cogens‘ models of treaty-based intervention.  Cf. Ian Brownlie International Law and the Use of Force by 
States (1963) 152 (hereafter Brownlie ‗Use of Force‘); Oscar Schachter ‗The legality of pro-democratic 
invasion‘ (1984) 78 AJIL 645; Fernando R. Teson Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and 
Morality (2 ed) (1997) (hereafter Teson, ‗Law and Morality‘) at 147 note 42  where he gives a list of writers 
opposed to the legality of humanitarian intervention, but for authors supporting the legality of the doctrine, see 
the writers he lists at page 148 note 44.   
30
 Allen Buchanan ‗Reforming the international law of humanitarian intervention‘ in J L Holzgrefe & Robert O 
Keohane (eds) Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas (2003) 138.  See generally, 
Levitt ‗Evolving intervention‘ op cit note 17 supporting the emergence of a new intervention regime in Africa.  
31
 Academic Council of the United Nations ‗Embracing the elephant: Perspectives on humanitarian operations‘ 
A Policy Brief of the Academic Council of the United Nations System and the American Society of 
International Law Workshop on International Organisations, University of Namibia (5 – 18 August, 2001) 10. 
available at <http://ww.drjeremylevitt.com/files/Embracing_the_Elephant.pdf> (accessed on 20 November 
2010). Treaties could be modified by customary international law. See the preamble to the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties 1969. See also Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) 
(1962) Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962 ICJ Report 6 at 33-5, stating that the subsequent practice of parties to 
a treaty could modify the treaty. 
 
 
7 
as I argue here, these treaties actually comply with and further the purposes of the 
Charter while reinforcing the legitimacy of international law.
32
 The treaties while 
acknowledging that the UNSC has primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security however do not require the AU/ECOWAS to obtain 
UNSC approval before undertaking enforcement action within their jurisdictions as 
provided by article 53(1) of the Charter.
33
 Assuming it can be argued that they are valid 
because the prohibition on the use of force under the Charter is not absolute,
34
 can the 
AU/ECOWAS states initiate treaties that limit the right of future action of a sovereign 
state?
35
 Does this invalidate the AU/ECOWAS treaties or do the treaties themselves 
represent evidence of normative change in regional customary international law that has 
received wide acceptance within the given community of states (Africa) and with a 
capacity to modify general international law on the use of force?
36
  
(iii) African states are traditionally noninterventionists. What informed the willingness to 
cede a part of their sovereignty to the AU/ECOWAS while very reluctant to do the 
same with the UN?
37
  To what extent do such considerations influence the fidelity to 
the current international legal order by African states or their preparedness to act in 
violation of it? 
                                                          
32
 See generally Allen Buchanan ‗From Nuremberg to Kosovo: The morality of illegal international legal 
reform‘ (July 2001) 111 Ethics 673 (hereafter Buchanan ‗From Nuremberg‘), exploring the theory of illegal 
international legal reform and how illegal acts of states are used as instruments for international law reform. 
33
 See AU Act article 4(h) and articles 16 and 17 of AUPSC Protocol on the relationship between the AU and 
the UN. It gives the AUPSC primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace, security and stability in 
Africa. This is inconsistent with article 24 of the UN Charter which confers those powers on the UNSC. See 
article 10 and 25 of ECOWAS MCPMRPS Protocol and paragraphs 18, 46 & 52 of ECOWAS Framework.  
34
 See Teson ‗Law and Morality‘ op cit note 29 at 148 notes 44. 
35
 Wippman ‗Treaty-based intervention‘ op cit note 27 at 678 arguing that states can sign such treaties so long as 
it is signed by the de jure government. 
36
 Mark E Villiger Customary International Law and Treaties: A Manual on the Theory and Practice of the 
Interrelation of Sces 2 ed (1997) 56 (hereafter Villiger „Customary International Law and Treaties‘). 
37
 Jeremy Levitt ‗The Peace and Security Council of the African Union: The known unknowns‘ (2003) 13 
Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 109 at 127 (hereafter Levitt ‗Peace and Security Council‘); 
Levitt ‗Evolving intervention‘ op cit note 17 at 137.  It has been observed that there is a ‗perception disparity in 
the assistance given, to displaced persons from Kosovo, as opposed to that given to Africa.‘  See Jeremy Levitt 
‗Conflict prevention, management, and resolution: Africa – regional strategies for the prevention of 
displacement and protection of displaced persons: The cases of the OAU, ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD‘ (2001) 
11 Duke Jnal of Comparative and International Law 39 at 71  (hereafter Levitt ‗Conflict prevention‘) citing 
Sadako Ogata ‗Promoting peace and security: Humanitarian assistance to refugees in Africa‘, briefing at the 
formal session of the Security Council (July 26, 1999). 
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(iv) What theory underpins the challenge posed to the international legal order by the 
AU/ECOWAS humanitarian law regime and what are the normative and practical 
implications?
38
  When states consent to a treaty such consent operates to suspend the 
normal principles of international law that otherwise regulate the relationship.
39
  
Arguably this includes intervention, but some scholars argue that where the legal norm 
involved is one of jus cogens, states cannot contract to suspend such norm.
40
  
At the normative level, the key provisions in the AU/ECOWAS treaties indicate a 
deliberate departure from the UN humanitarian intervention law regime to pursue the 
protection of human rights, peace and security and stability in Africa outside the UN 
framework, cooperating when possible and necessary, but retaining the authority to 
decide on matters of intervention.
41
 I will argue that this is an attempt to start a process 
of reforming the international legal order from without rather than from within the UN.  
The research will attempt a synthesis of two theoretical approaches to validate this 
claim: Transformation of world constitutive process model of the Realist theory of 
international law
42
 and the illegal international legal reform model of the nonideal 
theory of international law.
43
  I will briefly discuss these theories and their application 
in this research.  
                                                          
38
 Levitt argues that the AU/ECOWAS treaties are not inconsistent with the UN Charter as long as they affirm 
and reinforce UN‘s key objectives – promote, maintain and keep international peace and security albeit through 
regional action. Even if the provisions were seemingly incompatible with the Charter, it does not render the 
treaties void or voidable whether in whole or in part. See Levitt ‗Peace and Security Council‘ op cit note 37 at 
127. 
39
 Roberto Ago The International Law Commission Eight Report on State Responsibility (1979) 2 Yearbook of 
International Law Commission 1, 31-32 UN Doc A/CN. 4/318. 
40
 Ibid. 
41
 See Wippman ‗Pro-democratic intervention‘ op cit note 5 at 145, observing that ECOWAS is apparently 
arrogating to itself the authority to decide on when to use force to intervene in its jurisdiction and is apparently 
‗less concerned with the legal basis of such intervention than building the institutional capacity to respond to 
emergencies in the subregion.‘ 
42
 W M Reisman ‗Unilateral action and the transformations of world constitutive process: The special problem 
of humanitarian intervention‘ (2000) 11:1 EJlL 3 (hereafter Reisman ‗Unilateral action‘); Myres S McDougal, 
Harold D Lasswell & W Michael Reisman ‗The world constitutive process of authoritative decision‘ in Richard 
A Falk and Cyril E Black (eds) The Future of the International Legal Order: Trends and Patterns (1969) 73 at 
74. See also Tom J Farer ‗Humanitarian intervention before and after 9/11: Legality and legitimacy‘ in J L 
Holzgrefe & Robert O Keohane Humanitarian Intervention op cit note 19 at 53, 65-66 (hereafter Farer 
‗Humanitarian intervention before and after 9/11‘). 
43
 Buchannan ‗From Nuremberg‘ op cit note 32 at 673. 
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(v) What will be the normative consequences of the above for the UN Charter law on 
nonuse of force?  How will it affect the United Nation‘s capacity for humanitarian 
intervention, particularly in Africa?  Does opinio juris support the emergence of a 
doctrine of RHMI in Africa? Can AU/ECOWAS treaties and state practice 
subsequently operate to modify the Charter law and general customary international 
law on the use of force?  The most obvious consequences would be positive and 
negative.  Negatively such conflict could weaken the UN system normatively.
44
  But I 
will argue in this thesis that this impact will most likely be temporary as the regional 
customary international law could produce a ‗ripple effect‘ that will result in a 
modification of, and produce a more responsive general customary international law 
and thereby reinforce the legitimacy of international law.
45
  Jean Allain argues, and I 
think correctly too, that the real challenge to the UN system on the use of force is its 
own failures to respond to humanitarian emergencies.
46
   
(vi) How can the RHMI model be adopted to foster a global consensus on implementing the 
responsibility to react component of the responsibility to protect
47
 principle?  Since the 
1990s, ECOWAS has consistently pursued a practice of unauthorised humanitarian 
intervention.
48
  The case for regionalisation of humanitarian military intervention has 
been advocated severally in the past
49
 and even recently too.
50
  NATO and ECOWAS 
                                                          
44
 See Andreas Paulus & Johann Ruben Leib ‗Article 103‘ in Bruno Simma et al (eds) The Charter of the United 
Nations: A Commentary 3 ed (2012) 2114, (hereafter Paulus & Leib ‗Article 103‘). In his contribution to the 
second edition of the volume Rudolf Bernhardt argued that treaties of intervention like the AU/ECOWAS 
imperil the entire international legal order. See Rudolf Bernhardt ‗Article 103‘ in Simma Bruno et al (eds) The 
Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 2 ed (2002) 1297 (hereafter Bernhardt ‗Article 103‘). 
45
 Kristin M Haugevik Regionalising the responsibility to protect: Possibilities, capabilities and actualities‘ 
(2009) 1 Global Responsibility to Protect 346 at 351 (hereafter Haugevik ‗Regionalising the Responsibility to 
Protect‘), arguing that the failure by the UN to halt humanitarian crises shows it is ‗fundamentally flawed and 
opens the possibilities for regional bodies. …‘  However, she is opposed to a ‗full‘ regionalisation strategy 
because it could lead to pursuit of national interests and hegemonic aspirations.  
46
 Jean Allain ‗The true challenge to the United Nations system of the use of force: The failures of Kosovo and 
Iraq and the emergence of the African Union‘ (2004) 8 Max Planck United Nations Yearbook 237 at 261. 
47
 R2P hereafter. 
48
 For example, ECOWAS humanitarian intervention operations in Liberia in 1990, Sierra-Leone in 1997 and 
Cote d‘Ivoire in 2000. 
49
 W Michael Reisman & Myres S McDougal ‗Humanitarian intervention to protect the Ibos‘ in Richard B. 
Lillich (ed) Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations (1973) 167-195 at 179 (hereafter Reisman & 
McDougal ‗Humanitarian intervention to protect the Ibos‘); Boutros Boutros-Ghali An Agenda for Peace: 
Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping: Report of the Secretary General A/47/277-S/2411117 
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have been the most proactive in the use of RHMI and the AU/ECOWAS treaty regime 
is a direct effort to provide the legal backing for the existing practice and moral 
imperatives.
51
  At a time when the world failed at the 2005 World Summit to work out 
a useful framework for implementing the responsibility to react by use of force under 
R2P, does the AU/ECOWAS humanitarian intervention legal framework provide 
sufficient scope and authority for such implementation in Africa?
52 
  As observed by 
some scholars ‗it is extremely unlikely that workable criteria for a right of humanitarian 
intervention without UNSC authorisation will ever be developed to the satisfaction of 
more than a handful of states.‘53  
(vii) What mechanism is required for the implementation of the responsibility to react 
component of R2P and what are the obstacles?  If the AU/ECOWAS treaties are valid, 
how do their frameworks overcome these obstacles?  The ICISS in its report achieved 
two main objectives both normative in character: a reinterpretation of sovereignty that 
shifts emphasis away from a ‗right to intervene‘ to a ‗responsibility to protect‘,54 and an 
enlargement of the scope of this responsibility to include prevention, reaction and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
June, 1992.  (Available at 
<http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.htmlhttp://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html>. (accessed on 30 March 
2010).  See Wippman ‗Treaty-based intervention‘ op cit note 27 at 609, suggesting that states may soon be 
persuaded to accept Stanley Hoffman‘s proposal for a multilateral treaty regime in which the parties would 
consent to intervention in their internal affairs to halt mass atrocities. See also the Report of the Secretary 
General on the Work of the Organisation A/54/1 September 20, 1999, where Kofi Annan observed that states 
may be justified to take unilateral action if the UNSC is paralysed in compelling cases of massive human rights 
violations.  
50
 See the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001) available at 
<http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf> (hereafter ICISS) (accessed on 24 June 2010). 
51
 Patricia Taft & Jason Ladnier ‗Realising ―Never Again‖: Regional capacities to protect civilians in violent 
conflicts‘ (January 2006) Fund For Peace 8 at 11 available at 
<http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/images/pdf/realizing_never_again.pdf> (accessed on 25 May 2010) 
(hereafter Taft & Ladnier ‗Realising ―Never Again‖‘). 
52
 See Vogt ‗The involvement of ECOWAS in Liberia‘s peacekeeping‘ op cit note 9 at 168-9.  See para 138 & 
139 of the World Summit Outcome Document 2005 A/6o/L.1, available at 
<www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/world%20summit%20outcome%20doc%202005(1).pdf>  (accessed on 24 
June 2010).   
53
 Byers & Chesterman ‗Changing the rules about rules?‘ op cit note 19, at 202. 
54
 Penelope Simons ‗From intervention to prevention‘: The emerging duty to protect‘ available at 
<http://www.worldialogue.ord/content.php?id=328&PHPSESSID=b14321baa899b4533a4962c2609f3448>  
(accessed on 24 June, 2010).   
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rebuilding.
55
  My research is concerned with the responsibility to react through military 
force as a sub-set of the R2P component. Through a theoretical conceptualisation, it 
engages the main challenges facing R2P in this respect
56
 - conceptual, institutional and 
political. It argues that while controversy still surrounds the scope of R2P at the 
doctrinal level at the UN, the AU/ECOWAS treaty regimes already captured the 
essentials of the doctrine by encompassing war crimes, crime against humanity and 
genocide.
57
 However, there are definitional questions as the crimes are not defined in 
the treaties. The thesis will also show that regional treaties can provide the institutional 
framework for the use of force to implement R2P.
58
  Drawing on the analysis of the 
AU/ECOWAS, I hope to show that the political obstacle to implementing R2P could be 
reduced through a regional arrangement like the AU/ECOWAS frameworks. 
(viii) How will the question of abuse that article 2(7) of the Charter seeks to curtail be 
addressed within the framework?
59
  The AU/ECOWAS is founded on the principle of 
equality of states and though with organs similar to the UN, their constitutive 
documents differ.
60
  The frameworks situate victims at the centre of the humanitarian 
intervention law regime and confirm the findings of an ICRC research that two-thirds 
of people in war ravaged societies actually want more intervention.
61
 
 
1.4 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
                                                          
55
  Gareth Evans ‗Ending mass atrocity crimes once and for all‘ Law Week Oration 2009, Law Foundation and 
Melbne Law School, Melbne, 22 September, 2009, available at 
<http://www.lawisanasswingate.blogspot.com/2009/11/professor-hon-gareth-evans-qc-ao-html> (accessed on 
26 June 2010). 
56
 Ibid. 
57
 See AU Act, article 4(h). 
58
  See AU Act, article 13 (1), (2), (3) establishing the African Standby Force and stating its roles.  See also 
article 17 ECOWAS MCPMRPS Protocol establishing the ECOMOG. 
59
 See Thomas Weiss ‗Kenya and R2P‘ in  Piet de Klerk et al (eds) A Major Boost for the UN: A Collection of 
Essays on the Occasion of the Departure of Frank Majoor from New York (2009) 107 at 112 available at 
<http://www.netherlandsmission.org/files/pdf/amajoorboostfortheun.pdf> (accessed on 20 April 2010). 
60
 See generally, Nsongurua J Udombana ‗The institutional structure of the African Union: A legal analysis‘ 
(2002) 33 California Western International Law Jnal 69. 
61
 Greenberg Research ‗The people on war report‘ (1999) International Committee of the Red Cross (Geneva) 
xvi available at <http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0758.pdf> (accessed on 21 April 2010). 
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Since the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, states have traditionally claimed exclusive 
jurisdiction over their citizens and have been averse to any criticism of how they treat their 
nationals as undue interference in their internal affairs.
62
  But that has been altered by the 
structure of the modern world of interdependence which has raised the level of international 
concerns with human rights with the international community developing more intrusive 
norms and mechanisms for monitoring and protecting human rights.  The oldest of these is 
probably the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.  This doctrine did not have a precise 
meaning in the writings of early jurists and for a very long time, its scope and content 
remained unclear.
63
 Early state practice of the doctrine was based on ‗religious solidarity‘ and 
it was only in the nineteenth century that it began to acquire a specific and technical 
meaning.
64
  But its legal validity before and after the Charter came into force remains 
controversial. 
1.4.1 The Pre-Charter Era 
 
Writing in the seventeenth century, Hugo Grotius approved of humanitarian intervention but 
also recognised the likelihood of its abuse.
65
  Some writers in that period supported the 
                                                          
62
 For a detailed treatment of the contents and protection of human rights see Henry J Steiner, Philip Alston & 
Ryan Goodman International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals 3 ed (2008); R McCorquodale & 
R Fairbroth ‗Globalization and human rights‘ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 739. 
63
 See P H Winfield ‗The history of intervention in international law‘ (1922/23) 3 British Yearbook of 
International Law 130, discussing how the meaning of the world has changed over several centuries.   At some 
point it in time, it meant diplomatic pressure, espionage, infiltration, sabotage, assassination, embargo, threat, 
display of force, economic disruptions, subversion of government and direct use of military force were termed 
intervention at different times.  See for example, Brownlie ‗Use of Force‘ op cit note 29 at 44 stating that 
interference in the affairs of a state even by mere diplomatic protest is tantamount to intervention. 
64
 For a review of the historical development of the doctrine, see Jeane-Pierre L Fonteyne ‗The customary 
international law doctrine of humanitarian intervention: Its current validity under the U.N. Charter‘ (1974) 4 
California Western International Law Jnal 203 at 205 footnotes 7 (hereafter Fonteyne ‗The customary 
international law doctrine‘); L B Sohn & T Buergenthal, International Protection of Human Rights (1973); 
Nicholas Onuf ‗Humanitarian intervention: The early years‘ (2004) 16 Florida Jnal of International Law 753, 
offering a historical development of the doctrine from an international relations perspective, (hereafter Onuf 
‗The early years‘); R George Wright ‗A contemporary theory of humanitarian intervention‘ (1988-9) 4 Florida 
International Law Jnal 435.  
65
 Ryan Goodman ‗Humanitarian intervention and pretexts for war‘ (2006) 100 AJIL 107.  ‗Kings and those who 
are with a Power equal to that of Kings, have a right to exact Punishments, not only for Injuries committed 
against themselves, or their Subjects, but likewise for those which do not particularly concern them, but which 
are, in any persons whatsoever, grievous Violations of the Law of Nature or Nations. For the Liberty of 
Consulting the Benefit of human Society, by Punishments that War is lawful against those who offend against 
Nature.‘ Hugo Grotius De Jure belli ac Pacis Bk 2 chapter 20 section 40, 1 & 4 (English transl (1738) 436 – 
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validity of the doctrine so long as it was civilized nations who intervened in uncivilized 
nations.
66
 Others argued that there was a customary right of humanitarian intervention before 
1945 and as Fonteyne submits, state practice supports this conclusion.
67
 This thesis finds it 
necessary briefly to relate the historical background to the extent that I draw on it to support 
my argument that the AU/ECOWAS interventionist treaties are anything but novel because 
state practice of humanitarian intervention in the pre-charter era was based on the treaty 
system.
68
 This is significant because if such treaty rights existed under customary 
international law in the pre-Charter era did that right survive the prohibition of use of force 
by the Charter? If yes, what is the implication for the AU/ECOWAS treaties? If no, were 
there assumptions or conditions precedent implicit or explicit in the Charter, the fulfillment of 
which was to be the basis for the surrender of the rights?
69
  Were those conditions fulfilled 
afterwards? If no, how does it affect the validity of the AU/ECOWAS treaties under the 
fidelity to law argument (in this case compliance with articles 2(4) 24, 53 and 103) and their 
actions under the world constitutive process theory? 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
4389, as cited in L C Green ‗General principles of human rights‘ (1955) 8 Current Legal Problems 162.  The 
term has been defined as ‗the reliance upon force for the justifiable reason of protecting the inhabitants of 
another state from treatment which is so arbitrary or abusive as to exceed the limit of that authority within which 
the sovereign is presumed to act within reason and justice.‘ See Simon Chesterman Just War or Just Peace? 
Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (2001) 1 quoting Ellery C Stowell Intervention in 
International Law (1921) 53 (hereafter Chesterman ‗Just War or Just Peace?‘). 
66
 Richard B Lillich & Frank C Newman International Human Rights:  Problems of Law and Policy (1979) 499. 
67
 Fonteyne ‗The customary international law doctrine‘ op cit note 64 at 235-6. See also Richard Falk Legal 
Order in a Violent World (1968) 161. 
68
 For example, in 1827, Great Britain, France and Russia under the Treaty of Locarno intervened in Greece to 
protect Christians which culminated in the independence of Greece from Turkey in 1830. See Onuf ‗The early 
years‘ op cit note 64 at 765. See Chesterman ‗Just War or Just Peace?‘ op cit note 65 at 32 asserting that the 
intervention in Greece ‗is at best a questionable precedent for the doctrine‘ and that there is no conclusive proof 
that a doctrine of humanitarian intervention existed in the pre-charter era.  Other examples include the 
intervention of France in Syria in 1860 to stop the massacre of Christians; the Russian intervention in Bosnia, 
Herzegovina and Bulgaria in 1877 based on the Treaty of London.  See generally, Nicholas Onuf op cit note 64. 
69
 W Michael Reisman, ‗Criteria for the lawful use of force in international law‘ (1985) 10 Yale Jnal of 
International Law 279 at 279-80 (hereafter Reisman ‗Criteria for the lawful use of force).  See also R George 
Wright ‘A Contemporary theory of humanitarian intervention‘ (1988-9) 4 Florida International Law Jnal 435 at 
439, discussing the issue and concluding that the approach is doubtful.  Richard B Lillich ‗Forcible self-help by 
states to protect human iights‘ (1967) 53 Iowa Law Review 325, arguing for unilateral or collective humanitarian 
intervention in the absence of UN action. 
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1.4.2 Post-Charter Era    
 
No sooner was the UN Charter adopted than it was realised that ‗there was tension between 
the UN‘s primary purpose—maintenance of international peace and security and a secondary 
purpose that was fast becoming important—promotion and protection of human rights …‘70  
Various theories surround the doctrine and I consider the disciplines of law and international 
relations. 
1.4.3 International Relations Theories of Humanitarian Intervention 
 
Under the UN Charter, international relations view nonintervention as a norm of friendly 
relations and intervention as a violation of state sovereignty.
71
 Within the field of 
international relations, the debate has been between Pluralists and Solidarists.
72
 
1.4.3.1    Pluralist Objections to Humanitarian Intervention 
 
To pluralists, states, and not individuals are the rights holders in international law and as 
such, attempts to use force to enforce individual rights violate the principles of sovereignty, 
non-interference and non-use of force as well as endangers inter-state relations, international 
order and stability.
73
  The society of states depends on a rules-based system that allows states 
to protect ‗the values of individual life and communal liberty‘ within their territories.74  
Pluralists prioritise order over justice. For example, it is argued that the protection of 
individual rights within states depends on the existence of a minimum level of harmony and 
                                                          
70
 Richard B Lillich, ‗Kant and the current debate over humanitarian intervention‘ (1997) 6 Jnal of 
Transnational Law and Policy 397 at 399.  See also the preambles and articles 1(1), (3), 2(4), 2(7), 55 and 56 of 
the UN Charter. 
71
 Christopher C Joyner & Anthony Clark Arend ‗Anticipatory humanitarian intervention: An emerging legal 
norm?‘ (1999-2000) 10 Jnal of Legal Studies 27 at 27. 
72
 For an analysis of the subject from international relations perspective, see Sean D Murphy Humanitarian 
Intervention: the United Nations in an Evolving World Order (1996); Oliver Ramsbotham & Tom Woodhouse 
Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflicts: a Reconceptualisation (1991). 
73
 Nicholas J Wheeler Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (2000) 11 
(hereafter Wheeler ‗Saving Strangers‘). 
74
 Michael Walzer Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations 4 ed (2006) 108 
(hereafter Walzer ‗Just and Unjust Wars‘). 
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stability in international society,
75
 because any attempt at recognising a right of unilateral 
humanitarian intervention when there is no central authority and without states agreeing on 
what ‗human rights‘ means could undermine the international system.76  Hedley Bull argues 
that this explains why states have refused to embrace the practice and it is in the best interest 
of all that humanitarian intervention should remain prohibited.
77
  But is this assertion still true 
today in the face of the universalisation and international concern with human rights?  Does it 
mean that states will accept the doctrine once it is codified in a convention or treaty like the 
AU/ECOWAS? 
1.4.3.2    Solidarists Argument for Humanitarian Intervention 
 
Solidarists argue that sovereignty is not absolute and that states must meet a minimum 
standard of human rights to be eligible for the protection accruing from sovereignty and 
nonintervention.  Michael J Smith argues that because states‘ rights derive from individual 
rights, when a state violates the rights of individuals it loses its legitimacy and moral right to 
‗full sovereignty‘.78  In such cases, intervention by other states is not only allowed,79 it is also 
a moral duty.
80
  Solidarists base their argument on the ground that national boundaries are 
mere artificial creations that do not have the authority to limit our moral responsibility to 
fellow human beings and as such, states not only have a domestic responsibility to observe 
human rights but also an international responsibility to protect human rights even at the risk 
of their own soldiers.
81
   
                                                          
75
 See Wheeler ‗Saving Strangers‘ op cit note 73 at 29 reviewing some of these arguments. 
76
 Hedley Bull ‗Conclusion‘ in Hedley Bull (ed) Intervention in World Politics (1984)181-95 at 193.  Realists 
advance the following main arguments against humanitarian intervention.  First they argue that it will always be 
open to abuse.  Second, relying on examples of selective intervention, they argue that intervention by states will 
always be driven by national interests and never wholly by humanitarian motives and at best by a convergence 
of purposes.  Third, they submit that states have no right to risk the lives of their soldiers to protect strangers in 
foreign lands from human rights abuse. 
77
 Ibid 
78
 Michael J Smith ‗Humanitarian intervention: An overview of the ethical issues‘ (1989) 3 Ethics and 
International Affairs 74.  See also Teson ‗Law and Morality‘ op cit note 29 at 174.  
79
  Walzer ‗Just and Unjust Wars‘ op cit note 74 at 107. 
80
 R J Vincent & Peter Wilson ‗Beyond non-intervention‘ in Ian Forbes & Mark Hoffman (eds) Political 
Theory, International Relations and the Ethics of Intervention (1993) 122-30 at 123, 128. 
81
 Wheeler ‗Saving Strangers‘ op cit note 73 at 39. 
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1.4.4 International Law Theories of Humanitarian Intervention 
 
Various classifications have been adopted to distinguish theorists on humanitarian 
intervention in international law.
82
  However, the debate is generally between two main 
schools of thought: 
1.4.4.1    Restrictionists  
 
Restrictionists argue that article 2(4) prohibits the use of force by states except in the case of 
the exceptions provided in article 51 and Chapter VII of the Charter.
83
  To these writers, the 
use of force to protect human rights is illegal under current international law.
84
  Chesterman 
contends that there was no right of unilateral humanitarian intervention in the pre-Charter era 
and it is prohibited by article 2(4) under the Charter, concluding that humanitarian 
intervention will remain in a ‗legal penumbra‘ for the foreseeable future.85  This prohibition 
does not admit of any exception and use of force to secure a legal right
86
 or to assist in the 
administration of justice is a violation of article 2(4) and illegal.
87
  The International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) held that much in The Corfu Channel Case
88
 and again confirmed the view in 
                                                          
82
 J L Holzgrefe ‗The humanitarian intervention debate‘ in J L Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane (eds) 
Humanitarian Intervention op cit note 19 at 18-19, distinguishing between naturalist, consensualist, collectivist 
and individualist theorists. 
83
 Michael Akehurst ‗Humanitarian intervention‘ in Hedley Bull (ed) Intervention in World Politics (1984) 95-
118 at 99. 
84
 See Brownlie ‗Use of Force‘ op cit note 29 at 267. 
85
 See Chesterman ‗Just War or Just Peace?‘ op cit note 65 at 87 
86
 Oscar Schachter International Law in Theory and Practice (1991) 112-114 (hereafter Schachter ‗International 
Law in Theory‘). 
87
 See The Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain v Albania) (Merits) Judgment of 9, April 
1949 ICJ Report 4 at 35.  
88
 Where it was held that the Ct ‗…can only regard the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a 
policy of force such as has in the past given rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot find a place in 
international law It is still less admissible in the particular form it would take here – it would be reserved for the 
most powerful states.‘ Id. 
 
 
17 
Nicaragua Case.
89
  Even if it is conceded that human rights have achieved the status of jus 
cogens, it still does not mean that force can be used for its protection.
90
 They argue that the 
prohibition in article 2(4) is a total ban and the inclusion of the words ‗…in any other manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter‘ was not intended to create an exception but to 
stress the totality of the prohibition.
91
  Thus, Gray asks rather rhetorically, [i]f art. 2(4) of the 
UN Charter is a dynamic provision opened to changing interpretation over time, what 
developments in fact justified a new interpretation?‘92  However, it is my contention that 
besides the failure to develop an effective collective security mechanism and the 
ineffectiveness of the UNSC, state practice as it relates to the use of force as well as 
intervention treaties and obligations of member states under article 53 and 103 need a 
reappraisal in view of recent developments: interventions by NATO and ECOWAS and the 
AU/ECOWAS intervention treaties.  The literature indicates that subsequent state practice 
can modify a treaty and a treaty is to be interpreted in the light of such practice.
93
  I argue that 
on the basis of the principle of rebus sic stantibus the role of regional organisations in the use 
of force vis-à-vis the UNSC needs a re-examination.  For example, what impact does the non-
implementation of article 43 of the Charter have on the obligations of states under the 
Charter? 
1.4.4.2    Counter-Restrictionists  
 
The argument of these theorists turn on the approach to be adopted in the interpretation of the 
Charter and the views here are split between the Classicists and the Realists.  Classicists 
opine that the parties to a treaty have intentions that are discoverable from an analysis of the 
                                                          
89
 Case of Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America), (Merits) Judgment of June 27, 1986 ICJ Report 14 at para 190, where the Court held article 2(4) to be 
a norm of jus cogens from which no derogation is permitted.  For a critique of the judgment see Teson Law and 
Morality op cit note 29 at 267-312. 
90
 Christine Gray International Law and the Use of Force 2 ed (2004) 46 (hereafter Gray ‗International Law‘). 
91
 Simma ‗Use of force‘ op cit note 25 at 2.  
92
 Gray ‗International Law‘ op cit note 90 at 35. 
93
 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia notwithstanding 
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), (Advisory Opinion) 21 June 1971 ICJ Report 16 at 22. See also article 
62(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 which permits states to suspend, terminate or even 
withdraw from treaty obligations due to a fundamental change of circumstances upon which the treaty 
obligations were assumed.  See Teson ‗Law and Morality‘ op cit note 29 at 35.   But see ‗Just War or Unjust 
Peace?‘ op cit note 68 at 56. 
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text of the treaty whose provisions should be respected until varied or expired.
94
  Realists 
assert that article 2(4) prohibits humanitarian intervention only to the extent that it is directed 
‗against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.‘95  From a Classicist 
view, unauthorised humanitarian intervention is illegal, but from a Realist standpoint, its 
legality or otherwise depends on the attitude of contemporary international community.
96
 The 
second argument of Realist is that since the UN failed in one of its purposes (the 
establishment of a mechanism of collective security) the basis and assumption upon which 
states surrendered their right of use of force was not fulfilled and states reverted back to their 
customary international law status on the use of force, hence if the UN fails to halt violations 
of human rights, states have a right to do so.
97
  Their third argument seeks to give article 39 
an expanded interpretation under which the UNSC is said to have the authority to approve the 
use of force to halt humanitarian crises even where such crises lack cross-boundary effects.
98
 
1.5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
There is the need to examine the validity argument not only from a theoretical perspective but 
also by drawing on contemporary cases and this thesis adopts this approach.  It examines the 
legal validity of the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes by applying the Realist theory of the 
                                                          
94
 Tom J Farer ‗An inquiry into the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention‘ in Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J 
Scheffer (eds) Law and Force in the New International Order (1991) 186 (hereafter Farer ‗An inquiry into the 
legitimacy of humanitarian intervention‘). 
95
 Teson ‗Law and Morality‘ op cit note 29 at 151; Reisman & McDougal ‗Humanitarian intervention to protect 
the Ibos‘ op cit note 49 at 177.  But see Oscar Schachter ‗Legality of pro-democratic invasion‘ op cit note 84 at 
649, arguing that to interpret the words in this way would require ‗an Orwellian construction of those terms.‘  
Realism views ‗explicit and implicit agreements, formal texts, and state behavi as being in a condition of 
effervescent interaction, unceasingly creating, modifying and replacing norms. Texts themselves are but one 
among a large number of means of ascertaining original intention.‘ See Farer ‗An inquiry into the legitimacy of 
humanitarian intervention‘ op cit 94 at 186. 
96
 See J L Holzgrefe & Robert O Keohane Humanitarian Intervention op cit note 19 at 39. 
97
 Reisman ‗Criteria for the lawful use of force‘ op cit note 69 at 279-80; W Michael Reisman ‗Sovereignty and 
human rights in contemporary international law‘ (1990) 84 AJIL 866 at 869. 
98
 Jost Delbruck ‗A fresh look at humanitarian intervention under the authority of the United Nations‘ (1992) 67 
Indiana Law Jnal 898-99,  Cf. Lori Fisler Damrosch ‗Commentary on collective military intervention to enforce 
human rights‘ in Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J Scheffer (eds) Law and Force in the New International Order 
(1991) 219.  See generally, Richard B Lillich ‗Humanitarian intervention: A reply to Ian Brownlie and a plea for 
constructive alternatives‘ in Law and Civil War in the Modern World John Norton Moore (ed) (1974) 229-251. 
See also John Norton Moore ‗Toward an applied theory for the regulation of intervention‘ in John Norton 
Moore (ed) Law and Civil War in the Modern World (1974) 3-37. 
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transformation of world constitutive process of authoritative decision as developed by 
Reisman.
99
 I consider the four stages of the constitutive process in international law and 
determine what stage the law on humanitarian intervention is at today.  I argue that the 
envisaged stage as at the time the Charter was drafted was stage 4 hence the rule on nonuse of 
force; but as it turned out, the system failed and it reverted back to stage 3 and it is the basis 
for the legality of the unilateral acts of AU/ECOWAS (states) participants in the world 
constitutive process.  
Secondly, in consideration of the moral object of international law (particularly, 
Charter law), the thesis relies on the illegal international legal reform model of the nonideal 
theory of international law as developed by Allen Buchanan to assess the present law on 
humanitarian intervention especially as applied to Africa and concludes that the international 
legal order being morally defective, it imbues the AU/ECOWAS with a moral right to 
embark on a reform of the system provided they meet certain conditions.
100  
The fact that 
African states readily ceded away part of their sovereignty by acceding to these 
interventionist treaties lends credence to the moral forfeiture theory espoused by these 
treaties.
101
 
Implicit in the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes is the Lockean social contract theory 
that the relationship between the government and the governed is contractual.
102
  A people 
organise themselves into a political community and appoint an authority to ensure law and 
order.
103
  The agency so appointed derives its legitimacy from the consent of the governed in 
whom sovereignty resides and the rights and duties of the sovereign government subsists only 
as long as it adheres to its legitimate roles under the contract  which consist basically of 
                                                          
99
 See generally Reisman ‗Unilateral action‘ op cit note 42; Myres S McDougal, Harold D Lasswell & W 
Michael Reisman ‗The world constitutive process of authoritative decision‘ op cit note 42. 
100
 Buchanan ‗From Nuremberg‘ op cit note 32 at 130. 
101
 Teson ‗Law and Morality‘ op cit note 29; Christopher C. Joyner & Anthony Clark Arend ‗Anticipatory 
humanitarian intervention: An emerging legal norm‘ (1999-2000) 10 Jnal of Legal Education 27 at 48 (hereafter 
Joyner & Arend ‗Anticipatory humanitarian intervention‘); Bryan Hehir ‗Interventions: From theories to cases‘ 
(1995) 9 Ethics & International Affairs 1. 
102
 John Locke Two Treatise of Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration Thomas I Cook (ed) (1966) 
168-9, 174, 184. 
103
 Joyner & Arend ‗Anticipatory humanitarian intervention‘op cit note 101 at 48. 
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protecting its citizens.
104
  When a state therefore violates the rights of those it was appointed 
to protect, it loses its legitimacy.
105
  My argument is that the AU/ECOWAS states have, by 
signing the treaties limiting their sovereign authority accepted that popular sovereignty 
resides in their citizens and should the states fail in their duty to protect those citizens, such 
states lose the claim to legitimacy, sovereignty and nonintervention, and the authority of the 
regional organisations to intervene is activated.  It is antithetical to the moral objectives of 
international law to argue that such treaty is invalid and that the states reserve their right to 
absolute sovereignty not withstanding their willingness to place a limitation on that 
sovereignty and subject it to the protection of the human rights of their citizens from whom 
they derived the authority in the first place.  One legal implication of the treaties is an 
acknowledgement by states that: popular sovereignty resides in the people; states derive their 
legitimacy from their citizens; states are under obligation to respect those rights as their 
continued legitimacy rests on it; that they forfeit their immunity from external intervention if 
they violate those rights.  
1.5.1 Testing the Legal Validity of AU/ECOWAS RHMI Regimes under International Law 
1.5.1.1  The Illegal International Legal Reform Theory 
106
(IILR) 
   
The thrust of this theory is summed up as follows ‗… given the relatively undeveloped state 
of international law—in particular, its inadequate protection of basic human rights and the 
limited resources for timely and lawful change in the direction of more adequate protection—
there are opportunities for acts which are both illegal and highly desirable as steps towards 
morally improving the system.‘107  This approach contends that the present international legal 
order is defective and in dire need of moral reform.
108
  However, given the difficulties of 
                                                          
104
 Ibid. 
105
 Ibid. 
106
 Is a contribution to the nonideal moral theory of international law and it seeks to answer the question of ‗… 
when, if ever, illegal acts directed towards improving the international system are morally justified.‘  See 
Buchanan ‗From Nuremberg‘ op cit note 32 at 675.  For a critique of the theory, see J S Watson ‗A Realistic 
Jurisprudence of International Law‘ (1980) The Yearbook of World Affairs 271-2; Alfred P Rubin Ethics and 
Authority in International Law (1997) 124. 
107
 Buchanan ‗From Nuremberg‘ op cit note 32 at 680. 
108
 Ibid at 676. 
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norm-making in international law,
109
 law reform at the international level is particularly 
problematic and slow.
110
 Ironically, ‗some of the most important moral improvements in the 
international legal system have resulted, at least in part, from illegal acts.‘111 If such 
significant progress has been a product of illegal acts in the past and international law is still 
ill-equipped to deal with problems like human rights protection, the question of illegal reform 
of international law is unavoidable.
112
 This theory however does not lend itself to every type 
of intervention but only to ‗illegal humanitarian intervention directed towards reform of the 
international legal order‘113 because it aims to bring the system significantly closer to the 
ideal of the rule of law by rectifying the most substantive injustice supported by the system, 
and reducing the systemic defects that undermines its legitimacy.
114
 Although Buchanan does 
not deal with illegal reform through treaty formation as the AU/ECOWAS seek to do, I will 
argue that the treaties combine the benefits of codification with a moral improvement of the 
international legal order.  
The theory of IILR basically asks the question ‗under what conditions, if any, is it 
morally justifiable to breach international law in order to try to improve the system from a 
moral point of view?‘115  In other words, when is it permitted to break the law to improve the 
law?  If you so much as give allegiance to the law, then you should at least obey it as it is 
rather than break it and bring it into disrepute.  So goes the fidelity to the ideal of rule of law 
argument.  It is argued that the rule of law as an ideal has the following components: that the 
law should be clear enough, it should be general and public, not subject to arbitrary change 
                                                          
109
 International law norms are mostly created through treaties and customary international law.  See article 38 
of the Statute of the International Ct of Justice, annexed to the UN Charter. 
110
 Buchanan ‗From Nuremberg‘ op cit note 32 at 679.  Treaties and customary international law require state 
consent. While states often enter reservations to the former, they raise persistent objections to the latter. And it is 
often difficult to ascertain opinio juris or how wide a state practice should be to form a custom. 
111
 Ibid at 682, where he cites the Nuremberg Trials which has been criticized as victor‘s justice because some of 
the acts complained of were neither criminal acts as at the time they took place nor was there prescribed 
punishment. Yet some of the principles formulated at the Trials form the basis of international criminal law, and 
have contributed to the development of international human rights and international humanitarian law. 
112
 Ibid. 
113
 Ibid at 676. 
114
 Ibid. 
115
 Buchanan, ‗From Nuremberg‘ op cit note 32 at 682. 
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and it should apply to all equally.
116
  The Fidelity Argument says that as a result of our moral 
allegiance to the normative ideal of rule of law, it will be inconsistent to call for an illegal act 
even if directed at reforming the law while we yet hold or claim that allegiance.
117
 
The Fidelity Argument presupposes that the law meets certain basic characteristics to 
be able to attract the required moral allegiance.  Yet the current international law does not 
meet one such critical element: equality before the law.  States are far from being equal 
before the law under current international law both in theory and in practice.  Since 
international law does not meet this requirement, its moral appeal for allegiance is weakened 
and states are less likely to feel any moral obligation to obey.
118
  In fact, states feel a moral 
obligation to undertake acts (even if illegal) that could improve the legal system and fidelity 
to law.
119
  To what extent states will refrain from violating international law due to their 
allegiance to the ideal of rule of law depends on how close international law approximates the 
ideal.
120
  The moral failures of the UN, and by extension, the international legal order in 
Rwanda, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra-Leone, Sudan and so on. compel unilateral acts of legal 
reform.  The treaties in issue here are a response to these moral imperatives and, though they 
breach articles 53 and 103, they are aimed at improving the system.
121
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 Ibid at 683. 
117
 Ibid at 684.  
118
 Ibid. See also Laurie Gorman ‗The implications of regional peace operations on the United Nations capacity 
for peacekeeping‘ in Ann Livingstone (ed) Challenge of Effective Cooperation and Coordination in Peace 
Operations (Spring 2008) 11:1 The Pearson Papers 1 at 9 (hereafter Gorman ‗The implications of regional 
peace operations‘), asserting that the decade between 1995 and 2005 saw a significant reduction in troops 
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 See generally, Buchanan ‗From Nuremberg‘ op cit note 32.  
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 Ibid at 684. 
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 Ibid at 868, citing as example the remarks by the US Secretary of States during the Kosovo intervention that 
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the International Independent Commission on Kosovo Kosovo Report: Conflicts, International Response: 
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1.5.1.2   Realist Theory of Transformations of World Constitutive Process of Authoritative             
Decision
122
 
 
It is pertinent to give a short background of the New Haven School (NHS) as a theoretical 
approach to the study of international law for two reasons: first, the theory of the 
Transformation of the global constitutive process applied by Reisman to the problem of 
humanitarian intervention (that I also employ here) is located within the theoretical 
framework of the NHS Jurisprudence. Secondly, Reisman‘s theory pays particular attention 
to the specific question of the lawfulness of unilateral action such as the AU/ECOWAS 
RHMI regimes under international law and thus provides the tools for analysing the 
circumstances under which such treaties are valid if at all. 
This theory derives from the New Haven School of jurisprudence which conceives of 
law as a process of decision that is both ‗authoritative and controlling‘ aimed at enhancing 
human dignity and ensuring international peace and security as well as stability in the legal 
order.
123
 According to the NHS, the international legal order should support a system where 
every individual can achieve power, wealth, enlightenment, skill, wellbeing, affection, 
respect and rectitude.
124
 It adopts a functional analysis that seeks to account for the variation 
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 The term ‗constitutive‘ is used differently from its ordinary meaning by the NHS. The ‗world constitutive 
process‘ means international law while ‗human dignity‘ refers to ‗human rights‘. See Teson ‗Law and Morality‘ 
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 W Michael Reisman, Siegried Wiessner & Andrew Willard ‗The New Haven School: A brief introduction‘  
(2007) 32 Yale Jnal of International Law 575 at 576 (hereafter Reisman, Wiessner & Willard ‗The New Haven 
School‘). 
124
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between the rules defined in the constitutive document and the modifications often 
occasioned by practice.
125
 It conceives of the process of international law as consisting of five 
intellectual tasks: clarification of community goals, explanation of past trends moving 
towards or away from the realisation of these goals, an explanation of the factors that shaped 
those decisions, projection of the course of future decisions or trends, and the creation and 
assessment of possible options.
126
 The objective of the NHS is the recommendation of 
alternatives in policy choices and application in order to realise maximum human dignity.
127
 
It achieves this by studying the different phases of the decision-making process and the 
participants in the process (such as states and intergovernmental organisations).
128
 NHS 
policy-oriented search for a minimum world public order of human dignity is based on the 
premis that law is meant to serve human beings to achieve certain universal values which are 
empirically expressed in human aspirations already stated above.
129
  
Here, the ‗perspectives of authority‘ can influence how a problem is perceived, 
decisions made, criteria for decisions selected, and alternatives pursued.
130
 If a decision is 
made by the appropriate authority it will be more effective and authoritative. For example, a 
decision by the UNSC to intervene in a state will be more authoritative than unilateral 
intervention by a single state. But a decision made without reference to the designated agent 
could still 
 acquire a retrospective authority if the degree of their effectiveness is such as to reshape 
community expectations; … a flow of comparable decisions through time, whatever their 
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initial relation to authority, may under certain conditions perform a prescriptive function in 
creating new expectations of authority in regard to projected future decision.
131
  
It is unhelpful in the world constitutive process to remain fixated on the parochial 
constitutionalism of the Charter for example, because intergovernmental organisations like 
the AU, ECOWAS, OAS and the League of Arab States have all become important 
participants and forums in the constitutive process.
132
 The world comprise of several systems 
of public orders each according to its own development approximating different levels of 
human dignity.
133
 Hence, Reisman states that ‗[a]ny reasonably comprehensive world history 
will quickly indicate that the Western assumption that international law is a creation of Hugo 
Grotius and his contemporaries is outstanding only for its inaccuracy, narrowness and 
arrogance.‘134 Unfortunately, the presence of regional differences in the elucidation of 
allegedly universal norms and the fundamental principles relating to the distribution of 
authority continue to be obscured by the argument that such divergences are mere deviations 
from the normative prescriptions.
135
  
This professed universality of certain norms is weakened by the practice of Western 
scholars who on the one hand affirm Eurocentric notion of human rights while waging an 
intellectual war against principles like those articulated in the New International Economic 
Order and the Third World agitation for a right to development. The pretended claim to 
universality in the international legal order in almost all aspects obscures pressing demands 
of the different system of public orders that some of these conflicting claims are unsettled and 
so need reappraisal.
136
 A case in point here would be the question of use of force by regional 
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organisations to prevent genocides and mass atrocities and the distribution of authority 
between the UNSC and regional organisations under the Charter. ‗Unless the institutional 
details of all systems of public order are open to reconsideration in the light of the 
contribution that they make to the realisation of human dignity in theory and in fact, the 
plight of the world community will remain as precarious as we know it today.‘137 Such 
reappraisal must acknowledge that beyond the state lay another public order system –
‗regional international law‘ (including its sub-regional compositions).138 
The NHS evaluates the legality of unilateral action in a legal system using two criteria: 
substantive and procedural.
139
  Unilateral action by participants that seek to displace the 
authoritative agent saddled with the right to make the decision is said to be legal if: 
1. The pertinent legal system allows such unilateral acts in certain circumstances and on 
conditions that substantive tests of lawfulness are met;  
2. The circumstances for the particular unilateral act are claimed to be appropriate; and 
3. The act despite its procedural irregularities, has complied with the relevant substantive 
requirements of lawfulness;
140
 
4. The pertinent question is whether the legal system in any circumstance allows unilateral 
action and whether the particular unilateral action in question has complied with the 
substantive requirements.  They argue that the only important thing is the substantive 
rules. 
Can the compliance of AU/ECOWAS with the substantive criteria for humanitarian 
intervention cure the procedural defects of noncompliance with articles 53 (the need for 
UNSC authorisation) and 103 (the obligation not to enter into treaties inconsistent with the 
Charter)?
141
 Critics argue that 
[n]o matter how noble a cause may be, actions taken in the common interest but without 
formal authorisation could have incalculable public and private costs and this explains 
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why the law frowns at … legally unauthorised actions no matter how urgent the 
circumstances or morally imperative the impulse.
142
 
Such that  
even where it is sometimes clear that the formal decision-maker is failing in responding 
to a situation with grave consequences, some scholars still insist that the good intentions 
notwithstanding, greater systemic injury will be caused by the prospective unilateral 
action than by the failure of the designated decision maker to respond adequately.
143
  
However, how often states or regional organisations like AU/ECOWAS will undertake 
RHMI or enter into treaties of intervention outside the UN framework depends on how 
effective the UNSC responds to mass atrocities because ‗…the less effective the system, the 
more the impulse for and use of unilateral action and vice versa.‘144  But who determines 
when the current law on humanitarian intervention is ineffective?  This has been the main 
obstacle to reforming the legal order. My research draws on case study to answer the 
question: has the response of the UNSC to use of force to protect human rights especially in 
Africa been effective?  If not, is it enough grounds for unilateral acts by regional 
organisations like AU/ECOWAS?  How should such devolution of powers be pursued, within 
or without the UN framework?   
Four Categories of Constitutive Process: 
 
1. Constitutive process without hierarchical institutions of decision: this is likened to the 
Hobbesian state of nature and the pre-League of Nations era where might was right and 
‗the strong do what they will and the weak suffer what they must‘. 
2. Constitutive process in which there are hierarchical institutions which are manifestly 
ineffective: this type of legal system has a constitutive document with hierarchical 
decision-making institutions but in reality, de jure power is wielded by outside actors, 
such as the League of Nations. 
3. Constitutive process in which the hierarchical institutions are generally effective, but 
prove to be ineffective in applying particular norms such as the UNSC and the use of 
force to protect human rights under the Charter. In a legal system with this defect, 
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unilateral acts are usually allowed to fill the lacuna and an example is article 51 on self-
defence which was designed as a temporary exception to the use of force. 
4. Constitutive process in which hierarchical institutions are highly effective and as such 
unilateral acts are unjustified.
145
 
 
Under the first, unilateral action was not just legal, it was the only rule because the legal 
system had no hierarchical institution effective or not.  Under the second and third, there is a 
contest over the legality or otherwise of unilateral action because the body to which the 
constitutive process has assigned the primary authority (such as the UNSC on the use of 
force) has failed or is incapable of exercising it when needed.  With the coming of the League 
of Nations states attempted to create the second type of constitutive process by transferring 
their rights to use force to the body but with limitations that weakened the body until it failed 
and the system reverted back to type 1.  
Under the Charter, states created type 4 by surrendering the right to use force 
exclusively to the UNSC which was to act on the principle of collective security for the 
protection of all.  To the extent that UNSC was effective in the use of force to protect human 
rights, unilateral action is illegal under international law.  However, the veto had 
incapacitated the UNSC and having failed in several cases to exercise its authority to use 
force to protect human rights, the system reverted back and now fluctuates between types 2 
and 3 pushing states to seek unilateral arrangements outside the UN framework to protect 
human rights.
146
 
The above process has been facilitated by the rapid changes in the international 
system which has seen a broadening of the legal space with new and varied participants in the 
international constitutive process such as NGOs and other actors. These new actors have 
internationalised and re-characterised human rights from mere aspirational norms to norms of 
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jus cogens worthy of international protection.
147
  But widespread violations continued and as 
the veto paralysed UNSC enforcement decisions, unilateral use of force became legal under 
the transformed constitutive process of the international legal order.  Because the current 
international legal order is transformed, procedural constraints such as articles 24 and 53 are 
inoperative and only substantive rules (such as the principles regulating humanitarian 
intervention) count.
148
 
However, this theory‘s limitation is that it implies using different parameters for 
determining the legality of different unilateral acts based on their objectives.
149
 ‗Legal realists 
like Reisman provide a conception of the legal process that dissolves the distinction between 
legality and legitimacy.‘150 The AU/ECOWAS treaties attempt to resolve this by its 
humanitarian intervention legal framework under which the legality question is answered 
before rather than after the fact.
151
  Further, if the AU/ECOWAS models are adopted, they 
will be an improvement on the current international constitutive process by trying to revert it 
back to type 4 where it becomes effective and unilateral action once again becomes 
unnecessary and illegal. The perceived illegality of unilateral action arises from failure to 
comply with procedural requirements under the Charter but since the substantive criteria are 
satisfied, the unilateral act is legitimate and as far as the enforcement of human rights are 
concerned, the current constitutive process is type 3 under which failure to comply with 
procedural criteria are irrelevant for purposes of the validity of unilateral interventions.
152
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1.6 AU/ECOWAS HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION LAW V ARTICLES 2(4), 
53(1) AND 103 OF THE UN CHARTER 
 
Article 4(h) of the AU Act, article 25 of the ECOWAS MCPMRPS Protocol and paragraphs 
46 and 52 of the ECOWAS Framework empower the organisations to intervene in the 
internal affairs of their members on humanitarian grounds.  This is in conflict with article 
2(4) of the Charter which forbids the use of force.  Article 16 of the AUPSC Protocol gives 
the ‗primary responsibility‘ for the maintenance of peace and security in Africa to the AU 
contrary to article 24 of the UN Charter which gives that role to the UNSC.
153
  This seems to 
suggest that the AU/ECOWAS do not require UNSC approval before undertaking 
enforcement action and this is contrary to article 53 of the UN Charter.  Apparently, the 
combined effect of articles 4(h) and (j) of AU Act; 4(j) and (k), 6(d), 7(c)–(g), 16(1), 17(1), 
(2), of AUPSC Protocol is that the AU does not require UNSC authorisation for its 
enforcement actions.  This apparently violates article 103 of the Charter and some writers 
have concluded that ‗…any treaty purporting to authorise states to use force against another 
state without its contemporaneous consent necessarily violates article 2(4) and therefore also 
Article 103. …‘ and such treaty, it is argued, must be declared void.154  Similarly, in the 
second edition of the Commentary on Article 103, Bernhardt puts it more poignantly: 
If the members of a regional arrangement, … agree that in case of internal disturbances 
or other events within one of the States concerned, the other States can intervene with 
military forces without the consent of the de jure or de facto government, the 
compatibility of such a special agreement with the Charter becomes doubtful and must, 
in principle be denied. Here, the territorial integrity of all States and the prohibition of 
the use of force is at stake. An agreement permitting forceful intervention would hardly 
be compatible with the Charter and would fall under Article 103.
155
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Other writers however argue that when states intervene to protect human rights on the basis 
of a treaty of intervention, in so far as they act in accordance with the ‗will of the state 
expressed in the consent‘ UNSC approval is not needed and such states are in fact, giving 
effect to UN purposes.
156
  This type of intervention does not come within the ambit of 
Chapter VIII because it derives its legality from the prior express consent of the concerned 
state.
157
  Yoram Dinstein on the other hand argues that article 2(4) is only concerned with 
interstate rather than intra-state conflicts and since article 4(h) deals with intra-state conflicts 
it falls outside the scope of article 2(4).
158
  Moreover he cites article 2(7) which precludes UN 
from intervening in the internal affairs of member states.
159
  
However, the problem with this approach to the legality question is that it 
unnecessarily concedes the moral validity (even if not legal validity) of current international 
law on humanitarian intervention.  Also, it implies that the Charter and the UN are the only 
forums for law reform and this could undermine the possible reform impact of regional 
humanitarian intervention law practice and norms on the use of force under the Charter.  
Further, it seems to assume that humanitarian intervention under the Charter is illegal 
whereas the scope of the prohibition in article 2(4) is still a subject of debate. 
Some other writers have taken a more cautious approach to reconciling the 
AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes with the UN Charter and the current international law on 
humanitarian intervention reform without necessarily addressing the question of whether such 
regional treaties are valid.
160
 Others like Stromseth argue that codification would resolve the 
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tension between sovereignty and human rights and the ‗illegal but legitimate‘ dilemma.161 
But by offering other justifications, these approaches presuppose that the existing law or rule 
is good and does not need improvement. I do not accept this. The current international law on 
humanitarian intervention is not serving the most fundamental normative values of the 
international legal system (peace and security and human rights) effectively which makes 
reform imperative.  
From the review of authorities above, it is clear that besides having not attracted 
significant academic attention, the few writers who have written on the AU/ECOWAS 
treaties have either been quick to dismiss the treaties as illegal, null and void, or those that 
support the legality argument see it as codification of existing regional norms.  Those who 
argue that the treaties are invalid have tested the legality by applying mainly the Charter law, 
while those who support the treaties relied basically on regional customary international law 
and the ‗benefit‘ argument. But none of these approaches satisfy the twin requirements of 
meeting the test of legality and also showing need for moral improvement that the treaties 
seek to bring to the law on humanitarian intervention.   
For one, those opposing the legality of the AU/ECOWAS treaties argue that the laws 
are invalid because they violate international law, but they do not discount their reform 
potentials for international humanitarian intervention law in general and R2P implementation 
in particular. Nor do they prescribe how else to achieve the object of halting egregious human 
rights violations without changing the rules these laws now seek to change albeit through 
illegal reform. Their argument is therefore the same as the pluralists in international relations 
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and the restrictionists of international law, preferring order over justice and sovereignty over 
human security. 
1.7 UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW  
 
There is controversy about whether there is sufficient state practice of unauthorised 
humanitarian intervention by states or regional organisations in the post-Charter era to be   
viewed as modifying article 2(4).
162
  In relation to AU/ECOWAS, the validity argument can 
be viewed from two perspectives in relation to customary international law.  First, did the 
treaties codify an existing regional customary international law
163
 or are they evidence of an 
emerging norm of regional humanitarian intervention in Africa?
164
  To answer these 
questions, it will be important to determine the ingredients for the formation of a regional 
customary international law and then examine the AU/ECOWAS practice.
165
 I draw a 
distinction between widespread practice required to form general customary international law 
and the principle of law that where a practice is not general enough, it could still constitute 
‗local or regional customary rule.‘166 It is trite that such rule constitutes customary law 
binding on a limited number of states usually a particular geographical region on the basis of 
lex specialis derodat legi generali.
167
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1.8 RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND AU/ECOWAS TREATIES: A 
CONVERGENCE OF PURPOSES? 
 
The research gives a brief historical background and contends that the responsibility to 
protect
168
 as conceived by the ICISS in 2001 has been weakened under the World Summit 
Outcome Document of 2005
169
 demanding a different implementation framework.
170
 For 
example, the WSOD jettisoned the criteria for intervention which includes the threshold and 
precautionary principles.  It sets a higher threshold for UNSC use of force and also eliminates 
intervention without UNSC authorisation.
171
 There is also no legal duty on the international 
community to intervene.
172
 
1.8.1 Requirements for the Implementation of the Responsibility to React Component of 
R2P 
 
The research focuses on the responsibility to react by use of force under R2P and as Gareth 
Evans points out, there are three challenges to the implementation of R2P—conceptual, 
institutional and political.
173
  At the conceptual level, forging a consensus on the concept at 
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the World Summit saw the key elements of the doctrine as conceived by ICISS compromised.  
But my thesis argues here that the essential norms of R2P converge with the AU/ECOWAS 
treaty law provisions on war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.
174
 What role 
should regional organisations play in the implementation of R2P? 
One of the political challenges for R2P will be the issue of authority: deciding to use 
force where necessary and how to overcome the dangers posed by the veto.  The US has 
rejected any attempt to circumscribe the use of the veto under any circumstances or to impose 
a positive duty on the UN to intervene.
175
  This has already played out in Darfur where both 
Russia and China threatened to use the veto.  The proposal by ICISS that the P5 should limit 
the use of the veto in R2P cases where their vital national interest is not at stake is unrealistic 
and instead recommends a theory of regional responsibility to protect.
176
 
1.8.2 Available Mechanisms under International Law/UN Charter   
 
At the UN level, four major documents are related to R2P among which the WSOD is the 
most authoritative.
177
  Paragraphs 138 and 139 of the WSOD provides the legal framework 
for R2P implementation and I will argue that by limiting use of force for human rights 
protection to Chapters VI, VII and VIII arrangements under the Charter, the WSOD is a mere 
restatement of Charter position and demonstrates the impossibility of achieving a consensus 
within the UN framework compared to a regional approach.
178
 Can the current UN 
enforcement mechanism deliver on the implementation of the responsibility to react 
component of R2P considering that many states are still wary of the doctrine and its 
implications for their sovereignty and nonintervention? Could a regional approach utilising 
                                                          
174
 See AU Act, article 4(h); AUPSC Protocol, article 13. 
175
 Letter from Ambassador John Bolton to UN Member States conveying U.S. amendments to the Draft 
Outcome Document being prepared for the High Level Event on Responsibility to Protect‘ available at 
<http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/US_Boltonletter_R2P_30Aug05[1].pdf> (accessed 15 May 2010). 
176
 Richard Falk, ‗Humanitarian intervention: Elite and critical perspectives‘ (Winter/Spring 2005)7:1/2 Global 
Dialogue available at <http://www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=329> (accessed 20 April 1020). 
177
 Stahn ‗Political rhetoric or emerging legal norm‘ op cit note 150 at 102. 
178
 Kenya is often cited as the first test of R2P (though it is the preventive component), and it iss agreed that it 
was made possible because it was pursued largely within an African framework with the support of other global 
actors. 
 
 
36 
the AU/ECOWAS legal framework be useful alternative?
179
  Given that regions vary in their 
security arrangements and capacities, how will this proposal deal with regions without such 
treaty arrangements or where such arrangements are weak like IGAD and ASEAN?  
1.8.3 Legal and Theoretical Framework for Humanitarian Intervention and R2P under 
AU/ECOWAS 
 
By their intervention treaties, the AU/ECOWAS provide, at least in theory, the legal 
framework that could be adopted to implement R2P.
180
  It is expected that the collective 
security provisions for the preservation of life and property, early warning arrangements for 
timely response, decision-making processes, and the human rights criteria for membership, 
can be effective if use of force is needed for R2P.
181
 However, these regional organisations 
face a lot of challenges including financial, planning, doctrinal capacity and so on.
182
 There is 
unanimity that the AU could enjoy legitimacy and support if it can develop the capacity to 
intervene on the continent.
183
 While the AU/ECOWAS treaties make it clear that they can 
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for enforcement. See Ramesh Thakur ‗Iraq and the Responsibility to Protect‘ (Winter/Spring 2005) 7:1-2 Global 
Dialogue available at <www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=327> (accessed on 28 June 2010), arguing that 
where the UNSC and the United Nations General Assembly fail to act, regional organisations should be able to 
intervene. 
180
 Greg Puley ‗The Responsibility to Protect: East, West and Southern African perspectives on preventing and 
responding to humanitarian crises‘ Project  Ploughshares Working Paper no. 5, September 2005 at 4 available at 
<http://www.Ploughshares.ca/libraries/WorkingPapers/wp005.pdf.> (accessed on 12 April 2010). 
181
  Within the UNSC and under present law, there is no legal, but a moral obligation to act and even so, it has 
been selective, but ‗… humanitarian imperative would entail an obligation to treat all victims similarly and react 
to all crises consistently. …‘ See Thomas G Weiss ‗The sunset of humanitarian intervention? The Responsibility 
to Protect in a unipolar world‘ (2004) 35 Security Dialogue 135 at 147.  The advantages of regional 
organisations in humanitarian intervention operations includes: (1) Greater legitimacy among belligerents (2) 
Knowledge of root causes and the combatants gives opportunity for resolution (3) Proximity to conflicts 
enhances rapid deployment (4) In better position to reduce or control potential spoilers (5) The interest to avoid 
spill over makes them more likely to intervene and stay the cse (6) It is likely the only option to the UNSC. See 
Gorman ‗The implications of regional peace operations‘ op cit note 118 at 2. 
182
 Taft & Ladnier ‗Realizing ―Never Again‖‘ op cit note 51 at 16. 
183
 Alex Bellamy ‗Responsibility to Protect or Trojan horse? The crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention 
after Iraq‘ (2006) 19 Ethics and International Affairs 31. See Kioko ‗The right of intervention under the African 
Union‘s Constitutive Act‘ op cit note 160 at 821, asserting that when the question of whether the AU would 
seek UNSC approval for intervention was raised at the drafting of the AU Act, ‗it was dismissed out of hand‘ 
showing the frustrations at the preference given to crisis elsewhere while Africa‘s more pressing crises are 
neglected.  
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take RHMI action unilaterally in Africa, it remains to be seen how this will play out in 
practice in relation to the UN.
184
  In view of the Ezulwini Consensus, the question therefore 
arises, in the event of a humanitarian crisis in which AU/ECOWAS and the UNSC indicate 
interest to intervene, who takes precedence?  Do these treaties amount to Africa‘s attempt to 
renegotiate the Treaty of San Francisco or ‗redraft‘ articles 2(4), 24, 53 and 103?185 
1.9 HYPOTHESES 
 
That the AU/ECOWAS treaties are valid because they are backed by the moral theory of 
Illegal International Legal Reform and Legal Realist theory of transformations of world 
constitutive process, and since a useful legal framework for implementing the use of force 
component of R2P has been difficult to achieve, a theory of regional responsibility to protect 
based on the AU/ECOWAS legal and theoretical framework should be adopted for the 
operationalisation of R2P in Africa. 
1.10 METHODOLOGY 
 
The thesis will rely essentially on primary and secondary sources: relevant treaties and 
legislative documents, case law and learned publications both hard and electronic versions.  
Theoretical illustrations will be drawn from contemporary cases which will be useful in 
synthesizing extant principles to realise the objective of the thesis: providing a legal and 
theoretical explanation for the validity of the AU/ECOWAS treaties and their adoption for 
R2P implementation.  
The selection of the cases studied was guided by three criteria: first, they were all 
African crises to underscore the assertion that the UNSC has not been very effective in its 
response to crises in Africa. Secondly, the level of the mass atrocities and humanitarian crises 
involved were such that they reached the threshold of genocide in Rwanda and Darfur, or 
would probably have reached that threshold but for the intervention of regional organisations. 
Thirdly, there was no UN intervention at all or where there was intervention it was 
                                                          
184
 Louis Fawcett ‗Evolving architecture of regionalization‘ in Michael Pugh & Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu (eds) 
The United Nations and Regional Security: Europe and Beyond  (2003) 13.  
185
 See generally, Rosemary Durward ‗Security Council authorisation for regional peacekeeping operations‘ 
(2006) 13:3 International Peacekeeping 350. 
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abandoned with the exception of Libya which was included in the study because of its 
contemporary relevance as the first R2P intervention. 
The rationale for choosing two treaties rather than one without necessarily engaging 
in a comparative analysis lay in the fact that whereas in examining the AU Act, I am able to 
capture Darfur (post-ICISS and  contemporary but outside the ECOWAS jurisdiction) as a 
test case, but in examining ECOWAS, I am also able to draw on its innovations, provisions 
and intervention precedents in the African context to explain the new dimensions in  African 
humanitarian intervention legal regime and the normative and practical significance for the 
doctrine of R2P and the international legal order. 
To the extent that the provisions relating to humanitarian intervention in the AU Act 
and AUPSC Protocol are similar to those in the ECOWAS MCPMRPS Protocol as analysed 
in this study, I found it useful and convenient to refer to the AU and ECOWAS jointly as 
‗AU/ECOWAS‘ and deal with both simultaneously. From a theoretical point of view, except 
where necessary, the distinction between the AU as a regional body and ECOWAS as a sub-
regional body is not drawn and both are regarded as regional arrangements as used in Chapter 
VIII of the UN Charter.   
1.11  SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
 
Humanitarian intervention is a broad and controversial subject criss-crossing the disciplines 
of international law, international relations, political science, and philosophy and so on. The 
emerging norm of responsibility to protect is no less so even though it apparently has 
gathered a lot of momentum in its short life. This thesis is not intended to study humanitarian 
intervention as a doctrine; rather, it is focused mainly on specific humanitarian intervention 
provisions of the treaties of two regional organisations–the African Union and the Economic 
Community of West African States; and the validity of such provisions under current 
international law.   
However, to achieve this objective, the thesis looks at how the doctrine has been 
applied or not applied in the past by states, the UNSC and regional organisations and the 
effect this has had on the legitimacy of the UN and international law. The focus is Africa 
though examples are drawn from outside the continent as well. This thesis is not concerned 
with whether or not the AU/ECOWAS provisions would eventually be efficacious, or how 
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well they will stem the tide of humanitarian crises on the continent. It will not evaluate the 
success or failure of these provisions. It will mainly advance theoretical arguments in defense 
of the legality of the treaties. Beyond the above, the thesis explores the benefits the treaties 
could provide for the current law on humanitarian intervention. The thesis does not consider 
the whole gamut of the R2P norm.  This focus is further elaborated in the chapter outline 
below. The thesis does not discuss the AU and ECOWAS as regional organisations per se or 
their institutional arrangements. I focused on testing the legal validity of specific provisions 
of particular AU and ECOWAS treaties which are similar in certain respects. However, even 
though this is not a comparative study, where necessary, distinctions will be highlighted.  
1.12 LIMITATION OF THE STUDY 
 
This study does not attempt to prescribe a whole range of legal schema for the 
implementation of R2P in Africa, for that will require another PhD thesis. Rather, this study 
takes on the challenge of the ‗legal validity question‘ in the belief that significant progress in 
implementation of R2P through the AU/ECOWAS framework will not be possible so long as 
the frameworks continue to be hounded by a fundamental question about its validity under 
international law. The study therefore outlines the contours of the normative incompatibility 
between the Charter regime and the AU/ECOWAS framework, tackles the theoretical issues 
involved, and shows why these treaties are valid and their potential utility. Though I suggest 
a paradigm arising from my discussion of the theoretical issues, the broader question of 
crafting a full schema for implementation based on this theoretical analysis is not fully 
engaged and would therefore be an area for further research. While much effort was made to 
update the materials, cases and developments in the law as the thesis progressed, this effort is 
also limited by the realisation that international law is in a constant flux particularly in 
relation to one of its major sources—customary law, as demonstrated by state practice. In 
view of the developments in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in the period during 
which this study was undertaken, only the events in Libya was included in this research for 
the important reason that it was the only case that resulted in UNSC-authorised intervention 
with an R2P dimension. 
1.13 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
There has been very little written on the AU/ECOWAS RHMI framework and even less on 
the possibility of adopting them for the implementation of R2P with the exception of Dan 
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Kuwali‘s recent publication. The reason for this intellectual apathy is not clear. Perhaps, it is 
partially attributable to the common misconception surrounding the legal validity of the 
provisions of these treaties under current international law. Perhaps it is due to the radical 
reforms they seek to introduce in relation to the law on humanitarian intervention, the 
relationship between African regional organisations and the UNSC, and certain fundamental 
norms of international law. That is why this study is even more imperative in order to 
examine the legal validity question in the hope that should I be able to contribute to its 
eventual resolution one way or another, I will have advanced the search for a legal framework 
for the implementation of R2P, at least, in Africa. 
This thesis sets out to achieve three objectives: first, is to advance arguments for 
holding the AU/ECOWAS legal framework legally valid under international law. Secondly, 
and related to this, it is hoped that upholding the validity of these provisions under 
international law means that they could now be deployed for the operationalisation of R2P in 
Africa. Thirdly, it is hoped that it will also draw attention to these provisions than they have 
attracted until now as a way of stimulating further research in the area. If these objectives are 
achieved then this study will have achieved its main objectives. 
1.14 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY 
 
(a) Chapter 1  
 
This chapter is an overview of the thesis. Further, it provides a general background for the 
succeeding chapters. It sets out the framework for the interrogation to be undertaken in the 
research, its main focus and the research tools to be utilised in realising the objectives of the 
study. It gives a brief discussion of the theoretical framework to be employed and the 
structure of the research. Finally, it highlights the potential benefits of the study. 
(b) Chapter 2 
 
This chapter discusses the evolution of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention in three 
periods: first, a brief historical account of classical writings and state practice of the doctrine 
is given to show its origin. Second, a discussion of the doctrine in the pre-Charter era is given 
to highlight the legal position of the doctrine in international law before the advent of the 
Charter.  The chapter concludes with an examination of four international law norms under 
 
 
41 
the Charter that have direct bearing on humanitarian intervention and the AU/ECOWAS 
treaties. 
(c) Chapter 3 
 
This chapter examines the effectiveness of UNSC with respect to humanitarian intervention 
in Africa by drawing on UN post-Cold War interventions in the 1990s. It looks at how the 
failures of the UN actually set the stage for the emergence of the AU/ECOWAS as regional 
humanitarian interveners and how the lessons of those interventions led to the new 
AU/ECOWAS RHMI legal regime.  
(d) Chapter 4 
 
Against the backdrop of the ineffectiveness of the UN and current international law in the 
protection of human rights in Africa already discussed in chapter 3, chapter 4 focuses on a 
deconstruction of the AU/ECOWAS regional humanitarian intervention legal provisions. 
Four main areas of normative incompatibility are discussed. The chapter concludes with an 
examination of specific provisions of the AU Constitutive Act, the ECOWAS Protocols 
relating to humanitarian intervention vis-à-vis the UN Charter.   
(e) Chapter 5 
 
Here, I employ Michael Reisman‘s theory of transformation of world constitutive process to 
address the normative conflict between the UN Charter and the AU/ECOWAS treaties in 
order to determine the validity or otherwise of the latter from a legal perspective. 
(f) Chapter 6 
 
This chapter addresses the question of validity of the AU/ECOWAS treaties from a legal 
reform perspective. I rely on Allen Buchannan‘s theory of illegal international legal reform as 
a theoretical framework in analysing the validity of the AU/ECOWAS regimes. Drawing on 
my case studies in the preceding chapters, the inadequacies of current law on humanitarian 
intervention in dealing with humanitarian crises in Africa, and the problems of reforming 
international law in this respect, this chapter discusses the validity of the AU/ECOWAS 
regimes as a process of illegal international legal reform.  
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(g) Chapter 7 
 
In this chapter, the validity of the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes is subjected to further legal 
validity test under conventional international law and customary international law. 
 
(h) Chapter 8  
 
Having concluded my analyses on the validity question in the preceding chapters, this 
concluding chapter proposes that the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes be adopted for the 
implementation of the responsibility to react under R2P. I propose a theory of regional 
responsibility to protect (RR2P) based on the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes. To achieve this 
I call for a recalibration of the R2P schema and a redistribution of authority between the 
UNSC and AU/ECOWAS.  
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CHAPTER 2: MEANING AND DEVELOPMENT OF HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter briefly tracks the debate and the different stages of the normative evolution of 
the doctrine of humanitarian intervention and relevant international law norms that impact the 
doctrine. The purpose is to set out the scope and significance of humanitarian intervention as 
a broad context within which to explore the legal validity of the AU/ECOWAS humanitarian 
intervention treaties in international law.   
2.1.1 Meaning and Scope of Humanitarian Intervention 
It is pertinent to begin with a definition of our subject, not just because the term 
‗intervention‘ is a broader concept than ‗humanitarian intervention‘, but because the latter has 
been applied to different situations at different times making a precise definition an onerous 
task. For a long time, the word ‗intervention‘ did not have a technical meaning and was often 
used interchangeably with ‗interference‘, ‗interposition‘ and so on. Hence the term is a 
relatively modern development.
1
 The doctrine of ‗humanitarian intervention‘ can be seen as a 
subset of the concept of ‗intervention‘.2 ‗Intervention‘ has been defined as the ‗dictatorial 
interference by a State [or group of States] in the affairs of another State for the purpose of 
maintaining or altering the actual conditions of things.‘3  
 
Hedley Bull defines the term in similar words thus ‗[i]ntervention is the dictatorial or 
coercive interference by an outside party or parties in the sphere of jurisdiction of a sovereign 
state. It may be forcible or non-forcible intervention.‘4 I am however concerned with 
                                                          
1
 P H Winfield ‗The history of intervention in international law‘ (1922-23) 3 British Yearbook of International 
Law 130 at 136 (hereafter Winfield ‗The history of intervention‘). 
2
 Ibid at 132. Even mere opinions expressed by states have been regarded as amounting to intervention. See 
Winfield cites Westlake International Law (1904) Pt 1 at 307 to argue that though such opinion may be 
improper it does not constitute intervention in international law. Winfield believes that mere statement can at 
best amount to peaceful intervention which must be distinguished from ‗dictatorial intervention‘. See Winfield 
‗The history of intervention‘ op cit note 1 at 141. It is still not uncommon today, however, to hear state leaders 
condemn statements by foreign governments as undue interference in their internal affairs. 
3
 See Jean-Pierre L Fonteyne ‗The customary international law doctrine of humanitarian intervention: its current 
validity under the UN Charter‘ (1974) 4 California Western International Law Journal 203 at 204 note 4 
(hereafter Fonteyne ‗The customary international law doctrine‘).  
4
 Hedley Bull ‗Introduction‘ in Hedley Bull (ed) Intervention in World Politics (1984) 1-6 at 1 (hereafter Bull 
‗Intervention in World Politics‘). This definition was also upheld by the ICJ in Case Concerning the Military 
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (Merits) 
Judgment of 27 June 1986 ICJ Rep 14 at 107-8.  
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intervention by the use of armed force for the protection of human rights. According to 
Stowell humanitarian intervention is ‗[t]he justifiable use of force for the purpose of 
protecting the inhabitants of another State from treatments which is so arbitrary and 
persistently abusive as to exceed the limits within which the sovereign is presumed to act 
with reason and justice.
5
 Verwey defines it as  
the threat or use of force by a state or states abroad, for the sole purpose of preventing or 
putting a halt to a serious violations of fundamental human rights, in particular the right to life 
of persons, regardless of their nationality, such protection taking place neither upon 
authorization by relevant organs of the United Nations nor with the permission by the 
legitimate government of the target state.
6
  
Although in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, humanitarian intervention was mainly 
undertaken by single states or group of states in Europe, international and regional 
organisations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Organisation of American 
States (OAS), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU now AU) and ECOWAS have also 
carried out humanitarian intervention in recent times. Thus, Brownlie‘s definition of the 
doctrine as ‗[t]he threat or use of armed force by a state, a belligerent community, or an 
international organisation with the object of protecting human rights‘, is to be preferred in 
this respect.
7
 This view is also shared by Kofi Abiew who opines that 
humanitarian intervention refers primarily to forcible means employed by a state, group of 
states, an international or regional organization, or humanitarian agencies with the aim (or at 
least one of its principal aims) of ending egregious human rights violations perpetrated by 
governments, or preventing or alleviating human suffering in situations of internal conflicts.
8
 
This definition seems too broad by including ‗humanitarian agencies‘ but it does highlight the 
objections by such bodies as the International Committee of the Red Cross on the abuse of 
the term and the continuing debate about the humanitarianism of bombing to save lives.
9
 
Humanitarian intervention has also been defined as the ‗coercive action by one or more states 
involving the use of armed force in another state without the consent of its authorities, and 
                                                          
5
 See Fonteyne ‗The customary international law doctrine‘ op cit note 3 at 204. 
6
 Wil Verwey ‗Legality of humanitarian intervention after the Cold War‘ in Elizabeth G Ferris (ed) Challenge to 
Intervene: A New Role for the United Nations (1992) 113-22 at at 114 (hereafter Verwey ‗Legality of 
humanitarian intervention‘). 
7
 See Ian Brownlie ‗Humanitarian intervention‘ in J N Moore (ed) Law and Civil War in the Modern World 
(1974) 217 (hereafter Brownlie ‗Humanitarian intervention‘). 
8
 Kofi Francis Abiew The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention (1999) 18. 
(hereafter Abiew ‗The Evolution of the Doctrine‘). 
9
 ‗There may be few concepts in international law today which are as conceptually obscure and legally 
controversial‘ as the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. See Verwey Legality of humanitarian intervention 
op cit note 6 at 114. 
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with the purpose of preventing widespread suffering or death among the inhabitants.‘10 To 
Fernando Teson, the doctrine means ‗the proportionate transboundary help, including forcible 
help, provided by governments to individuals in another state who are being denied basic 
human rights and who themselves would be rationally willing to revolt against their 
oppressive government.‘11 Apparently this definition attempts to include all the basic and 
traditional criteria for a valid act of humanitarian intervention.  From the above definitions, 
the elements of humanitarian intervention include (a) use of armed force (b) for purposes of 
protecting the target state‘s nationals from widespread violations of human rights (c) without 
the consent of the target state‘s government.  
There have been debates in the past as to whether the scope of the meaning of 
humanitarian intervention extends to the use of armed force by a State to rescue its own 
nationals abroad.
12
 Some writers have treated the principle as an extension of the right of self-
defence well established in customary international law and also recognised in article 51 of 
the UN Charter.
13
 Examples include the operation conducted by Israel at Entebe in Uganda, 
the 1964 invasion of Congo by Belgium, the United States and the United Kingdom. 
However, it is doubtful whether this can qualify as humanitarian intervention since the 
purpose of the intervention is the protection of a state‘s own nationals abroad. The right of 
such act would seem to flow more from the customary international law right of self-defence, 
of course, its legality or otherwise is a different issue.
14
  
2.3 STATE PRACTICE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION  
 
Notwithstanding the Crusades and the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries and other ear similar practices, it is believed that humanitarian intervention actually 
developed in the latter part of the nineteenth century.
15
 The interventions in this period were 
strongly linked to Christianity. At different times in the nineteenth century, major European 
                                                          
10
 Adam Roberts ‗The so-called right of humanitarian intervention‘ (2000) 3 Yearbook of International 
Humanitarian Law 3 at 5 (emphasis in original). 
11
 Fernando Teson Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality (1997) 5 (hereafter Teson 
‗Law and Morality‘).  
12
 See generally Natalino Ronzitti Rescuing Nationals Abroad through Military Coercion and Intervention on 
Grounds of Humanity (1985) (hereafter Ronzitti ‗Rescuing Nationals Abroad‘). 
13
 See for example, Sean D Murphy Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World 
(1996) at 15 (hereafter Murphy ‗The United Nations in an Evolving World‘). 
14
 Ibid at 361. 
15
 Fonteyne ‗The customary international law doctrine‘ op cit note 3 at 206. 
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Powers intervened in different European countries to protect Christians.
16
 It was only in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that the doctrine developed its defining features as an 
institution.
17
 I briefly discuss a few of these cases below.
18
 
2.3.1 The Intervention in Greece 1827-1830 
 
At this time, Greece was still a part of the Ottoman Empire presided over by the Porte or 
Sultan. Greeks were subjected to human rights abuses and many Greek Christians were 
massacred.
19
 This led Russia, Great Britain and France to conclude the Treaty of London on 6 
July 1827 in which they proposed that the Sultan grant the Greeks some degree of 
independence within the Ottoman Empire.
20
 The Sultan rejected the proposal insisting that 
the Greek issue was a matter within the domestic jurisdiction of his Empire.
21
 In reaction, 
Britain, France and Russia embarked on an armed intervention which led to the independence 
of Greece in 1830.
22
 Although some have doubted the precedential value of this case for a 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention, it is noteworthy that the intervening Powers did state in 
the London Treaty that they were motivated ‗no less by sentiments of humanity, than by 
interest for the tranquility of Europe.‘23  
2.3.2 Intervention in Syria 1860-1861 
 
Like Greece, Syria also formed part of the Ottoman Empire during this period. Owing to the 
massacres of thousands of Christians by the Muslim population, Great Britain, France, 
Prussia and Russia convened the Conference of Paris and signed a Protocol with Turkey on 3 
August 1860.
24
 The Protocol authorised France to intervene in Syria on behalf of the Concert 
of Europe in order to halt the atrocities and Turkey gave its consent to this intervention. A 
Commission was set up and the terms and duration of the French intervention was agreed 
                                                          
16
 See Nicholas Onuf ‗Humanitarian intervention: the early years‘ (2004) 16(4) Florida Journal of International 
Law 753 at 762. 
17Abiew ‗The Evolution of the Doctrine‘ op cit note 8 at 33. 
18
 For a detailed analysis of these cases of intervention in this period, see generally M Ganji International 
Protection of Human Rights (1962) 13-44. 
19
 Fonteyne ‗The customary international law doctrine‘ op cit note 3 at 207. 
20
 See Murphy ‗The United Nations in an Evolving World‘ op cit note 13 at 52.  
21
 Fonteyne ‗The customary international law doctrine‘ op cit note 13 at 207-8. 
22
 Id at 207 note 17. 
23
 Ibid at 208. 
24
 Id. 
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upon.
25
 There is unanimity that this particular intervention is an example of lawful 
humanitarian intervention where the motive was humanitarian and where the conditions of 
the use of force was spelt out in a prior legal instrument to which the parties were expected to 
abide.
26
 Although questions have been raised as to the voluntariness of the Sultan‘s consent 
and whether Turkey actually had a choice in the matter, it is significant that in keeping with 
the terms of disinterestedness and the Protocol, the French troops withdrew in 1861 after 
completing their mission.
27
 Hence even though Brownlie denies that a right of humanitarian 
intervention existed in state practice in the period before the UN Charter, he concedes that 
this one instance was an exception.
28
 
2.3.3 The Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgarian Intervention 1876-78 
 
As was the case in the other interventions carried out by European Powers in Turkey in that 
century,  the persecution of Christians was again at the  heart of the intervention of Italy, 
France, Great Britain, Germany and Russia in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria in order to 
protect the Christians from Turkish misrule.
29
  On 30 June 1876, Serbia and Montenegro had 
declared war on Turkey in view of its continued oppression of Christians in Bosnia, 
Herzegovina and Bulgaria.
30
 The European Powers then proposed an International 
Commission to oversee reforms agreed with Turkey at the Conference of Constantinople on 
these issues, but this proposal was rejected by the Porte.  
Italy, France, Germany, Russia, Great Britain and Austria-Hungary then signed the 
London Protocol of 31 March 1877 in which they declared their preparedness to take 
measures if Turkey failed to implement its undertakings under the 1856 Paris Treaty.
31
  
Turkey rejected these proposals and Russia declared war on Turkey. The war was eventually 
brought to an end by the San Stefano Treaty and the Berlin Congress in 1878 which 
guaranteed autonomy under a Christian government for Bulgaria and independence for Serbia 
                                                          
25
 The European Powers based the justification for the intervention on Article IX of the General Treaty of Paris 
signed on 30 March 1856 but the text of that provision does not reveal any ground for such justification. They 
were therefore by humanitarian considerations rather than the need to enforce the said treaty. See Fonteyne The 
customary international law doctrine op cit note 3 at 209. 
26
 Ian Brownlie International Law and the Use of Force by States (1963) 338 (hereafter Brownlie ‗Use of 
Force‘). 
27W Michael Reisman & Myres S McDougal ‗Humanitarian intervention to protect the Ibos‘ in Richard B 
Lillich ed Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations (1973) 181 (hereafter Reisman & McDougal 
‗Humanitarian intervention to protect the Ibos‘). 
28
 Fonteyne ‗The customary international law doctrine‘ op cit note 3 at 209. 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Ibid at 211. 
31
 Id. 
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and Montenegro and Rumania while Bosnia and Herzegovina were annexed by Austria-
Hungary.
32
 The other European Powers had maintained their neutrality during the war and the 
unilateral nature of the intervention thus left room for abuse.
33
 However, this does not remove 
the initial humanitarian motives of the intervention or of its general character though it does 
show the dangers inherent in the doctrine.
34
 
2.3.4 Intervention in Macedonia 1903-1908 and 1912-1913 
 
The Macedonians had risen against the Porte in 1903 and owing to the atrocities committed 
by the Porte in Macedonia, Austria-Hungary and Russia acting on the authority of the 
Concert of Europe impressed on the Porte to accept the Murzsteg Program which was 
designed to carry out reforms in Macedonia.
35
 The Program was to be overseen by Russian 
and Austrian diplomats and the Porte had actually begun the implementation before it was 
truncated by the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. The new rulers pursued a policy of 
―Turkification‖ of Macedonia in the most brutal ways, hence Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia 
declared war on Turkey. The war ended in the Treaty of London in 1913 under which most 
part of Macedonia was ceded to the Balkan Allies.
36
    
From the above cases, it is clear that the practice of the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention in the early stage of its development was largely a European affair. The brief 
sketch of the practice of states regarding the doctrine in the pre-Charter period shows that 
states felt that there was a right, and even an obligation to intervene in cases of atrocities on 
grounds of humanity.  Referring to Vattel, Winfield concludes:  
To him and those who came after him, ―the subject of how it is permitted to enter into a 
struggle between a sovereign and his subjects‖ meant something perfectly clear. They were 
simply stating, nay, strictly limiting the international usage of the eighteenth century, when 
they conferred upon a nation the right to aid a rebel or his government,—a right as real then 
as that of ambassadorial inviolability is now.
37
  
It can safely be concluded that states recognised a right of humanitarian intervention and this 
view was reflected and supported by the writings of jurist to which we now turn.  
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 Reisman & McDougal ‗Humanitarian intervention to protect the Ibos‘ op cit note 27 at 182. 
33
 Fonteyne ‗The customary international law doctrine‘ op cit note 3 at 213. 
34
 Id. 
35
 Id. 
36
 Fonteyne ‗The customary international law doctrine‘ op cit note 3 at 213. 
37
 Winfield ‗The history of intervention‘ op cit note 1 at 137. 
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2.4 The Opinion of Jurists on Humanitarian Intervention Before 1945 
As mentioned above, the origin of humanitarian intervention is closely linked with religious 
solidarity and early thinkers like St. Thomas Aquinas supported the right of states to 
intervene in other states to stop religious persecution. Vitoria states: 
If any of the native converts to Christianity be subjected to force or fear by their princes in 
order to make them return to idolatry, this would justify the Spaniards … in making war and 
in compelling the barbarians by force to stop such misconduct, … and in deposing rulers as in 
other just wars … . Suppose a large part of the Indians were converted to Christianity, and 
this whether it were done lawfully or unlawfully … so long as they really were Christians, the 
Pope might for a reasonable cause, either with or without a request from them give them a 
Christian Sovereign and depose their other unbelieving ruler.
38
 
In lending his weight to the doctrine, Hugo Grotius observes: 
The fact must be recognized that kings, and those who possess rights equal to kings, have the 
right of demanding punishments not only on account of injuries committed against 
themselves or their subjects, but also on accounts of injuries which do not affect them but 
excessively violates the law of nature or nations in regard to any persons whatsoever … Truly 
it is more honourable to avenge the wrongs of others rather than one‘s own, in the degree that 
in the case of one‘s own wrongs it is more to be feared that through a sense of personal 
suffering one may exceed the proper limit or at least prejudice his mind … Kings in addition 
to the particular care of their own state, are also burdened with a general responsibility for 
human society … The … most wide-reaching cause for undertaking wars on behalf of others 
is the mutual tie of kinship among men, which of itself affords sufficient grounds for 
rendering assistance.
39
 
In conclusion, Grotius states: 
There is also another question, whether a war for another‘s subjects be just, for the purpose of 
defending them from injuries by their ruler. Certainly it is undoubted that ever since civil 
society were formed, the rulers of each claimed some especial rights over his own subjects. … 
But … [i]f a tyrant… practices atrocities towards his subjects which no just man can approve, 
the right of human connexion is not cut off in such case. … [I]t would not follow that others 
may not take up arms for them. 
40
 
Towards mid-nineteenth century, growing nationalism began to entrench the notion of 
absolute sovereignty and non-intervention. This led to a normative clash with the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention in which various scholars of the time took different positions.
41
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Some publicists were not prepared to concede that a state had the right to intervene in other 
states on humanitarian grounds. For example, Kant argues that it is not possible to exercise 
such a right of humanitarian intervention without falling into the same mischief one was 
trying to halt and thereby endangering the entire state system.
42
 This assertion is predicated 
on the view that since action within a territory does not harm those outside it, it cannot give 
rise to a right of intervention by outside powers or states whose rights have not been affected 
by the said conduct.
43
 As will be shown in the next section, this view persisted throughout the 
Cold War period and only waned after 1990. 
Many writers in the late nineteenth century were strongly in support of the view of 
non-intervention.  It was only the sovereign who had authority over his subjects and could 
punish crimes by his subjects but such authority ended at the limit of the national 
boundaries.
44
 According to a commentator, 
[t]his [humanitarian] intervention is illegal because it constitutes an infringement upon the 
independence of States, because the powers that are not directly, immediately affected by 
these inhuman acts are not entitled to intervene. If the inhuman acts are committed against 
nationals of the country where they are committed, the powers are totally disinterested. The 
acts of inhumanity however condemnable they may  be, as long as they do not affect nor 
threaten the rights of other States, do not provide the latter with a basis for lawful 
intervention, as no State can stand up in judgment of the conduct of others. As long as they do 
not infringe upon the rights of the other powers or of their subjects, they remain the sole 
business of the nationals of the countries where they are committed.
45
 
Wide and sweeping assertions like the above were made about the principle of non-
intervention and absolute sovereignty.  ‗Internal oppression, however odious and violent it 
may be, does not affect, either directly or indirectly, external relations and does not endanger 
the existence of other States. Accordingly, it cannot be used as a legal basis for use of force 
and violent means.‘46 On the other extreme were those who believed that there was indeed a 
right of humanitarian intervention in international law. These writers based their argument on 
various grounds. Some believed that intervention was justifiable in the ‗general interest of 
humanity‘;47 arguing that: 
When a government, even acting within the limits of its rights of sovereignty, violates the 
laws of humanity, either by measures contrary to the interests of other States, or by excessive 
injustice or brutality which seriously injures our morals and civilization, the right of 
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intervention is legitimate. For, however worthy of respect the rights of independence and 
sovereignty of States may be, there is something even more worthy of respect, namely the law 
of humanity, or of human society, that must not be violated. In the same way as within the 
State freedom of the individual is and must be restricted by the law and the morals of society, 
the individual freedom of the States must be limited by the law of human society… I 
recognise right of intervention in an absolute way as against all States.
48
 
It was also argued that the practice was justifiable in the event of the violations of 
internationally recognised human rights in an internal conflict,
49
  
[t]here is general agreement that, by virtue of its personal and territorial supremacy, a 
State can treat its own nationals according to discretion. But there is a substantial 
body of opinion and of practice in support of the view that there are limits to that 
discretion and that when a State renders itself guilty of cruelties against and 
persecution of its nationals in such a way as to deny their fundamental rights and to 
shock the conscience of mankind, intervention in the interest of humanity is legally 
permissible.
50
 
Still, others offered religious grounds as a basis for humanitarian intervention.
51
 Woolsey 
writes ‗[I]nterference … can be justified … on … the … following [ground]: … [t]hat some 
extraordinary state of things is brought about by the crime of a government against its 
subjects.‘52  Such crimes could be the violation of international humanitarian law and where 
that is the case 
[i]naction and indifference of other States would constitute an egocentric policy contrary to 
the rights of all; for whoever violates international law to the disadvantage of anybody, 
violates it not only to the detriment of the person directly affected, but as against all civilized 
States.
53
  
On the other hand, there were writers who maintained a middle ground by proposing that 
although humanitarian intervention remained technically illegal, it was however permissible 
in certain circumstances in what they called the ‗double-level permissibility‘ test which could 
even be a ‗positive duty.‘54 This view discountenanced the fears of likelihood of abuse 
expressed by critics of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.
55
 At the end, it was the pro-
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intervention jurists that triumphed and ‗by the end of the nineteenth century, majority of 
publicists admitted that a right of humanitarian intervention … existed.‘56  It is interesting to 
note how many of the views expressed by these writers still resonate today in the current 
debates on humanitarian intervention–the requirement of trans-border effects as a condition 
for humanitarian intervention, the question of threshold, the debate on whether there should 
be a ‗positive duty‘ to intervene (responsibility to protect) on the international community, 
who has authority to intervene and so on. These issues are taken up in succeeding chapters. 
2.5 HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION UNDER THE UN CHARTER: THREE 
NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS 
 
One of the most important developments of the last century was the adoption of the United 
Nations Charter which brought about important changes in inter-state relations on the one 
hand and the relationship between citizens and national governments on the other. The 
atrocities of World War II showed the weaknesses of the League of Nations and the many 
incongruities between providing for human rights protection in theory and the reality of 
prevalence of abuses. This reality is not necessarily better under the UN Charter that 
succeeded the League Covenant. As a result certain principles were included in the Charter as 
the anchor of the new post-war international legal order: the principles of state sovereignty 
and non-interference, sovereign equality of states and non-use of force. 
Thus, the drafters of the Charter seem to realise the linkage and interdependence of 
human rights and international peace and security by providing that member states and the 
UN work together to protect and promote human rights and international peace and 
security.
57
 These provisions have influenced the practice and debates on the legal status of 
humanitarian intervention since 1945.
58
 Given the institutional and structural deficiencies of 
the international legal system, the interpretation of the Charter has been problematic and the 
legal status of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention under the Charter even more so. The 
whole issue revolves round the seeming contradiction between the Charter principles of non-
use of force, state sovereignty and non-intervention on the one hand, and the duty to protect 
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human rights, and the failure of the UN to develop a mechanism of collective security as 
originally envisaged under article 43 of the Charter on the other. A possible explanation for 
this is the Cold War politics that engulfed the UN and which greatly circumscribed its 
effectiveness especially its principal political organ—the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) throughout the first fifty years of its existence. The linchpins were the principles of 
equality of states, state sovereignty and non-use of force.  
In order to analyse the unique character and novelty of the AU/ECOWAS treaty 
provisions the validity of which is my concern in this thesis, it is imperative at the outset to 
examine these three fundamental norms and situate their meanings in current international 
law, not just because they impact the debate on humanitarian intervention and the emerging 
doctrine of the responsibility to protect (R2P), but also because the argument for or against 
the validity of the AU/ECOWAS humanitarian intervention regime are also influenced by 
these norms.  
For example, the inherent contradictions in the principle of equality of states as 
espoused by the Charter on the one hand and the reality of state inequalities also legalised in 
the same Charter (by granting permanent seat on the UNSC to a select few) have impacted on 
the ineffectiveness of the UNSC and the erosion of its legitimacy in its practice of 
humanitarian intervention. Also, the principle of sovereignty and non-interference represent 
the foremost defence of states to any external scrutiny of their human rights records and also 
serve as a barrier to external intervention in matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of states. 
It is the legal basis of granting or withholding consent to external intervention. Finally, the 
prohibition of the use of force is a fundamental norm that challenges any treaty arrangement 
amongst states that rely on the use of force as a means of settlement of international disputes 
and therefore has implications for the validity of the treaty provisions of the AU/ECOWAS. 
To this extent therefore, I find it imperative briefly to examine the meaning, scope and 
contents of these principles in contemporary international law.  
2.5.1 Equality of States 
The concept of equality of states means that all states are equal in international law and have 
equal rights and obligations irrespective of inequalities in other aspects.
59
 This principle 
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derives from the natural law theory of the equality of men.
60
 Hugo Grotius is generally 
credited with developing this principle and other natural law theorists posit that the law of 
nature which is applicable to all mankind and discoverable by reason was also applicable to 
inter-state relations in the community of states.
61
 It was argued that since states are made up 
of men who are by the law of nature equal, enjoying equal rights and obligations regardless 
of their physical size or inadequacies, the states consisting of these men must also be equal 
amongst themselves.
62
  
Indeed, as men are naturally equal, and as nations are composed only of men, and are 
considered as being moral persons who enjoy perfect liberty, it follows that they ought to 
regard one another as naturally equal. The strength or weakness of any one of them does not 
make any difference in this respect; just as a dwarf is as much a man as a giant, so a small 
republic is no less a sovereign state than the most powerful kingdom; and, consequently, all 
the rights assumed by the great kingdoms, such as France or Spain, belong also to the 
republics of Lucca and of San Marino, and all the duties which these republics are obliged to 
perform are no less obligatory on the kingdoms of France and of Spain.
63
 
A second argument was that there was no universal superior common to all states and 
therefore states existed in a state of nature equal to one another in accordance with the 
principle of natural law.
64
  
Thus the equality of states came down to the nineteenth century grounded upon the natural 
law, the state of nature, natural equality …. It is the right by virtue of which every sovereign 
State may demand that another State shall not assume more extensive rights, in their mutual 
relations, than it enjoys itself, and shall not free itself from any of the obligations imposed 
upon all. The equality of sovereign states is a generally recognised principle of public law. It 
has a twofold consequence in that it attributes to all States the same rights and imposes upon 
them reciprocally the same duties.
65
 
Sovereign equality of states was therefore seen as an inevitable consequence of the 
independence and sovereignty of states and it was only reasonable that states be treated as 
equals in international law.
66
 The principle of equality of states has regulated the intercourse 
of inter-state relations for centuries and is a fundamental principle of the current international 
legal order enshrined in article 2(1) of the Charter which provides ‗[t]he Organisation is 
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based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.‘ However, the 
contradictions between the equality of states professed by international law and the manifest 
inequalities amongst states means that the content and application of the principle would be 
controversial. Though the principle quickly achieved the status of a fundamental norm in 
international law,
67
 its incubation seemed to have been incomplete and continues to exist side 
by side with inequalities among states.
68
 In fact, one of the lessons of World War I was that 
the principle of equality of states was unsustainable in reality in the face of de facto 
inequalities and the propensities of states to project their power and pursue national interests 
through the use of force.
69
 
Some writers have submitted that a distinction be drawn between juridical equality of 
states and their political status.
70
 According to this view, the principle does not mean that 
states must be able to exercise their rights to the same extent but that they should all enjoy 
equal recognition to the extent that they have the capacity to realise those rights as permitted 
by each state‘s conditions and circumstances.71 This is the juridical equality of states and it 
has nothing to do with political inequalities.
72
 However the principle is construed the reality 
has always been that Great Powers make the rules and weaker states assent and follow those 
rules.
73
 From the Concert of Europe to the League of Nations and the UN Charter these states 
arrogate to themselves the rights to determine the course of events in the international 
community.
74
 Thus international law in practice permitted exceptions to the rule of equality 
of states.
75
 This contradiction was summed up thus: 
[i]t is worthwhile to have it clearly pointed out that legal equality and political equality differ 
fundamentally in character and in validity both as ideals and as rules or principles of the 
actual law. …It is especially worthwhile to have it emphatically stated that progress in the 
science and art of international law and relations, and particularly in international 
                                                          
67
 Kingsbury Benedict ‗Sovereignty and inequality‘ (1998) 9:4 EJIL 599 at 600. 
68
 Jack Donnelly ‗Sovereign inequality and hierarchy in anarchy: American power in international society‘ 
(2006) 12:2 EJIL 139 at 145 (hereafter Donnelly ‗Sovereign equality‘). 
69
 Wright ‗The equality of states‘ op cit note 66 at 5. 
70
 Pitman B Potter ‗The equality of states in international law‘ (1921) 15:2 The American Political Science 
Review 287 at 288. (hereafter Potter ‗The equality of states‘). 
71
 Dickinson ‗Equality of States‘ op cit note 59 at 107. ‗Equality of states means nothing more or less than that 
each state may exercise equally with other all rights that are based upon its existence as a state in the 
international society.‘  Ibid at 106. 
72
 Ibid at at 3. 
73
 See In what he describes as ‗legalized hegemony‘ Simpson observes that during the Concert of Europe ‗[t]he 
Great Powers made the law and the middle powers signed the resulting Treaty. The smaller powers, meanwhile 
were erased from consideration.‘ See Gerry Simpson Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in 
the International Legal Order (2004) 112.   
74
 Ibid at 153.  
75
 For example, right of conquest, reprisals and use of force by powerful states to compel weak states to accept 
unequal treaties were permitted. See Wright ‗Equality of states‘ op cit note 66 at 2-3. 
 
 
56 
organization and government, can only be made when the de facto inequalities of states are 
given de jure recognition. … The small states may balk and delay the march of events, but if 
facts are facts and men are in any degree candid they must eventually recognize that Haiti and 
France are entitled to widely divergent measures of political power in international 
government, albeit they are entitled to equal opportunity to vindicate such rights as in 
substance they actually possess.
76
 
The UN Charter had on the one hand conferred formal recognition on the principle of state 
equality and on the other hand accorded legal recognition to inequality of states by giving 
permanent seat of the UNSC to a few states such that they are able to determine and manage 
the course of global governance as they deem fit. This has proved problematic in operation 
and nowhere else is its impact felt more than the area of humanitarian intervention as will be 
demonstrated in the next chapter. It should be noted that one impact of this anomaly is that 
the system has unwittingly reverted back to the old era of regional hegemonies.
77
  
2.5.2 Sovereignty and Non-intervention 
 
The term ‗sovereignty‘ has a ‗long and troubled history.‘78 It remains the most contentious 
principle in the history and development of international law,
79
 and according to Oppenheim, 
‗it is doubtful whether any single word has caused so much intellectual confusion.‘80 The 
historical origin of the term dates almost as far back as the beginning of the development of 
the Law of Nations.
81
 Consequently, discerning its meaning, scope and contents requires a 
periodisation of the various evolutionary contexts in which it was conceived, interpreted and 
applied.
82
  Sovereignty has meant different things to different people since the time of 
Aristotle.
83
 The Aristotelian conception of sovereignty was in absolute terms in that he 
regarded sovereignty as the supreme authority held by an individual or group of individuals 
in the state.
84
 To ancient Romans, sovereignty meant the unqualified powers of the Emperor 
and his unrestrained right to rule over the people who had transferred their rights to him.
85
 By 
the Middle Ages the notion of absolute sovereignty had gone into oblivion and it was only 
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after the after 1648 that the concept was revisited in order to provide legitimacy for the 
emerging secular nation state.
86
  
It was however, Jean Bodin who first presented a comprehensive conceptualisation of 
the term. According to him sovereignty is the extraordinary, unconditional and perpetual 
authority conferred on the state over its citizens.
87
 Sovereignty was unlimited by any other 
form of authority except divine law and the law of nature.
88
 The Sovereign could do no 
wrong and was neither subject to the law of nature nor the Law of God.
89
 From the moment 
the people, through mutual covenant amongst themselves coalesced their will, rights and 
strengths and conferred it upon one man or group of men, the Leviathan or ‗Mortal God‘ was 
established.
90
 The authority of the Leviathan was totally absolute and based on the free 
‗irrevocable‘ contract that thus conferred unqualified freedom of action on the sovereign as 
the ultimate political authority whose freedom of action was not subject to any constraints 
whatsoever legal or moral.
91
  
At a time Europe was engulfed by political crisis, Hobbes and Bodin elevated 
sovereignty to the status of a legal principle to provide a theoretical defence for the actions of 
European monarchs.
92
 Though there were those who resisted the view of absolute 
sovereignty, the concept was nonetheless accorded pre-eminence with the crystallisation of 
nation-states in Europe in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.
93
 John Locke‘s social contract 
theory conceptualised sovereignty as residing in the constituted legislature.
94
 He argued that a 
state‘s claim to sovereign authority was preconditioned on the state‘s fulfilment of the 
obligation to respect the rights of the citizens with whom it had entered into a social 
contract.
95
 To the extent that the government respected the rights of its citizens, sovereignty 
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vests in the government, but when it violates the rights of its citizens, then sovereignty reverts 
back to the citizens. Hence sovereignty to Locke ultimately resides in the people. This is 
more akin to the notion of popular sovereignty and provides the theoretical argument for the 
emergence of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect discussed. But suffice it to mention 
here that the scope and contents of sovereignty has continued to vary greatly in different legal 
epochs. 
Sovereignty is a state attribute and in its classical sense, has both an internal and 
external aspect.
96
Territory has always shaped the understanding of sovereignty and the limits 
to which a state would claim sovereignty has in part been determined by geographical 
boundaries.
97
 In this sense, we speak of territorial sovereignty and it implies that a political 
community vested with public power enjoys complete and exclusive jurisdiction over a 
defined territory (including land, airspace, maritime) and thus exercises freedom of action to 
determine the social, economic, cultural and political organisation of that territory to the 
exclusion of any foreign authority.
98
 It is therefore a question of exercise of internal juridical 
sovereignty and the right to rule for a state to exercise internal control over its subjects.
99
 This 
internal sovereignty is demonstrated by the unchallenged supremacy of a state over all 
persons, groups and property within its domestic jurisdiction or territory.
100
 Several UN 
General Assembly resolutions restate the content of sovereignty in this sense.
101
 
The exercise of this supremacy in practice has often pitched the state against its 
citizens. Citizens challenge the unlimited powers of the state to determine their fate because 
the state often violates their rights and liberties in the course of performing state functions. 
This raises the question of the basis of legitimacy of a government and the scope of external 
aspect of its sovereignty vis-à-vis the basis of international concern with how a state treats its 
citizens and the argument for external intervention in cases of abuses of human rights. These 
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questions border on the limits of the external aspects of sovereignty. As will be seen in 
subsequent chapters, legal frameworks have been designed by the AU and ECOWAS to deal 
with this problem by codifying legal norms of how African regional organisations should 
respond to demands for the protection of human rights. These legal instruments apparently 
impinge on the sovereignty of member states and other fundamental norms of international 
law leading to a challenge of their legal validity, but this thesis will demonstrate that this is 
hardly the case. I will argue that accession to these legal instruments is in fact an exercise of 
sovereignty even though the effects of the treaties are such that they constrain the sovereignty 
of member states.
102
 
Legally speaking, sovereignty in its external manifestation is a corollary of the 
principle of juridical equality of states already discussed above and it refers to the 
independence and external autonomy of a state in how it conducts its foreign relations.
103
 It 
derives from the recognition conferred upon a state by other states in the international system 
and it is critical to the maintenance of minimum world public order in an international system 
characterised by de facto state inequalities.
104
 Sovereignty in this sense thus serves as a shield 
that protects weak states from the excesses of strong states by defining and protecting their 
legal status in international law as affected by their factual relations.
105
 In such inter-state 
relations, the state not owing allegiance to any outside authority cannot be bound by 
commitments it has not consented to and even where it has assumed treaty obligations, it still 
retains its sovereignty which is then only circumscribed to the extent of the obligations it has 
assumed under the treaty.
106
 Save for restrictions imposed by public international law, a state 
in exercise of its sovereignty is at liberty to enter into a treaty which may severely constrain 
its freedom of choice.
107
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The international law concept of sovereignty as discussed above implies an internal 
omnipotence and external independence and it has been enshrined in article 2(7) of the UN 
Charter which provides:  
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the 
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle 
shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
108
 
This principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states was devised to safeguard the 
sovereignty of states and maintain peace and stability in the international legal order. Though 
there is no similar express provision in the Charter regarding state-state relations, it is 
generally conceded that an expanded interpretation this rule also applies to inter-state 
relations.
109
 The omission has been attributed to the imprecision associated with what 
constitutes ‗interference‘ under the Charter.110 That notwithstanding, non-interference is 
regarded as a fundamental norm constitutive of the international legal order and is actually a 
constraint on the independence conferred by sovereignty, since it imposes a ‗duty and 
obligation not to intervene in the domestic affairs of other states.‘111 The UN has confirmed 
this in several General Assembly resolutions, most of which now constitute norms of 
customary international law.
112
  
However construed, the notion of sovereignty is both constitutive of a heterogonous 
society as well as an individualistic one at the same time.
113
 But ‗[I]f particular manifestation 
of sovereignty in contemporary international affairs is at issue, its accurate interpretations is 
likely to depend largely on an adequate assessment of its social environmental, that is to say 
present-day world society.‘114 The scope of sovereignty in contemporary international law 
has been largely determined by the internationalisation of human rights.
115
Traditionally, 
                                                          
108
 See Article 2 (7) Charter of the United Nations. 
109
 Oliver Ramsbothan & Tom Woodhouse Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflicts: A 
Reconceptualization (1996) 34 (hereafter Ramsbothan & Woodhouse ‗Humanitarian Intervention‘). See article 
1(2), 35 and 55 of the UN Charter. 
110
 Ramsbotham & Woodhouse ‗Humanitarian Intervention‘ op cit note 109 at 40. 
111
 Caroline Thomas New States, Sovereignty and Intervention (1985) 15. 
112
 See Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Internal Affairs of States and Protection of their 
Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res 2131, U.N. G.A.O.R. 20
th
 Sess. 1408
th
 Plen. Mtg. Suppl. No. 14 
(1965); The Declaration on the Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations supra note 102. 
113
 Fabri Human rights and state sovereignty op cit note 96 at 35. 
114
 Georg Schwarzenberger ‗The forms of sovereignty: an essay in comparative jurisprudence‘ (1957) 10 
Current Legal Problems 264 at 266. 
115
 Fabri ‗Human rights and state sovereignty‘ op cit note 96 at 41. 
 
 
61 
ascertaining what falls within the domestic jurisdiction of a state depends on, and to what 
extent, the subject matter is covered by international law.
116
  
One of the achievements of the human rights movement of the 60s and 70s was the 
‗transfer‘ of human rights from the exclusive domestic jurisdiction list to the ‗matters for 
international concern‘ list. The experiences of World War I and the atrocities of World War II 
effectively placed concern for human protection on the international agenda. By making it 
one of its ‗Purposes‘, the UN Charter opened the floodgates to international human rights 
legal instruments under which states assumed different degrees of commitments. A survey of 
this is outside the scope of this work.
117
 But suffice it to mention that the combined effect of 
the International Bill of Rights and decolonisation in the post-World War world was a 
gradual move that sought to place emphasis on the protection of human rights. This 
development was however truncated by the Cold War rivalry which saw sovereignty 
prioritised over human rights as an inviolable cornerstone of the international legal order. 
Sovereignty was mainly viewed through geostrategic lenses and human right was of little 
importance.
118
 The few instances—particularly in Africa—were external interventions were 
undertaken to protect human rights were isolated cases that were exceptions rather than the 
norm. Even so, the motives and legality of such humanitarian intervention was mired in 
controversy. I will discuss some of the instances and interventions and the role they played in 
setting the stage for the new interventionism of AU and ECOWAS in the next chapter.  
However, with the end of the Cold War, the UNSC became more active in tackling 
human rights violations by states. Human rights made some advances leading to a 
redefinition of sovereignty and its scope. Thus, the 1990s saw a further narrowing of the 
scope of sovereignty and the expansion of human rights by placing the human being at the 
centre of protection of international law.
119
 In this respect, Reisman states: 
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International law is still concerned with the protection of sovereignty, but, in its modern 
sense, the object of protection is not the power base of the tyrant who rules by naked power or 
through the apparatus of a totalitarian political order, but the continuing capacity of a 
population freely to express and effect choices about the identities and policies of its 
governors.
120
 
 It was contended that there is no conflict between the Charter principles (protection of 
human rights and non-intervention) because as members of the UN, states have assumed 
obligations to protect human rights and as such the principle of non-intervention was 
inapplicable when they breached this duty.
121
 Sovereignty now means an internal 
responsibility to protect the citizens and an external obligation to the international community 
to that effect.  
Although the term ‗sovereignty‘ is still used in international law but its referent has since 
changed –it is the people‘s sovereignty rather than the sovereign‘s sovereignty that is today 
protected by international law. The UN Charter maintains the ‗domestic jurisdiction-
international concern‘ dichotomy, but no serious scholar still supports the contention that 
internal human rights are ―essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state‖ and hence 
insulated from international scrutiny.
122
 
This assertion has found expressions in the humanitarian intervention legal regime of the AU 
and ECOWAS. Third World states during the Cold War were staunch champions of the 
principle of sovereignty and non-intervention and regarded any breach as a violation of 
international law, irrespective of the justifications for such intervention. It is therefore an 
irony of history that the first regional organisations to codify the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention and the right to democracy should be the AU and ECOWAS respectively, 
traditional pro-absolute sovereignty and non-intervention organisations. This is apart from 
being some of the strongest advocates of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect. The 
principle of sovereignty and its shifting contextual meaning means that African states had at 
one time been beneficiaries and at another victims of its application. The inviolability of 
sovereignty offered post-colonial African states some degree of protection as they struggled 
to maintain internal cohesion, control over natural resources and consolidate their status as 
independent states autonomous in their external engagements. At another level, it became the 
shield for despotic and brutal regimes like Idi Amin and Mobutu Sese Seko. Sovereignty and 
what it meant to African states in the past and its future must be understood in this context. 
Why did African states decide to embrace a new conception of sovereignty in the 
AU/ECOWAS treaty and how does their new legal regime fit in to the existing international 
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legal order? Before attempting to answer this question in the next chapters, I briefly consider 
the norm of non-use of force since the provisions of the AU/ECOWAS treaties apparently 
conflict with this international law norm. 
2.5.3 Prohibition of the Use of Force 
 
The prohibition of the use of force is discussed here in the context of the humanitarian 
intervention debate.
123
 Through the 1899-1907 Hague Conventions, the Locarno Treaty, the 
Kellog-Briand Pact, the League of Nations Covenant, series of efforts were made to ban 
recourse to war as an instrument of state policy in the Law of Nations. In principle, this goal 
was only achieved by the UN Charter, article 2(4) of which provides that ‗[a]ll Members shall 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purpose of the United Nations Charter.‘ 
This provision, it is argued, outlaws not just war for whatever purpose, but also the 
use of force short of war and the threat to use such force.
124
 The prohibition in article 2(4) 
relates to inter-state rather than intra-state use of force.
125
 From the beginning, the continued 
relevance of article 2(4) was questioned in view of its failure to prevent states from actually 
resorting to the use of force in practice.
126
 No sooner was the UN Charter adopted than it was 
realised that ‗there was tension between the UN‘s primary purpose—the maintenance of 
international peace and security and a secondary purpose that was fast becoming important—
promotion and protection of human rights … .‘127 The prohibition of the use of force is 
generally regarded as a norm of jus cogens and one of the pillars of international law.  
The debate about humanitarian intervention since 1945 essentially turns on how to 
reconcile the prohibition of the use of force by article 2(4) with the moral imperatives to 
protect people who are victims of massive human rights violations at the hands of their own 
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government. It is not surprising that treaty provisions like article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive 
Act and article 25 of the ECOWAS Protocol on MCPMRPS should meet with their first 
opposition for conflicting with article 2(4) in this regard. This is addressed in detail in 
subsequent chapters. The aim here is to show that though mainly observed in the breach by 
powerful states, within the context of the humanitarian debate, there is support for the view 
that article 2(4) was never an absolute prohibition because it was an obligation undertaken on 
the premise of certain assumptions that never materialised under the Charter; and if that is so, 
a regional treaty providing for a right of humanitarian intervention can only be viewed as 
fulfilling the objectives of the Charter. 
Within international relations, the debate about the use of force is basically between 
pluralists and solidarists. To pluralists, states, and not individuals are the rights holders in 
international law, and as such, attempts to use force to enforce individual rights violate the 
principles of sovereignty, non-interference and non-use of force and endangers inter-state 
relations and international order and stability.
128
  The society of states depends on a rules-
based system that allows states to protect ‗the values of individual life and communal liberty‘ 
within their territories.
129
  Pluralists prioritise order over justice because the protection of 
individual rights within states depends on the existence of a minimum level of harmony and 
stability in international society and to permit the use of force even for human rights 
protection negates this arrangement.
130
 Consequently, Bull concludes that states are wary of 
recognising a right of unilateral humanitarian intervention since there is no regulatory legal 
regime or consensus on what human rights entails a right of unilateral intervention could 
undermine the international system.
131
  This is the reason, he argues, why states have refused 
to embrace the practice and it is in the best interest of all that humanitarian intervention 
should remain prohibited.
132
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Solidarists contend that sovereignty is not absolute and that states must meet a 
minimum standard of human rights to be eligible for the protection accruing from sovereignty 
and nonintervention. Michael J Smith argues that because states‘ rights derive from 
individual rights, when a state violates the rights of individuals it loses its legitimacy and 
moral right to ‗full sovereignty.‘133  In such cases, intervention by other states is not only 
allowed,
134
 it is also a moral duty.
135
 This argument is based on the ground that national 
boundaries are mere artificial constructs that do not have the authority to limit our moral 
responsibility to fellow human beings, hence states not only have a domestic responsibility to 
observe human rights but also an international responsibility to protect it even at the risk of  
their own soldiers.
136
   
Various classifications have been adopted to distinguish theorists on humanitarian 
intervention and the use of force in international law.
137
 However, the debate is generally 
between two main schools of thought: restrictionists and counter-restrictionists. 
Restrictionists argue that article 2(4) prohibits the use of force by states except in the case of 
the exceptions provided in article 51 and Chapter VII of the Charter.
138
 To these writers, the 
use of force to protect human rights is illegal under current international law.
139
 As Ronzitti 
puts it, ‗unlike intervention for protecting citizens abroad, humanitarian intervention has no 
unquestionable ‗historic titles‘ supporting its legality; it is radically contrary to Article 2(4) of 
the United Nations Charter and no precedent supporting the opposite view can be quoted.‘140 
Chesterman argues that article 2 (4) prohibits the use of force even for humanitarian 
purposes and he cites several UN General Assembly declarations to buttress his point.
141
  
Save for the exceptions recognised in the Charter, this prohibition does not admit of any 
exception and the use of force to secure a legal right
142
 or to assist in the administration of 
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justice is a violation of article 2(4) and illegal.
143
 In the Corfu Channel Case the ICJ held that 
it could  
only regard the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force such as 
has in the past given rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot find a place in 
international law. It is still less admissible in the particular form it would take here—it would 
be reserved for the most powerful states.
144
  
This view was also confirmed by the ICJ in in the Nicaragua Case where the Court held that 
article 2(4) not only prohibits the use of force but that the provision is now a norm of jus 
cogens from which no derogation is permitted.
145
 To these writers, the internationalisation of 
human rights norms and the growing international concerns with human rights does not 
translate to a modification of the prohibition of force in article 2(4). It is argued that even if 
human rights have achieved the status of jus cogens, it still does not mean that force can be 
used for its protection.
146
 This school rejects the view that article 2(4) only prohibits the use 
of force when directed against the political independence or territorial integrity of a state. In 
their view, to interpret the provision in such a way as to come to this conclusion would 
require an ‗Orwellian construction‘.147Article 2(4) is a total ban on the use of force and the 
inclusion of the words ‗… in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter‘ 
was not intended to create an exception to the rule but to stress the totality of the 
prohibition.
148
  Thus, Gray asks rather rhetorically, ‘[i]f Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is a 
dynamic provision opened to changing interpretation over time, what developments in fact 
justified a new interpretation?‘149   
However, this thesis contends that, besides the failure to develop an effective 
collective security mechanism and the ineffectiveness of the UNSC, state practice as it relates 
to the use of force since 1945, as well as intervention treaties and obligations of member 
states under articles 53 and 103 must be given a contextual rather than a textual 
interpretation—at least, in view of developments in regional and general customary 
international law, such as the interventions by NATO and ECOWAS and the AU/ECOWAS 
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intervention treaties. The literature indicates that subsequent state practice can modify a 
treaty and a treaty is to be interpreted in the light of such practice.
150
 It is my opinion that on 
the principle of rebus sic stantibus the role of regional organisations in the use of force vis-à-
vis the UNSC needs a re-examination. The compromise between the regionalists and the 
universalists at the time of drafting the Charter in the distribution of authority in the use of 
force between them has since been overtaken by the failures of the other institutions the 
UNSC was supposed to create and the responsibility it should have assumed.  
The Counter-Restrictionists‘ argument turns on the approach to be adopted in the 
interpretation of the Charter and the views here are split between the Classicists and the 
Realists.  Classicists opine that the parties to a treaty have intentions that are discoverable 
from an analysis of the text of the treaty and which provisions should be respected until 
varied or expired.
151
  Realists assert that article 2(4) prohibits humanitarian intervention only 
to the extent that it is directed ‗against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
State.‘152  Fernando Teson argues that unless one reads these words outside the Charter, the 
implication is a qualification of the prohibition in article 2(4).
153
 Importantly too, article 2(4) 
would not preclude the use of force where it is aimed at protecting human rights which is just 
as important as any other purpose  of the UN.
154
 From a classicist view, unauthorised 
humanitarian intervention is illegal, but from a realist standpoint, its legality or otherwise 
depends on the attitude of the contemporary international community.
155
  
The second argument of the Realists claims that since the UN failed in one of its 
purposes—to establish a mechanism of collective security—the basic assumption upon which 
states surrendered their right of use of force was not fulfilled and states reverted back to their 
customary international law status on the use of force, and if the UN fails to halt violations of 
                                                          
150
 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (Advisory Opinion) 
(1971) ICJ Reports 22. See also article 62(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 which 
permits states to suspend, terminate or even withdraw from treaty obligations due to a fundamental change of 
circumstances upon which the treaty obligations were assumed.  See Teson ‗Law and Morality‘ op cit note 11 at 
35. But see Chesterman Just War or Just Peace op cit note 141 at 56. 
151
 Tom J Farer ‗An inquiry into the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention‘ in Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J 
Scheffer (eds) Law and Force in the New International Order (1991)185-201at 186. 
152
 Teson ‗Law and Morality‘ op cit note 11 at 151; Reisman & McDougal ‗Humanitarian intervention to protect 
the Ibos‘ op cit note 27 at 177. Realists assert that ‗explicit and implicit agreements, formal texts, and state 
behaviour as being in a condition of effervescent interaction, unceasingly creating, modifying and replacing 
norms. Texts themselves are but one among a large number of means of ascertaining original intention…‘ see 
Farer ‗An inquiry into the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention‘ op cit note 151 at 185. 
153
 Teson ‗Law and Morality‘  op cit note 11 at 150. 
154
 Ibid at 151 
155
 See J L Holzgrefe & Robert O Keohane ‗Humanitarian Intervention‘ op cit note 137 at 39. 
 
 
68 
human rights, states have a right to do so.
156
  Their third argument seeks to give article 39 an 
expanded interpretation under which the UNSC is said to have the authority to approve the 
use of force to halt humanitarian crises even where such crises lack cross-boundary effects.
157
 
The ban on the use of force in article 2(4) is one that could swing either way depending on 
the context. If a state violates the rights of its citizens so egregiously, it loses the protection 
offered by article 2(4) and the use of force is not prohibited in those circumstances.
158
 In 
striking a balance between these two purposes of the UN, Reisman and McDougal observe 
state: 
The continuing authority of community expectations about the lawfulness of humanitarian 
intervention is greatly confirmed by all the contemporary developments associated with the 
United Nations. The repeated, insistent emphasis upon its underlying policies can be regarded 
as strengthening not weakening the historic remedy.
159 
Over the past decades, the view that article 2(4) is not a total ban on the use of force has 
rallied supporters. More writers now concede that use of force for humanitarian purposes is 
admissible as an exception to the general rule of non-use of force under article 2(4).
160
 
Moreover, since a treaty can be modified by subsequent state practice, events and state 
practice since 1945 have modified article 2(4) to such an extent that there is today under 
customary international law, a recognised exception to the ban on the use of force.
161
  
From the very outset, the rule was never really going to be followed and according to 
Franck ‗[p]erhaps the world of Article 2(4) never did and never could exist.‘162 The use of 
force by the US in the Dominican Republic, Panama, Grenada and Guatemala; the USSR in 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Afghanistan; Tanzania in Uganda, India in East Pakistan. if 
anything were indications that article 2(4) was in fact, pronounced dead on arrival. There is a 
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lack of congruence between the ideals espoused by Article 2(4) and the attitude of states and 
the way they pursue their perceived national interests.
163
 As a commentator puts it, 
[w]hat killed Article 2(4) was the wide disparity between the norms it sought to establish and 
the practical goals the nations are pursuing in defense of their national interest. So long as 
there are nations-which is likely to be for a very long time-their pursuit of the national interest 
will continue; and where that interest habitually runs counter to a stated international legal 
norm, it is the latter which will bend and break.
164
 
To what extent States obey the rule of non-use of force was always going to depend on a 
convergence of a variety of national interests rather than any normative restraint by 
international law. It is possible that once in a while such national interests converge with 
existing or emerging international normative standards such as human rights protection. This 
is reflected even in recent state practice notably NATO intervention in Kosovo and 
ECOWAS interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone.  
Article 2(4) was an integral part of a war prevention mechanism designed by the 
Charter that encompassed Chapters VI and VII dealing with the pacific settlement of disputes 
and collective security respectively.
165
 The Charter and the system which article 2(4) is a part 
of recognise the inevitability of the use of force and it was in that context rather than as an 
independent normative standard legal or moral imperative that article 2(4) derived its 
potency.
166
 Summing up Thomas Franck‘s Realist argument, David Wippman remarks that 
for realists, article 2(4) had never had an independent life of its own and was just a mere 
‗coincidence of interests among powerful states, to be used by them when convenient and 
ignored, violated or explained away when inconvenient‘.167 
 2.6 THE EMERGING NORM OF RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
 
The debate surrounding the legality of humanitarian intervention under the UN Charter 
continued even after the Cold War and though the UNSC was able to take action to maintain 
international peace and security and made attempts to protect human rights under its new-
found activism, this did not translate to a transformation of the normative contradictions 
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inherent in the Charter and which often stood in the way of international protection of human 
rights. This dilemma is the tension between two important norms of the Charter: the principle 
of sovereignty and non-use of force on the one hand and the protection of human rights on 
the other.  
The objections to the legality of humanitarian intervention meant that either the UN 
would have to uphold the principle of state sovereignty and non-intervention at all times and 
standby while intra-state conflicts lead to mass atrocity crimes, or it would have to find a way 
of protecting an imperiled population while at the same time respecting the norm of state 
sovereignty and non-interference. This dilemma came to sharp focus following the series of 
atrocities that characterised the 1990s, culminating in the Rwandan genocide. Then UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan, in an address to the UN General Assembly posed this 
dilemma thus ‗… if humanitarian intervention is indeed, an unacceptable assault on 
sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, a Srebrenica—to gross and systematic 
violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?‘168 The task of 
resolving this dilemma fell on the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty set up by the Canadian Government, which published its report in 2001.
169
  
The Report gave birth to the emerging doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). 
It seeks to resolve the tension between sovereignty and human rights protection by re-
conceptualising sovereignty as responsibility. The emerging norm of R2P refers to the idea 
that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable 
catastrophes such as genocides, mass murders, war crimes and crimes against humanity but 
when the state is unable or unwilling to do so, this responsibility shifts to the international 
community.
170
 By reconceptualising sovereignty as responsibility rather than control, the 
ICISS adopted a rights-based approach that shifts emphasis from the right to intervene to the 
security need of victims of human rights violations and moved the focus of the debate from 
the right to intervene—the dominant theme under humanitarian intervention debate—to the 
need to protect victims of mass atrocities.
171
 Focus has moved from territorial security to 
human security and the protection of citizens is now the defining factor of both internal and 
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international legitimacy of states.
172
 Since then the norm has evolved rapidly but more as a 
political rather than a legal principle. Its contours remain unclear, its contents undefined and 
its reach inherently controversial.
173
 As we shall see, this norm, like its predecessor, has 
quickly fallen into disrepute in application. But what does this principle entails? What is its 
legal characterisation and which actors bear what right and responsibility under the norm? 
How has the norm been impacted by the controversies that often surrounds international law 
it is now called upon to serve? And what prospects exists for its operationalisation in Africa 
and what framework will be required? 
The view that the international community has a responsibility to protect the citizens 
of a country where the territorial state is unable or has failed to do so was also expressed by 
the UN High Level Panel on Threats and Challenges (HLP) when it stated that though states 
have the primary responsibility to protect their populations from mass atrocities, when they 
fail that responsibility should fall on the broader international community.
174
 According to 
the HLP, 
[t]he Security Council so far has been neither very consistent nor very effective in dealing 
with these cases, very often acting too late, too hesitantly or not at all. But step by step, the 
Council and the wider international community have come to accept that, under Chapter VII 
and in pursuit of the emerging norm of a collective international responsibility to protect, it 
can always authorise military action to redress catastrophic internal wrongs if it is prepared to 
declare that the situation is a ―threat to international peace and security. …175 
Perhaps in response to this and other criticisms, states unanimously embraced the R2P norm, 
declaring: 
[w]e endorse the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to 
protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorising military intervention as a last resort, 
in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of 
international humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or 
unwilling to prevent.
176
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In his report, the UN Secretary General stressed the importance of the relationship between 
internal strife arising from violations of human rights and mass atrocities, underdevelopment, 
poverty and insecurity international crimes.
177
 In paragraph 21, he stressed the important role 
of regional organisations in mobilising and coordinating collective action in pursuit of this 
common objective.
178
 While calling on states to accept and act on the R2P norm, the UN 
Secretary General stated 
[t]his responsibility lies, first and foremost, with each individual State, whose primary raison 
d‘être and duty is to protect its population. But if national authorities are unable or unwilling 
to protect their citizens, then the responsibility shifts to the international community to use 
diplomatic, humanitarian and other methods to help protect the human rights and well-being 
of civilian populations. When such methods appear insufficient, the Security Council may out 
of necessity decide to take action under the Charter of the United Nations, including 
enforcement action, if so required.
179
 
The first attempt to outline the legal contours of R2P is in paragraph 138 and 139 of the 2005 
World Summit Outcome Document (WSOD) where each state accepted the ‗responsibility to 
protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity… The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to 
exercise this responsibility…‘180 This means that there would be international assistance to 
help states build capacity to meet these challenges and help states under stress to address root 
causes of conflicts before crises break out.
181
 More importantly, states resolved in 
paragraph139 to act collectively through the UNSC and use peaceful measures in line with 
Chapters VI and VIII to protect populations from these four crimes.
182
 States further affirmed 
that they  
 
… are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the 
Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case 
basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organisations as appropriate, should peaceful 
means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations…183 
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R2P quickly garnered global political support culminating after the adoption of the WSOD in 
2005. The UNSC itself first affirmed R2P as adopted in paragraph 138 and 139 of the WSOD 
in Resolution 1674 relating to the protection of civilians.
184
 Since then it has made reference 
to the principle severally in different resolutions.
185
 Significant in all these resolutions is the 
fact that the UNSC seems to acknowledge that it has a responsibility to protect civilians from 
grave crimes, and this is evident in the shift in the debate, from questions about whether to 
act to protect civilians, to questions about how to engage.
186
      
From inception, R2P has attracted controversy from states as to its essential normative 
characterisation, its scope, contents and relationship with other long-standing norms and 
doctrines in international law such as sovereignty and non-interference and humanitarian 
intervention.
187
 It imposes obligations at three levels: first, the state owes a duty to protect its 
citizens; secondly, there is a duty on the international community to assist the state to 
discharge this responsibility; thirdly, when the state fails this responsibility shifts to the 
international community.
188
  At all times, the primary responsibility to protect lies with states 
and they owe this responsibility at two levels: first, there is domestic responsibility to the 
citizens and secondly, there is an external responsibility owed to the international community 
to fulfill that responsibility.
189
 Though the extent to which R2P is radically different from the 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention it seeks to replace remains debatable but as an 
emerging norm, it is agreed that it has certain unique features: the responsibility to prevent 
and the responsibility to rebuild. The UNSC however remains cautious in embracing the 
norm and has done little to clarify its legal status in international law.
190
  
So what is new about R2P? It is different from humanitarian intervention because, 
first, it focuses on the needs of victims rather than the right of the intervener; secondly, under 
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R2P, sovereignty is not control but responsibility, and finally, R2P incorporates other 
concepts like prevention and reconstruction.
191
 For its normative authority in law, R2P draws 
on natural law principles, human rights provisions in the UN Charter, Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and international humanitarian law.
192
 Both humanitarian intervention (at 
least whenever it is well intentioned) and R2P seek to protect human rights. However, the 
susceptibility of the former to abuse necessitated the latter. R2P is an attempt at the revival of 
the old doctrine of collective security. The scope of R2P covers genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity. Basically, R2P is limited to these four crimes even 
though attempt has been made by some to extend it to natural disasters, such as Cyclone 
Nargis in Burma in 2008 and the earthquake in Haiti.
193
 The overextension of the norm could 
make it lose its meaning and relevance at a time when much discussion and normative clarity 
is needed.
194
 
The ICISS elaborated the three phases of R2P to include the responsibility to prevent, 
the responsibility to react and the responsibility to rebuild.
195
 Of these, the responsibility to 
prevent is the single most important component.
196
 According to the Report of the UN 
Secretary General, there are three pillars in the R2P implementation framework.
197
 Pillar I 
consists of the responsibility of the territorial state, Pillar II consists of the responsibility of 
the international community to assist the state in this respect to build the capacity to fulfill its 
responsibility to protect, while Pillar III consists of timely and decisive response including 
deploying the range of tools available in the R2P tool box.
198
   
Arguably, the most contentious of its components is the ‗responsibility to react‘ 
particularly the use of military force to protect people from mass atrocity crimes. How do we 
ensure that when necessary, military force can be used without abusing the principle? It is not 
clear whether R2P is a legal or moral duty or a right on the part of the international 
community. If we say it is a ‗responsibility‘ to protect, this suggests a moral obligation rather 
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than a legal duty. This played out at the debate of the WSOD, in 2005 when certain pro-R2P 
countries pushed for an outright codification of the norm establishing firm and pre-
determined principles imposing a duty on the international community to intervene in given 
circumstances.
199
 However, certain states, particularly the US insisted that they would only 
support an ad hoc approach.
200
 The UN was expected to work out a legal framework for the 
use of force when necessary for the implementation of R2P but the WSOD which is the most 
authoritative document on R2P, unfortunately did not produce one. It is one of the reasons 
my thesis recommends the AU/ECOWAS framework for R2P implementation.  
The recurrent theme at the various R2P debates has been how to operationalise R2P to 
ensure that the international community delivers on R2P when the need arises. This will 
definitely require something more than the WSOD. By reaffirming their commitment to the 
Charter provisions on the use of force, it is apparent that it will take a while to build 
consensus on the need to have a legal framework for use of force under R2P. Part of the 
problem of R2P implementation is the politics of international law be it the classification of 
conflicts or the decision to intervene. The reason even powerful states rejected R2P being 
made an international obligation which was intended to avoid selective intervention is 
because they did not want to incur any obligation to have to intervene in some obscure 
country solely on humanitarian purposes where they have no national interest.
201
 The US 
insisted that the UNSC should be at liberty to act in one case and not act in another arguing 
that there should be no legal obligation on the UNSC to intervene anywhere and everywhere 
the set conditions are met.
202
 The Non-Aligned Movement objected that R2P has been framed 
in a way that it empowers the powerful states of the North to decide when and where to 
intervene thus strengthening their sovereignty while weakening that of the South.
203
 These 
and other issues continue to hinder the implementation of R2P through the UN framework. 
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2.7 CONCLUSION 
 
The subject of humanitarian intervention has strong basis in customary international law 
though its limit was not always clearly delineated. But the experiences of two World Wars 
helped create an international solidarity for the prohibition on recourse to the use of force by 
states. However, the efforts to create a New World Order that guarantees human rights and 
maintains international peace and security was undermined from the on-set by the 
ambiguities and apparent contradictions in the UN Charter. These contradictions, the inability 
to create the institutions envisaged for its effectiveness were exploited during the Cold War 
with the legacy of a weakened international normative order and a UN lacking the capacity to 
protect human rights or maintain international peace and security as envisaged by its 
founding fathers. Neither the principle of equality of states, sovereignty or non-use of force 
has been able to create anything near the kind of world envisaged by the drafters of the 
Charter.  
Since the 1990s, the international community has progressively moved away from the 
notion that article 2(4) is an airtight prohibition of the use of force towards a more responsive 
interpretation that recognises that force could be used to protect human rights. The UN has 
gone about this by re-interpretation of sovereignty as responsibility to protect and by 
broadening the scope of what constitutes ‗threat to international peace and security‘ as part of 
its enforcement powers under article 39 of the Charter. Yet, it has not stopped ethnic 
cleansing, genocides, war crimes and crimes against humanity. In fact, the apparent inability 
of the international community to provide an effective system and legal framework has led 
some to seek alternatives outside the Charter paradigm. More than ever before, the poor and 
weak states (especially in Africa) have realised that unless they look out for themselves, the 
lessons of history is that they might be abandoned to their fate as was the case in Rwanda.  
The effort to prevent genocides and man-made humanitarian disasters on the 
continent has produced the R2P principle and the AU/ECOWAS humanitarian intervention 
legal framework both unprecedented in scope and unsurpassed in their normative aspirations. 
These developments shaped by historical experiences are bound to conflict with existing 
international legal norms on the basis of which some have challenged the African initiative. 
But before I consider the question of validity of the AU/ECOWAS treaty provisions, it is 
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imperative to survey the conditions that made them necessary in the first place.  As the next 
chapter shows, in many cases when Africa had had to depend on the UN to intervene in the 
two decades of the so-called ‗UNSC activism‘ they were disappointed. 
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CHAPTER 3: POST-COLD WAR INTERVENTIONS IN AFRICA AND THE ORIGIN OF 
THE AU/ECOWAS UNILATERAL HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION LEGEAL 
REGIMES 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The end of the Cold War ushered in a new opportunity for East-West cooperation, especially 
within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to build a truly global organisation 
capable of meeting the aspirations of the founding fathers of the UN.
1
 This ‗new‘ UNSC 
would be able to respond to the challenges of the twenty-first. This enthusiasm was 
particularly so in the case of Africa which had had more than its fair share as a theatre of 
Super Power proxy wars for the most part of its post-colonial history. The legacies 
bequeathed to Africa by that era—weak and fragile states, proliferation of small arms and 
light weapons across the continent, declining revenue, and heightened ethnic rivalry, were to 
exacerbate conflicts in the continent in subsequent decades. The consequence was a sharp 
increase in the number of intra-state conflicts in Africa. At the beginning of the 1989-1998 
decade, there were 110 armed conflicts in the world 14, of which were in Africa second only 
to Asia.
2
 But by the end of the 1990s, the number of armed conflicts in Africa rose to 16 
while it declined to 14 in Asia.
3
 
Given the devaluation of the geostrategic stocks of Africa in a bipolar world, these 
African states found themselves unprepared to deal with these challenges.
4
 This resulted in 
protracted civil wars in some states such as Liberia and Sierra Leone, the disintegration of 
others Eritrea/Ethiopia, the anaemia of others like Rwanda, and the outright collapse of others 
like Somalia. All these happened with the resultant massive violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law. What was the response of the ‗new‘ proactive, UNSC crises? 
What was the impact of such response on African humanitarian intervention legal regime? 
What has been the legal response of the OAU/AU and ECOWAS to these developments? 
How do these legal responses sit with existing international law norms on humanitarian 
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intervention? The last question will be engaged in the next chapter. The current chapter sets 
out to achieve two main objectives. 
It analyses the attitude of the UN to crises in Africa. In particular, it examines the 
degree of responsiveness of the UNSC to crises in Africa where the national self-interest of 
major powers are not at stake and how this weakened the UNSC and laid the foundation for 
the emergence of the AU/ECOWAS new interventionist regime. Secondly, it demonstrates 
that the new AU/ECOWAS humanitarian intervention legal framework seeks to create a 
humanitarian intervention legal regime outside the Charter framework and that this was borne 
out of necessity arising from the failures of the UNSC to respond to crises in Africa in the 
1990s. It does so by drawing on some of the interventions or non-interventions in Liberia, 
Somalia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda and Darfur. While references would be made to cases of 
intervention generally, the focus is on post-Cold War interventions in Africa. 
3.2 LIBERIA: A BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND GENESIS OF THE 
CONFLICT 
 
Modern day Liberia was established when freed American slaves were resettled in the 
territory already inhabited by indigenous African populations in 1821. These new settlers 
were called Americo-Liberians and in 1847 proclaimed the Liberian Declaration of 
Independence even though technically speaking, Liberia was never colonised.
5
 From then on, 
its economic, social and political life was dominated by the Americo-Liberians and their True 
Whig Party was in power from 1878 to 1980 even though by 1980 estimates, they only 
constituted five per cent of the population.
6
 Liberia prospered economically and by the 1970s 
was regarded by the World Bank as a middle income country.
7
 However, this prosperity was 
unevenly distributed with the Ameico-Liberians controlling more than 60 per cent while the 
majority indigenous population lived in poverty.
8
 
On 12 April 1980, Master Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe led a team of non-
commissioned officers to topple the government of President Tolbert in a coup. The President 
was killed and several members of his government publicly executed. Though initially 
popular Doe‘s government eventually assumed ethnic character as it became dominated by 
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members of his Khran tribe. Under intense domestic and international pressure to transit to 
democracy, Doe conducted elections in 1985 which he manipulated and emerged as winner 
and President.
9
 Frustrated, some soldiers led by General Thomas Quinwokpa, a member of 
Doe‘s government, tried to topple Doe in a coup but failed and he was executed.10  
Charles Taylor who had served in Doe‘s government escaped to the US after he was 
accused of corruption.
11
 While in jail in the US awaiting extradition to Liberia, Taylor 
escaped and managed to land in Ivory Coast where he started recruiting young Liberians, 
mainly from the Nimba County, into the National Patriotic Front of Liberia.
12
 On 24 
December 1989, he launched an attack against Doe‘s forces at Nimba County near the 
Ivorian border which the ill-trained and ill-equipped Liberian government forces could not be 
repelled.
13
 Within six months, the NPFL had control of about ninety per cent of the country 
and pressed towards Monrovia.
14
 The war soon assumed an ethnic dimension as the different 
tribes took sides in the conflict and there were widespread atrocities committed against 
civilians.
15 
3.2.1 The Humanitarian Crisis 
 
The carnage and savagery that characterised the conflict was mostly felt by civilians both 
nationals and foreigners alike. Taylor instigated a ‗relentless campaign of sadistic, wanton 
violence unimaginable to those unfamiliar with the details of man‘s capacity to visit the 
abyss.‘16 It is estimated that 200,000 people lost their lives, 750,000 internally displaced 
persons and 1.2 million refugees fled to neighbouring countries.
17
  Following the ethnic 
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dimension the war assumed, a reign of terror was unleashed on Khran and Mandingos. 
Recounting his experience, Obed, a Krahn student, stated:  
 
The rebels were killing us. They killed my father; they killed three women; they killed my 
uncle. My father was killed on June 11. It was about 6:30 in the morning. Some rebels came 
from Harper to Putu, some came from Sino and from Zwedru. They went from village to 
village, killing whoever they could find. When they got to my village, Tumbo, they started 
firing and everyone began to run. They grabbed my father and asked if he was a Krahn; when 
he said 'yes, I'm a Krahn man,' they shot him. A woman I knew, Betty Pine, ran when the 
rebels came, and the rebels took her baby. They called to her in the bush and told her to come 
and get her baby. They shot her as she was coming, then used a cutlass and cut the baby in 
half. I was also shot, in my left leg, but hid in the grass.
18
 
 
Ordinarily, ethnic differences are not very apparent among the different tribes of Liberia and 
language was therefore deployed as the test that meant life or death as determined by the 
insurgents.
19
 On 27 June the rebels invaded the district of Grand Gedeh and killed literally 
everyone in sight—Krahn, Mandingo and Bassa—in the mistaken belief that everyone there 
was a Krahn.
20
 This was graphically demonstrated by a 30-year old survivor, Jackson thus ‗I 
was captured by the rebels last September in Kaweaken. I could speak Gola, so I told them I 
was Gola. If I had told them I was Mandingo, they would have killed me. I said I wanted to 
join them, it was the only way to rescue myself.‘21 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions was violated by all sides to the conflict 
with impunity. According to the account of another survivor, the perpetrators 
indiscriminately executed captured soldiers, non-combatants and combatants who had laid 
down their arms, in violation of the Geneva Conventions.
22
 According to her: 
In July, we went to harvest the rice. When we got to the fields, we saw rebels with guns 
around the farm. They started shooting at us. Five people were killed: a woman, Manta Tweh; 
an old woman, Klay Zor; and three men—Palu Nyonbior, Josiah Beh and Bestman Sayde. 
The rest of us ran into the bush and fled to the Ivory Coast.‘23 
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The NPFL practice of searching for Krahn and Mandingo was discussed by Jackson, a 30-
year-old Mandingo who had been recruited by the NPFL after his capture in September 1990. 
[When the NPFL arrived] they told the residents they were there to free the people. After a 
few days, however, they began taking people from their homes, stripping them naked and 
carrying them down to the water. They moved from house to house, looking for Krahns, 
Mandingos and Government officials. [Once], an NPFL vehicle arrived, NPFL soldiers 
opened the trunk and pulled a man out. The man began to beg, ―don‘t kill me, I'm not a Krahn 
man.‖ The soldiers pushed him into a ditch and shot him. Later, a dumptruck arrived from 
Monrovia loaded with men, women and children. ... [T]he truck dumped people in the water, 
[rebels were] shooting them as they fell in the water.
24
 
In a confidential report to the Monrovia Headquarters in 1995, the Chief Security Officer of 
the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) wrote:  
There are numerous reports of fighters moving among the displaced of various areas looking 
for pregnant women. When they find them they gamble on the sex of the unborn baby. They 
then cut the woman‘s womb open to see who won the bet. The mother and the baby are then 
thrown to the side of the road as the fighters go looking for their next victim.
25
 
Child soldiers recruited, trained, armed by senior rebels were let loose on civilians and they 
went into a frenzy of atrocities raping, maiming, killing, burning and looting.
26
 People were 
set ablaze and whole villages were burned down in what could only pass for an orgy of the 
macabre.
27
 Accounts of the sexual abuses were just as barbaric and it is estimated that over 
168,000 girls and women were raped during the conflict.
28
 In the town of Buchanan alone, 
UNICEF registered 652 women who had been raped.
29
 Unlawful killings were widespread 
and the use of torture was routinely employed by all sides to the conflict.
30
 Sometime in July 
1990, about six hundred defenseless civilians taking refuge in the Lutheran church were 
massacred by the Armed Forces of Liberia soldiers.
31According to a victim‘s account of her 
ordeal: 
The LPC fighters entered my village in the bush and [tortured my neighbour] and many others 
… there were about eighteen armed men. I was raped along with my two younger sisters in 
the village by ten LPC armed men. After the acts of raping, our wearings and properties were 
looted.
32
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Another rape victim narrates her ordeal thus: 
I was forcibly taken into the bush with my three children and husband by the LPC fighters 
under the accusation of [trying to kill] ―General War Boss‖ and ―General kill the Bitch.‖ We 
have always been accused and tortured by these rebels because many of us are Bassa by tribe. 
My husband was tied to a thorny tree, black drivers ants were put all over his body while I 
was raped as a pregnant woman in front of my three children by four LPC fighters. Later an 
order was given that my husband should be beheaded in front of my children. My husband 
cried for mercy, but the LPC did not listen and cut his esophagus and my husband finally 
died.
33
 
In a recent report published by the ICRC on the impact of the Liberian civil war, it was 
revealed that 74 per cent of the population had their property damaged and seven in every ten 
persons had a member of immediate family killed in the war.
34
 Two in every five said they 
were wounded in the conflict and a significant number reported being victims of sexual 
violence themselves or somebody they know. Torture, rapes, executions and cannibalism 
were widespread and most of the victims were civilians.
35
 By March 1993, casualties had 
reached approximately 150,000 and about 700,000 refugees scattered across the region.
36
 By 
the end of 1994, 1,100,000 Liberians were internally displaced 420,000 refugees in Guinea, 
320,000 in Ivory Coast, 20,000 in Ghana and 20,000 in Sierra Leone, and 5,000 in Nigeria 
and other countries.
37
 Put together, these figures represent 85 per cent of the pre-war 
estimated 2.5 million population of Liberia.
38
 It is therefore important to inquire about the 
role of the international community and in particular the global body saddled with the 
responsibility to address such situations –the United Nations and its principal political organ, 
the UNSC. 
3.2.2 The International Response 
 
As the carnage continued in Liberia with widespread indiscriminate killing of citizens and 
foreign nationals alike, prominent Liberians began to appeal for foreign intervention.
39
 For 
example, on 30 May 1990, Senator David Toweh, speaking in the Liberian Senate, called on 
the UN, OAU and ECOWAS to help Liberia put a stop to the conflict but the plea got no 
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response.
40
 In June 1990, Samuel Doe himself requested the UN to intervene in the conflict 
but the UN declined.
41
 Even when the UN Mission in Monrovia was attacked by the NPFL in 
a bid to kill civilians taking refuge there, all the UN did was to condemn the attacks, evacuate 
its staff and close the Mission.
42
 Not surprisingly, many countries followed suit and 
evacuated their citizens.
43
 Meanwhile the international community‘s preoccupation was the 
conflict in the Gulf, the former Yugoslavia and Somalia (abandoning the latter mid-way). 
Hence it was always unlikely that anyone outside Liberia‘s contiguous zone or immediate 
neighbours would come to its rescue.
44
  
No one doubted that the Liberian crisis was a humanitarian catastrophe or that it 
posed a threat to the West African subregion. Roughly 200,000 people perished in the 
conflict about the same casualties recorded in the Former Yugoslavia, yet ‗[t]he international 
community … responded to human rights in Liberia with unqualified neglect.‘45 The US 
observed that ‗… the current [Liberian] conflict holds great danger for the sub-region. 
Escalating tensions could cause additional refugees and conflict to spill over to Liberia‘s 
borders, widening the war and leading to more arms proliferation.‘46 Based on this 
assessment and against the background of its historical ties with Liberia, many within and 
without Liberia expected the US to intervene or at least, mobilise major powers within the 
UNSC for such intervention.
47
 But the US made clear there would be no intervention.
48
 The 
US was of the view that Liberia was best suited to work out a Liberian solution to the crisis 
and that this was the only viable route to peace.
49
 At the peak of the war ‗… the United States 
refused requests for military intervention insisting that an ‗African problem‘ required an 
‗African Solution.‘50 The above response contrasts sharply with the international 
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community‘s commitments elsewhere outside Africa such as the Balkans at the time. In fact, 
casualties in Bosnia and Liberia had hovered comparatively around the same levels yet 
Liberia did not attract any compassion to warrant intervention.  
 
Thus, when the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia is assessed, often times it is 
forgotten that ECOWAS was set up originally as a subregional body solely to promote 
economic integration and development within the region rather than a collective security 
organisation.
51
 ECOWAS therefore assumed the responsibility of intervention in the Liberian 
civil war only by default.
52
 For, according to one commentator ‗[i]f the world had abandoned 
Africa because the Cold War had ended, the prescription was clear: Africa must act in the 
spirit of pan-Africanism to save one of its own from self-destruction.‘53 It marked the first 
time an effort to halt intra-state conflict would inadvertently produce a regional humanitarian 
intervention mechanism in Africa.
54
  
The main culprit in the abandonment of Liberians to their fate in the wake of the 
conflict is the UNSC. For whatever reason, the UNSC only got involved in the Liberian crisis 
‗after the fact‘.55 For a conflict that began in 1989, it took over a year before the UNSC could 
even place the matter on its agenda for discussion.
56
 Thereafter, the UNSC made its first 
statement on the conflict in January 1991 over a year after the conflict began and five months 
after ECOWAS had intervened and a ceasefire had been brokered and the national 
reconciliation process was well underway.
57
 Throughout the conflict, UN involvement did 
not go beyond condemnations, calls for ceasefires, and at its best, the co-deployment of 
UNOMIL with ECOMOG. 
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ECOWAS intervention in Liberia was in recognition of the fact that if Africans failed 
to solve their problems then no one would.
58
 This buttresses the view expressed when some 
assessed the impact of the end of the Cold War on Africa: that a bipolar world would deepen 
the general disinterestedness in African crises, or at least, for those states without scarce 
natural resources like oil.
59
 So, clearly, the ECOWAS intervention was a reaction to the 
failure of the international community in general and the UNSC in particular.
60
 Were the 
UNSC minded to intervene in the Liberian crisis, there were several valid legal grounds on 
which it could have acted. First, there was an international dimension to the conflict. The 
refugee outflows into neighbouring countries like Guinea, Sierra Leone, Ghana and Nigeria 
had a cross-border effect on these countries as it threatened regional peace, security and 
stability. This should have been sufficient to constitute a ‗threat to international peace and 
security‘ worthy of a Chapter VII action by the UNSC. Secondly, there were clear cases of 
targeting foreign nationals who were either captured or wantonly killed by the warring 
factions. Third, was the role of external actors like Libya, Burkina Faso, Cote d‘Ivoire, who 
ostensibly aided the rebels to destabilise the Doe government with the risk that these 
neighbours could have been sucked into the conflict themselves, creating a regional 
conflagration. Again, this was sufficient ground for a Chapter VII intervention by the UNSC 
but it refused to act. 
Despite the shortcomings of the ECOWAS mission, the intervention was 
groundbreaking with some legal significance. It marked the first time a regional organisation 
would undertake humanitarian intervention in an internal conflict.
61
 Secondly, the 
intervention marked the first time the UN would co-deploy troops in a mission with a 
regional organisation.
62
 Thirdly, it suggests the existence, or at least the emergence of a new 
model for humanitarian intervention and international law whereby a regional organisation 
could undertake humanitarian intervention in urgent cases without UNSC authorisation and 
could thereafter secure ex post facto ratification.
63
 Apparently wanting to avoid the question 
of legality raised by its unauthorised intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone, ECOWAS 
subsequently decided to adopt a legal framework that recognises the right of the organisation 
to undertake humanitarian intervention in prescribed circumstances in member states. Of 
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course this has raised further normative issues but it also holds a great potential for advancing 
international law norms that protect human rights. This is discussed in subsequent chapters 
but it should be mentioned here that ECOWAS received commendation both from the UN 
and the international community in general thus suggesting that it might well be time to 
revisit the redistribution of authority on the use of force between the UN and regional 
organisations. As will be shown below, the universalism-subsidiarity approach to 
international peace and security enshrined in the Charter at San Francisco in 1945 has been 
ineffective because the prerequisites for its implementation never materialised. 
The main arguments against the intervention were two-fold: first, it is argued that 
nothing in ECOWAS constitutive document authorised it to undertake such intervention.
64
 
Secondly it is contended that since ECOWAS did not obtain the approval of the UNSC 
before the intervention, it was illegal.
65
 Taking these arguments into account, ECOWAS 
adopted the ECOWAS Revised Treaty and the Protocol on Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (MCPMRPS), the 
compatibility with the UN Charter regime on humanitarian intervention and norms of 
international aw have been questioned. By implication, the legal validity of these provisions 
has been questioned and this is taken up in the next chapter. 
3.3 SOMALIA: A BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND GENESIS OF THE 
CONFLICT  
 
Somalia has been without an effective government since January 1991 and it is often cited as 
the textbook example of a failed state.
66
 Somalia is a clan-based society and one of the most 
homogenous states in Africa both linguistically and religiously.
67
 At independence in 1960, 
British Somaliland and Italia Somalia were amalgamated to create the Somali state.
68
 In 1969 
Mohammed Siad Barre seized power in a military coup and established an authoritarian 
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regime that lasted until 1991.
69
 Throughout his reign, Barre exploited the geostrategic 
opportunities offered by the Horn of Africa state by alternately courting the Soviets and the 
US during the Cold War.
70
 He initiated a despotic rule that thrived on the manipulation of 
clan loyalties, patronage and brutal repression.
71
 Menkhaus captures the decline and descent 
of the Somali state into the abyss of failure thus: 
 
Evidence suggests that by the mid-1980s Somalia was already a failed state. With the partial 
exception of the security sector, most government institutions began to atrophy in the years 
following the disastrous Ogaden War with Ethiopia in 1977–78. Fierce government 
repression, heightened clan cleavages and animosities, gross levels of corruption, and low 
salaries all combined to accelerate the state‘s decline. The public school system, a source of 
pride and progress in the 1970s, crumbled. Production on state-run farms and in factories 
plummeted. Government ministries were almost entirely dysfunctional despite a bloated civil 
service, due in part to chronic absenteeism and cronyism; effective and committed civil 
servants were seen as a threat and removed.
72
 
 
But with the aid of the Super Powers who funneled financial aid, arms and ammunition to 
him, Barre was able to maintain a firm grip on power until his support base began to erode in 
the 1980s owing to threats of insurgencies from several fronts.
73
 A combination of declining 
foreign aid from the US, corruption and inter-clan rivalry further weakened the Somali state 
as it became an institution of ‗… repression, and expropriation, a tool to dominate political 
opponents and rival clans, expropriate resources, and above all serve as a catchment point for 
foreign aid that was then diverted into the pockets of civil servants clever, powerful, or well-
connected enough to place themselves at strategic spigots in the foreign aid pipeline.‘74 
 
It was therefore no surprise when the Barre regime collapsed at about the same time 
the Cold War drew to a close. The nature of this relationship that characterised the last half of 
the 20
th
 Century undermined African states creative ability to evolve effective statehood and 
nation-building capacity such that states like Somalia ‗existed for 30 years and fell apart 
when the foreign resources which had held it together disappeared at the same time that clan-
based … non-state opposition was growing.‘75 It is widely agreed that the proliferation of 
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weapons left behind by the Super Powers was the major source of destabilization in 
Somalia.
76
  
 
Who is to blame? … Those who kill and loot are to blame. …We too are to blame, we who 
call ourselves ―the international community.‖ … There are more arms than food in Somalia. 
… They were given by the outside world to serve outside interests. Those who provide arms 
are partners in the crime.
77
 
 
In fact, according to an author, purchasing military tanks were as cheap as purchasing used-
cars.
78
 This easy and almost unlimited access to sophisticated weapons laid the foundation for 
Somalia‘s long-term final ruin.79 So pervasive was this proliferation that by January 1991, 
General Mohamed Farah Aideed and other different clan-based factions easily joined ranks in 
armed insurrection to topple the already weakened government of Siad Barre.
80
  
Unfortunately, this unity of purpose however proved insufficient to sustain the alliance and 
maintain political stability in post Siad Barre Somalia.
81
 Since then absence of a central 
government, unending civil war, chaos and anarchy have characterised the life of Somalis.
82
  
 
Attempts at state reconstruction in Somalia have proved abortive so far as it seems to 
have sunk beyond redemption. More than twenty years later, notwithstanding the fiction of 
statehood attached to Somalia, it still lacks ‗substantial and credible statehood by the 
empirical criteria of classical positive international law‘83 and as I have argued elsewhere, it 
is just as well if the international community would rethink its approach to the Somali 
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crisis.
84
 Like all the other problems that had sprung up since the UN dumped UNOSOM in 
1995, the present humanitarian crisis arising from drought cannot be explained and addressed 
outside the context of the unresolved broader Somali conflict. It is just another chapter in an 
unfolding humanitarian tragedy that began over two decades ago but to which the UNSC had 
largely ignored or paid lip service at best. 
 
3.3.1 The Humanitarian Crisis 
 
The scale of human misery, human rights violations and violations of international 
humanitarian law that gripped Somalia since the commencement of the civil war will defy 
attempt at accurate assessment. Nor is it possible to come to a precise figure of the casualties 
of the conflict since 1991. What however is clear that the degree of atrocities committed and 
the suffering it foisted on the civilian population is unimaginable. Speaking at the height of 
the crisis in 1992, the former director of the US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance 
described the situation as the ‗worst humanitarian disaster in the world.‘85 And according to 
another commentator, ‗[t]he tragic events in Mogadishu since the defeat of Siyad Barre's 
regime, and the … fighting in Burao and Berbera in the northern region, are clear 
manifestations of the bottomless nature of the hell into which millions of Somalis have 
fallen.‘86 The fight between the different insurgent groups and the Barre regime before it fell 
claimed about 4000 lives.
87
 It is estimated that at the height of the conflict, about 3,000 
people comprising mainly women and children were dying every day.
88
 Between 17 
November 1991 and 27 February 1992, it is estimated that between 30,000 and 50,000 people 
died and no fewer than 14,000 of them were killed around Mogadishu alone.
89
 Recounting 
what he saw in Somalia, then United Nations Special Representative to Somalia Mohamed 
Sahnoun writes: 
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When I arrived in Mogadishu in March 1992 on a fact-finding mission, the city was nearly 
deserted. Most people had fled to surrounding areas where they lived in the worst of 
conditions and many faced death by starvation … at least 300, 0000 people had died of 
hunger and hunger-related disease, and thousands more were casualties of the repression and 
the civil war.
90
 
 
At the same time, there was acute shortage of food particularly in the Bay and Lower 
Shebelle provinces which recorded 90 per cent malnutrition rate and 16.5 per cent death rates 
by June 1992.
91
 It is no accident therefore that throughout the conflict and the subsequent 
drought-related famine, these same regions remains most affected and vulnerable.
92
 ‗The 
carnage inflicted upon the civilian population by indiscriminate use of weapons of 
extraordinary force and by the failure on all sides to abide by minimum standards of 
international humanitarian law … has already earned Mogadishu a special place in the annals 
of human cruelty.‘93 
 
By the summer of 1992, more than one-third of the Somali population had either been 
killed by the war or was on the verge of starving to death.
94
 Although there is no accurate 
data on the exact figures, it is estimated that about 900,000 Somalis fled into neighbouring 
countries—Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia etc. Together, the number of refugees and internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) stood at a staggering 1.5 million, representing 29 percent of the total 
Somali population before the outbreak of conflict.
95
 Sadly, recent statistics still reveal that by 
the end of 2010, the number of IDPs in Somalia stood at 1.5 million, among the highest in the 
world and 3.7 million Somalis are at risk of starving to death.
96
  
 
3.3.2 The International Response 
 
As usual, the international community prevaricated on the Somali crisis and did not respond 
with the urgency demanded by the situation or with the swiftness with which troops were 
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mobilized for, and dispatched to Kuwait for example.
97
 ‗Their greatest crime was their 
absence in 1991 … The factions were crying out for someone to, broker the peace. If the 
world had made an effort to mediate, much could have been saved.‘98 As the world focused 
on the Gulf crisis, Somalia did not attract international attention until the intensive fighting 
spanning the period November 1991 to February 1992.
99
 The US, which had no use for the 
strategic alliance with Somalia anymore, worked to undermine any effort to get the UN 
involved in the crisis.
100
 This attitude by the global North (championed by the US) was 
fiercely challenged by African states, particularly those who fortuitously were non-permanent 
members of the UNSC at the time by publicly alleging that the US was biased against Africa, 
blocking intervention in Somali, while at the same time championing intervention in 
Yugoslavia.
101
 For example, 
[t]he heated debate on the resolution highlighted the determination of the United States to 
limit U.N. involvement in Somalia to humanitarian concerns, and to tone down any 
commitment to work towards a political resolution. African members of the Security Council 
and other African representatives who participated in the debate accused the U.S. of applying 
double standards with regard to Somalia and Yugoslavia. According to press reports and to 
diplomatic sources, the U.S. and African members clashed on the issue during the Security 
Council debate. The Nigerian Foreign Minister, Maj. Gen. Nwachukwu, commented that 
"Africa must receive the same qualitative and quantitative attention paid to other regions.
102
 
In the ensuing bloody conflict, foreign countries and humanitarian agencies evacuated their 
embassies, nationals, and staff respectively while abandoning Somalis to their ‗gruesome 
fate‘.103 By 1991 the specialised agencies of the UN—the UNDP, WHO, UNICEF and the 
WFP—complained that the operational environment in Somalia had become too risky for 
them to continue their work and so withdrew.
104
 Just as in Liberia, this created a bitter feeling 
in the people who felt that they had been abandoned by the world body in their hour of 
need.
105
 Save for the unsuccessful attempt by a few governments in the region, no committed 
effort was forthcoming on the part of the international community to push for a resolution of 
the conflict and the UN actually started pulling out its personnel as early as 1988.
106
 A few 
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humanitarian agencies, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and 
Medicins San Frontieres  (MSF) and so on braved the odds to provide humanitarian reliefs to 
the people despite the great danger of working in the environment. As a human right body 
puts it, ‗[t]he complete absence of the UN since January 1991 when the government of 
Somalia collapsed … put the entire burden of meeting the basic needs of the people for 
survival on the ICRC and NGOs.‘107 The NGOs severely criticized the UN and its specialised 
agencies because while these NGOs continued to foray deeper into the country to provide 
assistance to desperate civilians, the UN literally abdicated its responsibilities.
108
 Somalis 
were confounded as to why they would be abandoned by the UN in such critical times despite 
the obvious desperate situation they faced.
109
 
It is important to understand this background because following the events of ‗Black 
Hawk Down‘ the view often presented is that Somalis did not want external intervention in 
their conflict. On the contrary, most Somalis actually desired and waited anxiously for the 
UN to intervene in their crisis. In fact, as concluded by Trevor Page who was head of the UN 
World Food Programme during the conflict, the tragedy in Somalia happened ‗because we‘ve 
let things simmer without paying attention.‘110 The delay in providing humanitarian 
assistance let alone intervening to halt the conflict significantly contributed to the staggering 
casualties recorded. 
Had the UN‘s assistance, both military and humanitarian, been forthcoming in the way and at 
the level expected by relief workers and Somalis, it would have greatly contributed to an 
atmosphere propitious to dialogue and compromise.  … The provision of humanitarian 
assistance and the maintenance of the cease-fire are closely linked. We need both at the same 
time.
111
 
By the time the UNSC finally passed its first resolution to enter the conflict, Somalia had 
slipped into a ‗black hole‘ irretrievably.112 The US was very unwilling to support a 
peacekeeping operation in Somalia for various reasons ranging from financial to domestic 
politics back in Washington.
113
 So, as Somalis waited on the UN and the UN in turn waited 
on a reluctant US, the situation grew from bad to worse. Finally, after so much criticism and 
based on the report of the UN Secretary General, the UNSC passed resolution 733 on 23 
                                                          
107Africa Watch ‗No mercy in Mogadishu‘ op cit note 85. 
108Sahnoun ‗Somalia: The Missed Opportunities‘ op cit note 81 at 9. 
109
Id. 
110
Ibid at 18 quoting Jane Perlez ‗UN let the Somali famine get out of hand, Aid says‘ New York Times 16 
August 1992 at 12. 
111
 Sahnoun ‗Somalia: The Missed Opportunities‘ op cit note 81 at 18. 
112
Id at 15. 
113
  Lewis & Mayhall ‗Somalia‘ op cit note 68 at 108. 
 
 
94 
January 1992 in which it recognised the situation in Somalia as constituting a threat to 
international peace and security.
114
 The resolution imposed arms embargo on Somalia, 
approved the appointment of a humanitarian relief coordinator and requested the Secretary 
General to take necessary action to provide humanitarian assistance to the population in all 
parts of Somalia.
115
 This resolution was unlikely to impact on the supply of arms because 
Somalia, and the entire region, as already mentioned above, was awash with arms left behind 
by the superpowers at the end of the Cold War.
116
  
On 17 March 1992, the UNSC unanimously adopted resolution 746 in which it 
pledged its support for the UN Secretary General‘s decision to dispatch a technical observer 
mission to Somalia.
117
 Following the continued deterioration of the situation in Somalia, the 
UNSC unanimously adopted resolution 751 to establish the United Nations Mission in 
Somalia (UNOSOM I) on 24 April 1992.
118
 This resolution directed the UN Secretary 
General to commence the airlift of humanitarian aid and to deploy a unit of 50 United 
Nations Observers to monitor the ceasefire in Somalia.
119
 The UNSC adopted several other 
resolutions in this regard in an attempt to bring the situation in Somalia under control but it 
proved difficult. As Ken Menkhaus observed years later, the impediments faced in state 
reconstruction efforts in Somalia ever since ‗… serves as a cautionary note that delayed 
external action to revive and support failing states only compounds the difficulty of state 
building later on.‘120  
On 25 November 1992, the US volunteered 20,000 troops and on 3 December 1992 
the UNSC unanimously adopted resolution 794 under Chapter VII authorising the 
deployment of a US-led multinational Unified Task Force (UNITAF) consisting mainly of 
US troops.
121
 By January 1993, the total UNITAF troops in Somalia stood at a record 38,300 
and the operation recorded some remarkable results in that it was able to secure the 
environment for delivery of humanitarian relief.
122
 However, the operation was short-lived 
and the lack of commitment to stay the course was apparent from the very beginning. For 
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example, although US troops arrived in Somalia on 8 December 1992, the US had made it 
clear that by the time President Clinton was inaugurated in January 1993, it should have 
pulled out of Somalia, indicating that the U.S. had no long term-strategy of commitment to 
the operation.
123
 During its short stay, UNITAF was able to restore some level of normalcy 
and create the enabling environment for aid agencies to deliver humanitarian reliefs.
124
 On 26 
March 1993, the UNSC unanimously adopted resolution 814 authorising UNITAF to transfer 
command authority to UNOSOM II and expanded the mandate of the new mission.
125
 The 
US had already begun a unilateral withdrawal of its troops and by March 1993 when 
resolution 814 was adopted for UNOSOM II to take over from UNITAF, it had cut its troops 
down to about 1,400 from 26,000 at the commencement of Operation Restore Hope.
126
  
Though largely regarded as a success at the time, the sudden and premature 
withdrawal of UNITAF eventually proved decisive in reversing the relative stability achieved 
by the operation and pushing Somalia into total anarchy, which UNOSOM II could not 
handle.
127
 By the time UNOSOM II withdrew in February 2005, the death toll was over 
300,000 and it is generally agreed that the intervention was a failure.
128
 Notwithstanding the 
failure of UNOSOM II, resolution 794 was celebrated at the time by scholars and 
practitioners alike as a normative breakthrough on two grounds: first, it set the precedent that 
the use of force within the territory of a sovereign state could be justified on humanitarian 
grounds because it constitutes a ‗threat to international peace and security‘.129 Secondly, it 
affirmed the existence of a moral obligation on the UNSC to rescue populations imperilled by 
famine and civil war.
130
 However, as events in Rwanda would prove subsequently, such 
euphoria was rather premature. 
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3.4 RWANDA: A BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND GENESIS OF THE 
CONFLICT 
 
‗Nations with a long history of conflict—whether Yugoslavia, Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
Congo or Rwanda will never know  peace unless they address the underlying historical social 
causes of conflict. They cannot do that alone; there must be concerted effort and mutual 
reinforcement on the part of multiple regional and global bodies.‘131 This assessment of the 
nature of African conflicts both in their origin, contemporary manifestations and the 
prospects for panacea serves a useful purpose in putting the Rwandan genocide in 
perspective. At the height of the conflict in Rwanda, many dismissed it as just another 
instance of inter-ethnic bloodletting characteristic of African societies for which the 
international press was later criticised.
132
 This rather simplistic view of the causes of the 
Rwandan genocide has been discredited as lacking any anthropological or historical basis, for 
long before the advent of the modern Rwandan state, the three ethnic compositions of Twa 
(hunters and gatherers), Hutu (peasant farmers) and Tutsi (herdsmen), lived side by side, 
spoke the same language, and shared other common cultural values without a clear distinction 
along racial identity.
133
  
The power structure in pre-colonial Rwanda was in four levels—provincial, district, 
hill and neighbourhood—with the Tutsis controlling power at the provincial, district and hill 
levels while the Hutus led at the neighbourhood level.
134
 This social arrangement of 
harmonious co-existence changed with colonialism, particularly after Rwanda became a 
Belgium-administered mandated territory. Relying on distorted history, the Belgians 
propagated a theory of racial superiority that regarded the Tutsis as having features similar to 
Europeans and thus probably being of European descent and so of superior race to the Hutus 
and the Twas.
135
 The Tutsis took this falsification of history and furnished the Belgians with 
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materials that purported to validate it.
136
 In 1933, the Belgians issued identification cards 
based on ethnic origin determined by physical features such as height, shape of nose. thus, 
institutionalising ethnic division by casting the ethnic distinction between Tutsis and Hutus in 
more concrete social forms.
137
 This policy afforded the Tutsis who dominated the colonial 
bureaucracy social and economic privileges to the exclusion of the Hutus who also quietly 
resented such systemic and systematic discrimination.
138
 Belgium‘s colonial policies of 
promoting ethnic division heightened the cycle of ethnic tension and violence right up to the 
eve of Rwandan independence and continued throughout much of its post-colonial history to 
1994.
139
  
The Hutus published a manifesto in 1957 demanding majority rule and in 1959, the 
Tutsi monarchy that had ruled Rwanda over centuries died in controversial circumstances 
sparking the first wave of genocide.
140
 The Hutus assumed power at independence in 1961 
and when attempts to reclaim power by Tutsis in 1963 failed, the Hutu majority embarked on 
a killing spree that left about 14,000 dead.
141
 The UN blamed the Belgians and the Rwandan 
government for the massacre.
142
 Both the 1959 and 1963 incidents resulted in thousands of 
Tutsis fleeing Rwanda for neighbouring countries and these refugees were to form the bulk of 
the Rwandan Patriotic Front rebel group that later waged a guerrilla war against the Rwandan 
government in the 1990s. In 1973, Juvenal Habyarimana seized power in a coup and his 
government maintained a strangle hold on power until he was killed in the 6 April 1994 plane 
crash igniting decades-old ethnic animosities and culminating in the decimation of a tenth of 
Rwanda‘s population—mostly Tutsis. 
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3.4.1 The Genocide and the Ensuing Humanitarian Crisis 
 
The Rwandan genocide was total in every respect. The clinical meticulousness that went into 
its planning, the military precision with which it was executed, the cruel efficiency of the 
strategies and instruments deployed and the diversity of the background of perpetrators all 
combined to produce the most efficient extermination of a group since Nazi Holocaust. An 
estimated one million people, mostly Tutsis and moderate Hutus were slaughtered within one 
hundred days. Within a short time after President Habyarimana‘s death, the would-be 
genocidaires comprising members of the Presidential Guard, the Interahamwe, soldiers, and 
other militias descended on Kigali with lists of opposition political leaders, human right 
activists, journalists and other professionals considered as ‗enemies‘ of the government all 
marked for elimination.
143
 There were different sides to the organisation and execution of the 
massacres but they all shared a common goal—the extermination of the Tutsi minority. 
Given the scale of the genocide, it is obvious that it did not begin in April 1994. In 
fact, planning and preparations had started as early as January 1991.
144
 When the RPF 
attacked a local prison in January 1991 setting the prisoners free, the government‘s response 
was to instigate and mobilise the local Hutu population to attack Tutsis resulting in the death 
of over 300 people.
145
 From then on, the ruling party, using the army, began to recruit and 
train ‗civil defense‘ teams.146 In 1992, as negotiations between the RPF and the government 
for a political solution progressed at Arusha, Hutu extremists within the government began to 
work to subvert the peace process and in no time another cycle of violence broke out, again 
claiming scores of lives.
147
 Government officials and local community leaders actively 
participated by inciting Hutus at  meetings to defend their country by burning the houses and 
killing the ‗inyenzi‘—a derogatory name that means cockroaches and used to describe the 
Tutsis.
148
 Within two days, more than 550 houses had been burnt and 248 people killed.
149
 
Huge refugee camps sprang up as Tutsis fled their homes and this continued into 1993 with 
an average of five people being killed daily.
150
 In a 1993 report by Bacre Waly Ndiaye, the 
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Special Rapporteur for the Commission on Human Rights for Extrajudicial, Summary or 
Arbitrary Executions, it was established that within the two previous years, over two 
thousand people, mainly Tutsis, had been targeted and killed purely on the basis of their 
ethnic identity.
151
 Ordinarily, this borders on genocide.
152
 
Another dimension was added to the preparation for the genocide when Radio-
Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) was established. Together with the government 
owned Radio Rwanda, and the Kangura Newspaper, this triumvirate constituted the media 
propaganda wing of the genocidaires.
153
 RTLM preached hate message relentlessly on the 
airwaves portraying Tutsis as enemies and often using crude metaphorical aphorisms such as 
‗[A] cockroach cannot give birth to a butterfly.‘154 Throughout the genocide the RTLM 
waged a relentless media war of spreading hate, first against the Tutsis, then against the 
Belgians, and finally against the UNAMIR troops. RTLM would broadcast wherever Tutsis 
were believed to have taken refuge and call on the perpetrators to finish the ‗work‘ (killing of 
Tutsis) as part of their duty to defend Rwanda.
155
 A Belgian journalist with RTLM later 
narrated how 129 Tutsis were killed in a field one after the other.
156
 In overall assessment, the 
creation and operation of RTLM was decisive in the genocide by spreading hate and inciting 
violence.
157
 Unfortunately, there was no contrary news channel to counter the propagandists 
whether within Rwanda itself or in the international press and as observed by the UNAMIR 
Commander, General Daillaire ‗[H]ad the international press been interested they would have 
made a difference but they simply were not interested.‘158 
Roadblocks sprang up all over Kigali and hundreds of Presidential Guards armed 
militias were on the streets.
159
 ‗At roadblocks in Kigali, the militia asked for identification 
cards, at first kicking all those with designation Tutsi, but this took too much time and 
became an irritation so militia singled out those who were tall, with straight noses and long 
fingers. And they killed those who looked educated and more wealthy [sic] than others.‘160 
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Within the first week, more than 20000 people had been massacred.
161
 On 7 April 
1994 in Gikongoro prefecture, militia members embarked on a house-to-house killing and 
refused to spare the eighteen Gikongoro orphans whose parents had been killed in February 
but who were being catered for by the local school.
162
 The killings were very often grotesque. 
On 8 April, the militia took their killing mission to hospitals and even mortuaries cut people 
with machetes and left the bodies were they fell.
163
 At the hospitals, they killed the sick and 
wounded and even health workers identified as Tutsis were taken away and killed.
164
 On 9 
April at Gikondo, members of the Presidential Guards stormed the Catholic Church and 
massacred the more than 500 people who had taken refuge in the Catholic Church after 
separating the Hutus from the Tutsis by checking their identity cards.
165
 Not even babies were 
spared and when the ICRC arrived in search of survivors, they estimated that over 10,000 
people had been killed at Gikondo within two days.
166
 In other sub-prefectures, roadblocks 
were first set up to control movements of those targeted, then Tutsi homes were attacked 
while local leaders and authorities like burgomasters encouraged the terrified Tutsis to gather 
at designated location for protection.
167
 But once they were gathered, the same local leaders 
surreptitiously mobilised and armed the militia directing them to attack the refuge sites.
168
 
This had the great advantage of facilitating the killings by reducing the time spent on hunting 
down every Tutsi through a house-to-house search.
169
 Narrating how one such ambush was 
put together by a leader in Mwendo, a survivor recounts ‗[t]here was so much blood that the 
burgomaster‘s car slid on the road when he drove by later.‘170  Another survivor recounts: 
I remember that already on April 10
 
there was a communiqué on the radio from the provincial 
administrator calling all the drivers with big trucks, because only four days after the genocide 
started there were such a lot of dead people here that it was necessary to bring the big 
trucks.
171
 
At the Gatwaro local stadium in the commune of Gitesi, about 20,000 people took refuge 
there on the advice of a local leader. But as soon as a lot of people had taken shelter there, the 
militia attacked the stadium using grenades and shooting at the multitudes. The Interahamwe 
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kept vigil outside the stadium and killed anyone lucky enough to get out of the stadium 
alive.
172
 Another survivor from Bissero recounts what happened there in the following words 
‗[W]hen we saw the attack coming we fled … they followed us, killing people, especially 
children, old men and women who could not run.‘ Over 50,000 people were killed that day at 
Bissero.
173
 So alarming were the atrocities that the ICRC had to issue a rare strongly worded 
statement on 29 April 1994 stating ‗[w]hole families are exterminated, babies, children, old 
people, women are massacred in the most atrocious conditions, often cut with a machete or a 
knife, or blown apart by grenades, or burned or buried alive. The cruelty knows no limits.‘174 
Even students were not spared so long as their ethnic origin was Tutsi. At Butare, 
university students who were Tutsis organised themselves into groups to keep watch for the 
attackers at night. This was of no effect because soldiers soon rounded up all Tutsi students 
and led them to where they were shot.
175
 Over 40,000 people were massacred in Runyinya in 
Butare prefecture and witnesses narrate how soldiers and gendarmes shot about 70,000 
people who had taken shelter in a church watching children weeping over their dead 
parents.
176
 At some stage in the genocide, the genocidaires moved around with lists of Tutsis 
and moderate Hutus marked for extermination. ‗Every journalist, every lawyer, every 
professor, every teacher, every civil servant, every priest, every doctor, every clerk, every 
student, every civil rights activist were hunted down in a house-to-house operation.‘177 As the 
killing spread, marauders moved slashing throats, cracking skulls and cutting people in 
halves. In Kibuye, out of a pre-genocide census figure of over 200,000 resident Tutsis, only 
about 8,000 were left at the end of the genocide in June 1994.
178
 Today, several churches, 
schools, markets, seminaries, are genocide sites all over the country.
179
 In its first letter to 
officially notify the UN of the genocide, the RPF stated: 
A crime of genocide has been committed against the Rwandese people in the presence of a 
UN international force, and the international community has stood by and watched. Efforts 
have been mobilized to rescue foreign nationals from the horrifying events in Rwanda, but 
there has been no concrete action on the part of the international community to protect 
innocent Rwandese children, women, and men who have been crying for help.
180
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The humanitarian statistics are staggering. In the heat of the crisis, 50,000 Rwandan IDPs 
settled in the central part of the country while another 200,000 mainly Tutsis fled to RPF-held 
areas of the north.
181
 Then as the RPF advanced up north, Hutus feared retaliation and within 
a day, about 250,000 had fled across the border into Tanzanian and another 47,000 fled into 
Burundi while Uganda and Zaire all recorded thousands of refugee influx into their 
countries.
182
 Sexual violence was also deployed as a tool in the genocide and it is estimated 
that there were about 250,000 and 500,000 rape cases though a paltry figure of 15,700 was 
reported.
183
 Children suffered most in the conflict as many of them were orphaned and there 
are about 300,000 child victims.
184
 In the midst of all these, the UN and the international 
community barely lifted a finger and it is instructive to briefly examine the degree of 
responsiveness of the international community in general and the UNSC in particular to the 
events of April – June 1994 in Rwanda. 
3.4.2 The International Response 
 
For some inexplicable reason, the Rwandan genocide can be said to have been malevolently 
‗opportunistic‘. Though it was predictable and preventable, yet it happened on a continent 
that has been condemned to international marginalisation—Africa— at a time when global 
attention was focused on other countries whose human rights were, perhaps more worthy of 
protection than those of Rwandese. In this scenario, there was just two alternatives that could 
have averted or halted the genocide: either the genocidaires had a change of heart or the OAU 
rose up to the challenge and both were remote possibilities at the time, hence the Rwandan 
genocide successfully entered the history books. A useful starting point for assessing the 
degree of responsiveness of the UN to the genocide would be to ascertain what the UN knew 
and what it did not know as a way of judging its attitude, first, to the imminent genocide and 
its obligations to halt it once it started, and, secondly, to crises in Africa generally. 
As mentioned above, the international media was severely criticised for not giving 
necessary publicity to the events leading up to the genocide and the massive killings that 
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characterised the month of April when the genocide began.
185
 Had this been done, it is 
argued, it would have created public awareness thereby generating public pressure for 
political leaders and governments to act.
186
 While not denying the impact of the so-called 
‗CNN effect‘, but this conclusion is questionable on the ground that the major forces at work 
within the UNSC that paralysed it from taking action had different agendas they pursued at 
the time. While France worked to prevent intervention on account of its long and messy 
involvement in the internal politics of Rwanda and its role in the run up to the genocide, the 
US had refocused its foreign policy thrust relating to humanitarian intervention as a result of 
the Somali debacle. It had stated that by Presidential Decision Directive 25, the US 
interventions would thenceforth be determined by national interest, and the extent to which it 
constitutes a threat to international peace and security.
187
 Even this latter condition would, it 
appears, also be interpreted in the light of direct or indirect US national interests or those of 
its allies. Rwanda did not meet any of these conditions and it is doubtful that any amount of 
media coverage would have persuaded the US to act or allow the UNSC to do so. 
In the case of Belgium and the UK, the two other major actors in the genocide, the 
motives were less benign except that they were a reflection of conflicting priorities where 
national interests were not at stake but there seemingly existed a moral obligation to act and 
the human and material resources such commitments entailed. In the end, it was an act of 
balancing between what material, human and financial resources should be made to satisfy 
the ‗consciences‘ and the demands of the gravity of the situation at hand. In Rwanda, it was 
the former that prevailed over the latter. The same rational probably explains the initial 
reluctance to label the atrocities genocide despite the overwhelming evidence because this 
would have given rise to a legal obligation to act under the Genocide Convention.
188
 Perhaps, 
the same reason also explains why the UK, for example, leased derelict armoured personnel 
carriers to the UN for UNAMIR at ludicrous fees only to withdraw the demand for money in 
embarrassment, when it became clear that the equipment were relics only fit for the 
museum.
189
 Finally, subsequent events in Darfur for example would lend credence to this. As 
will be shown below, Darfur received wide media coverage, but that did not necessarily lead 
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to intervention on the part of the UNSC even though the scale of atrocities arguably bordered 
on genocide. 
UNAMIR was always intended to be a small mission irrespective of the demands of 
the situation on the ground in Rwanda and this is evidenced by the opposition of prominent 
states within the UNSC to its creation and also reflected in its final size and mandate.
190
 Out 
of the minimum 4,500 troops requested by General Romeo Dallaire (UNAMIR Commander), 
just 2,548 were approved.
191
 Its mandate stipulated that it was to advance the ceasefire, help 
other UN agencies in the coordination of humanitarian assistance and facilitate the political 
process; and as a peacekeeping mission the traditional rules of engagement applied—that it 
could only use force in self-defense.
192
 There was no mention of civilian protection or 
collection of illegal arms or if it was to deal with armed gangs.
193
 As it turned out during the 
genocide, these defects and weaknesses in the mandate were decisive and handicapped 
UNAMIR and severely constrained its ability to prevent or halt the atrocities it witnessed. In 
fact, it did not take long for Dallaire to realise the inadequacies of the Mission in its mandate, 
equipment and personnel.
194
 Writing in his report of the atrocities observed by UNAMIR 
after arrival, Dallaire stated ‗[T]he swiftness, the callous efficiency and the ruthless number 
of men, women and children, murdered principally by machetes and bayonets was obvious in 
this well-orchestrated operation.‘195 The report states further that: 
The terms indiscriminate and ruthless are certainly not exaggerated as in these circumstances 
… the manner in which they were conducted in their execution, in their co-ordination, in their 
cover-ups and in their political motives lead us to firmly believe that the perpetrators of these 
evil deeds were well organised, well informed, well motivated and prepared to commit pre-
meditated murder. We have no reason to believe that such occurences could not and will not 
be repeated again in any part of this country where arms are prolific and political and ethnic 
tensions are prevalent.
196
 
This was to be followed by series of similar reports to the UN Headquarters in New York as 
the Commander kept the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) abreast of the 
mission and the operational difficulties it faced in the face of the gravity of the humanitarian 
crisis it confronted on arrival in Rwanda. The final size of UNAMIR and its mandate 
approved by resolution 872 was a compromise made to the US and the UK who were 
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vehemently opposed to any intervention in Rwanda.
197
 Coupled with this is the fact that long 
before the inception of the genocide, the US government had intelligence report warning that 
up to 500,000 people would die in Rwanda in the violence that would result should the peace 
process fail.
198
 There were reports detailing evidence of preparation for genocide, such as 
importation of arms and ammunition, machetes; recruitment, training and arming of militia; 
preparation of hit lists of targeted people. were presented to the US and the UK, yet they 
blocked attempts to expand UNAMIR‘s mandate and the resources available to it to respond 
effectively in the event of a massacre.
199
According to a Belgian official of UNAMIR, 
‗[e]veryone knew, even in Belgium what was going to happen for the plan of genocide was in 
place for a long time.‘200  
The international community and the UN in particular, had been informed of the 
preparations for genocide and everybody had been warned and so it was up to the UN to have 
responded appropriately through the right force and mandate, and for obvious reasons, it 
failed miserably.
201
 The evidence from both the US intelligence and US Ambassador to 
Rwanda at the time explaining that there was an unfolding genocide in Rwanda upon which 
the US acted and evacuated its citizens was sufficient proof of knowledge of the imminent 
genocide and refutes the ignorance feigned by US officials including then Secretary of State 
Madeline Albright and President Clinton.
202
 The explanation for the failure to intervene to 
prevent or halt the genocide was because Rwanda was not considered as worthy of the 
resources intervention would require.
203
 
The clearest evidence of the above assertion was the view by the UNSC to either 
withdraw UNAMIR completely when the genocide started or to scale down operations.
204
 
UNAMIR Commander had requested for a stronger mandate and reinforcements to respond 
to the spreading massacres but based on a United Nations Secretary General (UNSG) 
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recommendation to the UNSC, what he got at the end was the reduction of the troops to 270 
via resolution 912.
205
 The Nigerian representative had queried the wisdom of the 
recommendations of the UNSG on the ground that it did not provide for civilian protection.
206
 
In fact, during the debates on the initial intervention, African states maintained that the West 
could not reasonably and justifiably oppose the creation of UNAMIR on grounds of lack of 
resources while cornering resources to the mission in Yugoslavia.
207
 In the end, 
[h]ow half-hearted was the UN‘s effort for Rwanda was plain to see. Dallaire lacked the 
barest essentials. He was reduced to borrowing petty cash from another UN agency. He 
lacked everything from communication to sandbags, fuel and barbed wire. The mission 
lacked essential personnel.‘ Dallaire had originally requested for 4,500 troops but in the end 
he got only 2548 with US insisting that the mission must not cost above 10m dollars a 
month.
208
 
Perhaps, the most ignoble aspect of the role of foreign powers in the genocide is attributed to 
France for its participation in both the training and arming of the perpetrators of the 
genocide.
209
 Though the true extent of the French complicity in the genocide may never be 
known, very few doubt that the desperate efforts it made to secure UNSC authorisation for its 
‗dubious‘ Operation Turquois has more to do with obfuscating the extent it is implicated in 
the genocide than protecting Rwandan civilians in a genocide that had effectively ended by 
then.
210
 In the words of a French journalist ‗[i]n the far hills of Rwanda, France is supporting 
a regime which for two years with a militia and death squads, has been trying to organise the 
extermination of the minority Tutsi …‘211 In the end, the operation mainly succeeded in 
facilitating the escape of the genocidaires who then syndicated along the borders of 
neighbouring countries, especially Zaire, thus sparking a conflict that would eventually suck 
in two-thirds of the countries on the African continent.
212
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3.5 DARFUR: A BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND GENESIS OF THE 
CRISIS 
 
The origin and nature of the Darfur conflict is so convoluted that it is difficult to fully 
comprehend it without situating the conflict in the broader historical context of the North-
South Sudan civil war which is outside the scope of this thesis.
213
 Sudan as a country is 
religiously and linguistically dissected into Arabic-speaking North and the indigenous 
African languages of the South.
214
 Approximately 70 per cent of the population is Muslims, 
25 per cent practice indigenous beliefs while 5 per cent follow Christianity.
215
 The root of the 
present Darfur conflict is traceable to the colonial era when Britain amalgamated Darfur with 
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan in 1916 and the resurgence of violence in Darfur in 2003 was actually 
more of a product of these and other historical realities than a cause of it.
216
 Darfur is 
basically inhabited by the Fur, Zaghawi and Massaleit and though not necessarily a 
harmonious relationship, the history of Darfur shows that despite its diversity, Darfurians did  
not experience systematic conflict that pitched different races against one another and racial 
labelling such as ‗Arab‘ and ‗African‘ that now characterise modern Darfurian societies were 
virtually absent.
217
 
 
Throughout much of the colonial period, Darfur existed marginally in the social, 
political and economic periphery of Sudan and it was Khartoum and the Blue Nile Provinces 
that attracted investment and development while Darfur was neglected.
218
 At independence, 
the predominantly Arab North held political power and continued with the same system of 
governance they inherited from the British by marginalising Darfur and the South hence the 
North was cynically referred to as the ‗colonial successor‘ of Britain.219 There has therefore 
been a tension between those trying to reorder this relationship and create an inclusive system 
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that guarantees equal rights for minorities and a common political identity for the country.
220
 
According to Lesch, 
 
[b]ut the ruling ethnic nationalists have insisted and imposed a model that the majority of 
religion and widespread language should define the country‘s identity and be expressed in its 
legal and political system. In their view, minority groups who speak indigenous languages or 
subscribe to Christianity must either assimilate culturally to the Arab-Islamic majority or 
remain in separate territorial enclaves in which they can be exempted from the application of 
certain religious laws or linguistic requirements. They therefore see any compromise of Arab-
Islamic identity as impossible since that would mean relinquishing the image of a country that 
seeks to be homogenous in language and religion and intrinsically linked to Arab-Islamic 
civilization.
221
 
 
Against this background and situated in the context of the North-South civil war that has 
lasted for several decades, Darfur became militarized from the 1980s through to 2000s 
producing two parallel wings—the one advocating a restructuring of the Sudanese state for a 
more equitable distribution of political power and economic resources and the other a ‗neo-
Islamic revivalist movement that defines Darfur‘s role within a Sharia ruled-Sudan‘.222 
However, it was a combination of the policy of Arabisation pursued by both the Islamist 
government in Khartoum and Libya that sought to reinforce the ‗Arabness‘ or ‗Africaness‘ 
identities as a way of supporting Darfur‘s Arab communities against the indigenous African 
tribes in Darfur that finally threw Darfur into the abyss of genocide that it plunged into in 
2003.
223
 Libyan troops had been stationed in Darfur and flooded it with arms in aid of the 
Murahleen which the Sudanese government was purportedly putting together to fight the 
SPLA but who were in actual fact coercing Darfurians to accept Libya‘s ambition of 
annexation of Darfur.
224
 The anonymous publication of the ‗Black Book‘ gave expression to 
the historical dominance of the Arab North and the injustices and alienation suffered by 
Darfur and other parts of Sudan.
225
 At the same time, Chadian rebels were constantly raiding 
Darfur and it was in response to this that the Darfur Development Front decided to arm the 
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tribes in order to defend Darfur.
226
 It was in the midst of these dynamics that the Darfur 
conflict took on an ethnic dimension and the name Janjaweed first appeared.
227
 The supposed 
democracy in Sudan wreaked havoc in Darfur and all of these dovetailed with the 
expansionist ambitions of Libya in Darfur and the irresponsible politics of Chad in Darfur. 
Since then, the Darfur genocide was just waiting to happen.
228 
In early 2003 skirmishes ensued between government forces and the rebel groups but 
this was not seen as constituting any serious threat by Khartoum until on 26 February 2003 
when about 300 men attacked the town of Golu, killing about 200 government soldiers.
229
 
Again, on 25 April 2003, the group killed another 30 government soldiers and captured the 
commander of an Air Force Base causing a major setback and embarrassment to the 
government.
230
 In May and June of 2003, they killed another 500 and 250 soldiers 
respectively and captured the town of Kutun and its garrison. Thus, the Justice and Equality 
Movement became a force to reckon with as it waged a guerrilla war against the government 
of Sudan in defense of Darfur.
231
 The Sudanese government panicked and one way it 
responded was to begin to reconstitute the Arab militia, its composition and its relationship 
with the Sudanese government.
232
 Several Janjaweed camps were established across Darfur 
where they were supplied with arms and from where they launched attacks against civilians 
in Darfur villages.
233
 
3.5.1 The Humanitarian Crisis and Ambiguous Genocide
234
 
 
The mere fact that there is a debate on whether ‗genocide‘ is the proper term to describe the 
atrocities that occurred in Darfur is enough testimony to the magnitude of that tragedy. The 
exact date of the first attacks is not clear but sometime in April 2002 Arab raiders attacked 
Darfur killing 17 people, wounded many others, stole more than 2000 cattle and burnt over 
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600 houses.
235
 As the insurrection intensified in Western Darfur, the government of Sudan 
began to arm proxy Arab militias and mobilised them to attack Darfur.
236
 The ‗Janjaweed‘ as 
they became known, unleashed a reign of terror on Fur civilians in pre-dawn attacks in which 
they would kill and mutilate men, rape women and abduct children.
237
 These became the 
defining features of the lives of Darfurians in the huge province throughout early and late 
2000. The objective of the government-backed Janjaweed was a total destruction and 
annihilation of the non-Arab Fur, Massaleit and Zaghawa tribes of Darfur. 
As 2003 set in, more than 160 civilians had been killed and hundreds of villages razed 
while their livestock were stolen and it was clear the Arab militias were government 
sponsored and enjoyed immunity.
238
 According to a government official coordinating one of 
such attacks, ‗I have orders from the government. All our orders come from the government. 
We are here so no-one can point a finger at the government.‘239  By the time that attack 
ended, there were more than 1000 Masaliet dead and thirty villages burned.
240
 As the 
villagers took up arms in defense of their villages the attacks intensified and so did the 
casualties and the humanitarian crisis. These attacks were usually planned using certain 
tactics and their barbarity was indescribable. An aircraft could fly over a target village and 
later followed by another aircraft that would start dropping off improvised cluster bombs 
targeting mainly civilian objects.
241
 This is then followed by helicopters that fire rockets and 
machine guns at any standing object. When the air raids end, the Janjaweed ‗ground troops‘ 
move in for the final onslaught and would begin their operation by encircling the village and 
then launching an operation of killing, raping and burning of houses. Children are simply 
tossed into the burning houses.
242
 Attacks are usually well coordinated with the regular army 
providing reconnaissance with military aircraft and forerunner Jeeps. Describing the modus 
operandi of the Janjaweed, Flint and de Waal quote a report thus: 
Most attacks took place at night, when villagers were sleeping. Upon reaching a village, the 
attackers typically began by setting fire to all houses. Villagers who managed to escape the 
flames were then shot by the Arab militias as they fled their homes. The timing of most 
attacks coincided with the agricultural harvest. By burning the fields just before they were 
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ready to be harvested, or while the crop lay on the ground after first being cut, the militias 
destroyed the year‘s crop and exposed Masaleit farmers to starvation. … The atrocities were 
well planned and directed by the Sudanese military governor of the area.
243
 
The resulting humanitarian crisis was monumental. By May 2004 when US officials began 
mooting the word ‗genocide‘ in reference to Darfur, the conflict had already resulted in over 
80,000 deaths, 100,000 refugees and a million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).
244
 In one 
incident, a huge number of IDP had gathered at the village of Habila and without warning, 
the government air force started bombing them (though there was no evidence of rebels 
there), killing scores of civilians and wounding others.
245
 In a similar operation carried out by 
the Janjaweed and the Sudan armed forces,t Wadi Saleh, where thousands of Fur IDPs had 
taken refuge, was attacked and 332 villages were burned within a fortnight, leaving about 172 
people dead.
246
 The operation was extended to Wadi Debarei, where soldiers and Janjaweed 
took away over 100 men and executed 71 of them. In the end, more than 200 civilians were 
killed in that manner. Thus terrorized in this manner, the villagers would flee and the Arabs 
could then follow taking possession of the area.
247
 
There was pervasive violation of human rights and international humanitarian law by 
the Janjaweed militia. They would attack defenseless civilian communities and shoot, stab, 
burn alive, hang by the feet, decapitate or mutilate men and women while torturing others 
before killing them execution-style.
248
Rape also featured prominently as an instrument of the 
Janjaweed in Darfur. According to Flint and de Waal, 
[r]ape was so ubiquitous that it appeared to be an instrument of policy to destroy the targeted 
communities and perhaps even to create a new generation with ‗Arab‘ paternity. … These 
rapes are … orchestrated to create a dynamic where African tribal groups are destroyed … it‘s 
hard to believe that they tell them they want to make Arab babies, but it‘s true. It‘s 
systematic.
249
 
The tendency of the Sudanese authorities had always bordered on the adoption of genocide as 
an official policy of the Arab-Islamic government so it ought not to have taken the world a 
long time to discern that genocide was being orchestrated in Darfur.
250
As early as December 
2003, Jan Egeland observed that the ‗humanitarian situation in Darfur has quickly become 
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one of the worst in the world.‘251 In 2005, the number of Darfurian refugees in Chad rose to 
200,000, while IDPs stood at 2 million.
252
 The Sudanese authorities then added another tool 
to their genocide tactics by deploying starvation as a weapon. Food shipments by 
humanitarian agencies were blocked often using an array of administrative bottlenecks 
deliberately designed to emasculate humanitarian assistance efforts.
253
 It was estimated that at 
least 10,000 people were dying every month and the government of Sudan was implicated in 
the systematic creation of starvation camps.
254
 In his assessment, Mukesh Kapila described 
the Darfur crisis as a ‗tragedy‘ observing that Khartoum was making peace with the South on 
the one hand and producing refugees in Darfur on the other.
255
 The alarming rate at which 
war-affected people were dying was exposed when a UN team visited an IDP camp and 
discovered that the mortality rate was 147 times higher than the accepted benchmark for an 
emergency.
256
 What was the attitude of the UN Security Council to what then UN Secretary 
General described as the ‗world‘s worst humanitarian crisis?‘257  
3.5.2 The International Response  
 
Arguably, Darfur goes down in history as the first case of genocide in the twenty-first century 
and may well be the clearest example of the failure of the UNSC in Africa in the new 
millennium.
258
 The scale of the tragedy started emerging when Darfur refugees in Chad 
narrated their experiences to foreign journalists and aid workers.
259
 When the grotesque 
pictures of the genocide filtered into the international media, the international community 
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was still focused mainly on the North-South peace talks at Naivasha.
260
 The UN was in a 
dilemma because it feared the North-South talks could derail if too much pressure was put on 
Khartoum, a situation that only served to embolden Khartoum.
261
 As rightly observed by a 
commentator, ‗[o]ne of the most horrible aspect of the situation was that the genocide 
violence was by then unfolding in full view, on the orders of people whose names were 
known and who were still being received in international forums.‘262 The UNSG was under 
pressure from the West for a solution but it kept resisting the urge to call it ‗genocide‘ or 
launch an intervention knowing that those clamouring for intervention were also responsible 
for undermining it by denying the UN the political and military resources needed to 
undertake a humanitarian intervention in Darfur.
263
  
In many ways, this situation came to demonstrate the UN‘s practical limitations in crisis over 
which the heavyweight member states do not want to act. Blaming the UN was easy for those 
who were responsible for its inaction, and passing the buck to the African Union was another 
resort to sophistry.
264 
The UNSC passed several resolutions which it clearly had no intention of enforcing 
whatsoever and Khartoum was just as glad to discountenance them.
265
  The international 
media initially failed to give the Darfur genocide publicity, preferring instead to focus on the 
North-South peace talks.
266
 But with the increasing awareness through the activities of 
NGOs, the scale of the atrocities was able to attract international concern though not enough 
to lead to a military intervention.
267
 It was unanimously agreed that mass killing was 
occurring in Darfur, except that diplomats and politicians procrastinating and trying to evade 
whatever responsibility there is to act, could not agree on a name for it.
268
 Jan Egeland 
observed ‗The same tribes are represented both among those who are cleansed and those who 
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are cleansing‘.269 The European Parliament recognised the atrocities as genocide but beyond 
the disparate approach of individual member countries, it demonstrated a lack of resolve and 
interest to press for humanitarian intervention.
270
 This was captured in the words of Alan 
Goulty the British Special Envoy for Sudan, ‗[h]umanitarian intervention in Darfur would be 
very expensive and, fraught with difficulties and hard to set up in a hurry.‘271 Although the 
US was the first country to officially recognise the atrocities in Darfur as genocide, it ruled 
out military intervention, apparently for fear of a backlash on the heels of the Iraqi and 
Afghan war.
272
 
Once again, as in Liberia and Somalia, after the UNSC has abdicated its responsibility 
in Darfur, the buck was passed to the AU under the guise of ‗African solution to African 
problems‘.273  With the consent of the Sudanese government, a small force of African 
Mission in Sudan (AMIS) landed in Darfur in 2004 with a rather weak mandate and plagued 
by all sorts of handicaps ranging from finance to logistics and equipment.
274
 It was the first 
major operation for the new AU and as it tried to grapple with the deteriorating situation 
major powers within the UNSC opposed any major military humanitarian intervention.
275
 In 
the end, the UN managed to set up a Commission of Inquiry to ascertain whether genocide 
had occurred in Darfur and its findings was just as controversial as the UN response to the 
entire conflict.
276
 The Commission concluded that though the Government of Sudan 
committed crimes against humanity, it lacked the necessary intent to destroy in whole or in 
part, the African tribes of Darfur and since these crucial elements were missing, genocide did 
not occur.
277
 Despite this finding, many observers agree that there was strong proof of 
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genocidal intent and upon which one could conclude that genocide occurred in Darfur.
278
 The 
atrocities may have occurred in the context of competition for resources and ‗contested 
identities‘ but ‗the ultimate goal of maintaining and consolidating power does not rule out 
genocide as a means to that end‘.279 As of 2006, the genocide in Darfur had claimed 400,000 
and left 1.9 million IDPs behind.
280
 Finally in 2008, the AU and the UN co-deployed the 
United Nations African Mission in Sudan (UNAMID), a hybrid peacekeeping force, but ‗[a]s 
the world has learned in the decade since Rwanda, political will is crucial to giving life to 
protestations of ―never again‖.‘281 
3.6 LIBYA: BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
For a long time, the Maghreb region of North Africa has been a bastion of political stability 
with strong dictators and only a few upheavals which were few and far between, such that 
none of the major international early-warning watchdogs and conflict prevention mechanisms 
captured the Arab Uprising or the Libyan conflict.
282
 Muammar Gaddafi came to power in 
Libya in 1969 via a military coup and maintained power in the former Italian colony through 
populist social and economic policies and political repression. Though predominantly 
Muslims, Libya has deep tribal divisions which were exacerbated by Gaddafi‘s long rule and 
accusations of marginalisation. Gaddafi fashioned a foreign policy of aggression and 
meddling in the affairs of its poor neighbouring countries such as Chad and Sudan where it 
sponsored or supported different insurgencies oscillating between Arabisation of the Sahel 
Savannah and Pan Africanism.
283
 Whether in pursuit of his self-glorification of his ambition 
for a United States of Africa and the spirit of Pax Africana, Gaddafi championed the 
formation of the African Union and was its major financier until the events of 2011. While 
this earned him praises from admirers, particularly poor African states who benefitted from 
his largesse, it alienated his Arab neighbours and the West who saw Gaddafi as a sponsor of 
terrorism with a penchant for acquiring weapons of mass destruction. It was in this context 
that Gaddafi‘s Libya was sucked into the flames of the Arab Uprising in February 2011.  
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3.6.1 A Humanitarian Crisis? 
 
The uprising which began as mere protests in Benghazi on 16 February 2011, resonating 
events in neighbouring Tunisia and Egypt where popular uprising had toppled the regimes of 
Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak respectively, quickly escalated and spread to other parts of Libya 
within weeks and the demands changed from calls for better socio-economic conditions to 
political reforms. Gaddafi‘s response was swift, unleashing his apparatus of coercion on 
protesters and killing about 200 people in the first 3 days.
284
 On 20 February 2011, Human 
Rights Watch reports that the death toll had reached 233.
285
In another report, it was estimated 
that about 1000 were killed within the first two weeks as Gaddafi vowed to crush the 
uprising.
286 But rather than deter the protesters, the crackdown escalated the violence after 
every funeral procession and soon Libya was engulfed by a full-scale civil war.
287 
3.6.2 The International Response 
 
The international response to the Libyan crisis involved several actors: the UN, the League of 
Arab States, NATO and the African Union. France, Britain, Bahrain, UAE, the US and Qatar 
also played prominent roles within and without these organisations. The Libyan situation 
highlights the pitfalls inherent in the implementation of R2P and reinforces the argument of 
those who fear that R2P would be abused by powerful states. As mentioned in the preceding 
chapter, the most contentious aspect of the implementation of R2P is the responsibility to 
react.
288
 At the 2005 World Summit, the most heated debate was on the use of force to 
enforce R2P. Since then there have been issues of clarifying the scope of the principle and the 
implications in relation to the use of force with differing views and the Libyan crisis 
highlights how problematic these normative issues could become in practice.
289
 It is ironic 
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that in the past, whereas the argument of African States has been too little intervention and 
indifference to African humanitarian crises by the UN as we saw in Rwanda and Darfur, the 
contention in the case of Libya has been one of ‗over-intervention‘. Did the Libyan case meet 
the R2P threshold to trigger intervention? What prompted the intervention and how was it 
implemented? What is the implication of the Libyan intervention for the future of R2P and 
humanitarian intervention in general especially in Africa? How will it affect the tenuous UN-
AU cooperation or apparent rivalry in the maintenance of peace and security in Africa? The 
following analyses attempts to provide answers to these questions. 
The Libyan crisis was significant in many ways. For one, many Arab states known for 
their long-standing pro-sovereignty and non-interference stance actively supported external 
intervention, perhaps owing to personal resentment for Colonel Gaddafi or to deflect 
attention from their own internal crisis.
290
 For example, the League of Arab States issued a 
particularly strongly-worded communique calling on the UNSC to:   
impose immediately a no-fly zone on Libyan military aviation, and to establish safe areas in 
places exposed to shelling as a precautionary measure that allows the protection of the Libyan 
people and foreign nationals residing in Libya, while respecting the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of neighbouring States‘, and to ‗cooperate and communicate with the Transitional 
National Council of Libya and to provide the Libyan people with urgent and continuing 
support as well as the necessary protection from the serious violations and grave crimes 
committed by the Libyan authorities, which have consequently lost their legitimacy.
291
 
The Organisation of Islamic Conference also issued a statement calling on the UNSC to 
consider imposing a no-fly zone aimed at protecting civilians in Libya.
292
 The AU 
condemned Gaddafi‘s use of excessive force and sued for peace between the warring factions 
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while it promised to dispatch a committee to Libya to broker peace.
293
 The United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA) suspended Libya from the Human Rights Council on 1 March 
2011 and the League of Arab States also suspended Libya‘s membership.294 As the crisis 
escalated, the UNSC adopted resolution 1970 on 26 February 2011 under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter calling on the Libyan regime to stop the violent crackdown on protesters and 
discharge its responsibility to protect its citizens.
295
 The resolution stated that the situation in 
Libya could constitute crimes against humanity and it imposed assets freeze and travel bans 
on top-Libyan officials, imposed arms embargo on Libya and also referred the case to the 
ICC.
296
  The African Union (AU) High-Level Committee, set up to find a peaceful solution to 
the conflict, invited the parties for peace talks but the National Transitional Council (NTC) 
failed to attend, though the Libyan government accepted the roadmap proposed by the 
Committee.
297
 On 17 March 2011, the UNSC adopted resolution 1973 recalling that Gaddafi 
had failed to comply with resolution 1970 and so imposed a no-fly zone on Libya.
298
  
Resolution 1973 recognised that the parties to armed conflicts have an obligation to 
protect civilians and reaffirmed Libya‘s responsibility to protect while deploring its failure to 
comply with resolution 1970.
299
 As it turned out, it appears both resolutions 1970 and 1973 
were only enforced against the regime of Gaddafi rather than both parties to the conflict. Both 
resolutions 1970 and 1973 invoked the responsibility to protect (R2P) principle, though not 
expressly stating that it was the basis of its decision to use force; resolution 1973 opted for 
civilian protection as the basis for the resolution. Yet, from the wording of the resolution, it is 
clear that the ‗spirit‘ of R2P was prominent though the UNSC failed to mention it as the legal 
basis for its Chapter VII action, perhaps because the norm is still being challenged by some 
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as a legal norm.
300
 Nevertheless, the concept of civilian protection and R2P seems to have 
been conflated, so Libya is thus generally regarded as the first case where the UN authorised 
the use of military force to enforce R2P to halt human rights violations, protect civilians and 
prevent mass atrocities.
301
 However, the intervention raises several legal issues with 
implications for the R2P norm and international law in general.  
First, in the so-called R2P implementation ‗tool-box, there are several non-coercive 
measures meant to be applied progressively (though by no means in an inflexible order), but a 
progressive application that makes use of force as a last resort.
302
 Just like normal UNSC 
Chapter VII practice, non-military measures should have been explored and recourse to force 
adopted when such measures proved unable or unlikely to halt the violence and prevent mass 
atrocities.
303
 But in Libya, non-forcible means were tried but not given the time to take effect 
by the UNSC—travel bans and assets freeze were at best pursued half-heartedly suggesting 
that the decision to use force to topple Gaddafi was the motive from the outset; nor was Libya 
given the opportunity to even comply with resolution 1973 before enforcement action by 
NATO jet-fighters invaded Libyan airspace. In fact, some states actually worked covertly to 
undermine the AU initiatives that would have resolved the conflict but would have also seen 
Gaddafi remain in power. For example, President Jacob Zuma of South Africa, who led the 
AU Committee on the Libyan crisis, reportedly told reporters ‗I think that the point we have 
been making is that those who have a lot of capacity, even the capacity to bombard the 
countries, really undermined the AU‘s (African Union‘s) initiatives and effort to deal with the 
matter in Libya‘.304  
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Second, it is also significant to note that whereas resolution 1973 was adopted on 19 
March 2011, by 22 March 2011, French jets had already invaded Libyan airspace barely 48 
hours later.
305
 This calls into question the motive behind the resolution itself and its 
implementation because NATO did not give room for a nonmilitary option to work. This 
does not however derogate from the wide discretionary powers of the UNSC to determine 
what measures to take once it had made a determination under article 39 that a threat to the 
peace exists. As Krisch argues 
[m]ilitary enforcement is not an automatic consequence of non-military measures. It 
is up to the [UN]SC to decide which Chapter VII measures are to be taken, and 
member States are not entitled to use unilateral measures to enforce resolutions unless 
the [UN]SC has clearly authorized them to do so.
306
  
Even though it is not bound to do so, UNSC practice shows that it had always 
preferred to pursue non-military measures and given them adequate room to take 
effect before resorting to enforcement measures. This is why the intervention in Libya 
has proved very controversial. In effect, it seems Libya was handed a set of 
instructions but denied the opportunity to even comply and avert the consequences by 
those who issued the instructions. Thus, NATO obviously overstepped the boundaries 
of the authorisation in resolution 1973.  
Third, one of the requirements of R2P before the responsibility to react by military 
force can be invoked is that there must be a likelihood that the atrocities would be prevented 
and that it would do less harm and result in less casualties.
307
 In Libya, it cannot be said that 
the intervention met this threshold because, for one, it apparently protracted the conflict to a 
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point when even NATO and its allies began to entertain fears of a ‗mission creep.‘308 The 
result of this was that the conflict lasted longer and, perhaps, there were more casualties than 
would otherwise have been. It is submitted that rather than an enforcement mission, a 
peacekeeping operation, which in my opinion was what 1973 was meant to work towards, 
should have been a better approach to the conflict. 
Fourth, NATO is a defense alliance-cum regional organisation whose status is not at 
all clear. From the discussion in chapter 2, UNSC is vested with the responsibility to take any 
action it deems necessary to remove any threat to international peace and security. It is 
interesting to note that in Libya, the UNSC chose to appeal to both ‗threat to international 
peace and security‘ and the R2P principle rather than its long-standing practice of just 
categorising the situation as a ‗threat to international peace and security.‘ The reason for this 
is not clear but it would seem that it is because the bar for authorising the use of force on 
grounds of ‗threat to international peace and security‘ is higher and would have been more 
difficult to satisfy in Libya. Writing about the just cause threshold in the Libyan case, 
Michael Walzer asserts, ‗a military attack of the sort now in progress is defensible only in the 
most extreme cases.‘309 It is unlikely that the Libyan situation would have satisfied this just 
cause threshold. 
 
Fifth and a corollary of the above is the issue of motive. Under R2P criteria, the 
primary motive of the intervener should be to protect civilians even though other motives 
may exist.
310
An intervention aimed at tilting the balance of power in favour of one of the 
belligerents in a civil war cannot meet this condition. NATO‘s intervention was calculated to 
swing the outcome of the war in the rebel‘s favour.311 Besides, in a civil war, it is illegal for a 
foreign state or organisation to enter the war on the side of either of the parties to the conflict, 
hence, though resolution 1973 authorised a no-fly zone and protection of civilians, it is 
doubtful whether it can be relied upon for the regime change that ultimately became the 
primary objective of NATO in Libya.
312
 In Libya, some countries of the West from the outset 
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offered support to the rebels both overtly and covertly.
313
 Besides diplomatic pressures aimed 
at removing Gadhafi from power as against resolving the conflict per se, (both objectives are 
not necessarily coterminous), France, was the first to recognise the rebels as the legitimate 
government of Libya even though, at the time, the rebels hardly controlled more than just 
Benghazi in the entire Libya.
314
 The legal arguments for and against this cannot be addressed 
here but it suffices to mention that it demonstrates the priorities of France, the US, the UK 
and NATO as ‗enforcers‘ of UNSC resolutions. By supplying arms to the rebels, France and 
Britain violated the same UNSC resolution 1970 which imposed an arms embargo on all of 
Libya and which NATO claimed to be enforcing. It is a violation of international law for 
NATO or its members to enter the war on the side of the rebels or supply arms to them when 
they took up arms against the de facto and de jure government in place in Libya.
315
  
 
Sixth, there was an effective government in control in Libya constituting both the de 
facto and de jure authority and its consent was not sought or obtained before the intervention, 
contrary to UNSC practice.
316
 Libya therefore marked the first time the UNSC would 
authorise the use of force against a state with an effective government and a sitting 
President.
317
 As mentioned above, nothing in the scale of violence or threat explains this 
break from practice by the UNSC except the political motives of the US, Britain and France 
to effect regime change in Libya. Does this mean that we are gradually shifting away from 
the international law norm that state consent is required for use of force in internal conflicts 
by an outside force?
318
 Whereas for several years after the Darfur genocide began the UNSC 
insisted it needed Al Bashir‘s consent to intervene, it appears the UNSC has become 
inconsistent and selective in its practice. While it may be true that no two cases of 
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intervention are exactly the same, nor is it possible for intervention to be launched in all 
deserving cases, but a principle that does not respond to the most deserving situation opens 
itself to abuse and ridicule. 
 
Seventh, it is also debatable whether resolution 1973 authorised the use of force in 
Libya in the manner subsequently pursued by NATO. The aim of the resolution was to 
protect civilians and halt the violence. This is further buttressed by subsequent statements by 
African and Arab countries that voted for Resolution 1973, to the effect that NATO‘s action 
was not contemplated by resolution 1973.
319
 Besides resolution 1973 leaving much to be 
desired in its vagueness, it creates further ambiguity surrounding the phrase ‗all necessary 
measures‘ that has become a dominant feature of UNSC practice under Chapter VII of the 
Charter. For example, from the moment the resolution was passed, there were divergent 
views on its interpretation with some countries saying it permitted use of force,
320
 arming the 
rebels
321
 and even targeting and killing Ghaddafi.
322
 The resolution itself was so amorphous 
that it was amenable to manipulation by those who would want to take it and the R2P  norm 
to achieve less than humanitarian objectives. It is reminiscent of resolution 688 that was also 
manipulated to invade Iraq in 2003. It was in reaction to this manipulation that countries like 
South Africa promptly recanted on resolution 1973.
323
 
 
Furthermore, it is very doubtful whether aerial bombardment is a measure that 
protects civilians by any stretch of the imagination. The NATO intervention in Kosovo has 
proved the danger of such operations and the only rationale for NATO adopting it again in 
Libya would be the ultimate motive to topple Gaddafi.
324
 While the imposition of a ‗no-fly-
zone‘ over Libyan airspace by UNSC is characteristic of enforcing such resolution and seems 
to have been legal, the same cannot be said of aerial bombings that targeted civilian 
residences such as the Presidential Palace of Gadaffi. Assuming NATO was even a party to 
the conflict (which it ought not to be), such bombings are not dictated by military necessity 
                                                          
319
 Doyle ‗The folly of protection‘ op cit note 312; Evans, ‗When intervening in a conflict‘ op cit note 312. 
320
 Bellamy & Williams ‗The new politics of protection‘ op cit note 293 at 845. 
321
BBC NEWS ‗Obama not ruling out Libya arms‘ 30 March 2011 available at 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12902450> (accessed on 20/01/2012). 
322
 UK Defense Secretary, Liam Fox is reported to have told the BBC that targeting Gaddafi was ‗potentially a 
possibility‘. See Patrick Wintour & Owen Bowcott Libya: the legal case for deployment The Guardian 21 
March 2011 available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/21/libya-arab-and-middle-east-protest> 
(accessed on 21 February 2012). 
323
 South Africa, ‗War Crimes Court should probe NATO‘ op cit note 304. 
324
 See generally, Ivor H. Daalder & Michael E. O‘Hanlon NATO‟s War to Save Kosovo (2000). 
 
 
124 
and violate international humanitarian law—evidence of this exist in the number of civilian 
casualties (members of Gadaffi‘s immediate family including women and children) either 
killed or injured by NATO raiding civilian objects.
325
 The extent to which Gadaffi‘s position 
as Commander-in-Chief made his civilian residence housing his civilian family a legitimate 
target remains debatable, a situation compounded by allegations that Gadaffi used the 
residence for tactical coordination and other military operations.  
 
Finally, was NATO the proper organisation to enforce resolution 1973? The 
intervention of NATO in Libya brings to the fore once again the capacity of the UN to give 
effectiveness of the UN in enforcing its own resolutions and the question of sub-contracting 
such enforcement action to capable sub-regional organisations, states or group of states 
almost always in the global North against the global South. It highlights the consequences of 
the failures of the UN to create its own military command as envisaged by article 43 of the 
UN Charter and at San Francisco when the UN was formed. It exposes the system to abuse 
and demonstrates the urgent need for a reform of the UN to review the practice of delegating 
enforcement measures to ‗the willing and able.‘ Otherwise, the world would continue to see a 
situation where a powerful state in pursuit of political and economic national self-interest 
simply pushes a Chapter VII resolution through a UNSC where it wields a veto, and armed 
with the resolution, it begins to enforce UNSC resolution by ‗all necessary measures‘. An 
alternative framework therefore becomes imperative.  
 
Could the Libyan crisis have been resolved under the AU framework? The AU was 
not proactive and was more or less lackluster in its handling of the crisis. While this may be 
attributable to several factors such as the larger-than-life personality of Gaddafi on the 
African continent, the overweening attitude of the NATO P5 members of the UNSC, it 
however highlights the challenges facing the AU in the effective utilisation of the 
humanitarian intervention legal framework provided in its Constitutive Act especially article 
4(h) which I engage in chapter 4. This can be contrasted with the ECOWAS handling of Cote 
d‘Ivoire which in the characteristic manner of the organisation, took and maintained a firm 
position throughout the crisis.
326
 Unlike the AU, ECOWAS made it clear to Laurent Gbagbo 
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that it would not hesitate to use legitimate force should it become necessary and should 
diplomacy fail.
327
 Libya and Cote d‘Ivoire were different and the approaches of the AU and 
ECOWAS were markedly different too, apparently in keeping terms with the practice and 
precedents set by both organisations. Since the Cote d‘Ivoire crisis was resolved largely by 
domestic actors with minimal external involvement it would not be addressed here and a few 
comments would suffice.  
 
It is important to note that whereas the AU Constitutive Act provides for 
‗unconstitutional change‘ of government, the ECOWAS MCPMRPS actually talks about 
overthrow of a democratically elected government.
328
 The Arab Spring brings to the fore the 
significance of this distinction and the lacuna in the AU Act compared to ECOWAS. A 
popular revolution is not a constitutional change of government and should ordinarily be 
illegal under the AU Act. However, to hold this would fly in the face of sovereignty residing 
in the people and the objectives and principles of the AU.
329
 While it is advisable for the AU 
to amend its laws in this respect to reflect the ECOWAS example, it is unlikely that there 
would be a need for a popular revolution in a democratic setting since government could be 
changed through periodic elections. 
 
However, the Arab Spring would have been legal under the ECOWAS regime 
because what is provided for is the overthrow of a ‗democratically elected‘ government and 
none of Ben Ali, Mubarak and Gadaffi was democratically elected. The situation in Libya 
and Tunisia and Egypt are different for the three reasons: Tunisia and Egypt never reached 
the level of non-international armed conflict like Libya. Second, there were no external forces 
involved in Tunisia and Egypt as NATO was involved in Libya. Third, no UNSC resolution 
was needed in Tunisia and Egypt like Libya.  
As we shall see in the next chapter the AU and ECOWAS regimes offer alternative 
frameworks for addressing similar problems in the future and avoid the issues of legitimacy a 
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NATO-style intervention, though UNSC-sanctioned, introduces to the normative arena that 
undermines R2P and international law. As pointed out above, the question of consent was 
crucial to the intervention. If there was going to be any legal ground for a regional body to 
intervene it should have been the AU because not only is it the relevant regional organisation 
as contemplated by Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, but also because the issue of consent, 
and by extension, legality of the intervention would have been settled already because Libya 
had already consented to such intervention in article 4(h) of the AU Act. It must also be 
stated that it is doubtful whether the AU would have invoked article 4(h) in Libya had NATO 
not intervened. It is clear, however, that whenever there has been a conflict between 
competing priorities of national self-interest and humanitarian intervention in Africa, the 
former has always prevailed. Often, when there has been intervention, it has been to serve the 
economic or political interests of the intervener and it is doubtful that R2P will change this. 
Libya is just the latest example and it portends danger for the future of R2P. 
3.7 A CONTINENT LET DOWN AND THE SEARCH FOR A NEW LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK 
 
African leaders will not forget in a hurry the many conflicts that plagued the continent at the 
end of the Cold War, the atrocities occasioned by them and the untold hardship and human 
misery brought upon millions of people on the continent. Nor will Africans forget very easily 
the failure of the UN to prevent or halt these atrocities and the indifference of the 
international community in the midst of those tragedies.
330
 For the careful observer of the 
degree of responsiveness of the UNSC to crises in Africa, this should not come as a surprise.  
The UNSC discussed Darfur for the first time five months after the UN Humanitarian 
Coordinator for Sudan, Mukesh Kapila described the atrocities in an interview as ‗the world‘s 
greatest humanitarian crisis‘ maintaining that the only difference between Darfur and 
Rwanda was the numbers involved.
331
 The question of what name to call the Darfur atrocities 
had little to do with Darfurians themselves who could not care less, but it was of significance 
to the UNSC because it defines the threshold of its legal obligation.
332
 When the West and the 
UNSC dumped the Darfur conflict on the AU, their justification was the Brahimi Report 
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which recommended that the UNSC should allow regional organisations take primary 
responsibility for crises in their zones.
333
 This should not be a surprise either because the 
North-South war in Sudan had lasted for 21 years without ever being tabled by the UNSC. 
According to Gerard Prunier,  
[f]or the world at large Darfur was and remained the quintessential ―African crisis‖: distant, 
esoteric, extremely violent, rooted in complex ethnic and historical factors which few 
understood, and devoid of any identifiable practical interest to the rich countries.‖ The media 
viewed it as a humanitarian crisis which are usually passed on to the UN and that the West 
would expect it to act without being given the means to do so. As it became clear that it was 
another genocide, the UN passed the job it would not handle to the new AU. For the West 
―African solution to African problems‖ had become the politically correct way of saying ―We 
do not really care.‖334 
It is to the credit of the AU that notwithstanding the shortcomings of AMIS, it managed to 
reduce the scale of atrocities and even the UNSC admitted that the situation would have been 
far worse without AMIS presence.
335
 If the attacks were sponsored by the government as was 
the case in Rwanda, if the government armed the Janjaweed; if the Janjaweed was given 
orders by those the political leaders in Sudan; if the idea was conceived by those in 
Khartoum; if the attacks were directed at ‗changing the demography of Darfur to empty it of 
African tribes‘; then the only difference between Darfur and Rwanda seems to be, as 
mentioned above, in the numbers. And if it is accepted that the figure is not the essential 
criteria for determining genocide what happened in Darfur was a case of genocide, even 
though the UNSC, in order to abdicate its moral responsibility, and for fear of incurring legal 
obligation under the Genocide Convention, chose to call it by some other name. In fact, it 
does injustice to the memory of the victims to allow this ‗legal spin‘ to stay. The responses of 
the UNSC to the three cases of genocides in Africa—prevaricate, deny, obfuscate, and when 
the killings are over, give it a label and say ‗Never Again.‘ 
Admitting failure of the UNSC in Rwanda, then UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated 
‘We are all to be held accountable for this failure, all of us, the great powers, African 
countries, the NGOs, the international community. It is a genocide. … I have failed. … It is a 
scandal.‘336 Similarly, the International Panel of Eminent Personalities blamed the UNSC for 
the genocide in Rwanda and recommended that the defunct OAU set up its own security 
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mechanism to avoid a recurrence and the AU and ECOWAS heeded this call by adopting a 
new humanitarian intervention framework modeled on that of ECOWAS.
337
 As we saw in the 
case of Liberia, ECOWAS intervention prevented the humanitarian crisis from worsening and 
brought the situation under control, thus averting Rwanda-style genocide. Wippman 
observes, ‗[f]or the most part, ECOMOG was welcomed throughout Liberia while the 
Liberian people continue to be bitter against the international community and the US for 
abandoning Liberia in sharp contrast with the swift response to the invasion of Kuwait.‘338 
On the other hand, there was no such competent regional organisation in East Africa 
to come to the aid of Somalia. The OAU was incompetent and still tied to its principle of 
non-interference in its Charter. An indifferent UNSC and a disinterested international 
community all made Somalia what it eventually became. Even the intervention that could be 
described as nothing more than a half-hearted attempt only stemmed from a feeling of moral 
guilt by those who helped create the volatile situation in the Horn of Africa in the first place. 
For nothing but ‗[t]he low priority of that region in the strategic calculations of the dominant 
coalition as compared to Europe or the Middle East explains the relative indifference of the 
―international community‖ to humanitarian crisis in Africa.‘339  
For far too long the UN procrastinated on intervening in Somalia basically because of 
the financial and human resources it would entail and Africa was not viewed as significant 
enough to warrant such commitments. And when the intervention finally happened, financial 
considerations motivated the US to terminate UNITAF and transfer the mission to UNOSOM 
II, which proved disastrous. Having been abandoned by the international community as a 
basket case for over two decades, Somalia now presents the world with its own dangers. It is 
now a threat to its neigbours and the international community with resurgence in piracy, 
pictures of starving and dying children, as well as becoming a breeding ground for 
transnational criminality and international terrorism. In the end, the world is paying much 
more than it would have cost to sustain a robust humanitarian intervention in Somalia in the 
1990s, both in terms of human and material resources.
340
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3.8 CONCLUSION 
 
Since the Rwandan genocide, there has been buck-passing within the UN and the 
international community forcing African leaders to re-assess the present Charter 
arrangements on the maintenance of peace and security in Africa, the role of regional 
organisations and its implications for Africa in the New World Order with a view to 
fashioning how Africa should respond appropriately to protect the continent and its peoples. 
 
The UNSC‘s response to the Darfur conflict is significant for two major reasons: first 
for its failure to prevent or halt the genocide, and secondly, it is the only genocide to have 
occurred post-R2P, and so provides a useful tool of analysis of the effectiveness of the UNSC 
and the Charter framework for humanitarian intervention to be adapted for the 
operationalisation of the doctrine. As will be shown in in subsequent chapters, it highlights 
not the weaknesses of R2P as a principle as some have argued, but underscores the fact that 
the Charter had never been able to function as intended by the drafters in 1945. This is 
particularly so in the area of human rights protection and the maintenance of international 
peace and security. There is reason to believe that unless properly implemented, R2P would 
probably meet the same fate if a complementary or alternative framework is not sought.
341
 
 
In Rwanda, and later in Darfur, there were several opportunities for the UN to have 
prevented the cycle of violence and bloodbaths that eventually enveloped these African 
countries, but being African crises no one, beyond the rhetoric of diplomatic niceties, was 
willing to make the sacrifices a humanitarian intervention in these conflicts would have 
entailed. As the cases reviewed above show, it is the failures of the UN in Africa that finally 
paved the way for a new Regional Order in Africa at the beginning of this century. This has 
taken the form of extra-Charter humanitarian intervention treaties by African states to which I 
now turn.  
                                                          
341
 Clough ‗Darfur: Whose responsibility to protect?‘ op cit note 259. 
 
 
130 
CHAPTER 4:  THE AU/ECOWAS UNILATERAL HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
LEGAL REGIMES AND THE UN CHARTER 
 
International law makes sense only in the context of the lived history of the peoples of the 
Third World. … The experience of colonialism and neo-colonialism has made Third World 
peoples acutely sensitive to power relations amongst states and to the ways in which any 
proposed international rule or institution will actually affect the distribution of power between 
states and peoples.
1
  
Africa cannot count on the world outside to solve its crises. It is largely on its own. This is at 
least as true in ending human rights abuses as in ending conflicts.
2
  
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapter discussed some cases of humanitarian crises in Africa, the 
disinterestedness and the degree of responsiveness of the international community in general 
and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in particular to crises in Africa compared to 
other regions of the world such as the Middle East and Europe. It underscored the 
ineffectiveness of the UNSC and how the experiences of Africa are increasingly pushing 
Africa towards designing its own coping mechanisms and competences for humanitarian 
intervention, such as the adoption by ECOWAS and the AU of a humanitarian intervention 
framework outside the UN Charter system. The objective of the present chapter is threefold: 
first, it outlines specific provisions of AU/ECOWAS instruments relating to humanitarian 
intervention in order to deconstruct their normative contents. Secondly, the chapter considers 
the relationship between these provisions and relevant provisions of the UN Charter and 
outlines the arenas of apparent normative conflict or ambiguities. Thirdly, it examines the 
justifications and possibility of normative compatibility between the regimes. Both the AU 
and ECOWAS instruments are examined simultaneously. The term ‗unilateral humanitarian 
intervention‘ as used here means humanitarian interventions not authorised by the UNSC. 
I argue here that there are three main arenas of normative clash between the 
AU/ECOWAS regimes and the UN Charter: first, the Charter prohibits the use of force 
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except in self-defense under article 51 and enforcement action under Chapter VII.
3
 By 
providing for new legal grounds on which force could be used outside these two grounds, 
article 4(h) of the AU Act and article 10 of the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (MCPMRPS) Protocol are 
in conflict with article 2(4) of the Charter. A second arena of normative ambiguity arises 
from the question of which agency, between the UN, AU and ECOWAS has primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in Africa (in the case of the AU), and 
West Africa (in the case of ECOWAS), in view of the following provisions: article 24 of the 
UN Charter, article 16 and 17 of the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) 
Protocol, and articles 10(c), (d), 22 and 25 of the ECOWAS MCPMRPS Protocol.  The third 
arena of normative clash arises from the question of which agency between the 
AU/ECOWAS and the UN authorises the use of force in Africa in view of the following 
provisions: articles 16 and 17 of the AUPSC, article 10(c) and 25 of the ECOWAS 
MCPMRPS, all suggesting that the AU and ECOWAS do not require United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) authorisation to use force in their regions, contrary to article 53(1) 
of the UN Charter which requires regional organisations to obtain UNSC authorisation for 
enforcement actions. This is then situated in the context of the supremacy clause in article 
103 of the Charter, which prohibits UN member states from entering into treaties whose 
obligations are inconsistent with their Charter obligations. Finally, the attempt at normative 
compatibility by scholars is considered in the context of the global search for a framework for 
the implementation of the military intervention component of R2P and the utility of the 
African initiatives. It should however be borne in mind that these arenas of normative 
incompatibility remain in the realm of theory and are yet to be borne out by state or 
organisational practice. 
4.2 BACKGROUND TO THE AU/ECOWAS REGIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION LEGAL REGIMES 
 
The sudden end of the Cold War and the consequent neglect of Africa presented African 
leaders with a set of new challenges, the foremost being how to manage the increasing intra-
state conflicts on the continent.
4
 African leaders‘ efforts to deal with these challenges have 
required innovation and creativity and, ironically, have resulted in novel norm-creation 
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described as some of the ‗most important post-Cold War developments in international law.‘5   
For example, as at the time of the intervention in Liberia, there was no extant legal instrument 
specifically dealing with such situations under ECOWAS law, but ECOWAS created 
ECOMOG in response, and the resulting legal quandary led to the unprecedented provisions 
in the 1993 ECOWAS Revised Treaty and the 1998 MCPMRPS Protocol.
6
 Taking a cue from 
ECOWAS interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone and its subsequent efforts to create a 
legal framework for future interventions, the defunct Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
sought to create an interventionist legal regime for the continent as a whole. Beginning with 
the Kampala Document, the OAU took a comprehensive assessment of the precarious peace 
and security condition of Africa, and proposed a new approach to the new challenges facing 
the Continent.
7
 This was followed by the adoption of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management and Resolution in 1993, which built on the Kampala Document. 
Against the backdrop of the numerous challenges faced by Africa, particularly in the area of 
peace and security and the debilitating impact they were having on socio-economic 
development in the context of the major changes taking place in the world, the OAU set out 
the framework that would later underpin the major transition from the OAU principle of non-
interference to the future AU‘s doctrine of non-indifference.8 From 1994, the OAU started re-
thinking its position on nonintervention in internal affairs but ECOWAS was the pacesetter  
for an interventionist legal regime on the continent. 
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Law and Practice: Integration, Migration, Human Rights, Access to Justice, Peace and Security (2009) 1. 
(hereafter Ladan Introduction to ECOWAS Law). 
7
 See Draft Kampala Document for a Proposed Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation 
in Africa (CSSDCA), Kampala, Uganda, 22 May, 1991. 
8
 See Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the Establishment of a Mechanism for 
Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (1993) AHG/Decl. 3/(XXIX) adopted by the 29
th
 Session of 
the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at Cairo, Egypt, from 28-30 June, 1993. 
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This paradigm shift should be understood in its historical context. At inception in 
1963, the cardinal objective of the OAU was the decolonisation of Africa.
9
 The OAU 
mobilised for this objective using the platform of the UN and employing the instrumentality 
of international law.
10
 It was important at that stage to guard the newly won independence, 
hence the principle of sovereignty and non-interference was viewed as central to OAU‘s 
objectives and was enshrined in article 3(2) and (3) of its Charter.
11
  The emphasis was on 
consolidation of sovereignty, promotion of unity and solidarity in Africa.  However, the OAU 
was sometimes confronted with a contradiction in its avowed principles of sovereignty, 
domestic jurisdiction and non-interference on the one hand, and its condemnation of the racist 
domestic policies of Apartheid South Africa, for example,
12
 on the other. 
By the 1980s, as the last vestiges of colonialism were broken and most African 
countries achieved self-rule, Africa entered a new phase and found itself confronted by a new 
set of challenges—internal armed conflicts and secessionist armed struggles. Many factors, 
both internal and external combined to produce a continent replete with states struggling to 
build national unity from the arbitrary assemblage of peoples that became the dominant 
characteristic of the inherited colonial borders of post-colonial African states. The result has 
been unending civil wars, genocides, state failures and state collapse. This colonial legacy 
partially explains the 1994 Rwanda genocide in which almost one million Tutsis and 
moderate Hutus were massacred within 100 days as the world stood by and watched. In the 
aftermath of the genocide, the OAU set up the International Panel of Eminent Personalities 
(IPEP) to investigate the immediate and remote causes of the genocide and recommend how 
Africa could avert a recurrence in future. In its recommendations, the Panel stated: 
‗Since Africa recognises its own primary responsibility to protect the lives of its citizens, we call on:  
(a)  the OAU to establish appropriate structures to enable it to respond effectively to enforce 
the peace in conflict situations; and  
                                                          
9
 See Article 2(d) of the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity adopted at Addis Ababa on 25 May 1963 
(479, U.N.T.S. 39) which came into force on 13 September 1963.To this end it sought to promote the 
consolidation of independence already won and solidarity with those still under the yoke of colonial domination.  
10
 For example, the OAU was at the vanguard of pushing for the UN Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 
1960; the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, General 
Assembly Resolution 3068 (XXVIII) of 30 November 1973 which entered into force on 18 July 1976. 
11
 Which provides ‗The Member States in pursuit of the purposes stated in article II, solemnly affirm and declare 
their adherence to the following principles (1) the sovereign equality of all Member States; (2) non-interference 
in the internal affairs of states; (3) respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each states and its 
inalienable tight to independent existence.‘  
12
 Claude E Welch Jr. ‗The O.A.U. and human rights: towards a new dawn definition‘ (1981) 19:3 The Journal 
of Modern African Studies 401 at 401. 
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(b)  the international community to assist such endeavours by the OAU through financial, 
logistic, and capacity support
13
 
These recommendations were implemented in the AU Constitutive Act examined below. 
Thus, the new humanitarian intervention regimes of AU and ECOWAS were spawned by the 
failures of the UN and its lack of interest and commitment to African crises and it was 
therefore up to African regional organisations to develop their own capacity in that respect.
14
 
As Jean Allain puts it, whatever legal debate the AU/ECOWAS humanitarian intervention 
may generate among scholars,  
One cannot over emphasize [sic] the effects the 1994 Rwandan Genocide had in moving 
African states in establishing a mechanism to ensure that such mass killing would not happen 
again. The memory of African leaders and the Continent as a whole remains scared by the 
mass slaughter which transpired in its midst and the indifference to it manifest by the 
international community as demonstrated by the United Nations own acknowledgement of its 
―failure […] to prevent, and subsequently to stop the genocide‘‘.15 
Africa‘s experiences as a battle ground for proxy wars during the Cold War and the 
humanitarian catastrophes of the 1990s reaffirmed the OAU‘s belief that African issues are 
more likely to be resolved amicably if pursued within Africa sheathed from external 
meddling and the politics of the UNSC.
16
 This provided the impetus and justifications for the 
new AU and ECOWAS humanitarian intervention regime. 
 
 
                                                          
13
 See IPEP Report ‗Recommendation‘ para 22, (emphasis added), echoing similar views, the OAU Secretary-
General‘s report had recommended that the OAU mechanism for peace and security should be made to include 
the deployment for peace enforcement forces under the control and authorisation of Africa. See, Organisation of 
African Unity, Background Document on the Review Structures, Procedures and Working Methods of the 
Central Organ (2002) 1-42, cited in Jeremy Levitt ‗The Peace and Security Council of the African Union: the 
known unknowns‘ (2003) 13 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 109 at 115 (hereafter, Levitt ‗The 
AUPSC‘) See also Kuwali ‗The end of humanitarian intervention‘ infra note 40 at 45, underscoring the self-
recriminations and indignation felt by Africans for their failures to act on their own in Rwanda and prevent the 
genocide. 
14
 Lee F Berger ‗State practice evidence of the humanitarian intervention doctrine: the ECOWAS intervention in 
Sierra Leone‘ (2001) 11 Indiana International and Comparative Law Review 605 at 613 (hereafter Berger 
‗ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone‘). 
15
 Jean Allain ‗The true challenge to the United Nations System of the use of force: The failures of Kosovo and 
Iraq and the Emergence of the African Union‘ (2004) Max Planck United Nations Yearbook 237 at 263 
(hereafter Allain ‗The true challenge to the United Nations‘). See further, United Nations Secretariat, Report of 
the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, Doc. 
S/1998/1257 (1999) 16 December, 1999 at 3. 
16
 Paul D Williams ‗From non-intervention to non-indifference: The origins and development of the African 
Union‘s security culture‘ (2007) 106: 423 African Affairs 253 at 264 (hereafter Williams ‗From non-intervention 
to non-indifference‘). 
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4.3 DECONSTRUCTING THE AU/ECOWAS HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
 LEGAL REGIME 
The relevant provisions I am concerned with here under ECOWAS law are article 58 of the 
ECOWAS Revised Treaty, Paragraph 46 of the Framework for the Establishment of the 
MCPMRPS, articles 10 and 25 of the ECOWAS MCPMRPS Protocol. For the AU, I consider 
article 4(h) and (j) of the AU Constitutive Act, article 4(j), 16 and 17 of the AUPSC Protocol. 
These provisions seek to construct an extra-Charter humanitarian intervention legal 
framework. To implement article 58 of the Revised Treaty, article 25 of the MCPMRPS of 
ECOWAS provides that the Protocol is to be invoked: 
(a) In cases of aggression or conflict in any Member State or threat thereof: 
(b) In case of conflict between two or several Member States; 
(c) In case of internal conflict: 
(i) that threatens to trigger a humanitarian disaster, or 
(ii) that poses a serious threat to peace and security in the sub-region; 
(iii) In event of serious and massive violation of human rights and the rule of law. 
(d) In event of massive and serious violation of human rights and the rule of law 
(e) Any other situation as may be decided by the Mediation and Security Council.17 
 
By the same token, article 10 of the MCPMRPS empowers the Mediation and Security 
Council to: ‗(a) decide on all matters relating to peace and security; (b) decide and implement 
all policies for conflict prevention, management and resolution, peace-keeping and security; 
(c) authorise all forms of intervention and decide particularly on the deployment of political 
and military missions; (d) approve mandates and terms of reference for such missions; (e) 
review the mandates and terms of reference periodically, on the basis of evolving 
situations.‘18 ECOMOG is appointed as the military wing of ECOWAS and responsible for 
all its military operations.
19
 Under the AU regime, article 4 of the AU Constitutive Act 
provides that ‗the Union shall function in accordance with the following principles:  
(h) the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the 
Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes 
against humanity; 
                                                          
17
 Protocol Relating to the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention Management, Resolution, Peace-
keeping and Security, signed at Lome, Togo on 10 December 1999 and entered into force upon adoption 
(hereafter the ‗ECOWAS MCPMRPS Protocol‘). See also Paragraphs 17 and 46 of the Framework Establishing 
the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security, 
Abuja, 31 October, 1998 (hereafter ‗ECOWAS MCPMRPS Framework‘). 
18
 See article 10 of the ‗ECOWAS MCPMRPS Protocol‘.  
19
 ECOMOG is created by article 17 of the ECOWAS MCPMRPS Protocol as one of the supporting Organs of 
the MCPMRPS and it is authorised to carry out all military interventions of ECOWAS including ‗Humanitarian 
intervention in support of humanitarian disasters, enforcement of sanctions and embargo, preventive 
deployment, Peacebuilding operations, disarmament and demobilization…‘ See article 22 of the ECOWAS 
MCPMRPS Protocol. See also the MCPMRPS Framework para. 51-52. 
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(j) the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace 
and security‘  
Similarly, the Protocol of the African Union Peace and Security Council provides that in 
discharging its duties, the AUPSC shall inter alia be guided by ‗the right of the Union to 
intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave 
circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity in accordance with 
article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act.‘20  It also provides for ‗the right of Member States to 
request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security in accordance with 
article 4(j) of the Constitutive Act.‘21 The relationship between the AU and sub-regional 
                                                          
20
 See article 4(j) of Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African 
Union signed on 9 July, 2002 at Durban, South Africa, and came into force on 26 December, 2003 (hereafter 
‗AUPSC Protocol‘). 
21
 Supra note 20 article 4(k). The question of whether article 4(h) can be seen as intervention by a priori 
invitation is addressed in Chapter 7. However, for purposes of deconstructing the relevant provisions of the 
AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes, the legal validity of which this thesis explores, it is pertinent to distinguish 
between article 4 (h) and article 4(j) of the AU Constitutive Act. Unlike article 4(h), article 4(j) codifies the right 
of of a member state to request intervention from the AU. It provides for the ‗right of Member States to request 
intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security‘. Some commentators argue that given the 
AU‘s intervention history, the AU intervention regime is more likely to be implemented Relying on article 4(j) 
rather than article 4(h) as legal basis for future interventions on the continent. See Erika de Wet ‗Regional 
Organisation and Arrangement and their relationship with the United Nations: The case of the African Union‘ in 
Marc Weller (ed)‘ Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force (2014); Erika de Wet ‗The evolving role of ECOWAS 
and SADC in peacekeeping-operations: A challenge to the primacy of the United Nations Security Council? 
(2014) 27 Leiden Journal of International Law (forthcoming). De Wet further argues that article 4(j)‘ derives 
from the practice of AU member states to request intervention from the Union to maintain internal stability and 
order. Other commentators argue that article 4(j) could be abused and used by a member state to seek AU 
intervention to help a government suppress legitimate aspirations for political reforms or democratic change. 
See A Parker & Donald Rukare ‗The new African Union and its Constitutive Act‘ (April 2002) 96: American 
Journal of International Law 365. First, it is conceded that article 4(j) of the AU Constitutive Act is a 
codification of the right to request intervention. However, article 4(h) on the other hand relates to the right of the 
AU to re intervene in a member state to prevent genocide, war crime and crimes against humanity. The issue 
then is: when the AU decides to intervene on the basis of article 4(h) or 4(j) does it need the contemporaneous 
consent of the target state? In my opinion, when the AU intervenes on the basis of article 4(h), the 
contemporaneous consent of the target state is not necessary because article 4(h) effectively amounts to 
intervention by invitation a priori. See Dan Kuwali ‗Persuasive prevention: Towards a principle for 
implementing article 4(h) and R2P by the African Union‘ (2009) 42 Current African Issues 1 at 17.  On the 
other hand, article 4(j) is only invoked upon a request made to the AU to intervene in a state. The crucial 
question then becomes: request by whom? Thus, the way article 4(j) would be invoked is likely to be determined 
by who can legally make the request for intervention. Who is entitled to request the intervention provided for 
under article 4(j)—the territorial state or a third (member) state of the AU? If it is the territorial state that is 
entitled to request intervention, then what happens if such territorial state is the perpetrator of the massive 
violations of human rights to be prevented or halted?  Certainly, such state would be unlikely to request 
intervention except it is aimed at stabilizing its government in power. It is important to underscore that when an 
AU member state requests intervention on the basis of article 4(j), first, the question of contemporaneous 
consent does not even arise. Secondly, UNSC authorisation to intervene in such state is not necessary since the 
right to request intervention is part of the exercise of sovereignty by a state. But it is not clear from a literal 
reading of article 4(j) who should request the intervention or whether a third state can lawfully make such 
request. Relying on the rule 4(f) of the Rules of Procedure of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government, Cilliers and Sturman contend that article 4(j) was intended to be given a narrow interpretation in 
which case only the territorial AU member state (as against third AU member states) can lawfully request 
intervention on the basis of article 4(j). See Jakckie Cilliers & Kathryn Sturman ‗The right intervention‘‘ (2002) 
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groups like ECOWAS, on the one hand, and other organisations, particularly the UN, on the 
other hand, is set out thus: 
16. (1) The Regional Mechanisms are part of the overall security architecture of the 
Union, which has the primary responsibility for promoting peace, security and stability in 
Africa. … 
17 (1) In the fulfillment of its mandate in the promotion and maintenance of peace, 
security and stability in Africa the Peace and Security Council shall cooperate and work 
closely with the United Nations Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. The Peace and Security Council shall also 
cooperate and work closely with other relevant UN Agencies in the promotion of peace, 
security and stability in Africa.  
(2) Where necessary, recourse will be made to the United Nations to provide the 
necessary financial, logistical and military support for the African Unions‘ activities in the 
promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, in keeping with the 
provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter on the role of Regional Organisations in the 
maintenance of international peace and security.
22
 
 
These provisions have serious implications for the Charter System and international law. At 
the drafting of the Charter in San Francisco, the relationship between regional organisations 
and the UN was hotly debated with some advocating the principle of universalism and others, 
like the Latin American states, preferring regionalism.
23
 The provisions in Chapter VIII of the 
UN Charter reflects the compromises by the groups that anchored the relationship between 
the UN and regional organisations like AU and ECOWAS on the principle of subsidiarity but 
also left some issues unresolved.
24
 Enforcement action by regional organisation not in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
11 African Security Review 29 at 36-37. The rule in question provides that  the [A]ssembly shall decide on 
intervention in a Member State at the request of that Member State in order to restore peace and security‘ This 
makes it clear that the request contemplated in article 4(j) is request by the territorial state rather than a third 
state. On the other hand, the AUPSC Protocol provides that based on article 4(k), the AUPSC would be guided 
by the ‗right of Member States to request intervention form the Union in order to restore peace and security in 
accordance with Article 4(j) of the Constitutive Act‘. Jean Allain therefore argues that since the Rules of 
Procedure of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government is merely a subsidiary legislation which does 
not require state consent, compared to the AUPSC Protocol which requires state consent for its creation, the AU 
might not necessarily follow the narrow construction of article 4(j) implied in rule 4(f) of the Rules of Procedure 
mentioned above, and an AU member state might be able to request intervention in a third AU state.  See Jean 
Allain ‗The true challenge to the United Nations System of the use of force: The failures of Kosovo and Iraq and 
the Emergence of the African Union‘ (2004) Max Planck United Nations Yearbook 237 at 283-4.  However, 
Kunschak argues that it is more probable that only the target state can request intervention b from the AU under 
article 4(j) See Martin Kunschak ‗The African Union and the right to intervention‘ (2006) 31 South African 
Yearbook of International Law 195 at 201. In my view,, it appears more persuasive to argue that intervention in 
terms of article 4(j) would be at the request of the target state and not a third state since article 4(h) already 
provides a basis for states within the AU (that think intervention is necessary) to mobilise the Organisation to 
take a decision suo motu to intervene in a member state. In view of this, further provision in article 4(j) for an 
AU member state to be able to request the AU to intervene in another member state would not only be 
superfluous but also counterproductive. 
22
 See ‗AUPSC Protocol‘ (emphasis added). 
23
 See S Neil MacFarlane & Thomas G Weiss ‗The United Nations, regional organisations and human security: 
building theory in Central America‘ (1994) 15:2 Third World Quarterly 277 at 280. 
24
 See Michael Pugh The World Order Politics of Regionalization in Michael Pugh & Waheguru Pal Singh 
Sidhu (eds) The United Nations and Regional Security: Europe and Beyond (2003) 31 at 35 (hereafter Pugh & 
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collective self-defense must be authorised by the UNSC and any provision in a regional 
agreement that permits a regional organisation to take enforcement action against a member 
state without UNSC authorisation is inconsistent with article 53 of the Charter.
25
 The 
unilateral action provisions contained in the AU/ECOWAS framework apparently amounts to 
a subtle attempt to renegotiate the provisions of Chapter VIII. It has therefore been argued 
that the AU and ECOWAS legal regimes of unilateral humanitarian intervention are 
incompatible with the UN Charter and thus, invalid.
26
 The validity question is engaged in 
subsequent chapters, but I set out the frame of the apparent normative incompatibility 
between the regimes below. 
4.4 ARENAS OF NORMATIVE INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN AU/ECOWAS 
UNILATERAL HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION LEGAL REGIME AND THE 
UN CHARTER 
 
From the provisions surveyed above, there are three main arenas of normative incompatibility 
between the AU and ECOWAS regime of unilateral humanitarian intervention and the 
Charter: the prohibition of the use of force in inter-state relations, the lawful agency with 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in Africa, and the lawful 
agency to authorise the use of force in Africa. 
4.4.1 Article 2(4) of UN Charter and the AU and ECOWAS Right of Unilateral Use of 
Force  
 
Article 2(4) prohibits the use of force in inter-state relations and it has been argued that this is 
a peremptory norm of international law which does not permit any derogation.
27
 The 
provisions of article 4(h) of the AU Act, article 4(j) of AUPSC Protocol, and article 25 of the 
ECOWAS MCPMRPS Protocol are in conflict with article 2(4) of the UN Charter. By 
providing for the right of the AU and ECOWAS to use force within member states on 
grounds not provided for in the UN Charter, these laws apparently violate the international 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Sigh Sidhu ‗The United Nations and Regional Security‘). See article 52 and 53, Charter of the United Nations 
signed on 26 June 1945 at San Francisco and entered into force on 24 October 1945 (hereafter the ‗Charter‘). 
25
 See Natalino Ronzitti Rescuing Nationals Abroad through Military Coercion and Intervention on Grounds of 
Necessity (1985) at 130 (hereafter Ronziti ‗Rescuing Nationals Abroad‘). 
26
 See Frederik Harhoff ‗Unauthorised humanitarian intervention – armed violence in the name of humanity?‘ 
(2001) 70 Nordic Journal of International Law 65 at 102. (hereafter Harhoff, ‗Unauthorised humanitarian 
intervention‘). 
27
 This would also extend to the principle of non-interference in matters essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of a state contained in article 2(7) of the UN Charter. See Ronzitti Rescuing Nationals Abroad, op 
cit note 25 at 87.  See Chapter 2 above. Although article 4(f) of the AU Act prohibits the use of force by 
member states against one another, this does not apply to the AU itself.  
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law norm of non-use of force and would thus be invalid.
28
 These provisions have introduced 
and codified new exceptions to the rule on the use of force besides those of self-defense and 
Chapter VII enforcement actions and thus pose a ‗fundamental challenge‘ to the UN System 
as they seek to supersede the provisions in article 2(4) and Chapter VII of the Charter.
29
 
These grounds under the AU Act are war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide; and 
with reference to the proposed amendment to the AU Act includes threat to legitimate 
order.
30
   
Under ECOWAS, new grounds as exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force 
rule now include internal conflict threatening humanitarian disasters or sub-regional peace 
and security, massive violation of human rights and overthrow or attempted overthrow of 
democratically elected governments. The ECOWAS framework has an omnibus clause the 
scope of which is not defined in the Protocol but will perhaps be determined through 
pragmatism and regional practice by ECOWAS. In the past, the UNSC has had to develop the 
Charter provisions through a reinterpretation and expansion of what constitutes ‗threat to 
international peace and security‘ in order to be able to respond to the challenges arising from 
massive violations of human rights in internal conflicts which was not covered by the UN 
Charter or was hitherto deemed prohibited by article 2(7) of the Charter.
31
 This approach by 
the UNSC has not been devoid of controversy and has largely remained problematic in its 
relationship with sovereignty, hence the emergence of the R2P norm. Though the 
AU/ECOWAS framework attempts to remedy this, their provisions present a unique 
challenge to the UN system.  Allain rightly put it thus: 
The coming into force of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security 
Council of the African Union, which operationalise the Constitutive Act of the African Union, 
is the first true blow to the international framework of the international system established in 
1945 predicated on the ultimate control of the use of force by the United Nations Security 
Council.
32
 
                                                          
28
 See Dan Kuwali ‗Persuasive prevention: Towards a principle for implementing article 4(h) and R2P by the 
African Union‘ (2009) 42 Current African Issues 1 at 17 (hereafter Kuwali ‗Persuasive prevention‘). 
29
 Allain The true challenge to the United Nations op cit note 15 at 238. 
30
 Protocol on the Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union Adopted by the 2
nd
 Ordinary 
Session of the Assembly of the Union in Maputo, Mozambique on 11 July, 2003, amending article 4(h) of the 
AU Act. 
31
 See S/RES/788 (1992) determining that the ‗deterioration of the situation in Liberia constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security.‘ See S/RES/1132 where the UNSC also determined that the ‗situation in Sierra 
Leone constitutes a threat to international peace and security.‘ See also Helene Rui Fabri ‗Human rights and 
state sovereignty: Have the boundaries been significantly redrawn?‘ in Philip Alston & Euan McDonald (eds) 
(2008) 33 at 49. See generally Rosalyn Higgins, The Development of International Law through the Political 
Organs of the United Nations (1963). 
32
 Allain ‗The true challenge to the United Nations‘ op cit note 15 at 238 (Italics in original). 
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Perhaps the most important evidence yet of the AU‘s resolve to create an extra-Charter 
humanitarian intervention legal regime is the Common African Position on the Proposed UN 
Reform—the Ezulwini Consensus. It states the position of the AU on its relationship with the 
UNSC, and article 4(h) of the AU Act vis-a-vis article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The Ezulwini 
Consensus maintains that self-defense remains the principal ground of exception to the 
prohibition of use of force. However, the AU insists at the same time that: 
[T]he Constitutive Act of the African Union, in its Article 4 (h), authorises intervention in 
grave circumstances such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.  
Consequently, any recourse to force outside the framework of Article 51 of the UN Charter 
and Article 4 (h) of the AU Constitutive Act should be prohibited.
33
 
Three inferences can be drawn from the above excerpt. First, the AU construes the rule on the 
use of force in article 2(4), and the exceptions in article 51 and Chapter VII of the Charter as 
the applicable law between the AU, its members and other states outside Africa as well as the 
UN. The AU asserts a second rule encapsulated in article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act 
which it deems to be applicable between the AU and its member states only. A third 
inference is that the AU insists that article 4(h) and the grounds recognised therein as 
additional exceptions to the general rule prohibiting the use of force in the UN Charter. 
ECOWAS has not advanced similar arguments in defense of its use of force law but since 
ECOWAS member states are also members of the AU and did not express contrary opinion 
on the Ezulwini Consensus principle, it is more than likely that ECOWAS shares this view. 
However, it has been argued that a regional organisation would be violating 
international law if it uses force against any state without UNSC authorisation, except in 
collective self-defense.
34
 The same rule applies where a treaty gives a regional organisation a 
right of unilateral intervention in a state without requiring the ‗contemporaneous consent‘ of 
the target state, such treaty is void for violating article 2(4) and 103.
35
 The argument of 
Paulus and Leiß that ‗subsequent agreements between States allowing for unilateral armed 
intervention cannot supersede the prohibition on the use of force under the Charter, but can 
be regarded as pernissible if upholding rather than diminishing or abrogating the territorial 
                                                          
33
 The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: The ‗Ezulwini Consensus‘, 
Executive Council 7
th
 Extraordinary Session, 7-8 March 2005, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Ext./EX. CL/2 (VII) p 6 
(hereafter the Ezulwini Consensus). Available at <http://www.cfr.org/africa/common-african-position-proposed-
reform-united-nations-ezulwini-consensus/p25444> (accessed on 10 July 2011). 
34
 Domingo E Acevedo ‗Collective self-defense and the use of regional or sub-regional authority as justification 
for the use of force‘ (1984)78 ASIL 69 at 73 (hereafter ‗Acevedo Collective self-defense‘). 
           
35
 Wippman ‗Treaty-based intervention: who can say no?‘ (1995) 62 University of Chicago Law Review 607 at 
620; David Wippman ‗Pro-democratic intervention in Africa‘ (March 13-16, 2002) 96 ASIL Proceedings 143-45 
at 145. 
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integrity and political independence of a State‘, is far more nuanced than Bernhardt‘s views 
on the same Article 103 in the third edition of Simma‘s Commentary on the Charter, where 
he puts it more vividly: 
If the members of a regional arrangement, … agree that in case of internal disturbances 
or other events within one of the States concerned, the other States can intervene with 
military forces without the consent of the de jure or de facto government, the 
compatibility of such a special agreement with the Charter becomes doubtful and must, 
in principle be denied. Here, the territorial integrity of all States and the prohibition of 
the use of force is at stake. An agreement permitting forceful intervention would hardly 
be compatible with the Charter and would fall under Article 103.
36
 
In general terms, the prohibition of use of force has, as some of its contentious dimensions, 
the characterisation and ambit of the ban, the limiting circumstances and the repercussions of 
any possible breach.
37
 The debate about the legality of humanitarian intervention under 
international law centres on the use of force to halt mass atrocities in the territory of a state by 
third states or group of states. The codification of the right of humanitarian intervention by 
the AU and ECOWAS introduces a new dimension to this debate.  
It is unclear what this will entail in practice, but as a starting point, it should be 
emphasised that given the immense changes that have taken place since 1945, the efficacy of 
the Charter in particular and international law in general can only be achieved if they are 
‗interpreted and applied in a manner commensurate with the requirements of an evolving 
international community‘.38 Though unsettled for a long time, the trends in the development 
of international law norms in relation to the international protection of human rights, 
including the evolution of the R2P norm, support the view that the use of force by external 
actors to prevent or halt massive violations of human rights does not fall within the purview 
of the prohibition in article 2(4).
39
 The principle of non-use of force must be juxtaposed with 
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 See Andreas Paulus & Johann Ruben Leiß ‗Article 103‘ in Bruno Simma et al (eds) The Charter of the 
United Nations: A Commentary 3 ed (2012) 2128, (hereafter Paulus & Leiß ‗Article 103‘), Cf Rudolf Bernhardt 
‗Article 103‘ in Simma Bruno et al (eds) The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 3 ed (2002) 1121-2 
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the community needs for collective intervention deployed in defense of human rights to halt 
mass atrocities.
40
 The normative evolution pioneered by the instruments surveyed above have 
certainly brought about a shift in the ‗international legal paradigm‘ (at least in the African 
context for the time being),
41
 and this calls for further legal elucidation rather than casual 
dismissal.
 
Even under general international law, it is a long standing argument that 
interventions conducted on certain grounds (like those codified in the AU and ECOWAS 
laws) actually enhances the implementation of the principles and purposes of the UN and 
cannot be viewed as violating article 2(4) since neither the AU nor ECOWAS seeks to assail 
the territorial integrity or political independence of Member States.
42
 To the extent that the 
AU and ECOWAS norms deal with intra-state cases, it is arguably outside the scope of article 
2(4) of the Charter which only regulates the use or threat of force in inter-state relations by 
UN member states.
43
 Arguably, both the AU and ECOWAS can lawfully use force within the 
territory of member states in the circumstances outlined in their respective laws and this 
would not violate article 2(4).
44
  
4.4.2 Primary Responsibility for the Maintenance of Peace and Security in Africa 
 
A second arena of normative clash between the Charter law and the AU/ECOWAS 
humanitarian intervention regimes is in the authoritative agency with primary responsibility 
for the maintenance of peace and security in Africa. In view of the provisions surveyed 
above, the question becomes which organisation, between the UN, AU and ECOWAS has the 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in Africa in the case of the 
AU, and West Africa in the case of ECOWAS? The answer to this question may not be as 
straightforward as might first appear. Article 16(1) of the AUPSC gives this authority to the 
AU and article 10(a) of the ECOWAS MCPMRPS Protocol gives the authority (in the case of 
West Africa), to the Mediation and Security Council. Both provisions apparently conflict 
with article 24(1) of the UN Charter which provides: 
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In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members 
confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this 
responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf. 
The AU recognises its status as a Chapter VIII regional organisation under the UN Charter in 
relation to the maintenance of international peace and security.
45
 But that is where the 
conformity with the Charter ends. In other material respects, the AU and ECOWAS 
provisions seek to dislodge the UNSC as the authoritative agency having primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in Africa. Article 17(1) AUPSC 
Protocol recognises the primary responsibility of the UNSC in the maintenance of 
international peace and security but at the same time, article 16(1) allocates exactly the same 
role to the AUPSC.
46
 This view is shared by AU member states (even if not often expressed). 
Although the AU recognises that the UN has primacy in the maintenance of international 
peace and security, the AU reserves a right of unilateral action in Africa which only ‗reverts 
to the UN where necessary.‘47 It is understandable if the AU insists that the Organisation will 
intervene in Africa with or without UNSC authorisation.
48
 This is essentially because the AU 
Act and the AUPSC Protocol have arrogated to the AU the primary responsibility for 
‗promoting peace, security and stability in Africa‘ by vesting the powers in its decision-
making organ—the AUPSC.49 As Allain asserts, and in my view rightly so too: 
By recourse to a treaty, the African Union has appropriated for itself the role which the UN 
Security Council is meant to play on a universal basis; in essence denying the Council its 
―primary responsibility‖ for the maintenance of international peace and security in relation to 
the African Continent.
50
  
Contrary to what is envisaged by Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, article 17(2) of the AUPSC 
Protocol implies that the AU will only seek assistance from the UN when necessary and that 
it is not obliged to defer to the UNSC on peace and security matters in Africa.
51
 
For its part, ECOWAS is not so explicit in its provisions in its relationship with the 
UN in this respect but by virtue of the powers conferred on the Mediation and Security 
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Council to perform the role reserved for the UNSC under the Charter, the ECOWAS regime 
arguably has the same effect.
52
 Even prior to its adopting its humanitarian intervention 
instruments, ECOWAS has launched unilateral humanitarian interventions without the 
backing of any legal instrument in its peace and security or human rights corpus.  It was such 
interventions that apparently influenced the AU. Within a few years of initiating the legal 
mechanism for unilateral action by ECOWAS, the system which was originally created for 
the subregion alone was adopted for all of Africa, underscoring the failure of the UNSC to 
prevent or halt genocide in Africa.
53
 Wippman also corroborates Allain‘s view that 
ECOWAS intervention and the right to unilateral intervention it claims for itself was due to 
the failure of the UNSC to respond to crises in Africa and the frustrations faced by African 
leaders when they tried to make the UN take any meaningful action in African crises.
54
 The 
AU and ECOWAS mechanisms therefore evolved as a buffer to UNSC veto paralysis and in 
the case of ECOWAS, they have been more proactive and successful in responding to the 
peace and security demands of Members and the sub-region compared to the UNSC.
55
  
Notwithstanding several proposals for UN reform so far, the fact that ECOWAS had 
to resort to unilateral action to initiate military interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone is 
itself indicative of three points: first, that the Brahimi Report was either not being 
implemented or the implementation side-lined Africa; second, it underscored the failures of 
the UN to take the initiative to intervene; third, the rejection of a ‗colonial-policy‘ approach 
underpinned by a lack of commitment to African crises.
56
 From discussions in chapter 3, it is 
clear that during the Liberian crisis, it was after ECOWAS had unsuccessfully tried to get the 
UNSC to even discuss the matter let alone intervene, that ECOWAS proceeded to intervene 
and left the UNSC in an awkward situation to either condone the intervention or condemn it 
and risk global opprobrium for its legal inertia and moral paralysis.
57
 Understandably, the 
UNSC chose the former granting what some have variously described as ex post facto 
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ratification, condonation or acquiescence to the interventions.
58
 There is lack of normative 
clarity here. 
Compared to other regional organisations, the provision for humanitarian intervention 
in their constitutive documents has helped ECOWAS and AU to avert the dilemma the OAS 
faced when it had to deal with the Haiti crisis by imposing sanctions contrary to the OAS 
Charter.
59
 Though few regional organisation‘s policy makers and even fewer UN staff would 
admit it, there is a subtle competition for relevance between the UN and the AU and 
ECOWAS, particularly with regards to maintenance of peace and security in Africa as the 
UNSC‘s attempts and failures in intervening in civil wars have pushed these regional 
organisations to clamour for more autonomy in the same arena.
60
 What has been the response 
to this development, particularly by Africa? 
The failure of this collective security system, in addition to state practice in this 
respect since 1945, has inexorably led regional organisations to either redefine themselves in 
terms of article 51 of the Charter or to call for a reinterpretation of Chapter VIII and a 
redistribution of authority.
61
 But it does not bode well for the international system or any 
world order based on law constantly to call for re-interpretation of its basic norms (such as 
the Charter provisions under consideration here) to suit the changing circumstance when in 
fact, what is actually wrong is not so much the changes that have rendered the formal text 
obsolete, but failures to implement the provisions of the text. In such situation, the choice, it 
would seem is either to amend the relevant text of the Charter to take account of changing 
state practice or to allow such change through the gradual development of customary 
international law including regional state practices. To this end, it is important for regional 
organisations to codify their constitutive documents in order to clarify their relationship with 
the UN and the legal position of humanitarian intervention. This is one aspect the 
AU/ECOWAS regimes are also significant.
62
 The current international mechanism for 
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maintenance of international peace and security was not meant to regulate the current type of 
global order.
63
  As a commentator put it,  
[t]he text of Chapter VIII has become separated from state practice. Given the changes taking 
place in the world, the spectre of divorce is not out of the question. However, for a 
reconciliation to occur, theory and practice will have to change somewhat, and state practice 
is notoriously stubborn.
64
  
With regard to state practice, unilateral action by states and organisations like 
ECOWAS in Liberia, and Sierra Leone, and NATO in Kosovo indicate that the construction 
of the Charter rule on the use of force is beginning to relax.
65
 But it is also being replaced by 
rules the scope and contents of which are not at all clear at the moment.
66
 The emerging 
doctrine of R2P and its implementation in Libya demonstrates this point.
67
 For example, the 
role of the UNSC in Libya and Darfur underscores the significance of the AU/ECOWAS 
frameworks advanced as paradigm shifts in the authoritative agency saddled with the 
responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security.
68
 Since the UN has 
demonstrated a lack of interest in crises in Africa, the AU and ECOWAS have to develop a 
regional humanitarian intervention mechanism and build the legal and institutional 
framework to respond to mass atrocities.
69
 How will this impact the UN? Allain puts it thus: 
The diffusion of the primary role of the Security Council over issues of international peace 
and security as developed in Article17, in essence, turns the United Nations system on its 
head, as the United Nations Security Council is meant to assist the African Union Peace and 
Security Council not vice versa. As a result of the fact that the Protocol, while paying lip-
service to the primacy of the United Nations Security Council seeks, at every turn, to dissipate 
its pre-eminence, makes clear that intervention as envisioned by the Constitutive Act  of the 
African Union usurps the ultimate control vested in the United Nations System over the use of 
force.
70
 
In an attempt to resolve this normative clash, some authors have adopted an interpretive 
method that maintains that the UN retains primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
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peace and security in Africa and that these provisions remain subordinated to article 24 of the 
Charter.
71
 The AU (and ECOWAS) provisions in this respect could co-exist with the Charter 
law mutantis mutanda.
72
 Besides oversimplifying the conundrum, it is not possible to come to 
such conclusion without declaring the AU and ECOWAS provisions invalid one way or the 
other and the attempt at legal manoeuvring without  necessarily establishing the validity of 
the provisions vis-à-vis article 24 end up imputing to the said provisions the exact opposite of 
what they sought to achieve—establish a framework for independence of action on the use of 
force to halt atrocities in Africa through the adoption of legal framework granting pre-
eminent role and rights of unilateral action to the AU and ECOWAS on the primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in Africa and West Africa 
respectively. However, to what extent they could do so through an extra-Charter legal 
framework adopted by them is what requires some inquiry.  
Dan Kuwali for example, does not explain the import of articles 16(1) and 17(1) & (2) 
of the AUPSC Protocol, the two fundamental provisions that define AU-UN relationship in 
the area of maintenance of peace and security in Africa. It is noteworthy that article 16 uses 
the word ‗promote‘ when it stipulates the relationship between the AU and other regional 
organisations on the continent; whereas in article 17(1), where it defines the relationship 
between the AU and the UN, it uses the word ‗maintenance‘, the exact word used in article 
24 of the UN Charter which allocates that role to the UNSC. According to Black‘s Law 
Dictionary, ‗maintenance‘ means ‗the continuation of something … the assertion of a 
position or opinion.‘73 This appears stronger than the word ‗promoting‘ which connotes 
encouraging or fostering an act and thus of less coercive character.
74
 It is unclear whether the 
deliberate choice of the word ‗promoting‘ was intended to suggest that the relationship 
between the AU and other regional organisations in Africa is vertical because the word 
‗maintenance‘ used in article 17(1) seems to suggest that the AU and UN are in a vertical 
relationship in which case the distribution of authority would be hierarchical with the UN at 
the apex. But when read together with article 17(2), it seems to suggest that the relationship 
between the AU and UN is horizontal and the AU is not required to defer to the UNSC in 
exercising the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in Africa 
                                                          
71
 See Kuwali ‗The end of humanitarian intervention‘ op cit note 40 at 57. 
72
 Id. 
73
 Black‘s Law Dictionary 8 ed. (2004) 973. 
74
 Ibid at 1250.  
 
 
148 
whether involving the use of force or otherwise.
75
 The right of humanitarian intervention as 
conceived under these frameworks is exercisable by the AU/ECOWAS which occupy pre-
eminent positions in this respect which ‗… usurps the ultimate control vested in the United 
Nations System over the use of force.‘76 
It could also mean that the words were intended to convey a less formalized 
relationship between the AU and other regional organisations whereas ‗maintenance‘ implies 
a more formalized relationship with the UN. Perhaps it is intended that in its relationship with 
other regional organisations in Africa, the AU would function in more or less advisory or 
coordinating role (not likely to use force). It is therefore important that the future legal 
relationship between the UN and the AU/ECOWAS be clarified, more so when these regional 
bodies have acquired legal capacity and are building military, and logistics capacity for 
humanitarian intervention.
77
  
The call for a greater role for regional organisations in conflict resolution and closer 
partnership and cooperation with the UN cannot take place outside the context of a 
redistribution of authority and competency and that in itself is also tied to UNSC reform 
which is unlikely to happen any time soon. Nor is it at all agreed what the terms of such 
cooperation and collaboration should be. While the UN insists that cooperation with regional 
organisations should be pursued within the framework of Chapter VIII,
78
 the AU, ECOWAS 
and other regional organisations think otherwise. The OAS for example, has made clear that 
it rejects any collaboration framework with the UN built on the ‗basis of prescription by one 
organisation to another‘ or the superintendence of the UN over regional organisations.79 And 
that is exactly what Chapter VIII does. The AU‘s primary responsibility to promote peace, 
security and stability in Africa aims at utilising its unique position as a regional organisation 
in areas of prompt response to peacekeeping and peace enforcement (something not even the 
staunchest universalist could fault), in Africa and this is not inconsistent with the primacy of 
the UNSC which is responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security.  
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4.4.3. Who Authorises the Use of Force in Africa?  
 
The third arena of normative conflict between the AU/EOCWAS framework and UN Charter 
regime is the question of who should authorise the use of force in Africa. The three regimes 
locate authority in different agencies. By virtue of article 52 of the Charter, ECOWAS and 
the AU have the authority to settle disputes amicably without reference to the UNSC. Under 
article 53(1) of the UN Charter only the UNSC can authorise AU to use force for the 
maintenance of international peace and security in Africa. However, a combined reading of 
article 4(j), 16 and 17 of the AUPSC Protocol gives the power to authorise the use of force in 
Africa to the AU. These provisions are in conflict with article 53(1) of the UN Charter which 
states: 
The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies 
for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under 
regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security 
Council. … 
 
However, under article 17(1), the AUPSC is expected to ‗cooperate‘ with other agencies one 
of which is the UNSC. Rather than prescribe that the AUPSC obtain authorisation from the 
UNSC, article 17(2) provides that the UN should provide assistance and support to the 
AUPSC.
80
 Allain has observed thus: 
The African Union … has, by way of regional instruments, overridden the multilateral control 
over the use of force which has been vested in the United Nations Security Council since 
1945. In so doing, African States have decided that they will, henceforth, not require Security 
Council authorisation to act on the Continent, and in fact, they have given themselves the 
prerogative to intervene militarily, not only beyond the authority of the UN Security Council, 
but by widening the scope of permissible use of force in Africa, by acting in ―respect to grave 
circumstances‖ such as war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.81 
The implication of this is that both the AUPSC and the UNSC seem to enjoy coordinate 
jurisdiction with respect to authorisation of use of force to maintain peace and security in 
Africa.
82
 The AUPSC Protocol pays allegiance to the primacy of the UNSC on the one hand 
and on the other hand espouses a new role that would see African states take control of 
processes that deal with enforcement measures in Africa.
83
 What could have influenced this 
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propensity for unilateral action? It could not have been inadvertent because UN staff served 
as support personnel during the drafting and would have brought the normative clash this 
provision would create under article 53 of the UN Charter to the attention of the AU.
84
 
Secondly, the AU/ECOWAS also rejected the examples of the constitutive documents of 
NATO and the OAS expressly requiring UNSC authorisation for enforcement action.
85
 The 
logical conclusion therefore, is that the AU/ECOWAS determined to create a legal 
framework for unilateral action for humanitarian intervention in Africa. Further evidence of 
this exists in the Ezulwini Consensus, where, the AU stated that: 
The African Union agrees with the Panel that the intervention of Regional Organisations 
should be with the approval of the Security Council; although in certain situations, such 
approval could be granted ―after the fact‖ in circumstances requiring urgent action. In such 
cases, the UN should assume responsibility for financing such operations. …86 
Thus, although the AU agreed in principle that its intervention should be with UNSC 
approval, it however attached a condition—that such approval would be sought [only] where 
the UN accepts to fund the operation.
87
 The UN Charter does not provide for such condition 
and though there has been cooperation between the UN and ECOWAS in the past, nothing in 
practice suggests how this AU condition would be implemented and the normative impact on 
UN-AU relationship.  
There are several questions and normative ambiguities involved, because whereas the 
AU purports to recognise the primacy of the UN to authorise the use of force, the AU did not 
subordinate the AUPSC to the UNSC.
88
 Will the AU feel itself bound to obtain UNSC 
authorisation (whether prior or after) if the UN refuses to fund such intervention? The answer 
is likely negative because UN funding is now a condition for the AU seeking UNSC 
authorisation for enforcement action. In the Elzuwini Consensus, the AU demonstrated an 
unwillingness to continue to subject itself to the principle of subsidiarity enshrined in Chapter 
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VIII of the Charter particularly, article 53(1). Based on its framework, it is arguable that the 
AU/ECOWAS appears not to be under obligation to obtain authorisation from, or to defer to 
the UNSC on the use of force in Africa thus raising questions about the legal validity of such 
provisions under the Charter.
89
 
Further to the above, the AU seems to suggest that there could be cases where it 
would not be bound to obtain UNSC authorisation at all. The phrase ‗in such cases‘ in the 
above excerpt presupposes the existence, or at least the possibility of other circumstances 
where the prescribed UNSC authorisation (whether before or after intervention) would be 
inapplicable. Under this provision, there seems to be some residual powers under which the 
AU has reserved for itself the latitude for unilateral action.  
A third point to be made here is the ex post facto approval proposed in the Elzuwini 
Consensus. There is no doubt about the efficacy of this approach as a compromise with the 
UNSC as the authoritative decision making agency under the Charter system. However, there 
is the inherent danger of blurring the allocation of competences and further eroding the 
legitimacy of the UNSC.
90
 In this sense, the intervention in Libya was a potentially volatile 
case where there was a likelihood of the practical manifestation of this normative ambiguity 
and incompatibility between the AU and the UNSC as both agencies pursued different 
approaches to the resolution of the crisis beyond the initial consensus on no-fly-zone 
resolutions.
91
 It was a threat, though subtle, to the practice by both the UN and AU to differ 
to one another and preferring to avoid any intervention where the other agency was already 
involved. Nevertheless, the crisis still underscores the need for normative clarification and as 
President Jacob Zuma of South Africa stated, there is an urgent need to clarify the legal 
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framework for partnership and cooperation between the UN and the AU/ECOWAS and the 
future role the former should play in conflicts in Africa.
92
 
If the AU‘s provision for unilateral action is audacious, then the ECOWAS 
framework is even more so. With an unassailable precedent in unilateral action in regional 
humanitarian intervention, ECOWAS has located the right to authorise the use of force in 
West Africa in its Mediation and Security Council by virtue of article 10(c) of the ECOWAS 
MCPMRPS. The provision does not require the Mediation and Security Council to obtain 
UNSC authorisation. Again, this is in conflict with article 53(1) which requires all regional 
organisations to obtain UNSC authorisation for use of force deployments and as an observer 
rightly opines, ‗ECOWAS had institutionalized a mechanism that allows it to opt out of the 
UN Security System.‘93 ECOWAS has created for itself, a ‗micro Security Council‘ modelled 
after the UNSC to which it gave the power to unilaterally authorise and initiate regional 
military intervention in the territory of ECOWAS members.
94
 According to Allain: 
With tacit consent having been given to the ECOWAS interventions in both Liberia and 
Sierra Leone, it should not come as a surprise that this West African organisation moved to 
institutionalize the power it had appropriated from the UN Security Council in the domain of 
peace and security. By its 1999 Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security, ECOWAS decided that its newly 
established Mediation and Security Council could ‗authorise all forms of intervention and 
decide particularly on the deployment of political and military missions.
95
 
The AU and ECOWAS laws suggest a paradigm shift in regional practice by asserting a right 
to unilateral enforcement action without the prior authorisation of the UNSC.
96
 Unlike the 
case of NATO, which, though, has undertaken unilateral action, still retains prior UNSC 
authorisation in its constitutive document, the AU and ECOWAS laws introduce a right of 
unilateral action by regional organisations.  
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The source of the legal validity of this norm has been disputed and it is argued that 
there is as yet no right of unilateral regional humanitarian intervention.
97
 This author points 
out that since the prohibition of the unilateral use of force both by states and regional 
organisations was a collective decision of the entire international community, it would take 
the same procedure to abolish it.
98
 But this can hardly be the case because states intervene in 
crises for different reasons and only few on strictly humanitarian grounds. NATO 
intervention in Libya once again demonstrates that the reason the US and its allies refused to 
intervene in Darfur was not so much because they respected article 2(4) but because there 
was not sufficient national interest at stake. This, most likely explains why a finding by the 
US that genocide occurred in Darfur was not sufficient motive to persuade intervention 
compared to Libya where the scale of violations of human rights was not even close to the 
threshold for intervention whether under traditional humanitarian intervention or under the 
emerging R2P norm.
99
  
It is hard not to conclude that the unilateral actions by NATO and ECOWAS indicate 
a shift in how the legality of humanitarian intervention in general
100
 and unilateral action by 
regional organisations in particular is viewed. NATO‘s intervention in Kosovo was described 
as ‗illegal but legitimate‘101 and ECOWAS was applauded for its interventions even by the 
UNSC that failed in its duty.
102
 AU/ECOWAS legal regimes seek to bring clarity and 
consistency to the normative arena of unilateral humanitarian intervention by regional 
organisations by codifying both the substantive and procedural criteria for their legal validity. 
It seems that the NATO and ECOWAS interventions marked the gradual erosion of the old 
system and the beginning of an evolving new normative regime of humanitarian intervention 
by regional organisations and international law.
103
 This point is discussed further in chapter 7. 
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It suffices here to mention that the utility of this regime at a time the world is searching for a 
legal framework for the implementation of R2P cannot be over-emphasised and a partnership 
of cooperation rather than one of subsidiarity and competition between the UN and 
AU/ECOWAS is to be preferred. This should avoid the Ivory Coast and Libya situation 
where Africa becomes the testing ground for newly-minted military hardware in pursuit of 
diverse interests under the guise of civilian protection.
104
 
Notwithstanding any pretentions to the contrary, the AU Act and the AUPSC Protocol 
all reveal the determination of African States to take control of the use of force and 
humanitarian intervention in Africa.
105
 The ambiguous situation created by this in terms of 
the relationship between the AU and the UN on the authorisation of the use of force in Africa 
has attracted criticisms from commentators who have dismissed the AU provisions.
106
 But to 
dismiss these provisions based on the legal inconsistencies alone without a theoretical inquiry 
into its legal validity ignores the circumstances and context in which they were adopted.
107
 It 
is the peripheral roles of Africa in the international system and the reluctance to commit 
troops and resources to Africa that is leading African leaders down the path of unilateral 
action ‗without concern for international endorsement.‘108 The rule deducible from the AU 
provision and arguably ECOWAS as well, is that the agencies are prepared to obtain UNSC 
authorisation for the use of force where possible but to also be able to act without it when 
necessary.
109
 The aim is to retain the right to unilateral action in Africa. As succinctly put by 
former President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa: 
Our view has been that it‘s critically important that the African continent [deals] with 
these conflict situations on the continent … we have not asked for anybody outside of 
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the African continent to deploy troops to Darfur. It‘s an African responsibility, and 
we can do it.
110
  
Though the vesting of authority to intervene in the UNSC created problems, this is not 
sufficient justification for AU/ECOWAS right of intervention without UNSC authorisation or 
to suggest that such authorisation could be obtained after the fact.
111
 Yet the UN Charter is 
silent on whether the authorisations should be prior or post.
112
 So, it is argued that it is legal if 
the regional organisation obtains the authorisation ex-post facto.
113
 The main argument 
against treaties like the AU/ECOWAS is that if unilateral enforcement actions were allowed, 
the UNSC will lose its primacy in the maintenance of international peace and security and the 
regulation of the use of force.
114
 
4.5 THE SITUATION INVOLVING NON-MEMBERS LIKE MOROCCO (AU) AND 
MAURITANIA (ECOWAS) 
 
The fourth arena of apparent normative conflict between the AU/ECOWAS regimes involves 
states who are non-members of these Organisations but who are nevertheless situated within 
the geographical areas of operation of the AU and ECOWAS respectively. The question is 
which legal regime would be applicable in the relationship between such non-member states 
and the relevant regional organisation? For example, Morocco is not a member of the AU and 
Mauritania is not a member of ECOWAS. The question arises therefore whether the 
respective organisations can legally intervene should any of these countries give rise to the 
circumstances warranting intervention according to the constitutive document of these 
organisations? The answer, it seems, would be in the negative because as non-members the 
legal regime regulating their relationship with the AU and ECOWAS respectively would be 
the Charter law and general international law rather than the humanitarian intervention 
regimes of the AU and ECOWAS.
115
 Thus, articles 2(4), 24, 53(1) and Chapter VII of the 
Charter and rules of general international law will apply. The same could be said of states 
that might subsequently withdraw their membership from the AU and ECOWAS in terms of 
these provisions. However, such norms of intervention may also bind non-members since 
                                                          
110See ‗Bush discusses mutual goals with NATO, South African leaders‘ Available at 
<http://www.eucom.mil/article/21619/Bush-discusses-mutual-goals-Nato-South-African> (accessed on 11 May 
2012). 
111
 Cha ‗Humanitarian intervention under the charter‘ op cit note at 140-1. 
112
 Simon Chesterman Just War or Unjust Peace (2001) 123 (hereafter Chesterman ‗Just War or Unjust Peace‘). 
113
 Moore ‗The role of regional arrangements‘ op cit note 90 at 153. 
114
 Monika Hakimi ‗To condone or condemn? Regional enforcement actions in the absence of Security Council 
authorisation‘ (2007) 40 Vanderbilt Journal of International Law 643 at 645. 
115
 It is trite that a state cannot be bound by a treaty to which it is not a party.  
 
 
156 
they derive from regional customary international law and in that regard, the AU and 
ECOWAS norms may apply to Morocco and Mauritania respectively even though they are 
not members of the AU and ECOWAS.
116
 In the case of AU/ECOWAS and countries outside 
Africa, arguably, the UN Charter and general international law regulates their relationship in 
terms of humanitarian intervention.  
4.6 IMPLICATIONS OF ARTICLE 103 OF THE UN CHARTER  
 
Article 103 of the UN Charter is described as the supremacy provision and it provides that 
‗[i]n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the United Nations 
under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their 
obligations under the Charter shall prevail.‘ However, the scope of this provision is not clear 
and has been disputed. For example, does article 103 invalidate the entire inconsistent treaty 
or only voids the specific provisions which are inconsistent with the UN Charter? In our 
context, does article 103 invalidate the entire AU/ECOWAS treaties or merely void article 
4(h) of the AU Act, articles 16 and 17 of the AUPSC and article 10(a), (c), and article 25 of 
the ECOWAS MCPRMPS Protocol? Are the provisions void ab initio or are they merely 
voidable?
117
 The attitude of some commentators has been to regard only the specific 
provisions that violate the Charter as invalid rather than the entire treaty.
118
 Where the 
obligations under the entire treaty conflicts with the Charter, then the entire treaty may be 
void ab initio but where it is only specific provisions that are inconsistent with the Charter, 
then only those specific provisions may be void depending on whether the norm in question 
is a jus cogens norm.
119
 As put by Cha ‗[i]t is understood that the provisions in a regional 
Charter could not, under any circumstances, contravene the UN Charter; if so, article 103 
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would make UN rights and obligations preeminent should they come into conflict with the 
provisions of a regional Charter.‘120 
It is not    however clear what the position is concerning certain provisions of a treaty 
which though are themselves not inconsistent with the Charter but are connected to other 
provisions which are.
121
 Bernhardt submits that these should be dealt with under the general 
law of treaties.
122
 These inconsistencies in the obligations of AU/ECOWAS States extend to 
both substantive and procedural matters. At the substantive level, the scope of the 
circumstances under which force may be used under the Charter has been substantially 
expanded by both the AU and ECOWAS frameworks. Under the AU/ECOWAS regimes 
force can now be used by the AU/ECOWAS not only in accordance with article 51 and 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, but in other situations including in both intra and inter-state 
conflicts as provided in their respective legal instruments.
123
 ECOWAS even expands the 
legal and normative basis for the use of force within its member states to a new height by 
introducing the novel right of pro-democratic intervention in its legal regime.
124
  
There is no doubt these provisions create obligations for member states which are 
inconsistent with the UN Charter provisions already highlighted above but it has also been 
argued that the AU/ECOWAS provisions derive from state consent which falls outside the 
ambit of article 2(4) and 53 and so not open to the application of article 103.
125
 This argument 
is explored further in chapter 7 but it suffices to state here that the provisions introduce far-
reaching norms to the law of use of force and humanitarian intervention in particular and 
international law in general; such that even if the AU/ECOWAS accepts the principle of 
subsidiarity and only intervenes in their member states with UNSC authorisation, the impact 
of these regional norms on general international law will be profound nonetheless.
126
 It will 
not be too much to expect that should the Charter be amended as part of a proposed UN 
                                                          
120
 Cha ‗Humanitarian intervention under the Charter‘ op cit note 100 at 136.  
121
 Bernhardt ‗Article 103‘ op cit note 36 at 1122. This has implications for such several provisions in the 
AUPSC Protocol some of which presuppose the legal validity of article 4(h) of the AU Act. In the case of 
ECOWAS, it seems this would invalidate such provisions as article 22(d) that empower ECOMOG to carry out 
enforcement operations in a member states presupposing the legal validity of the ECOWAS humanitarian 
intervention legal regime. 
122
 Bernhardt ‗Article 103‘ op cit note 36 at 1122. The tendency  
123
 See Allain ‗The true challenge to the United Nations‘ op cit note 15 at 239. Under the proposed amendment 
to article 4(h) the AU can also use force where a situation constitutes a ‗threat to legitimate order‘.  
124
 See ECOWAS MCPMRPS Protocol op cit note 17. 
125
 Kuwali ‗The end of humanitarian intervention‘ op cit note 40 at 46. 
126
 Allain ‗The true challenge to the United Nations‘ op cit note 15 at 284. 
 
 
158 
reform agenda, these AU/ECOWAS norms would be some of the issues to be considered for 
incorporation into the Charter taking into account current developments in international law.  
4.7 TOWARDS NORMATIVE COMPATIBILITY OF AU/ECOWAS AND UN 
CHARTER REGIMES 
 
Given the arenas of normative ambiguities discussed above, the immediate task for legal 
theorists then becomes how to design a regime of compatibility between the regimes. In this 
regard, it is important to bear in mind the circumstances that led to the present situation in the 
first place. The increase in the number of intra-state conflicts in the post-Cold-War world 
demanded more interventions than had hitherto been possible and effective response from the 
international community would have required a re-structured UN and a shift in the global 
governance paradigm—a change that was unlikely to happen then or any time soon.127 These 
failures of the UN have eroded the credibility and legitimacy of the organisation thereby 
bolstering the call for higher degree of independence and positive roles by African states in 
the exercise of sovereignty at the regional level.
128
 As a conflict-prone region, this led Africa 
to the pro-interventionist legal framework of the AU/ECOWAS through which they seek to 
obviate the UN structure which many developing countries feel marginalised them. These 
countries and organisations hope to bring about change in the international legal order by 
taking the initiative to expand the legal discourse and creating new norms.
129
 Given the 
changing pattern of global relations, regional organisations (not the least the AU and 
ECOWAS) have realised that major power would be disinclined to intervene abroad lest of 
all Africa, as they become more and more consumed by their own domestic problems, thus, 
they would have to take the challenge of intervening in their own regions.
130
  David 
Wippman puts it succinctly thus: 
ECOWAS has concluded that humanitarian emergencies in member States invariably spill 
over into neighbouring States and jeopardize regional security generally. ECOWAS has also 
concluded that it cannot rely on the U.N. to intervene effectively in such cases, and so it must 
be prepared to shoulder much of the burden itself.
131
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The question of how best to deal with the problem of unilateral actions of humanitarian 
intervention—whether by states, coalition of the willing or regional organisations has 
produced varied responses with some advocating for ‗tolerable breaches‘,132 ex post facto 
ratification,
133
 equation of non-condemnation to authorisation,
134
 acquiescence and so on.
135
  
Whatever approach is adopted, the failure of the Charter system to prevent the atrocities in 
Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Darfur all in Africa are perhaps reasons for 
arguing that the current system has been transformed by the consequences of these failures, 
leading to a system that now finds expression in the AU/ECOWAS legal regimes. This is an 
important achievement for the AU, which translates to the legal capacity to bypass the UNSC 
deadlock and evolve an independent humanitarian intervention mechanism for Africa.
136
 
There is little utility both for the object of humanitarian intervention and the Purposes and 
Principles of the UN to set up international criminal tribunals to prosecute perpetrators of 
mass atrocity crimes spending huge sums of money it claimed not to have had when there 
was yet opportunity to intervene and rescue the victims.
137
  
Obviously, African states are trying to chart a new course by creating new norms, or, 
at best, re-interpret existing international law principles.
138
 Therefore, they have been less 
than perturbed by the existing normative conflict between their regional legal framework and 
the UN Charter system. It would seem for the moment that the actors have been content to 
allow the ambiguities to remain, perhaps to be resolved through future practice and 
developments.  
Some of the few scholars who have written on the AU/ECOWAS humanitarian 
intervention legal regimes have attempted to resolve this normative ambiguity differently.
139
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But most, if not all, agree that there is a conflict between these regimes and the 
AU/ECOWAS with some taking moderate positions between two extremes.
140
 Others have 
attempted to construct a basis for normative compatibility between the regimes with reference 
to the AU. Kuwali, for example, adopts a utilitarian approach, stating that article 4(h) is an ‗a 
priori invitation to intervene‘ which complements but does not supplant existing UN 
structures for the implementation of R2P, and thus, should exist side by side with the UN 
framework.
141
 Kuwali advocates the implementation of article 4(h) through the pacific 
settlement framework in article 53(1) of the Charter so as to make it compatible with the UN 
Charter since in that case, the AU would not require UNSC authorisation.
142
 He concludes 
that in any case, should the AU desire intervention it would require UN authorisation.
143
 
While this may be a useful approach to reconciling the normative ambiguities it is 
however doubtful whether this was what the African leaders set out to achieve when they 
created a normative framework outside of the UN Charter system on use of force and 
humanitarian intervention. The shortcoming of this approach is that by focusing primarily on 
the utility of the AU norms as a basis for reconciling the normative incompatibility, it does 
not give due consideration to the normative, legal and structural defects in the current system. 
It therefore ignores part of the primary mischief the draftsman of the AU/ECOWAS treaties 
intended to cure and so risks compromising substance for form. The result is that the 
approach weakens the normative impact of the AU/ECOWAS treaties which is the prevention 
of another Rwanda. It sacrifices the progressive normative reform of the law of humanitarian 
intervention by the AU/ECOWAS on the altar of normative compatibility with UN Charter. 
However, whether we adopt a textual or contextual reading of the provisions, it does 
not seem that is what a combined reading of article 4(h), (j) of the AU Act and article 16 and 
17 of the AUPSC suggests. While the interpretation avoids the normative conflict 
conundrum, it does so at a considerable cost to the most fundamental and revolutionary 
achievement of the entire legal framework: providing a valid legal basis for unilateral action 
of humanitarian intervention by the AU notwithstanding the UN Charter system.  
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The interpretation suggested by Kuwali takes the AU back into the invidious position 
of being faced by mass atrocities but not being able to act because UNSC authorisation has 
been blocked by a veto with the resulting consequence of failure to prevent genocides and 
other mass atrocity crimes which is exactly the mischief in the current legal order that the 
AU/ECOWAS laws were intended to cure. It is argued that under these regimes, the 
intention, modus and effect, of article 4(h), and 25 of the ECOWAS MCPMRPS Protocol 
were aimed as legal revolution to either push for a quicker reform of the UN Charter system 
along the lines suggested by the AU in its Ezulwini Consensus or to accept the 
AU/ECOWAS new principled stance on the law of humanitarian intervention in Africa.
144
 
This view draws its support from the Ezulwini Consensus, and more recently, some AU 
decisions and resolutions in 2012.
145
  
The argument for non-military implementation of article 4(h) by the AU, while 
welcomed, might not be effective in all cases. Certain degree of humanitarian catastrophes 
caused by armed conflict can only be halted by armed intervention. This means that 
diplomatic, economic, judicial and all other non-military strategies must be backed by real 
force though such force should always be a last resort.
146
 This assertion was true under the 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention, it is true under the emerging norm of R2P calling for a 
new normative framework, and it is also true under the AU/ECOWAS framework. 
Besides, the challenges the AU/ECOWAS RHMI are likely to face in implementation 
is not the same thing as the legal effect or impact the provisions would have. However, it is 
possible that such impact could be affected in practice by these challenges. The major 
practical implications of the AU/ECOWAS, at least for now, is that Africa has several policy 
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prescriptions from which to draw in the enforcement of human rights and prevention of 
atrocities through the legal framework they have laid down by which member states ceded 
away part of their sovereignty in return for the collective protection of community citizens.
147
 
The scheme creates a primary responsibility to protect legal obligations for AU members and 
a role for the AU should members fail.
148
 The search for a legal foundation for normative 
compatibility may well be located in an inquiry into the nature and structure of the current 
global constitutive process and this is what we examine in our next chapter. 
4.8 CONCLUSION 
 
The failure of the collective security system created in 1945 under the UN Charter has 
produced new conditions in Africa. More and more reliance is being placed on regional 
organisations due to the failure and ineffectiveness of the UNSC in the maintenance of 
international peace and security and its unwillingness to commit material and resources to 
peace and security in Africa.
149
 Africans entertain worries that in deciding to intervene in 
Africa, the West, through the UN would always be motivated by geostrategic considerations 
rather than humanitarian cause.  
Africa‘s legal response poses new challenges for international law. The situation has 
led African states to withdraw from the world body in an attempt to exclude it from 
involvement in Africa‘s affairs.150 The AU and ECOWAS have been forced to begin a 
gradual development of their own legal and institutional frameworks and capacity to 
undertake humanitarian intervention in the continent.
151
 These instruments are the first 
attempt by any regional organisation to codify the right of humanitarian intervention, and in 
the case of ECOWAS, the first to create and codify a right of intervention to restore 
democracy in a regional treaty.
152
 Yet, enforcement action taken by a regional organisation 
even if authorised by the UNSC must be compatible with its own constituent document and 
the UN Charter.
153
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The question of whether or not the AU/ECOWAS legal framework for unilateral 
action will open the door to a flurry of unilateral interventions and so weaken the Charter 
collective security system as argued by some is a matter for conjecture.
154
 For now, the 
credibility of the UN and its claim to primary responsibility in the maintenance of 
international peace and security depends on the ability of the international community 
‗consistently‘ to apply and impartially to implement the collective security mechanism it lays 
claim to across regions and nations.
155
 Something it has obviously failed to do in the last 60 
years.   
As a way of resolving the normative ambiguities, some have called for re-distribution 
of authority between the UNSC and regional actors;
156
 others have called for an expansion of 
the scope of authority of regional actors as long as they further the principles and purposes of 
the UN Charter.
157
 However, these and other proposals like them try to resolve the normative 
ambiguity problem without paying significant attention to the systemic changes in the global 
constitutive process since 1945 and the impact they have on the theoretical foundations of 
unilateral actions of humanitarian interventions by actors in the international arena. The next 
chapter therefore examines the AU and ECOWAS unilateral intervention legal frameworks 
through the prism of the transformations that have taken place in the global constitutive 
process in order to ascertain its validity under current international law. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE LEGAL VALIDITY OF AU/ECOWAS UNILATERAL 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION LEGAL REGIMES IN A TRANSFORMED 
GLOBAL CONSTITUTIVE PROCESS 
 
In a period of rapid change, no system of law can content itself with a pious, mechanical 
replication of the past, for the future may be quite different from the past. Replication may then be 
a formula, not for reachieving what was gained in the past, but for disaster. The challenge to 
international lawyers and scholars must be to clarify continuously the common interests of this 
ever-changing community, drawing on historic policies but bearing in mind that the constitutive 
and institutional arrangements that were devised to achieve them may no longer be pertinent or 
effective.
1
  
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In the previous chapter I examined the AU/ECOWAS humanitarian intervention legal 
regimes and examined specific provisions and their compatibility with the UN Charter. I 
argued that at the normative level, the key provisions in the AU/ECOWAS treaties reveal a 
deliberate departure from the UN Charter collective security system and pursue the protection 
of human rights, peace, security and stability in Africa outside the UN framework; 
cooperating with the UN when possible and necessary, but also retaining for the 
AU/ECOWAS a domain reserve—primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and 
security in Africa and the  authority to undertake enforcement actions without United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) authorisation. Consequently, I established four arenas of normative 
incompatibility and ambiguities between the AU/ECOWAS regimes and the UN Charter and 
the challenge posed by these developments to the Charter system and international law on the 
use of force, raising the question of validity of the treaties. I argued that rather than dismiss 
the AU/ECOWAS regimes as invalid for imposing obligations on members which conflict 
with their Charter obligations, and thus, apparently incompatible with the Charter, the 
provisions should be seen as underscoring the need for a theoretical exploration to ascertain 
the legal validity or otherwise of these regimes in order to reconstruct a regime of normative 
compatibility between the UN Charter and the AU/ECOWAS regimes on humanitarian 
intervention and optimise their utility whether as instruments for traditional humanitarian 
intervention or for the operationalisation of R2P in Africa. 
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In this chapter, I seek to test the legal validity of these regimes by asking three 
fundamental questions: is there a jurisprudential foundation underpinning the apparent 
normative incompatibility between the AU/ECOWAS unilateral humanitarian intervention 
framework and the UN Charter and is it legally justifiable? Put differently, is there a 
theoretical basis for the legal validity of the AU/ECOWAS regime of unilateral humanitarian 
intervention, despite the apparent normative incompatibility with the Charter regime? Under 
what circumstances are unilateral acts like the AU/ECOWAS considered valid? Do the 
AU/ECOWAS regimes meet those conditions? I will then conclude the chapter with a brief 
assessment of the normative and practical implications unilateral acts under the 
AU/ECOWAS regimes might have on the UN Charter law on nonuse of force and how they 
will affect the UN‘s capacity for humanitarian intervention, particularly in Africa.    
 In attempting to answer the above questions, I adopt the Transformations of World 
Constitutive Process theory developed and applied by Reisman of the New Haven School
2
 to 
test the AU/ECOWAS regimes‘ claim to legal validity under international law.3 I find it 
useful to adopt this theoretical approach for three reasons: first, as a policy-oriented theory to 
the study of international law, it emphasises goals clarifications and therefore has the 
advantage of accounting for the different features, phases and policy consideration 
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law in contemporary perspective (1981) (hereafter McDougal & Reisman ‗International Law Essays‘); Siegfried 
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components of the decision-making process. Secondly, it also provides a comprehensive 
evaluation of all possible actors, their various roles and how their interactions affect the 
process of authoritative decision-making in the global constitutive process. Finally, and more 
importantly, based on its interpretative methods and preference for what states actually do, it 
gives what I consider to be a fair assessment and projections of how state actors in the global 
constitutive process can be expected to behave in the future and this is particularly useful for 
purposes of our inquiry because it enhances the task of projecting the likely pattern of future 
state behaviour with respect to the legal characterisation of unilateral humanitarian 
intervention. Some of the common terminologies employed by this theory and useful to our 
inquiry are ‗constitutive process‘, ‗authoritative decision‘ ‗constitutive‘ and ‗human dignity‘.4 
For our purposes, ‗human dignity‘ as used by the New Haven School means human rights in 
its fullest dimension and the term global constitutive process of authoritative decision refers 
to international law.
5
  
5.2 THE NEW HAVEN CONCEPTION OF THE GLOBAL CONSTITUTIVE PROCESS 
 
Configurative jurisprudence has been developed and employed in the study of different 
problems in international law.
6
 Under the rubric, Transformations of World Constitutive 
Process model, this theory was applied to the question of the lawfulness of unilateral 
humanitarian intervention by Michael Reisman.
7
 It relies on a differentiation of periods of 
world constitutive process. Under this theoretical model, the evolution of the global 
constitutive process can be categorised into four: (a) a period when the constitutive process 
was without hierarchical institutions of decision-making; (b) a period when the constitutive 
process had ineffective hierarchical institutions of decision-making; (c) a period when the 
constitutive process had hierarchical institutions of decision-making that were generally 
effective, but proved to be ineffective in applying particular norms; and (d) a period when the 
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constitutive process has very effective hierarchical institutions of decision-making. Though 
not always an accurate operation, this type of periodisation allows for clarity in analysis.
8
 The 
legal validity of unilateral humanitarian intervention such as those provided for under the 
AU/ECOWAS framework is examined under these four periods of global constitutive process 
below.  
5.2.1 Unorganised or Non-Hierarchical Constitutive Process Structures   (Pre-Global   
Community Constitutive Process) and the Legality of Unilateral Humanitarian 
Intervention 
 
In setting the stage for the analysis that follows it is pertinent to quote copiously from 
Reisman‘s graphic illustration: 
The situation was reminiscent of the standard American morality play: a town in the ―Wild 
West‖ in the 19th century without a sheriff, good people, perforce, carrying their own 
weapons and protecting their rights as they see fit. A sheriff comes to town, announcing that 
he brings with him law and order. As he will henceforth enforce the law, individuals no 
longer need carry weapons and the town need not tolerate individual resort to force to protect 
personal rights. Presumably, all good people would be delighted by this constitutional change 
and would accept the new norm prohibiting the unilateral use of force. Suppose, however, that 
within six months it becomes clear that the sheriff is utterly incapable of maintaining order. 
The rule against unilateral force that he has installed may continue on the books, but it is 
difficult to believe that even the best of citizens will refrain from the techniques of self-help 
that prevailed before the sheriff's arrival.‖ This is what happened in the international system. 
… Within 5 years of the creation of the UN, a pattern emerged that characterized the most of 
the life of the UN since in which unilateral violations of Art 2(4) might be condemned but 
literally validated and the violator allowed to enjoy the fruits of his wrong.
9
 
  
The pre-global constitutive process refers to a constitutive process without hierarchical 
institutions of decision-making. This period can be divided into two for convenience 
purposes. The first period spans the pre-intercontinental contact era when there was neither 
global community nor international law. The second period covers the era between the Treaty 
of Westphalia and the League of Nations (1648-1918), during which general international 
law developed.
10
 The historical evolution of the global constitutive process can be compared 
to the growth of a world community and its diversity and far-reaching influence has also been 
very huge.
11
 Most of the structures that underpin the current global constitutive process did 
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not exist in earlier periods when there were no interactions between different regions of the 
world and these structures only emerged later as a result of such interactions.
12
 From the 
Roman to the Chinese empires, there was very minimal contact between peoples by way of 
exchange of goods and services, trade and so on, that would justify any claim to a global 
community let alone an organisation like the League of Nations or a global constitutive 
process at that time.
13
 Nevertheless, there still existed a ‗functional equivalent of a universal 
system of public order‘ wherever tribes and civilizations considered themselves as the only 
relevant groups.
14
 
 
In the West, the basis of public order was sacred, but in the Chinese realm, it was 
more secular and the world was viewed as comprising the Chinese Empire or all peoples who 
embraced Chinese civilisation and lived under its Emperor.
15
 The sphere of effective control 
in this case did not actually correspond to the sphere of ‗pretended authority‘.16 In the West, 
as well as China, a system of order and practices were devised prescribing rules for 
interactions harmonious or otherwise, among blocs.
17
 Since these societies had such features 
as being territorially delimited vis-à-vis other societies, they had common imposition, desire, 
and modus operandi, they can be classified as constituting a community.
18
 An infraction of 
the evolving rules of interactions in these societies met with vehement demand that the status 
quo be restored and sometimes attracted sanctions to the violator.
19
 As these interactions 
deepened and expanded, specialised institutional frameworks and etiquettes saddled with the 
responsibility of crafting decision processes that were able to maintain stable interaction and 
the restoration of relations emerged and eventually crystallised into numerous global 
practices.
20
 It is pertinent to bear in mind that there were inter-group intercourse and relations 
amongst nations at this time though we could not speak of a global community or a global 
constitutive process.
21
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The period and system of interactions ushered in by the Peace Treaty of Westphalia 
was radically different from the one described above in many respects. Although centralised 
structures emerged in Europe between 1100 and 1300, it was only after 1450 that they began 
to bear any resemblance to the modern state and was therefore quite different from the 
Westphalian nation-states.
22
 Prior to the ascendance of Westphalia and the decline of the 
power of both the Church and the Emperor, ecclesiastical and imperial laws generated by 
them respectively prevailed and the constitutive process as we know it today could not 
emerge.
23
 But the gradual decline in the influence, and the inability of the Pope and Emperor 
to call on a universal submission soon dislocated the idea of a universal empire and 
substituted the theory of society of states.
24
 This new notion allowed the emerging nation-
states to assert themselves, though often in fierce rivalry with one another, which necessitated 
the modification of former codes of behavior for nation states and the invention of new ones 
which in turn resulted in the transformation of the constitutive process and the development 
of modern international law.
25
 Cassese puts it thus: 
The Peace of Westphalia testified to the rapid decline of the Church … and to the de 
facto disintegration of the Empire; by the same token it recorded the birth of an 
international system based on a plurality of independent States, recognising no 
superior authority over them.
26
 
Simultaneous with the above development, there was a corresponding preponderance of 
intellectual postulations seeking to justify these developments and transformation from a 
constitutive process of authoritative decision without hierarchical institutions of decision-
making and it is upon them that modern international law now rests.
27
  Meanwhile, in 
Western Europe, the scope, intensity and geographical reach of internal social, economic and 
political interactions had increased greatly and a global community with a single public order 
was beginning to emerge.
28
  
Naturally, in any community, whenever the volume of interactions amongst members 
intensify and extend to a certain level, leaders soon discover the need to devise some 
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mechanism of regulating the different groups to enhance the ultimate benefits derived from 
such interactions by participants.
29
 The usual response is to initiate practice which produces 
stable practice by prescribing ‗minimum contacts‘.30 Similarly, in the system that evolved out 
of Westphalia, nation-states began to see themselves as separate, independent and 
autonomous entities subject to no superior authority, Pope or Emperor.
31
 Again, jurists 
propounded legal concepts such as the concept of the ‗equality of states‘ and ‗state 
sovereignty‘ to validate these claims.32 Driven by the common desire to maximize their 
interests and net gain, nation-states were able to evolve common practices that now form 
rules of international law in the emergent global community.
33
 Through this mechanism, 
actors expect to be better off by conforming to the rules than by breaking them and this 
explains the foundation and continuous evolution of international law to date.
34
 According to 
Reisman: 
The changing features of ―world constitutional law‖ are to be understood by perceiving the 
intimacy of interplay between law and the entire social process of the world community. A 
world constitutive process of authoritative decision, thus, comes to include the establishment 
of an authoritative decision process on the world community, and its subsequent maintenance, 
modification, or even termination.
35
 
Having succeeded in the initial task of instituting an ‗authoritative decision process‘ for the 
global community‘, the enterprise of how to maintain, when and how to modify or terminate 
such rules has engaged jurists ever since. This is even more so with respect to collective 
security and the use of force for the protection of people facing massive violation of human 
rights at the hands of their own government. Even the Treaty of Westphalia itself attempted 
to regulate the use of force and create a collective security system but failed.
36
 Hence, the 
normative framework that developed in this period was largely driven and shaped by Great 
Powers of Christian and European civilisation.
37
 Many of the treaties centered on 
humanitarian concerns such as the prohibition of slave trade and the proscription of the use of 
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certain weapons like the Dum-Dum bullets.
38
 Emphasis was on encouraging cooperation 
amongst nation-states as a way of maintaining the peace, drawing on the postulations of 
jurists like Hugo Grotius who stressed inter-state cooperation and regulated interaction as a 
way of maintaining peace.
39
 This ‗pre-global‘ era had a profound impact on subsequent 
global events and systems because the conception of comprehensive ‗institutions of authority 
and control‘ developed in the different parts of the world at the time shaped the predilection 
carried into the larger global community and its subsequent constitutive process.
40
 The 
relationships and attitudes formed in the inter-tribal era still shape man‘s limitation for 
extensive and extraterritorial associations today.
41
  
In the pre-global era, there was no need for intervention whether collective or 
unilateral because there was hardly any contact between the different peoples. But in the 
second era described above (also called the Just War era), when contacts had begun to take 
place amongst the different peoples of the world, unilateral intervention developed and was 
regarded as valid in its various dimensions.
42
 As we have seen, there was no global 
community in this period and the ‗legal system‘ and constitutive process as it were, was 
without hierarchical institutions of decision-making.
43
 Existence was similar to the 
Hobbesian state of nature and participants were in a ‗perpetual state of war of all against all‘ 
and where life was ‗short, nasty and brutish‘.44 Under this paradigm of self-help, might was 
right and ‗the strong do what they will and the weak suffer what they must‘.45 Participants 
were at liberty to resort to force for the vindication of their rights and unilateral action and 
agreement in pursuit of such rights was the norm in the same way ‗unilateral action perforce 
is how law is created and applied‘ and so lawful.46 Under such international legal paradigm, 
the AU/ECOWAS unilateral humanitarian intervention framework would be valid. 
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The global community that has emerged is such that nation-states are preoccupied 
with optimising their priorities while effective decisions are made in accordance with the 
community expectations. Yet, the world public order, though existent, remained largely 
incomplete in its formation and function and thus incapable of maintaining a global public 
order. The reason for this is obvious—it is due to the very nature of the international legal 
order itself—lacking a centralized or superior authority and no effective enforcement 
mechanism. Throughout the history of the global constitutive process, no single empire has 
succeeded in establishing a complete public order by imposing itself on the world and actors 
continue to make claims of diverse public orders while power has remained diffused and 
fragmented without a legitimating authority to validate new situations, leaving every state to 
its own devises of self-help.
47
 States had an almost absolute right to go to war for whatever 
reason, or even without any reason because the exercise of such right was viewed as an 
attribute of sovereignty.
48
 In this pre-global era, not only was there no global community, it 
was also characterised by lack of a constitutive document and hierarchical decision-making 
authority. The closest was the various treaties from the Treaty of Westphalia itself, the 
different military alliance treaties and the Concert of Europe. At the dawn of the twentieth 
century, the constitutive process still had no hierarchical decision-making institution and 
decision-making was often unilateral and state behaviour and international law was shaped by 
custom produced by unilateral acts that sometimes created new customs by breaking old 
ones.
49
 ‗Self-help‘ was the rule and states vindicated their rights according to their power and 
the weak often had to forgo their rights because there was no institution to vindicate them.
50
  
Hence there were several instances of unilateral humanitarian intervention in the 
eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and these were legal.
51
 In such 
constitutive configuration, because of the absence of hierarchical institutions of decision 
making and implementation of rules, unilateral action was the only way usually adopted by 
participants and the legality or otherwise of an act was not a function of its unilateral 
character.
52
 Expectedly, such situation would be unsatisfactory to participants and they would 
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act to establish a better system leading to a transformation to the second type of constitutive 
configuration. 
5.2.2 League of Nations Era Global Constitutive Process with Ineffective Hierarchical    
Structures and the Legal Validity of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention 
 
This is the type 2 constitutive configuration. The evolution of a new constitutive 
configuration to replace the pre-global era was hastened by the atrocities of World War I. The 
magnitude of the horrors of war and the scale of loss of life persuaded statesmen and jurists 
to intensify efforts, which had begun in 1899 and 1907 on devising procedural checks on the 
resort to use of force by states because it was discovered that a major failing of the previous 
dispensation of defense alliances and self-help was the inability to impose a limitation on the 
rights of states to wage war.
53
 Thus, a world constitutive process with hierarchical institution 
animated the early twentieth
 
century, resulting in the creation of the League of Nations in 
1919. From inception, the new organisation suffered from many defects—poor drafting of its 
Covenant characterised by gaps and the need for compromise and flexibility attenuated its 
contents, casting it as more of a political pact than a legal text.
54
 However, as events later 
showed, the failure and eventual demise of the League of Nations resulted not from these 
weaknesses but from more compelling but inescapable factors emanating from the very 
nature of nation states and the global community.
55
 Importantly, the refusal of the US (one of 
the de facto Powers of the global constitutive process) to accede to the new ‗global body‘ 
made the League‘s claim to universality more formal than real.56 
 
For our purposes the most important provisions of the League‘s Covenant are articles 
10-16. Many of the norms embodied in the Covenant had actually existed in the preceding 
pre-global era. Submission of dispute to arbitration, provision for a period of moratorium, 
recourse to war as last resort and so on were either already part of customary international 
law or were evolving as such.
57
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The Covenant introduced two significant principles: a commitment by members to 
explore the peaceful resolution procedures under the League of Nations.
58
 Secondly, 
members undertook to apply both diplomatic and economic sanctions against any member 
state that waged war in violation of the Covenant.
59
 The Covenant instituted a wide-ranging 
restraint on the right of states to wage war by declaring ‗any war or threat of war … a matter 
of concern to the League‘ and this arguably was its most important single contribution.60 
Articles 10, 11, 12, 13, 15 and 16 in this respect, significantly advanced the development of a 
normative system of jus ad bellum and the evolving architecture of collective security in the 
global community.
61
 Collectively they availed the observer a set of criteria for appraising the 
legality of a decision process determined by the degree of compliance with the Covenant‘s 
procedural requirements on recourse to force.
62
 These provisions were quickly put to the test, 
revealing several institutional, substantive and procedural weaknesses in the new constitutive 
configuration despite the existence of a hierarchical decision-making organ with a 
constitutive document—League of Nations. 
 
Three major incidents underscored the ineffectiveness of the League of Nations and 
eventually paved the way for the transformation of the constitutive process to the third type: 
the Manchuria Crisis, the Abyssinia Crisis and WW II. On 18 September 1931, Japanese 
forces invaded Manchuria under the pretext of protecting Japanese nationals and their 
businesses, but it was clear that this was a case of unbridled aggression in violation of the 
League of Nations Covenant.
63
 Despite China‘s appeal to the League to act under article 16 
of the Covenant, the League of Nations declined to even investigate the incident because the 
US (a non-League Member) objected to any investigations.
64
 Emboldened by this lack of 
consensus between the League of Nations and the US, Japan pursued its aggressive policy 
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and occupied Manchuria and eventually went to war with China.
65
 The Manchuria incident 
exposed the inherent weaknesses and lack of potency by the League of Nations when it came 
to the enforcement of its most fundamental principle and provision.
66
 As observed by one 
commentator, ‗[t]he net result of the Sino-Japanese crisis is that the system of collective 
responsibility in international disputes has received a severe shock, and the sanctity of 
international contracts is to-day [sic] at the lowest ebb for many years. To that extent the 
League has thus far failed.‘67 
 
Similarly, in December 1934, Italian forces clashed with Abyssinia (now Ethiopia) 
under the pretext of freeing slaves from the authorities in Addis Ababa.
68
 Again, the League 
of Nations acknowledged that this was an act of aggression in violation of the Covenant but 
the League could not take any coercive measure to compel Italy to withdraw from Abyssinia, 
and just like Japanese forces in Manchuria, Italian forces remained in Abyssinia until 1941.
69
 
The League attempted to impose sanctions on Italy in accordance with article 16 but such 
resolution required a unanimous vote which the League could not muster and it had to settle 
for voluntary sanctions by members which weakened the sanctions regime.
70
 The primary 
concern of the Great Powers Members of the League of Nations was avoiding another World 
War rather than restoring Abyssinia‘s sovereignty.71 The League‘s inability to prevent the 
invasion coupled with the ineffective sanctions imposed, further undermined the legitimacy 
of the League of Nations and underscored the failure of collective security under that 
particular constitutive configuration.
72
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The expectations that the League of Nations would be able to serve as a collective 
security mechanism were quickly dashed by the Abyssinia and Manchuria incidents due to 
lack of enforcement mechanism.
73
 The political will and means of enforcing coercive 
measures against Great Powers, or a small state supported by a Great Power, was absent.
74
 
Article 16 was only legally binding if it was unanimous and Japan was able to vote down a 
resolution calling for its withdrawal from Manchuria.
75
 Hence, though Italy was vulnerable to 
sanctions due to its dependence on foreign supplies, no League member had the nerve to 
impose complete sanctions, giving Mussolini ample space to reap the fruits of his illegality.
76
  
In a global constitutive process such as existed under the League of Nations where effective 
decision-making depended on a consensus amongst member states, any disagreement would 
be catastrophic for such organisation‘s role and legitimacy, more so when its membership 
excluded key states that may refuse to support the policy direction of the organisation.
77
 
Furthermore, contrary to the expectations of League of Nations founders that the common 
objective of collective security would also yield collective action by states, in reality, states 
action or inaction was a function of their national interest calculus, which, though, sometimes 
converged with League of Nations objectives, nevertheless remained fundamentally a product 
of unilateral national interest perceptions.
78
 
Several other factors weakened the League of Nations as a decision-making 
hierarchical institution under this configurative constitutive process. The first was that there 
was no complete ban on the use of force, because by using the term ‗war‘ in article 12, the 
Covenant opened the way for states to engage in the use of force and deny that a state of war 
existed because there had been no formal declaration of war.
79
 Consequently, the 
effectiveness of the League of Nations was compromised because whatever action states 
decided to take depended on whether they individually characterised the situation as war or 
not.
80
 In the Manchuria incident, states colluded to maintain the false impression that Japan 
and China were not at war because this was considered a useful political tool.
81
 Besides this, 
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states reserved the right to take any action they deemed necessary to maintain peace and 
justice including going to war provided they fulfilled some conditions including first 
submitting the dispute for adjudication or arbitration and also allowing for a 3 month 
‗cooling-period‘.82  Furthermore, the League of Nations regarded human rights as a matter 
within the internal jurisdiction of states and left the question of the legality of humanitarian 
intervention open.
83
 Aggressor states like Japan, Italy and Germany were able to argue that 
their actions were driven by humanitarian interventions.
84
  
The failure of the League of Nations to prevent the Manchuria and Abyssinia 
incidents and ultimately World War II revealed its ineffectiveness and the type 2 constitutive 
configuration. It was a constitutive process with hierarchical institutions but the institutions 
were manifestly ineffective. This type of legal system has a constitutive document with 
hierarchical decision-making institutions (for example, the League of Nations), but, in reality, 
de jure power is wielded by outside actors. Under this era, the existence of a formal 
constitutive process with all the substantive and procedural requirements well defined in a 
constitutive document is of no moment because de jure power lies with a ‗shadow authority‘ 
operating outside the hierarchical institution of decision-making. So, even though it is 
sometimes possible for the objectives of the ‗formal authority‘ and ‗shadow authority‘ to 
coincide, they actually operate at different levels of value frequencies. Unilateral action is 
therefore legal and valid under such system.  
As noted above, the US remained outside the League of Nations and at various points 
so, too, did the USSR, Germany and Japan. However, the US not only participated with 
‗Observer Status‘ in many of the League of Nations deliberations, it actually drove such 
processes, lending or withdrawing its support according to its national interest calculus. In the 
Manchuria incident, one major reason the Council could not impose sanctions on Japan was 
the refusal of the US to support the decision.
85
 Similarly, Abyssinia could not secure any 
effective remedy against Italian aggression through the Council of the League of Nations. 
This systemic weakness is attributable, at least in part, to two legal conundrums: first is the 
practical difficulty of sustaining the legal equality of states concept when there is such 
substantial material inequality amongst states.
86
 The consequence is that despite the efforts of 
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the League of Nations, the system actually reverted to the previous constitutive configuration 
of self-help. The League of Nations decision process in the Manchurian and Abyssinia 
incidents demonstrates this point. 
Secondly, too often, ‗formal authority is equated with actual controlling institutional 
structures and expectations of authority.‘87 But this is hardly the case in practice especially in 
the international legal system which lacks an important characteristic of effective constitutive 
configuration—central authority. Reisman therefore concludes that in such legal systems, ‗…  
[i]nsiders—operators who understand the ‗operational code‘ know that it is fruitless to seek 
decision from the formal process if they had not first been certified by the actual power 
process.‘88 If the League-era constitutive configuration had an effective hierarchical 
institution—if diplomatic sanctions had been applied to Japan in 1931, if an oil embargo had 
been imposed on Italy in 1936, and if a comprehensive embargo had been imposed on 
Germany in 1939, these aggressor states would have abandoned their aggressor policies and 
the world would have been saved the catastrophe of World War II.
89
 But this did not happen 
and we therefore conclude that the League of Nations era exemplified a type 2 constitutive 
configuration with an ineffective decision-making hierarchical institution.
90
  
In addition to the above, the League of Nations era, the potency of the League as a 
decision-making institution depended on the discretional cooperation of members in taking 
action under the League‘s auspices including the imposition and enforcement of sanctions.91 
The consequence of non-performance of these actions by members invariably rendered the 
whole League system ineffective and the constitutive process reverted back to type 1 that 
operated in the pre-global era where unilateral action was the norm and legal.
92
 Though this 
transformation was less than obvious, it explains why states continued to claim a right of 
unilateral action deriving from the preceding pre-global constitutive configuration (of 
customary international law) in contrast to the succeeding League of Nations system that 
attempted to restrain that right by instituting a constitutive configuration with hierarchical 
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decision-making institution to which states surrendered their rights to unilateral action.
93
 
Thus, this fusion of two constitutive processes, (one without hierarchical institutions of 
decision making where unilateral action is legal and the second where there is an ineffective 
hierarchical institution of decision making and where unilateral action will ordinarily be 
unnecessary and unlawful but for the ineffectiveness) the legal status of unilateral 
intervention became ambiguous and remains so to this day.
94
 If it were understood that there 
had been a reversion from type 2 to type 1 constitutive configuration and both processes had 
been kept apart, perhaps the status of unilateral action would have been clearer than it is 
today and there would have been no basis for challenging its legal validity.
95
 
Nevertheless, as observed even in 1936, under any constitutive configuration, 
‗[c]ollective security remains the most promising hope for an ordered world however that is 
arranged whether on a universal or regional basis and whether by a limited or general treaty is 
a matter of expediency‘.96 The lesson from the League of Nations era was that prohibiting the 
use of force, leaving enforcement to the discretion of states, was incapable of deterring 
violators in the system because sates would usually be guided by national interest 
considerations.
97
 A total ban on the rights of states to use force would therefore require the 
establishment of an effective international organisation, which, in turn, depends on a 
fundamental re-structuring of the constitutive configuration.
98
 This led to the attempt to 
create a type 4 constitutive configuration by establishing the UN, but it is pertinent to 
describe the nature of a type 3 constitutive configuration which, as we shall see, eventually 
became the dominant system notwithstanding the attempt by the UN system to approximate a 
type 4 constitutive configuration. 
5.2.3 Constitutive Configuration with Hierarchical Institutions of Limited Effectiveness  
 
The third type of constitutive configuration is one with largely effective hierarchical decision-
making institutions but such decision making structures are ineffective in the implementation 
of certain important norms like human rights.
99
 An example is the UNSC in the protection of 
human rights. The UNSC has proved itself ineffective in the use of force to protect the human 
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rights guaranteed under the UN Charter when needed.
100
 The partial inefficacy of this 
constitutive configuration is partly explained by a lack of symmetry between authoritative 
power and controlling capacity and it occurs because ‗authoritative reach exceeds controlling 
grasps.‘101 Thus, although the Charter confers broad authority on the UNSC to maintain 
international peace and security, and arguably to protect human rights, several subsequent 
developments ensured that the UNSC does not quite have the controlling capacity to match 
the exercise of this power and has been ineffective in the protection of human rights.
102
 It was 
in anticipation of this that when states surrendered their rights to use force to the UNSC in 
1945 in exchange for an expected global collective security system, article 51 dealing with 
the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense was inserted in the Charter as a 
safety valve that permits unilateral action.
103
 
 
In a legal system with this defect, provision is made for unilateral acts to fill the 
lacuna, but such unilateral acts should comply with prescribed substantive and procedural 
requirements.
104
 However, it is my view that under type 3 constitutive configuration, whether 
unilateral acts of humanitarian intervention taken under article 10(c) of ECOWAS 
MCPMRPS and article 4(h) of the AU Act and 4(h) (j) of the AUPSC Protocol are lawful 
would depend on their compliance with the relevant substantive rather than procedural 
requirements for such intervention. Non-compliance with procedural requirements under 
article 53(1) of the Charter by ECOWAS and AU would not render such unilateral 
humanitarian intervention illegal, because the prevailing global constitutive configuration 
fluctuates between type 2 and type 3 which permit unilateral action under certain 
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circumstances.
105
 For such unilateral act to be valid, they must comply with the substantive 
requirements which, under the AU/ECOWAS regimes—to halt genocide, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and ethnic cleansing (and in the case of ECOWAS, undemocratic change of 
government) —which is the same with what is required under general international law and 
the emerging responsibility to protect (R2P) principle. I will examine further whether and 
how the AU/ECOWAS frameworks meet these substantive requirements presently so as to 
make the provisions and the unilateral action taken under them valid. 
5.2.4 Constitutive Configuration with Highly Effective Constitutive Structures and the 
Validity of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention 
 
Under the UN Charter, states attempted to create a constitutive configuration that 
approximates type 4 whereby states surrendered their right to use force to the UN in the 
understanding that matters of threats to international peace and security as well as aggression 
would be dealt with collectively by the global community through the UNSC, presumptively 
making unilateral action, including unilateral humanitarian intervention illegal.
106
This new 
constitutive configuration was founded on three pillars: the first pillar imposed legal 
obligation on states to refrain from use of force under article 2(4) of the Charter; the second 
created hierarchical institutions to enforce those obligations (particularly the UNSC); and the 
third created a hierarchy of norms as the philosophical foundation of the world public order 
which set the maintenance of international peace and security as the underpinning normative 
objective of the Charter and was to override other principles,including justice.
107
 Other 
matters were located in the domain of essential domestic jurisdiction of states where states 
exercised exclusive jurisdiction.
108
  
 
Ideally, this constitutive configuration and its hierarchical institutions of decision 
making should be highly effective in achieving community goals; hence recourse to unilateral 
action is both unnecessary and unlawful.
109
 In such system, if it had worked as envisaged 
when the Charter was drafted, the UNSC would have been highly effective in fulfilling its 
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obligations to maintain international peace and security and protect human rights as part of 
the purposes of the UN for which ‗The Peoples of the United Nations‘ acting through their 
states founded the body and unilateral action (by AU/EOCWAS) would have been illegal 
today.
110
 But, as seen in Chapter 3, the constitutive process soon underwent tremendous 
changes that rendered its hierarchical institutions of decision-making, particularly the UNSC 
ineffective and the system reverted back to type 3 constitutive configuration where unilateral 
action is lawful.
111
 I briefly examine some of these changes and their impact on the 
transformation of the constitutive process from type 4 that the UN system attempted to 
approximate to type 3 that now prevails. 
 
5.3 STRUCTURAL AND NORMATIVE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTIVE PROCESS AND THE VALIDITY OF UNILATERAL ACTION 
 
It is not only with respect to effective institutions that the transformation of the constitutive 
configuration occurred. It also occurred at the structural and normative level. First, the 
collective security arrangement in the Charter was based on certain fundamental assumptions 
including the continuous cooperation between the victorious Allied Powers led by the US and 
the USSR.
112
 But the inception of the Cold War and indiscriminate use of the veto soon 
crippled the UNSC and rendered it incapable of maintaining international peace and security 
as guaranteed to member states when they transferred parts of their sovereign rights to use 
force to the UN.
113
 The first casualty was article 43(1) of the Charter which mandated the 
creation of a standing UN army based on agreement to be signed by the UNSC and states in 
order to accomplish UN objectives. This provision, intended to be at the heart of the sanction 
regimes and enforcement mechanism of the collective security arrangement under the 
Charter, and therefore, the core of the global constitutive process was never created due to the 
Cold War.
114
 The UN had been forced to rely on voluntary troop contributions by states or a 
coalition of the willing over which it has no control for enforcement of its resolutions. The 
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impact of this failure to establish a UN army on the Charter system is much debated;
115
  but 
when taken together with the paralysis occasioned by the veto, it appears that by providing 
for ‗organised cooperation‘ rather than ‗institutionalized action‘116 the Charter system of 
collective security was inadvertently programmed to fail and has thus been generally unable 
to fulfill its primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security for most of 
its existence.
117
 With the failure of the Charter collective security system, the Charter 
paradigm on the use of force, and the collective security mechanism it set up, the type 4 
constitutive configuration it sought to establish was effectively set aside by states and 
replaced by a type 3 constitutive configuration based on a balance of power system in which 
unilateral intervention is lawful.
118
 With this transformation states devised their own means 
of seeing to peace and security in order to fill the vacuum left by the wide prohibition of force 
and the ‗intervening ineffectiveness of the constitutive structure that had been assigned the 
exclusive competence to use force in support of public order;‘119 such method includes 
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sometimes resorting to unilateral action by states and extra-Charter arrangements by regional 
organisations. However, efforts were still made to graft these measures onto the Charter—
through reinterpretations and the creation of new terminologies.
120
 This ambiguity in the 
character of the extant constitutive configuration has persisted for a long time and is 
responsible for the controversy surrounding the legality of unilateral acts of humanitarian 
intervention by the AU/ECOWAS.
121
 This anomaly has hardly changed, notwithstanding the 
end of the Cold War and a few years of UNSC interventionism.
122
 
 
There were also changes of normative character. The drafters of the Charter‘s 
normative hierarchy were persuaded by the horrors of World War II to prioritise peace over 
justice, hence the express provisions in Chapter VII on the maintenance of international peace 
and security. However, the internationalisation of human rights brought other participants to 
the constitutive process, other than states, that began to make new demands of community 
goals on the constitutive process in respect of human rights.
123
 As states recognised these 
human rights and the obligations they create, the view also emerged that rather than mere 
aspirations for progressive realisation, human rights were also worthy of international 
protection, by use of force if necessary.
124
 For example, it was contended even during the 
Cold War that force could be used in furtherance of national liberation and self-determination 
of peoples as well as to correct previous injustices.
125
 According to Arend and Beck, it is 
rather than prioritising peace over justice and  ‗believing that more injury to world order 
occurs when force is used to pursue just goals, states have come to believe that at certain 
times, it is better to break the peace in the name of justice, than to live with the injustice. At 
times justice must take precedence over peace.‘126 
In particular, the international concern with human rights has flourished since the 
1990s and through the practice of the UNSC, regional organisations and states have generated 
a norm of collective humanitarian intervention.
127
 Such collective humanitarian intervention 
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could be by a group of states, the UN, or by states in joint operations with the UN.
128
 
Arguably, this includes regional organisations like the AU and ECOWAS. The cumulative 
effect of this is that, at the normative level, there have been such fundamental changes that 
the authoritative and controlling reach of article 2(4) and its restraints on the use of force has 
been relaxed to accommodate this reality.
129
 So, challenging the legal validity of the 
provisions of article 4(h) of the AU Act, article 4(j) of the African Union Peace and Security 
Council (AUPSC) Protocol, and article 25 of the ECOWAS Protocol on the Mechanism for 
Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (MCPMRPS) for 
conflicting with article 2(4) of the UN Charter is unsustainable.  
For its part, the UNSC has sought to deal with this change in normative hierarchy and 
its implications for the jus ad bellum by reinterpreting expansively the meaning and scope of 
‗threat to peace and security‘ and developing the concept of peacekeeping. As seen in chapter 
3, this has been generally ineffective, especially in Africa. This is even more so, as the 
demands for the fulfillment of community goals of human dignity continue to rise. The legal 
implication of this ineffectiveness is that the constitutive process with effective hierarchical 
decision-making institutions established by the UN Charter in 1945, suffered atrophy and 
reverted back to type 3 constitutive configuration where unilateral action,
130
 including 
unilateral humanitarian intervention by regional organisations like ECOWAS and the AU, is 
lawful. As Reisman puts it, ‗[w]ith the advent of the Cold War, the constitutive structures 
created by the Charter remained in place, but, in practice, it quickly degraded from what had 
been intended to be the fourth type of constitutive arrangement to the third.‘131 However, 
some scholars doubt that these normative changes had such transformative impact on the UN 
Charter system, arguing that, at best, the modification and reordering of norms merely 
constitute a danger to the Charter framework.
132
 Henkin contends that critics focus on the 
number of times the Charter has failed rather than succeeded in restraining state behaviour—
in other words whether the glass is half-full or half-empty depends on your observational 
standpoint.  
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Yet, the general trajectory of normative evolution in the international legal order since 
1945 supports the conclusion that the Charter normative paradigm has been supplanted by a 
second paradigm of self-help, and, since the end of the Cold War, a third normative paradigm 
is gradually evolving.
133
 A good example of this trend is the question of the right of pro-
democratic intervention.
134
 In relation to the transformation of the normative framework of 
the Charter in this respect, Arend and Beck speak of a ‗post-Charter self-help paradigm‘135 
and Thomas Franck asserts that when a political arrangement has degraded to a certain extent 
it becomes incapable of reforming itself and will require help from without to salvage it.
136
  It 
is clear that the Charter paradigm of 1945 was not designed for the prevailing order and as 
Reisman rightly  predicts, if the United Nations fails to  adjust to the new challenges, 
authoritative decision-making is likely to move outside the UN system.
137
  
To this end, the world must think creatively of how to make international law 
responsive to the peace and security demands of the global community. It follows from the 
above that any rigorous analysis of the right of regional organisations to unilateral use of 
force since the end of the Cold War can no longer be sufficiently undertaken merely by 
relying on a textual construction of articles 2(4) and 53(1) of the Charter. Rather, such 
analysis must take account of other factors that the community of states has recognised 
through practice, as validating such unilateral resort to force and this includes the protection 
of human rights. By extension, any appraisal of the AU/ECOWAS right to intervene without 
UNSC authorisation will have to be undertaken through a substantive rather than procedural 
assessment of the purposive values pursued by the AU and ECOWAS. Where it is in 
fulfillment of the principles and purposes of the UN Charter, such as the AU/ECOWAS 
regimes under consideration, procedural irregularities in relation to the UNSC should not be 
allowed to stand in the way of the goal of rescuing a great number of people whose life and 
limb may be imperiled, provided such unilateral resort to force complies with the substantive 
requirements of the constitutive charter of the AU/ECOWAS and general international law. 
After all the Charter was made by the ‗Peoples of the United Nations‘—the human beings 
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and individuals, for themselves and not for the protection or pursuit of narrow national 
interests. The UNSC and other institutional framework and arrangements under the Charter 
were aimed at facilitating the realisation of this goal.  
5.4 THE PERSISTENCE OF TYPE 3 GLOBAL CONSTITUTIVE CONFIGURATION 
AND THE VALIDITY OF AU/ECOWAS UNILATERAL INTERVENTION 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN THE POST-COLD WAR PARADIGM 
 
The denial of the legality of unilateral action in the post-Charter constitutive configuration 
stems from the assumption that the Charter‘s attempt at replacing the League of Nations era 
constitutive process has been successful. Through the Charter‘s broad prohibition of use of 
force, establishment of intergovernmental and international organisations to remedy the 
weaknesses in a decentralised international legal system (lack of centralised law-making and 
enforcement mechanism) the Charter had attempted to replace a basically Grotian (or 
internationalist) with a Kantian (or universalist) world order.
138
 Unfortunately, the state 
system is so well entrenched that from time to time it resurfaces especially during crises and 
destroys extant institutions.
139
 ‗It is like a human skeleton that can only be seen on an X-ray 
being covered by flesh and skin and clothes. Though momentarily concealed, it is still very 
much there, constituting the framework on which all the rest is based.‘140 It suffices to state 
here that, from the outset, in the attempt to fashion a system approximating the fourth 
constitutive configuration by the Charter, some scholars had pointed out that both the League 
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of Nations and the Charter systems shared similar inbuilt weaknesses.
141
 It is pertinent to 
quote Goodrich copiously here: 
It can, however, be queried whether the Charter system will be more effective than the 
League system, in view of the requirement of unanimity of the permanent members of the 
Security Council. If we imagine its application in situations such as the Italian-Ethiopian and 
Sino-Japanese affairs, it is difficult to see how the United Nations would achieve any better 
results than did the League. Like the League, but for somewhat different technical reasons, 
the United Nations, in so far as its enforcement activities are concerned, is an organisation for 
the enforcement of peace among the smaller states. If the permanent members of the Security 
Council are in agreement, it will be possible to take effective action under the Charter. It is 
not likely that such agreement will be reached to take measures against one of these great 
powers or against a protégé of such a great power. Consequently the sphere of effective 
enforcement action by the United Nations is restricted in advance, even more perhaps than 
was that of the League. Within the area of possible operation, the actual effectiveness of the 
United Nations system will depend upon political conditions which, if they had existed, 
would have also assured the success of the League of Nations.
142
 
This type 4 architecture is deeply flawed under the UN and problematic, hence the reversion 
to, and persistence of, type 3 constitutive configuration.
143
 As pointed out above, the global 
constitutive process since 1945 has fluctuated between types 2 and 3, where the legal validity 
of unilateral action is contentious.
144 However, as Reisman points out, when confronted with 
questions of the legality of resort to unilateral action by states (and regional organisations), 
rather than dismiss such intervention as illegal, the task for the international lawyer is to 
undertake an assessment of such intervention by devising and using a set of parameters.
145
 
But before exploring what these criteria are and whether the AU/ECOWAS regimes satisfy 
them, it is pertinent to dispose of the procedural objections often raised to the legal validity of 
the AU/ECOWAS regimes.  
5.5 PROCEDURAL OBJECTIONS TO THE AU/ECOWAS UNILATERAL 
RHMI  REGIMES 
 
The major objection to unilateral action is that the unilateral agent unlawfully arrogates to 
itself the authority to take an action that another appropriate and ‗lawful‘ agency has been 
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appointed to take.
146
 In this case, the UNSC is the right authority appointed to authorise the 
use of force for whatever purpose outside self-defense. However, by article 10(c) and (d) of 
its MCPMRPSC Protocol, ECOWAS has arrogated that authority to itself and under article 
52(3) of the same Protocol, ECOWAS merely provides that it will inform the UNSC of its 
enforcement actions. It does not provide that it will follow the procedure laid down in article 
53(1) of the UN Charter.
147
 Similarly, the AU has jettisoned the procedural requirement in 
article 53(1) of the Charter by virtue of the provisions in articles 16(1), 17(1) and (2) of the 
AUPSC Protocol.
148
 As demonstrated in the previous chapter, these procedural irregularities 
and the resulting normative incompatibility with the Charter is the basis for the challenge to 
the legal validity of the AU/ECOWAS regional humanitarian military intervention (RHMI) 
regimes.  
However, as I have already demonstrated in this chapter, such a conclusion is based 
on the mistaken assumption that the same constitutive process that was established in 1945 
operates today. But we do know that the type 4 constitutive process that was envisaged in 
1945 had for reasons discussed above, reverted to type 3. I will now consider whether the 
AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes fulfill the substantive requirement for a claim to legal validity 
of unilateral action in the prevailing constitutive process. In this context, the substantive 
requirements for humanitarian intervention, though largely derived from the just war 
tradition, are essentially incorporated in the emerging norm of R2P. Since the ultimate utility 
of this research lies in providing a legal and theoretical framework for the operationalisation 
of R2P in Africa, I will assess how the AU/ECOWAS regimes meet these substantive 
requirements as framed in the ongoing R2P discourse. 
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5.6 CONDITIONS FOR THE LEGAL VALIDITY OF UNILATERAL ACTS IN A 
TRANSFORMED CONSTITUTIVE   PROCESS  
 
In the type 4 constitutive process discussed above, unilateral actions and regional treaty 
frameworks creating them would have been unnecessary and unlawful. However, since the 
UNSC which is the authoritative agency granted the power to use force or authorise the use 
of force when necessary, was unable to exercise it as occasion demands, resulting in the 
failure of the collective security arrangement, the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes for unilateral 
actions are legally valid provided they satisfied certain substantive requirements.
149
 
There are six such substantive criteria that must be satisfied under the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention. It is important to note that essentially the same criteria are 
required for use of military force under Pillar Three, dealing with the responsibility to react 
under R2P.
150
  
The validity of unilateral action in a transformed constitutive process could rest on 
three pillars which are cumulative: (a) whether the legal system allows such unilateral act; (b) 
whether the circumstances were right; (c) whether the unilateral act meets the substantive 
criteria of legality.
151
 I have already disposed of the first condition above by arguing that with 
the reversion of the constitutive configuration from type 4 to type 3, unilateral action, and by 
extension treaty arrangements like the AU/ECOWAS regimes establishing them, are valid.
152
 
By the same token, I had also dealt with (b) by arguing that the paralysis of the UNSC as a 
result of the veto with the consequence that it is unable to act to prevent or halt mass 
atrocities and genocides in Africa, provides the ‗right circumstances‘ for unilateral actions 
and treaty arrangements by AU/ECOWAS to facilitate them. I now turn to condition (c).  
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5.7 SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE VALIDATY OF 
 AU/ECOWAS RHMI REGIMES  
These requirements were derived from the doctrine of humanitarian intervention and also 
reflected in the R2P rubric. They include right authority, last resort, necessity, 
proportionality, reasonable chance of success, just cause, right intention.
153
 I briefly outline 
how the AU/ECOWAS frameworks meet these substantive requirements below. 
5.7.1 Right Intention  
 
This criterion has always been difficult to satisfy even in the best of circumstances. It is hard 
to imagine, let alone find any case of ‗pure‘ humanitarian intervention because states hardly 
send their soldiers and resources to distant lands and risk domestic political costs at least in 
Western liberal democracies where national interest is not at stake.
154
 In practice, 
humanitarian intervention is often driven by a combination of motives of different shades.
155
 
Whatever might be the case, a regional organisation engaging in unilateral intervention must 
be driven by humanitarian considerations.
156
 To this end, there has always been a preference 
for multilateral force (preferably under the UN) or collective intervention under the auspices 
of a regional organisation such as the AU or ECOWAS, as this is less susceptible to abuse.
157
  
5.7.2 Right Authority 
 
According to the major legal documents on the R2P norm, the UNSC is the appropriate 
agency to authorise any military intervention.
158
 However, there are several grounds for 
arguing that such authority is not, and should not be, exclusive to the UNSC because, with 
                                                          
153
 See Antonio Cassese ‗Ex iniura ius oritur: Are we moving towards international legitimation of forcible 
humanitarian countermeasures in the world community?‘ (1999) 10 EJIL 23 at 27 listing some of these criteria. 
(hereafter Cassese ‗Countermeasures in the world community‘). See also Report of the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001) para 4.18, 4.32 - 4.38 (hereafter ‗ICISS Report‘). 
154
 See Allen Buchanan ‗The internal legitimacy of humanitarian intervention‘ (1999) 7:1 The Journal of 
Political Philosophy 71 at 86. 
155
 Michael Walzer Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations 4ed (2006) 101 
(hereafter Walzer ‗Just and Unjust Wars‘). 
156
 Cassese ‗Countermeasures in the world community‘ op cit note 153 at 26. 
157
 See ‗ICISS Report‘ op cit note 153 para 4.33 – 4.36. 
158
 Ibid para 6.28; A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change U.N. Doc A/59/565 (2004) 56-57 para 201. But see para 272 where the Panel conceded 
that regional organisations (read AU/ECOWAS) could obtain UNSC authorisation ex post facto. This is in 
tandem with the AU position. See ‗The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United 
Nations: ―The Ezulwini Consensus‖‘ Executive Council Ext./EX. CL/2 (VII)  7th Extraordinary Session of the 
African Union, 7-8 March Addis Ababa Ethiopia (hereafter the ‗Ezulwini Consensus‘). 
158
 See In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, Report of the Secretary 
General U.N Doc A/59/2005 para 135; World Summit Outcome Document GA. Res. 60/1 para 139 (24 October 
2005). 
 
 
192 
special reference to Africa, the AU/ECOWAS regimes provide a legal basis for the 
organisations to exercise lawful authority to approve intervention as stipulated in their 
treaties. The first reason is that as argued above, the constitutive process has been 
transformed to type 3. Second, as I will demonstrate in chapter 7, the legal basis for 
AU/ECOWAS authority also derives from the consent of their member states, which 
invariably means it is outside the scope of enforcement action contemplated by article 53(1) 
and is thus precluded because absence of consent is a distinguishing characteristic of 
humanitarian intervention.
159
  
The danger in insisting that the AU/ECOWAS seek UNSC authorisation despite the 
transformed constitutive process is that, where, for example, the UNSC had already refused 
to intervene in a situation in Africa, it would be disinclined to authorise intervention by a 
regional organisation. As seen in chapter 3, despite the request for intervention by the 
Liberian Government, the UNSC not only declined to intervene but also refused to discuss 
the matter at all until ECOWAS had gone far into its own operations in Liberia. In the 
ongoing crisis in Mali, it took more than one year for the UNSC to authorise ECOWAS to 
intervene in the crisis.
160
  I will therefore argue that a regional organisation should be 
permitted to intervene without UNSC authorisation if the UNSC becomes paralysed.
161
 This 
will also avoid the normative ambiguity arising from UNSC ex post facto authorisations 
some scholars had ascribed to the UN reaction to ECOWAS interventions in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone, when in fact, ECOWAS was implementing its own mandate in both 
situations.
162
  
5.7.3 Last Resort 
 
Quite often, unilateral action is the only sure way to protect an imperiled population and 
prevent mass atrocities like genocide. Kofi Annan pointed to this in the wake of the Rwanda 
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genocide by asking ‗if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on 
sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and systematic 
violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?‘163 However, 
such resort to force by AU/ECOWAS must be a last resort. It should subsequently be 
submitted to a process of appraisal by the global community and report back to the UNSC on 
what actions have been taken.
164
 Both the AU and ECOWAS frameworks have provisions in 
their constitutive documents and relevant protocols for a graduated scheme of non-coercive 
measures.
165
 Use of force is to be a last resort and this has been demonstrated by both the AU 
and ECOWAS in deserving instances such as Togo, Cote d‘Ivoire, Liberia, and Sierra 
Leone.
166
 Of course, it is not in all deserving cases that the AU/ECOWAS frameworks have 
been successful and Darfur and Zimbabwe are examples. However, the focus of this research 
is not an assessment of the effectiveness of these frameworks, this cannot be addressed here. 
5.7.4 Just Cause: War Crimes, Crimes against Humanity and Genocide 
 
These crimes are now jus cogens under customary international law and since 1948 states 
have assumed obligations to prevent and punish their commission.
167
 As substantive criteria 
for humanitarian intervention in international law, they formed the core of the development 
of the traditional doctrine of humanitarian intervention in the classical sense of the word.
168
 
Their modern version was articulated by several jurists like Suarez, Grotius and Vattel so on 
even though the nomenclatures genocide, war crimes and crime against humanity did not 
emerge until after World War II.
169
 These international crimes, besides invoking universal 
jurisdiction, form the threshold of intervention in a plethora of human rights and international 
humanitarian law instruments. The most recent restatement is in the R2P norm which 
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stipulates that ‗[t]ough threshold conditions should be satisfied before military intervention is 
contemplated. For political, economic and judicial measures the barrier can be set lower, but 
for military intervention it must be high: for military action to be defensible the 
circumstances must be grave indeed.‘170  
Under article 4(h) of the AU Act, the commission of any of these three crimes 
constitute ‗grave circumstances‘ sufficient to activate the AU‘s right of intervention.171 The 
term is reminiscent of ‗grave breaches‘ used in the ICC Rome Statute.172 However, it is only 
under the AU/ECOWAS frameworks that, apart from genocide, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, can be grounds for intervention. The import of this is clear, where the level 
of violations fall below this threshold, it would appropriately be dealt with by the concerned 
state and other non-military measures could be deployed by the AU/ECOWAS. For purposes 
of ascertaining when the threshold has been crossed, which is a particularly difficult task for 
practical purposes, the AU/ECOWAS would have to rely on their Early Warning System to 
meet this criterion. By codifying these thresholds, both protocols bring clarity to the criteria 
for determining intervention unlike the somewhat nebulous terms often used to chacaterise 
the nature and scope of such atrocities—R2P uses ‗large scale ethnic cleansing‘  ‗large scale 
loss of life‘,173 ‗massive violations‘ ‗gross violations‘ and the definitional baggage they 
carry.
174
 Thus, they comply with the substantive requirement here. 
5.8 R2P AND THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE VALIDITY OF AU/ECOWAS 
RHMI REGIMES FOR THE UN CHARTER AND INTERNATIONAL LAW  
 
One drawback in resolving the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes validity question is that 
upholding their validity in effect reverses the roles of major participants in the decision 
making arena of the constitutive process, the AUPSC and ECOWAS Mediation and Security 
Council effectively take the place of the UNSC. This has major implications. By sidelining 
the UNSC through unilateral action (first, through unauthorised interventions, and, later, 
through codification of same), the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes seem to superimpose their 
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own normative articulation and change in the authoritative decision process and participants‘ 
roles on the UNSC. 
A second consequence is that AU/ECOWAS states would be excused from article 103 
obligations which were imposed by the Charter built on the assumption that with an effective 
UNSC collective security system, states would not need alternative arrangements whether by 
treaty or otherwise. Thirdly, a framework for unilateral intervention could be open to abuse 
and thus weaken the UN system for maintenance of international peace and security. As a 
decentralised system, institutionalised procedures are deemed crucial to orderly conduct of 
international law, and regardless of the moral objective, unilateral action that erodes this 
system is never justified.
175
  
However, when a system becomes ineffective like the current Charter system, due to 
defective procedure, there will be need for reform and where that is not possible through the 
formal procedures provided, participants might gravitate towards extra–legal options. 
Although procedure is important, substance is what the system lives for. Usually in the 
application of law to concrete cases as a part of the constitutive process, the need for remedy 
becomes obvious due to the inadequacies of the law. Thus, the application of existing Charter 
framework to humanitarian intervention reveals the need for such remedy. Today, this 
remedy has found expression in several proposals contained in different reports and studies, 
such as the Kosovo Report, the Ezulwini Consensus, the ICISS Report and ultimately the 
World Summit Outcome Document. When taken together, they are evidence of the normative 
congruence between the Purposes of the Charter system and the AU/ECOWAS RHMI 
regimes. Some of these instruments contemplate unilateral intervention by regional 
organisations as a normative response to the inadequate reach of the Charter. They therefore 
lend credence to the legal validity of the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes designed to give 
effect to them.  
Besides, the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes do not seek to supplant the Charter 
system. In fact, it is arguable that since the type 4 constitutive process has reverted back to 
the type 3, the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regime is an attempt to rescue it. The AU/ECOWAS 
RHMI regimes could rescue the system not only from the challenge of controversy about the 
definition of human rights and threshold for intervention but also other conditions that would 
guide the expression and exercise of authority for enforcement of values shared both by the 
                                                          
175
 Reisman ‗Unilateral action‘ op cit note 3 at 6. 
 
 
196 
Charter and the AU/ECOWAS framework. To this end, the fact that the AU/ECOWAS 
RHMI regimes might not meet the criteria of legal validity under the Charter would be of 
little significance. 
5.9 CONCLUSION 
 
When assessing the legal validity of unilateral acts one must examine the nature of such acts 
under the existing international law principles and whether there are circumstances where 
such acts are permissible. Does the UN Charter and current international law permit unilateral 
acts such as those contemplated un the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes and by implication a 
regional legal framework for that purpose? If the answer is yes, then the second question 
follows: whether the particular act in question fulfills the substantive criteria of lawfulness. If 
the answer to any of the two questions is negative then the act is illegal. Under the first, 
unilateral action was not just legal, it was the only rule because the legal system had no 
hierarchical institution effective or not. Under types 2 and 3, there is a contest over the 
legality or otherwise of unilateral action because the body to which the constitutive process 
has granted the primary authority on the use of force—UNSC—has failed or is incapable of 
exercising it when needed. To the extent that the UNSC was effective in the use of force to 
protect human rights under a type 4 constitutive process, unilateral action was illegal under 
international law, since these provisions were made on the assumption of a type 4 constitutive 
process with an effective hierarchical body.  
However, the veto had incapacitated the UNSC, having failed in deserving cases 
severally to exercise its authority to use force to protect human rights, the system reverted 
from type 4 back to type 3 constitutive process. This led to states seeking and creating 
unilateral arrangements outside the Charter framework to protect human rights and maintain 
regional peace and security.
176
 It is only when the global community is able to establish a 
type 4 constitutive process that states would be willing to abandon self-help and that 
unilateral action can effectively be declared illegal or invalid. Here, my thesis differs from 
Reisman, who appears to conclude that the type 3 constitutive process will continue to 
prevail. I am optimistic that the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes will facilitate the 
transformation of the system back to a type 4 constitutive process where the system is 
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effective in the protection of human rights and so unilateral intervention legal regimes like 
those of the AU and ECOWAS would once again become unnecessary and therefore illegal.
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CHAPTER 6:  THE AU/ECOWAS UNILATERAL HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
LEGAL REGIMES AS A PROCESS OF ILLEGAL INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REFORM  
 
If illegal acts are necessary to bring about important substantive improvements in the system 
whose rules for legal change are serious impediments to progress, and if these acts are undertaken 
in a responsible way, with appropriate precautions to reduce the risks of error and abuse, and with 
a proper regard for the dangers of undermining confidence in the law, then this presumption in 
favour of change through legal means can be overridden. … To insist otherwise is to privilege the 
presumption of change through lawful means over other elements and substantive justice.
1
  
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In the previous chapter I examined the legal validity of the AU/ECOWAS regional 
humanitarian military intervention regimes (RHMI) under different constitutive 
configurations into which the global constitutive process has been categorised. Through a 
policy-oriented jurisprudence approach, I demonstrated that the global constitutive process 
has evolved from one without a hierarchical institution of decision-making in the pre-global 
era (under which unilateral action was legal), to the League of Nations era (where the global 
community created a constitutive configuration with a hierarchical institution). This 
institution was ineffective because it relied on the voluntary cooperation of member states for 
effective operation and when that cooperation was not forthcoming, the system could only 
achieve limited effectiveness. I therefore concluded that the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes 
would have been legal in that era. I argued that the formation of the UN was an attempt to 
establish a constitutive configuration with effective hierarchical institutions of decision-
making under which unilateral action is unlawful because states had surrendered their right to 
use force to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in exchange for a guarantee of 
collective security. But the authoritative agency (the UNSC) granted the authority has been 
unable to exercise it when it matters most, resulting in the failure of the collective security 
arrangement, reverting the type 4 constitutive configuration back to type 3 under which 
unilateral actions and the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes are legally valid. 
Since the primary objective of this thesis is theoretical in nature—to test the legal 
validity of the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes—the present chapter is the second leg of my 
theoretical tripod interrogating the validity of the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes. In this 
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chapter, I examine the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes from the perspective of what Allen 
Buchanan has aptly described as ‗Illegal International Legal Reform‘. Like the previous 
chapter, my focus in this chapter is three major questions: is there a moral foundation 
underpinning the apparent normative incompatibility between the AU/ECOWAS RHMI 
regimes and the UN Charter and is it justifiable? Put differently, is there a moral basis for 
upholding the validity of the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes despite the apparent normative 
incompatibility with the UN Charter? Under what conditions, if any, are the African Union 
and ECOWAS morally justified to break international law in order to bring about reform in 
the law and its responses to humanitarian catastrophes in Africa? Do AU/ECOWAS meet 
these conditions? In other words, when, if at all, is the AU/ECOWAS permitted to break 
international law in order to improve it?  
I shall rely on Buchanan‘s theory of Illegal International Legal Reform (IILR) to 
argue that the existing law of humanitarian intervention that forbids the AU/ECOWAS from 
undertaking intervention to halt genocides and other mass atrocities unless authorised by the 
UNSC is so defective that it is incapable of protecting human rights and therefore in need of 
reform. I will further argue that since attempts at reforming the UN Charter system through 
formal channels have proved difficult, if not impossible, initiatives like the AU/ECOWAS 
RHMI regimes which, though apparently violate the Charter law, constitute an improvement 
on the law. They therefore derive their validity from their normative content as moral 
improvement on the existing Charter-based law of humanitarian intervention and are 
justifiable. I then examine the possibility of abuse of this process and the implications for 
international law. I contend that since this breach of the law represents improvement on the 
law its benefits outweigh whatever attendant costs there might be. 
 It should be emphasised from the outset that the analysis that follows proceeds 
mainly at a theoretical level (limited to AU/ECOWAS and relevant UN Charter provisions 
only). It does not examine how the AU/ECOWAS would be implemented nor does it answer 
the question whether they would actually be more effective than the UNSC in practice. Like 
the analyses in other chapters of the thesis, the objective is a theoretical validation of specific 
AU/ECOWAS treaty provisions vis-à-vis the UN Charter and international law.  
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6.2 THE CONCEPT OF ILLEGAL INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REFORM UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
The present Charter-based international legal order has made appreciable progress in human 
rights, from the pace-setting provisions in the UN Charter to the adoption of the International 
Bill of Rights 
2
 and more recently, the responsibility to protect (R2P) principle. However, this 
progress was attenuated by the tension between two diametrically opposed values enshrined 
in the Charter—state sovereignty and the maintenance of international peace and security on 
the one hand, and the promotion and protection of human rights on the other.
3
 Article 2(4) 
and (7) still represent the core of the Charter system notwithstanding the occasional 
reinterpretations by states and the UNSC in the light of changing circumstances and practices. 
This has posed two main challenges: first the Charter system has not been able to avert what 
Classicists traditionally warn against: the need to safeguard the role of law in maintaining 
world order by protecting its autonomy and insulating it from the whims of state powers.
4
 
Secondly, this ad hoc approach to a systemic problem has not been able to prevent genocides 
and other mass atrocities as we saw in chapter 3. Against the backdrop of the controversy of 
the legality of humanitarian intervention, the question of finding a legal basis for responding 
to community demands for protection against genocides and mass atrocity crimes has 
remained a dilemma. Despite this failure in its institutional goals, efforts to reform the UN 
Charter system have largely been unsuccessful. One way theorists have sought to resolve this 
dilemma is by developing the concept of IILR.
5
 The major proponent, Allen Buchanan states 
the theory thus: 
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[g]iven the relatively undeveloped state of international law—in particular, its inadequate 
protection of basic human rights and the limited resources for timely and lawful change in the 
direction of more adequate protection—there are opportunities for acts which are both illegal 
and highly desirable as steps towards morally improving the system.
6
 
It is generally conceded that there is a gap between the expectations of the global community 
and the normative reach and response of the law of humanitarian intervention.
7
 Since this 
chasm borders on legal and institutional arrangements under the Charter, bridging the gap 
will necessarily require a change in the Charter law. It is the strategy to bring about this 
change that is the focus of this chapter. All things considered, bringing about the needed 
change in the law to make it more responsive to community goals may not always be possible 
within the formal legal frameworks for such reforms.
8
 There will always be opportunity for 
acts of IILR because as Friedmann stated long ago, and rightly so even now, in my opinion, 
‗… the development of contemporary international law does not proceed exclusively—or 
perhaps even pre-dominantly—through the formal instruments of law-making.‘9 The making 
of a new rule of international law sometimes involves the breaking of the existing rule.
10
 For 
example, this is particularly true of customary law because it has no formal institutions and 
processes for its creation and determination. The implication is that there is no agency for 
purposive modification of its rules to suit changing times and circumstances, whether by 
abrogation of old rules or the invention of new ones, because the framework that can permit 
such reform will require the existence of secondary rules, something customary law lacks.
11
  
So, when a rule of customary law is violated, such act of violation could contain the ‗seeds of 
a new and contrary rule of custom‘, otherwise change in the law would be impossible.12  
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Therefore, when we observe an instance of violation of customary law, we must not 
only assess its disruptive impact but also the law-making potential of such incident.
13
 I will 
return to this point in the next chapter but suffice it to mention here that some of the changes 
occasioned by IILR could be a matter of course while others are inevitable especially where 
the international legal framework has no means of dealing with such situations and may 
therefore require some extra-legal means to solve the problem. The question then becomes 
whether this provides, at least, a moral basis for embarking on acts that violate the law but 
which also have the potential for improving it.
14
 In other words, taking cognisance of the gap 
between the lex lege lata and the lex lege ferenda, is it morally justifiable for actors to take 
unilateral acts that breach the existing law on humanitarian intervention in order to bring 
about its moral improvement? ‗Under what conditions, if any, is it morally justifiable to 
breach international law in order to try to improve the system from a moral point of view?‘15 
Advocates of this theory do not have a long list of historical examples to lean on; 
however, they do have on their side some of the most significant developments with arguably 
undisputed precedential value in the making and moral improvement of international law. For 
example, the practice where Britain used its superior naval power to unlawfully board and 
search ships of other flag states for slaves during the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade were IILR 
acts that subsequently resulted in treaty arrangements to reform international law in order to 
outlaw slavery and the slave trade.
16
 Another example of IILR with more profound impact 
was the Nuremberg Tribunal which introduced what is now known in international criminal 
law as ‗crime against humanity‘ and ‗conspiracy to wage aggressive war‘.17 During World 
War II when the acts complained of by the prosecution in the Tribunal took place, these acts 
were neither defined nor sanctions prescribed for them in international law and there was no 
rule of international law providing for their prosecution and punishment.
18
 In effect, the acts 
did not constitute a crime at the time they were committed prior to 1945 when the London 
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal was drafted.
19
 The standard of the Nuremberg Trials did 
not meet the minimum requirements of criminal justice under general international law and 
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has been described as ‗ex post facto criminalisation‘ or ‗victors‘ justice‘.20 The entire trial 
was an exercise in IILR. Yet, the precedent set at Nuremberg and brought about by a process 
of IILR, form the bedrock of modern international criminal law and has shaped the 
development of that branch of public international law ever since.
21
 
In the law of humanitarian intervention, such precedent-setting acts have taken place 
and have been repeated often enough to arguably reinforce its precedential value. First, in 
1999, NATO intervened in Kosovo without UNSC authorisation. There is extensive literature 
on the legality of the intervention, particularly with regard to UN Charter,
22
 but not so much 
on the extent to which the intervention constitutes a precedent for IILR aimed at morally 
improving the law on humanitarian intervention.
23
 By its Charter, NATO is a Chapter 51 
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defense alliance rather than a Chapter VIII regional organisation and whenever it seeks to use 
force not in individual or collective self-defense or pursuant to a UN mandate, it ought to 
obtain UNSC authorisation.
24
 However, one of the justifications given by NATO for its 
unilateral intervention in Kosovo was that it was dictated by the need to avert an imminent 
extreme humanitarian catastrophe.
25
 In fact, then UN Special Representative of the Secretary 
General to Kosovo, Bernard Kouchner, stated that the Kosovo intervention was necessary and 
hopefully aimed at generating a new rule of international law on humanitarian intervention 
through practice by modifying or substituting the existing rule requiring UNSC authorisation 
for one that dispenses with such requirement.
26
 
The interventions by ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone without UNSC 
authorisation represent, at least at a regional organisation level, acts of IILR.  The ECOWAS 
practice should be distinguished from other past incidents of humanitarian interventions such 
as Tanzania in Uganda, India in East Pakistan and Vietnam in Cambodia. The first point of 
departure is the response of the international community to the earlier interventions. Whereas 
India and Vietnam, for example, were criticised (even if by a few states), ECOWAS was 
commended for its interventions.
27
 Secondly, none of the intervening states in the earlier 
cases advanced humanitarian considerations as the primary justifications for their actions, but 
ECOWAS mainly based its justification on humanitarian grounds.
28
  Thirdly, none of the 
other states demonstrated a desire to reform the existing Charter paradigm on humanitarian 
intervention: articles 2(4), 2(7), 24, 53, and 103. ECOWAS gave humanitarian reasons as  
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justification for the intervention demonstrating its desire to initiate a process of IILR to 
improve the international law on humanitarian intervention, at least in its region.
29
  
The idea of an exercise in IILR by AU/ECOWAS may appear audacious and can 
hardly, in the nature of things, be grounded in law without debate. However, it finds 
expression and justification in its moral objective to improve the law of humanitarian 
intervention, approximating the ideal or the law as it ought to be. From the different moral 
justifications given for past unilateral acts of humanitarian intervention, it is clear that it is not 
the normative contents of human rights that are problematic as such, but the existing 
normative foundation of international law that has no provision for the use of force to halt 
mass atrocity crimes.
30
 This underscores the need to bring the law as close as possible to the 
ideal, and by ideal, I mean a law of humanitarian intervention (whether regional or 
international) providing the legal framework for the prevention of mass atrocity crimes.
31
 The 
morally right course of action, in say, Rwanda, Srebrenica, Darfur, may not always be legal 
and in fact, could mean an infringement of international law because law and morality could 
be at odds in such situations, making a change in the law necessary.
32
 Let us assume that this 
is the case, it will not be necessary, nor is it desirable, for a theory of moral justification of 
unilateral humanitarian intervention to concede that the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes violate 
the law.
33
 Expressing this point in relation to NATO‘s intervention in Kosovo, Buchanan 
states: 
[t]he significance of the Illegal International Legal Reform is that whereas the other 
justifications often offered for the NATO intervention in Kosovo merely state that the 
intervention was morally necessary without in any way implying that the international 
legal system as a whole or the particular norm violated needs improvement. Thus, to 
adopt such justification for illegal intervention is fully consistent with believing that 
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the existing rule requiring UNSC authorisation is a good rule, even that it is the best 
rule possible.
34
 
The view rightly criticised by Buchanan here assumes, even against prevailing cases of 
genocides and mass atrocities, that the existing law of humanitarian intervention is a good 
law when in fact, it is so defective that it is in dire need of reform. However, the 
AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes are morally justifiable because they do not just offer 
justifications for unilateral acts but posit that the existing law on humanitarian intervention is 
defective and its objective is to morally improve it through IILR. This view might be 
challenged since a rule of international law remains valid and ought to be obeyed until 
changed through the formal processes or procedures for amendment.
35
 However, as shown in 
chapter 5, if a ‗law‘ is no longer ‗controlling and authoritative‘, then its characterisation as 
such is at best questionable.
36
 In the context of my present analysis, such ‗law‘ has lost its 
moral pull and can only give rise to a situation where practice is far removed from formal 
prescriptions.
37
 This, in my view, is sufficient justification for the validity of the 
AU/ECOWAS IILR to which I now turn. 
6.3 JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ILLEGAL INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REFORM 
 
The main arguments usually offered as justifications for embarking on IILR are, first,  that 
the existing international law on humanitarian intervention is so defective that it is in need of 
reform and moral improvement; secondly, that since international law is still underdeveloped, 
change through the formal process such as outlined in the UN Charter is slow and even 
unlikely to happen; thirdly, it is argued that the current agency saddled with the duty to 
implement such reform has lost its legitimacy.
38
 The discussion that follows is intended to 
give brief insights into these justifications after which I proceed to apply them to the 
AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes. 
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6.3.1 The Current Law on Humanitarian Intervention is Defective and Needs Moral 
Improvement 
 
In chapter 5, I established that although international law aimed to develop a type 4 
constitutive configuration with centralised decision-making institutions, the system has 
actually degraded since 1945 and now swings between type 2 and 3 constitutive processes. 
The hope of an international legal system operating on a type 4 constitutive process like a 
national legal system will be difficult to replicate at the global level as there is no hope of 
achieving a world government any time soon.
39
 International law is still rudimentary and this 
relative undeveloped nature manifests in its inadequate protection of basic human rights.
40
 
This leaves room for states to interpret the same rules of international law differently in 
similar situations as national interests dictate.
41
 The consequence is that rules of international 
law are refined to fit state behaviour and rather than being what Farer calls a ‗stern judge‘ 
that states follow, the law now follows state behaviour.
42
 More importantly, the law is not 
able to adequately protect fundamental human rights, and the international community it 
serves is in a perpetual danger of slipping into chaos.
43
 
This problem has its roots in the history of the Charter. At the time the UN Charter 
was drafted, the international community prioritised peace over justice and sovereignty over 
human rights.
44
 To secure this arrangement, human rights was deemed as essentially within 
the domestic jurisdiction of states and the international regulation of use of force was vested 
in the UNSC.
45
 At that time, these principles, including sovereignty and non-intervention 
were perfectly valid and thus permeated the entire Charter-based system. However, the notion 
of justice and the promotion of human rights as well as the moral duty of peoples and nations 
across borders to reach out a hand of fellowship to suffering populations in an interdependent 
and interconnected world became the dominant element of the last quarter of the twentieth 
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century. Although the Charter had successfully adapted itself to some changes, its basic 
norms of world order implicating humanitarian intervention essentially remained unchanged 
and reform in this area is therefore necessary.
46
 The reason is that the international 
community and the Charter-based law must be able to respond effectively to the demands of 
victims of mass atrocities. The above idea which Kofi Annan succinctly described as our 
‗common humanity‘47 and the corresponding feeling of a moral duty to uphold as a 
minimum, certain values of human dignity, remain prohibited under a textual interpretation of 
the Charter law on humanitarian intervention, even in the face of genocides and mass atrocity 
crimes. So long as the extant law requiring UNSC authorisation has not been complied with, 
states and the international community are supposed to do nothing. The question then is 
whether a people wishing to fulfil what Buchanan calls the principle of ‗Natural Duty of 
Justice‘ to use the collective resources of their states to aid an endangered population 
overseas should refrain from doing so because the Charter law forbids it?
48
 Such group of 
states will be morally at odds to feel bound to support the existing international legal order 
and may well feel morally justified that there is a need for basic change in the current 
institutions and system through which international law is expressed.
49
 Bringing help to 
imperilled populations will inevitably require a change in the defective system. The desired 
change is of such nature that either a major change in the law of the UN system or an 
alternative system of law and institutional frameworks would have to be established.
50
 As the 
interventions in Liberia and Kosovo demonstrate, a     
responsible agent confronted with the possibility of preventing a humanitarian disaster but 
aware that doing so is illegal under existing international law will ask not only whether there 
is a sound moral principle that allows or requires him to violate the law, but also whether he 
should act so as to try to bring about a change in the law.
51
 
As I will demonstrate here, to be morally justifiable, an act of IILR must produce an 
improvement in the current law. The significance of an IILR for humanitarian intervention 
lies in its postulation that the law requiring every act of humanitarian intervention to be 
authorised by the UNSC is defective and a reform in the law whereby such authorisation is 
not always required is desirable even if it has to be brought about through IILR.
52
 Unlike 
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other justifications that advocate permissible violations of the law in exceptional cases but 
not necessarily aimed at improving the defective law, IILR only condones violation of the 
law when it is aimed at improving it.
53
 The question is whether the AU/ECOWAS RHMI 
regime could bring about a moral improvement on the current international law of 
humanitarian intervention. Buchanan contends that such a humanitarian intervention treaty 
arrangement that bypasses the UNSC is susceptible to abuse and unlikely to be an 
improvement on the current system, unless the reform involved only democratic and pro-
human rights states.
54
 If established by democratic and human rights-respecting states, such a 
treaty has greater promise because it is likely to be more effective in responding to genocides 
and mass atrocities than the Charter-based system requiring UNSC authorisation.
55
 This is 
because citizens of liberal democratic states would always hold their leaders to account and 
those leaders would therefore be deterred from acting arbitrarily.
56
 Besides, states are more 
likely to agree to this kind of arrangement amongst themselves than attempting a reform 
within the UN Charter framework.
57
 Further, he argues that this approach will constrain 
hegemonic tendencies by prescribing stiff conditions for intervention and democratic 
accountability back home by electorates.
58
  
However, in my view, states are no more likely to agree to such treaty arrangements 
than they would tolerate international protection of human rights within their territories.
59
  
Also, while a treaty approach of IILR to reforming the law of humanitarian intervention is a 
sound one, limiting such treaty arrangement to liberal-democratic states will not necessarily 
avoid abuse. As the US war in Iraq shows, democratic accountability to domestic populations 
in liberal democratic states is no guarantee that such states will not abuse the IILR process. 
So the challenge remains one of how to bring about the desired reform within the existing 
formal channels of the UN Charter. 
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6.3.2 The infeasibility of Reform through Formal Charter Processes 
 
There is consensus amongst actors in the international legal system on the need to 
reform the UN system and international law, but the disagreement is about how and to what 
extent. A commentator summed up the challenge of international legal reform thus: 
[t]here is a need for a kind of reform in international law as a legal system, and the realistic 
prospects for developments in specific areas … depend heavily on the prospects for such 
reform in the system as a whole. ... A major characteristic of the system that demonstrates this 
need is the notorious ineffectuality of its processes of appraisal, decision and compliance in 
particular cases. In some major areas, they are weak, and sometimes spurious, lacking the 
integrity required for an effectively working system, and foster chronic if misplaced doubts 
about the genuineness of the international legal system overall.
60
 
Since inception, there have been three amendments to the UN Charter despite several 
proposals for amendment and reform of its institutions.
61
 This lack of reform is felt even 
more in the law relating to humanitarian intervention. The ineffectiveness of the UN in 
halting mass atrocities is often blamed on the UNSC whose paralysis is in turn blamed on the 
veto of the five permanent members (P5).
62
 Despite this glaring need, any hope of 
amendment of the Charter to reflect the demands of humanitarian intervention is even more 
unlikely today.
63
 Several approaches have been proposed by different studies.
64
 Following the 
Kosovo incident, a three-pronged reform process was proposed.  
First, was the design of a framework for humanitarian intervention which would be 
limited  to only exceptional circumstances; the second was to draft a UN General Assembly 
Declaration on the Rights and Responsibility of Humanitarian Intervention which aims to 
reconcile the concept of sovereignty with the moral imperatives of protecting human rights 
and preventing humanitarian disasters; the third option was to amend the Charter in order to 
reflect these changes and outline the duty of the UN and other multilateral institutions that 
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undertake humanitarian intervention.
65
 It was argued that this reform could be achieved either 
through customary international law, a treaty within the UN framework or a treaty 
arrangement outside the UN framework.
66
 To date, states are still not agreed on the best 
approach, to reform nor what such reform should entail. There are proposals about expanding 
the UNSC, increasing the P5, abolishing the veto, admitting new members without veto 
power among others, but none of these has materialised so far.
67
   
Pursuing reform at the global level will face impediments because it requires majority 
of states to accept the new change and there is always the possibility that things could go 
wrong or the process could get stuck at several stages in the evolution of an international law 
principle.
68
 The process of law-making in international law implies that law reform will 
always be a slow and difficult process so long as the international legal order remains a state-
dominated system.
69
 Reform through treaty is laborious and time-consuming.
70
 For example, 
the negotiation and ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty began in 1954 and was 
only opened for signature in 1996.
71
 As the Kyoto Protocol experience shows, it is not a 
given that the treaty will eventually survive and become law. In addition to the above 
drawbacks, treaty law gives states several options in deciding whether to be bound by a 
treaty. A state could choose to accede to a treaty or not, it could ratify the treaty with 
reservations, qualifications, ‗understandings‘ or some may never even sign the treaty at all,72 
especially if the treaty focuses on monitoring domestic policies and international concern 
with human rights. 
Furthermore, any proposed reform of the UN system through treaty will have to 
contend with deep division between the global North and South on strategic, political and 
structural issues in the international legal order.
73
 Whereas the focus of the North in the 
reform is international security and combating human rights abuses, the South sees these 
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issues as inextricably linked to existing global economic inequalities.
74
 So, when the North 
speaks of humanitarian intervention or R2P, they do not necessarily mean the same thing as 
when the South uses those terms.
75
 This disagreement dominated the 2005 World Summit 
when some countries of the South vehemently opposed any attempt to liberalise the use of 
force regime, whether under the R2P framework or otherwise.
76
 Given this situation, it is 
difficult to envision that states will one day, at a UN summit, come to a consensus on how to 
rectify the defects and improve the Charter, especially when major powers want to continue 
to have free reigns to act and retain the freedom to decide.
77
 Change will most likely emerge 
gradually through state practice, otherwise the system might retain its current unworkable 
character.
78
 In this situation, the idea of reform through customary law was put forward.  
The first challenge any reform through customary law will face is the fact that 
customary law does not have any provision for its amendment and where a system of law has 
no mechanism for changing it, reform and improvement in the law usually occurs through 
breaking the existing law.
79
  Another obstacle to reform through customary law is that a state 
could declare itself to be a persistent objector to the emerging rule or it could give conflicting 
reasons for the same conduct in different circumstances.
80
 In both cases, the precedential 
value of an emerging rule is weakened as a result of the uncertainty and doubtful existence of 
opinio juris.
81
 In addition to the above, it is still debatable whether it is the actions rather than 
pronouncements of states that should be considered in ascertaining the existence of a rule of 
customary law.
82
 As Hargrove observes, the behaviour of states and   
their official utterances in justifying their conduct, have so often been so inconsistent 
and even contradictory from one case to another as not only to render the law‘s 
implementation processes ineffectual, but to be of little utility as a body of practice 
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from which the content and evolution of its substantive principles can be 
ascertained.
83
 
Many cases of state practice of humanitarian intervention since 1945 were justified on some 
other grounds and scholars remain divided about their legality.
84
 Strictly speaking, even some 
cases of humanitarian intervention that have received broad international approval actually 
constitute a violation of article 2(4), the principle of state sovereignty and non-interference 
under the Charter.
85
 It should therefore not be surprising that the AU/ECOWAS RHMI 
regimes that aim to develop rules from such practice should be incompatible with the law. 
Without a procedural system of amendment, the only way states can ‗propose an amendment‘ 
to customary law is by breaking the existing customary law.
86
 The fact that current 
international law on humanitarian intervention is seldom able to halt genocides and mass 
atrocities which are supposed to be some of the most fundamental values of the international 
legal order makes reform of the system even more imperative.
87
 If the reform of the law on 
humanitarian intervention cannot happen within the Charter framework, then it might happen 
without it. The fact that the UN is the only legitimate universal body does not make the 
Charter immutable or the only source of international law within which reform must take 
place.
88
 If it is to retain its primacy, the Charter must be amenable to reform as an instrument 
for responding to new challenges, promoting new values and community goals.
89
 Otherwise, 
its lack of reform would continue to undermine its legitimacy as a world body, weaken the 
Charter and even push states and regions to seek extra-Charter means of law reform.
90
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6.3.3 The Challenges of Reform and the UNSC‟s Loss of Legitimacy  
 
In a discussion of IILR, an inquiry into the legitimacy of the UNSC is important because it 
affects the further question of whether or not states are obliged to obey the rules emanating 
from it
91
 and the extent to which their resort to IILR is justifiable. The issue of legitimacy is 
viewed from diverse perspectives. An institution is said to be legitimate in the normative 
sense if it has the right to rule by prescribing rules and compelling obedience; whereas it is 
said to be legitimate in the sociological sense if it is generally believed such institution has 
the right to rule.
92
 In international law, such institution is legitimate in the sense of the 
legality of its formation —if it was created based on state consent and in accordance with 
rules of international law.
93
 The legitimacy of an international organisation means it has the 
prerogative to perform certain functions on behalf of members and members too feel a sense 
of obligation to comply with the rules it issues and not to subvert the enforcement of those 
rules.
94
 According to Buchanan and Keohane, 
[l]egitimacy in the case of global governance institutions, … is the right to rule, 
understood to mean both that institutional agents are morally justified in making rules 
and attempting to secure compliance with them and that people subject to those rules 
have moral, content-independent reasons to follow them and/or to not interfere with 
others‘ compliance with them.95 
In this sense accepting the legitimacy of an institution implies that the actors would seek 
ways of improving such institution rather than rejecting it for its weaknesses.
96
 Buchanan and 
Keohane argue that since most countries of the world are now democratic, a global 
governance institution that has the perpetual consent of human rights-respecting democratic 
states and which is also democratic is legitimate.
97
 Apart from the democratic criterion, the 
rationale for the existence and legitimacy of institutions like the UNSC is based on their 
ability to provide certain social goods that states cannot ordinarily provide for themselves 
such as the benefit from a stable world order.
98
 In addition, such institutions must follow their 
own procedures without selectivity and fulfil those conditions that justify their existence in 
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order to maintain a valid claim to legitimacy.
99
 The UNSC‘s claim to legitimacy and pull 
towards compliance with its resolutions depends on its compliance with established rules and 
constraints.
100
  
On the other hand, an institution may be illegitimate if its operational modalities 
negate the realisation of the objectives that form the basis for its existence and claim to 
legitimacy.
101
 For instance, ‗if the fundamental character of the Security Council‘s decision-
making process renders that institution incapable of successfully pursuing what it now 
acknowledges as one of its chief goals—stopping large-scale violations of basic human 
rights—this impugns its legitimacy.‘102 This loss of legitimacy may even become more acute 
and pronounced where efficacious parallel agents with readily available processes and more 
meaningful benefits have sprung up to fill the vacuum created by the ineffectiveness of the 
prime institution at cheaper costs.
103
 If we accept the view that the legitimacy of the 
international legal order and its prime institutions, like the UNSC, should be gauged by the 
extent to which they protects human rights, prevent genocides and other mass atrocities 
arguably, the UNSC has serious legitimacy deficits to contend with.
104
  
There are several objections to the legitimacy of the UNSC but two are prominent. 
The first is that the failure of the UNSC to prevent several genocides means it has failed to 
perform one of the fundamental purposes for which it was established.
105
 Although the UNSC 
activism in the 1990s represents a shift in how strikes a balance between human rights and 
peace, it was not a complete shift because any humanitarian intervention still requires UNSC 
authorisation.
106
 Subsequent humanitarian catastrophes underscore the fact that regardless of 
the approach, effective normative reform cannot happen in the law of humanitarian 
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intervention without addressing the problem of the UNSC itself and its perceived illegitimacy 
by a sizeable portion of the international community.
107
  
A second objection is that the organisation and the system on which it is based are 
controlled by a few powerful states.
108
 It is argued that the unjustifiable exclusion of Africa 
from a permanent seat on the UNSC as the major decision-making organ underscores its 
current unrepresentative structure.
109
 Arguably the legitimacy of the UN is seriously 
undermined by this fact, at least from an African perspective. As the legitimacy of the UNSC 
wanes, states are likely to look up to their regional organisations and devote more time and 
material resources to these organisations at the expense of the UN.
110
 One can conclude from 
the above analysis that if reform is impossible, the UNSC will continue to lose legitimacy and 
actions will be taken outside its processes.
111
 The AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes which, at 
least in theory, attempt to reform the law on humanitarian intervention outside the Charter 
framework underscore this point. As people‘s moral view of their relationship to peoples in 
faraway lands who are victims of genocides increasingly influence how they perceive the 
legitimacy of the international legal order, they might be more favourably disposed to acts of 
IILR aimed at improving the law on humanitarian intervention and any legal mechanism 
designed for that reform,
112
 even if this results in a parallel system. As Buchannan puts it, 
given the nature of the international legal order, one ‗cannot assume that at every point in the 
development of international law, there will be only one system of law. Progress may occur 
through the development of parallel and sometimes competing law-like systems of rules in 
distinct but also sometimes overlapping domains of competence.‘113 
6.4 OBJECTIONS TO REFORMING THE LAW OF HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION THROUGH ILLEGAL INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REFORM 
 
There are several objections to IILR as an alternative approach for bringing about reform in 
international law. This debate usually turns on three issues: the legitimacy of global 
governance institutions (already discussed above), the obligation of states to obey 
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international law and the fidelity to the rule of law.
114
 First, it is argued that when an agent 
undertakes an act of IILR, he violates the fidelity to law rule; and secondly that such agent is 
guilty of ‗moral imperialism‘ for foisting his concept of justice on others; thirdly that states 
have an obligation to obey international law since they consented to its creation.
115
 A final 
argument, one that has particularly been raised in the context of the global war on terror is 
that the ‗new‘ and transformative change often advanced as justifying an act of IILR by its 
proponents are anything but new and transformative.
116
 The last argument has often been 
made in the context of the legal effect of 9/11 on the Charter paradigm on the use of force 
and the right to self-defense in article 51 and the abuse of IILR.  It challenges the attempt to, 
through acts of IILR, extend the principle of inherent individual and collective self-defense to 
include ‗pre-emptive strike‘ against both states and non-state actors in the so-called ‗Global 
War On Terror‘ (GWOT). My analysis is also limited to GWOT and IILR in this respect.117 
The argument of ‗Legal Absolutists‘, as Buchanan calls them, is that it is never 
morally justifiable to break the law in order to improve it.
118
 If this argument is accepted then 
the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regime which seeks to reform the law on humanitarian intervention 
through IILR are morally unjustifiable. A major proponent of the ‗moral imperialism‘ 
criticism, Alfred Rubin, premised this argument on the fact that a moral agent of IILR could 
be mistaken in his perception of the issues and moral values at stake and this possibility and 
the impact it could have on the system should be a limiting consideration for IILR.
119
 He 
asserts that no one has the moral justification to determine how others are governed and there 
is no defect in an international legal order that seeks to protect such arrangement, ‗except in 
the minds of those who feel secure enough in their own moral insight and perception of facts 
to try to govern the lives (and deaths) of others.‘120 Accordingly, Rubin concludes that 
[t]hose who would argue that the evils of genocide can be apparent and the moral obligation 
to stop it so compelling that the use of third-party force is legally as well as morally justifiable 
in response, the legal system poses two answers. First, the notion that moral conviction by an 
outsider justifies the use of force by that outsider is an open invitation to chaos: rule by the 
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strongest outsider with the most persuasive demagogues and scrapping the fundamental rule 
of sovereign equality of states.
121
 
Rubin‘s alternative proposal in cases of genocides and mass atrocities is that third states 
should open their borders to fleeing refugees rather than launch unilateral humanitarian 
interventions.
122
 Therefore, the AU/ECOWAS act of IILR that attempts to legalise 
humanitarian intervention is unjustifiable. In my view, Rubin‘s criticism is flawed in some 
respects. First, his proposed solution to genocides can only have very little effect for a very 
small number of imperilled populations able to flee and it does not address the source of 
threat. Secondly, his criticism stems from a view that equates justice with the international 
rule of law by implying that a just international legal order implies a commitment to the goal 
of justice through international law only.
123
 In his view, when you comply with international 
rule of law, you are in pursuit of justice. However, when we apply this proposal to a case like 
Rwanda for example, the moral deficit is at once obvious and at an unacceptably high cost. 
The failure of the UNSC, third states and regional organisations to intervene in Rwanda could 
be explained to be in compliance with the rule of sovereignty and non-intervention, but one 
would be hard pressed to conclude that the resulting genocide amounts to justice even though 
the interest of international rule of law was served.  
Besides, halting genocides and other mass atrocity crimes are now universally 
regarded as basic norms of the international legal order and acts to improve the system to 
reflect these norms cannot be described as the imposition of moral values.
124
 These moral 
values which form the object of the AU/ECOWAS IILR are already widely shared. For 
example, we find similar norms (of intervention to halt genocides, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity) in R2P, Genocide Convention, and the Rome Statute of the ICC among 
others. The whole world expressed shock over Rwanda and Srebrenica and blamed the 
international community for failure to intervene. The need to end impunity and protect 
victims of ethnic cleansing, war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in Africa, is at 
least, in theory, a normative value shared by AU members as expressed in article 4(h)
125
 as 
well as by ECOWAS members as expressed in article 25 of the ECOWAS Protocol on the 
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Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security 
(MCPMRPS).
126
  
The fidelity to law argument states that our adherence to the rule of law as a 
normative ideal is incompatible with support for acts of IILR, regardless of whether such acts 
are aimed at morally improving the law and reforming the system.
127
 If this argument is 
accepted, then the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes would be morally unjustifiable and invalid. 
The ideal of the rule of law at the international level means appeal to law rather than states 
and state power.
128
 It implies a system of normative restraints on state behaviour as against 
the rule of the powerful state in international affairs.
129
 The ideal of the rule of law came 
about because of the desire to avoid anarchy by states whereby states agreed to the limitation 
of their powers in exchange for the powers of other states being restricted in the interest of 
all.
130
 Hence, critics of IILR rely on the Hobbesian notion of commitment to the rule of law 
as the only guarantee of order and an obligatory system of rules as the only way to avoid a 
state of nature and the concomitant anarchy.
131
 They conclude that acts of IILR aimed at 
moral improvement of the law are unjustifiable because they risk reintroducing the state of 
nature where life is ‗short, nasty and brutish‘.132 The second basis of this criticism is what I 
may call the sources of law thesis. Here, the argument is that there is a relationship between 
international rule of law and the ‗quality‘ of the source of a rule of international law to which 
proponents of IILR fail to attach the relevant weight in terms of the normative value inherent 
in the international law-making process.
133
 The very fact that a rule of international law 
emanates from the legally sanctified process of law-making confers certain normative value 
on that rule and by ignoring that law-making process, acts of IILR, however urgent the 
demands and whatever the motivations, undermine the law and by extension the international 
rule of law.
134
 According to Besson, 
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[o]n the long run, and despite the occurrence of such forms of illegal law-making in the 
current circumstances of international law, international law‘s legality will only be able to 
consolidate itself if its law-making processes are organised so as to reflect the very values 
inherent in the Rule of International Law.
135
 
This criticism has several weaknesses. First, on the ideal of rule of law, the question of 
whether or not an agent truly committed to the ideal of the rule of law is barred from IILR 
depends in part, on the extent to which the existing legal system approximates the ideal.
136
 
Commitment to an effective international legal order does not necessarily preclude an act of 
IILR directed at improving the international legal order which currently poorly approximates 
the ideal as far as humanitarian intervention is concerned.
137
 It is difficult to argue that in a 
case like Rwanda, an agent would have been forbidden from intervening because doing so 
would have amounted to a violation of commitment to international rule of law. This is the 
dilemma that confronts humanitarian intervention and how to bring about reform in the 
Charter-based system. According to Buchanan,   
[p]rogress towards justice is especially likely to require illegal acts if the system‘s 
imperfections include serious barriers to expeditious, legally permissible reform. … that is 
precisely the case regarding the existing international legal system‘s capacity for reforming 
the law of intervention. The UN Charter-based law of intervention is recalcitrant to legally 
permissible reform because the same obstacles to securing Security Council authorisation for 
morally justifiable interventions make it unlikely that the Charter will be amended to relax the 
requirement of Security Council authorisation. Being willing to act illegally to make a very 
unjust system more just need not be inconsistent with a commitment to justice through law; it 
may indeed be required by it.
138
 
Furthermore, commitment to the ideal of law presupposes that the law in question meets 
certain basic characteristics to be able to attract the required pull towards compliance.
139
  
Current international law, particularly the Charter, does not meet one of these requirements—
equality before the law.
140
 For example, notwithstanding article 2(1) of the Charter, there is 
no equality before the law amongst states.
141
 By legalising a system where five states have 
veto power, the Charter itself negates the ideal of rule of law and established a system of 
inequality anchored in actual power.
142
 However, the current legal order does not meet the 
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requirement of equality before the law, its moral pull to the ideal of rule of law is weakened 
and states are less likely to feel a moral obligation to obey.
143
 As we have seen, this has 
impacted the effectiveness of the system, particularly the UNSC and its ability to act to 
prevent genocides and other mass atrocities. It is this lacuna in the Charter that provides the 
justification for acts of IILR like the AU/ECOWAS regimes, directed at morally improving 
the system.  After all, to what extent states will refrain from violating international law due to 
their allegiance to the ideal of law depends on how close international law approximates the 
ideal.
144
 The moral failure of the system in Rwanda, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra-Leone and 
Sudan compels unilateral acts of legal reform such as the AU/ECOWAS provisions on 
humanitarian intervention and are therefore morally justified. 
On the claim that IILR risks reintroducing the Hobbesian system, it might be replied 
that history debunks the assumption that the stability of international life entirely depends on 
the efficacy of international law alone. Acts of IILR in the past, such as the Nuremberg 
Trials, did not result in a Hobbesian state of nature in the international community.
145
 It is not 
always the case that failure to follow the laid down procedures for the amendment of a rule of 
international law necessarily destabilises the legal order.
146
 There are several cases of IILR, 
some overt and others less obvious. For example, the UNSC has, through an initial act of 
IILR improved its voting procedures in article 27(3), the redefinition of ‗threat to 
international peace and security‘ and the meaning of ‗enforcement action‘.147 Through IILR, 
these terms have received new interpretations and applications very different from those 
intended by the Charter in 1945. Finally on this point, I think the claim that IILR does not 
give sufficient weight to the formal processes of law-making in international law seems to 
prioritise procedure over substance, and order over justice. It pays little attention to human 
dignity or the protection of human rights.  
Another objection to IILR is that it violates state consent.
148
 Watson contends that 
since international law is based on consent, the normative order can only be maintained by 
seeking state consent to changes in the system and states should therefore refrain from 
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unilateral acts or IILR.
149
 This argument is based on two premises, first, that states are under 
a moral obligation to obey international law because they consent to it, and secondly, that the 
principle of fairness demands such obedience from states because of the ‗non-excludable 
benefits‘ they receive from the international legal order.150 The first premise posits that since 
international rules generally are created based on state consent, acts of IILR by states violate 
such consent.
151
 The second premise asserts that the international legal order is a system of 
cooperation in which states work with one another by obeying international law in exchange 
for similar moral duty being expected of other states for the benefit of all.
152
 So long as states 
receive benefits from the international legal order by other states‘ compliance with 
international law, then the principle of fairness demands that states have a moral obligation to 
also obey international law and so contribute to securing goals of common value.
153
 If these 
arguments are accepted, then the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes would be morally 
unjustifiable because they are acts of IILR.  
The first response to the above objection is that it is not in all cases that states obey 
international law they consented to because of a feeling of moral obligation.
154
 In most cases 
state behaviour is based more on national interest calculus than any feeling of moral 
obligation to obey international law.
155
 Posner disputes the view that there is a moral 
obligation on states to obey international law and maintains that states perform their 
international obligations because they perceive it to be in their interest to do so.
156
 States have 
no inherent need to obey international law and conduct that conforms to international law 
should be seen as decisions made on the basis of rational choice.
157
 Perhaps a fairer 
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assessment may lie between both extremes—that the system operates on a spectrum based as 
much on international cooperation as effective power.
158
 For example, states consented to the 
Charter, but that has not led to the implementation of the Military Agreement and the creation 
of standing UN army as contemplated by article 43 and this is because states do not deem it 
in their interest to create one yet.
159
 In certain circumstances, a state will not comply with 
international law if it calculates that the benefit accruing from such a violation is greater than 
the costs.
160
  
Examined in this light, the decision of AU/ECOWAS to initiate IILR through their 
treaty provisions on humanitarian intervention would be seen to have been motivated by the 
interests of member states in having a legal framework for the prevention of mass atrocities 
through regional arrangements. It is obvious that the AU/ECOWAS are more concerned 
about developing a legal framework for regional humanitarian intervention than compliance 
with legal ‗niceties‘.161 
6.5 HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, ILLEGAL INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
REFORM AND THE QUESTION OF ABUSE 
 
Before going further with the discussion on the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes as IILR, it is 
pertinent to examine the likelihood of abuse of the IILR process, especially with regards to 
GWOT. As discussed above, whether an act of IILR is justified will be contingent on other 
variables, including the existence of moral deficits in the law, the infeasibility of legal reform 
through the formal processes, and that its institutions have legitimacy issues.
162
 In a nutshell, 
an IILR must not only bring about moral improvement in the existing law, fulfil the basics of 
substantive justice and fairly approximate the ideal of international rule of law, the IILR can 
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only occur in situations where the existing legal system‘s moral pull towards compliance is 
weak because of its poor approximation of justice and legitimacy deficits.
163
  
With respect to the GWOT, the argument is that IILR is open to abuse and could be 
used to advance morally questionable national interest projects of dubious legality such as the 
policy of pre-emptive strike as an instrument of the GWOT.
164
 It is doubtful whether the 
GWOT can successfully appeal to IILR to validate a rule of pre-emptive strike in 
international law.  The GWOT project is very different to the prevention of genocide and 
mass atrocities project that the AU/ECOWAS IILR treaties apply to. This difference lay in 
‗new‘ developments that have occurred but which were not foreseen in 1945.165 These ‗new‘ 
phenomena were not envisaged in 1945 when article 2(7) and Chapter VIII were drafted and 
since reform in the law of intervention has not been possible to reflect these new 
developments, it becomes one of the bases for justifying the AU/ECOWAS IILR. However, 
the same ‗new‘ and transformative change cannot be said of international terrorism because 
the ‗new‘ element that GWOT claims as justifying pre-emptive strikes as IILR is anything 
but new.
166
 As Okafor points out, the September 11 terrorist attacks on the US ‗have been 
significantly overstated by claims that the ―post-9/11‖ world is so significantly new that it 
justifies pre-emptive strikes, targeted killings, and acts of torture that would be otherwise 
illegal under international law.‘167 In this respect and bearing in mind the discussion of IILR 
rendered above, I can make the following observations with regards to GWOT and abuse of 
IILR. 
First, one of the conditions that distinguish an IILR agent from a random law breaker 
is that whereas the IILR agent openly breaks the law and acknowledges that he has broken 
the law, a random lawbreaker denies that he has broken the law and instead will try to justify 
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the action on the basis of the existing law.
168
 The initial US response to 9/11 was based on its 
right to self-defense under article 51 of the UN Charter, locating its justification within, rather 
than without, the Charter‘s normative order.169 The US did not acknowledge that it was 
breaking any rule of international law and so does not meet this condition. Secondly, an agent 
of IILR is motivated to break the law in protest against the injustice or moral deficits of the 
extant law.
170
 However, a random lawbreaker breaks the law without regard to its moral 
contents.
171
 The US invasion of Iraq in response to 9/11 was not a protest against the deficits 
in the current Charter rule on self-defense or that it was morally defective and needed 
improvement. Thus, the GWOT does not meet this condition as an act of IILR. Thirdly, an 
agent of IILR breaks the law with a declared motive: to compel a change in the law and bring 
about its moral improvement.
172
 However, the random lawbreaker breaks the law for a 
variety of reasons that change with its circumstances and the objective is not to bring about 
moral improvement in the law but to operate outside the law.
173
 In this sense, it was only as 
part of extending the scope of its GWOT that the US sought to advance the ‗newness‘ and 
transformative character of 9/11 argument to justify the right of ‗anticipatory self-defense‘ 
character of its future policy responses to terrorism.
174
 It did not seek a reform of the Charter-
based law nor did it call for an amendment to the Charter paradigm because it was morally 
unjust but as an unnecessary restraints on the exercise of its power. 
Thirdly, there is nothing in the development of international law, whether at regional 
or UN level, to suggest that the absence of a right of pre-emptive strike poses a threat to 
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international peace and security as do mass atrocities.
175
 In fact, it is its presence rather than 
its absence that could return the world to a Hobbesian order. As the R2P norm indicates, the 
need to prevent genocides, war crimes and crimes against humanity is a call to all states, but 
the claim of a right to pre-emptive strikes will most likely only be made by powerful states. 
Whereas the international concern with the protection of human rights within the borders of 
states is the concern of the international community, the right to pre-emptive strike has not 
received such broad consensus. Except for a few, a number of powerful states do not even 
support it because it threatens global stability. Thus, pre-emptive strike will most likely fail 
the validity test under IILR. 
6.6 AU/ECOWAS RHMI REGIMES AS EXERCISE IN ILLEGAL INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL REFORM AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
One can view the evolving legal situation in Africa either as part of a process of developing 
new norms of international law or as ‗reinterpretations‘ of the extant rules.176 If taken as the 
creation of new norms, the AU/ECOWAS regimes are merely adding to their reservoir of 
contributions to the development of international law, having introduced several norms 
through treaty and practice that have shaped international law in the past.
177
 In some of these 
cases, African states did not consciously set out to create comprehensively new international 
law but it was necessary to build on existing general international law by giving certain rules 
and principles a specifically African regional orientation.
178
 This is the case with the doctrine 
of humanitarian intervention which article 4(h) of the AU Act and article 25 of the ECOWAS 
MCPMRPS Protocol codify. The fact that these reforms were achieved through IILR only 
becomes significant when we discount this regional dimension. In a recent document, the AU 
(not ECOWAS), articulated this regional dimension of its legal framework and stated that it 
seeks to engage rules of international law to see that they address the specific problems 
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Africa faces with respect to intervention to protect populations.
179
 In the same vein, Maluwa 
notes that 
[i]n a sense, the preoccupation of African states with the need to regulate the right of 
intervention within the Constitutive Act, and on their own terms, signifies not only a desire to 
map new boundaries of international law but also to wrest the use of the right of intervention 
from the conventional ―civilizing mission‖ within which it is framed under current 
international law.
180
 
In terms of ‗mapping new boundaries‘ of international law,181 at least from a theoretical 
perspective, the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes seek to achieve the following by introducing 
reform to the international law of humanitarian intervention. First, they have achieved 
codification of the law of humanitarian intervention, thereby enhancing normative clarity. 
Secondly, it could reduce problems of delay that often arise from the normative ambiguity 
surrounding the legality of humanitarian intervention during crisis. Thirdly, the 
AU/ECOWAS regimes could set uniform standards for intervention and thus help reduce 
complaints of selectivity or double standards. Fourth, the regimes would provide a legal 
framework of a binding character for action to prevent mass atrocity crimes. Fifth, the 
regimes could ultimately create the basis for imposing a legal duty on AU/ECOWAS as 
regional agents to act in deserving cases under a theory of regional responsibility to protect. 
Sixth, they set predetermined objective criteria for intervention and in theory this should 
make the evaluation of each case of intervention easier. Finally, the regimes provide the legal 
framework for the establishment of necessary institutional structures such as a standing 
military command such as the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and the African 
Standby Force) as originally envisaged by article 43 of the UN Charter.  
With the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regime, at least in theory, intervention in Africa is not 
just ‗permissible‘ but there is now a ‗legal right of intervention‘, though as Kindiki and 
Kuwali point out, a more progressive approach would have been an ‗obligation‘ or ‗duty‘ to 
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intervene.
182
 This makes intervention, at least in principle, a real possibility backed by law. 
For its part, and through ‗institutional innovation‘, ECOWAS seems to have settled the 
controversy surrounding the legality of pro-democratic intervention within its subregion.
183
 
However, at the global level, there is still debate whether there is a right to democratic 
governance enforceable by pro-democratic intervention.
184
  
Thus, the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes arguably constitute improvement in the law 
of humanitarian intervention and can be regarded as attempts to initiate reforms from without 
rather than from within the UN. It is possible that such acts of IILR by large regional blocs 
could lead to new rules that could modify the principal rule, especially when other states 
follow the practice or indicate a favourable disposition to do so in the future.
185
 It is also 
possible that a practice that was initiated by a few states, with calculated benefits in the 
envisaged outcomes, could eventually produce results that blend such apparent infringement 
of the law into legal reform that benefits other states, the relevant global governance 
institutions and the entire system.
186
  
However, though the foregoing analysis has been a theoretical inquiry, it is important 
to make a few observations about the possible negative impact of an IILR act like the 
AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes as a way of introducing reform to the law of humanitarian 
intervention. The first point is that such act of IILR could further weaken the UN Charter 
system.
187
 Secondly, states may regress to pre-Charter era coalitions of the willing, collective 
security alliances and regional arrangements with severe consequences for the present 
multilateral system and international legal order.
188
 Thirdly, as an essentially regional 
approach to reform, the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes seem to discount the fact that regional 
organisations vary greatly in many respects.
189
 Fourthly, in an interdependent and 
interconnected world, it is difficult to see how the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes will not 
have implications beyond Africa‘s boundaries. As Kofi Annan pointed out, what is needed is 
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not a replacement for the UN but how to make the organisation more effective.
190
 Acts of 
IILR or pursuit of reform outside the UN platform not only undermines this objective, but 
also risk introducing a race to the bottom in collective security.  
 There is however reason to be optimistic that the enduring spirit of the Charter will 
withstand the impact of any act of IILR. This is because the normative erosion occasioned by 
the IILR discussed here will most likely be temporary. If the new norms receive wider 
acceptance and become consolidated in international law, they will contribute to the 
development of international law, the legitimacy of the UN and a regression to pre-Charter 
world order would be less likely. If on the other hand, the norms were rejected by the 
majority of states, they will most likely fizzle out. It is therefore important to emphasise, as I 
have analysed in this thesis, that the AU/ECOWAS regimes have merely developed a legal 
framework for humanitarian intervention which, in theory should be an improvement on the 
Charter, whether this will be so in practice is a matter for conjecture and a lot will depend on 
this. Therefore, the extent to which the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes are capable of 
weakening the Charter system will depend on the success of the implementation of the 
frameworks. Should the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes fail in implementation, African states 
will return to the Charter earlier than expected.
191
 As Wippman cautions, the lack of 
resources may hinder the utility of the AU/ECOWAS regimes so we might see less of it in 
practice than in theory.
192
 If this trend continues, then the utility of the AU/ECOWAS 
regional legal and theoretical framework for humanitarian intervention as instruments for 
operationalising R2P in Africa and their impact on the UN and international law would be 
less profound. 
6.7 CONCLUSION 
 
I have argued that due to the inadequacy of international law in the protection of human 
rights, and the obstacles to legal reform through the formal processes, the AU/ECOWAS acts 
of IILR that seek a moral improvement in the law of humanitarian intervention is morally 
justifiable. Relying on Buchanan‘s theory of IILR, I have argued that the current law of 
humanitarian intervention that forbids the AU/ECOWAS from undertaking intervention to 
prevent genocide and other mass atrocities unless they obtain UNSC authorisation in Africa 
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has proved incapable of protecting human rights and therefore so defective that it is in dire 
need of moral improvement and reform. Since the necessary reform could not be achieved 
within the Charter framework, the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes that introduced reform in 
Africa outside the Charter is morally justified even though they breach international law, they 
represent improvement in the law. By acceding to the treaties, African states acknowledge 
that: sovereignty resides in the people; that states derive their legitimacy from their citizens; 
that states are under an obligation to protect the human rights of citizens because their 
legitimacy depend on it; that states forfeit that legitimacy and become legal targets for 
regional humanitarian intervention when they violate, or are incapable of protecting, those 
rights. I also argued that the theory of IILR cannot be used to validate such claims as the right 
of pre-emptive strike because this claim does not meet some of the fundamental requirements 
of a valid act of IILR. Finally, the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes will have implications for 
international law and the UN Charter, much of which will depend on how the frameworks are 
implemented. However, they do not seek to replace the law-making processes of international 
law, rather they give allegiance to international law but insist that where formal law-making 
processes have failed in the reform of international law, especially with reference to 
intervention to halt mass atrocities, then IILR is welcome as an exceptional measure to bring 
about moral improvement in the law.  
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CHAPTER 7: THE LEGAL VALIDITY OF THE AU/ECOWAS UNILATERAL 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION LEGAL REGIME UNDER CONVENTIONAL AND 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Whether international law will deteriorate or flourish will depend upon whether the idea of 
the rule of law comes to be embodied in new, more responsive institutional structures, within 
which new, more sensitive principles will be appropriately applied. However, this much is 
clear: In the absence of a vigorous dialogue about the moral foundations of international law 
and an open-minded, critical exploration of the morality of international legal reform, the path 
of least resistance is likely to be destruction without reconstruction, the abandonment of 
existing legal constraints on the exercise of power without the development of new legal 
strictures to take their place.
1
 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In chapters 5 and 6, I addressed the validity question from a legal and moral standpoint. The 
present chapter represents the third and final leg of my tripod theoretical inquiry into the legal 
validity of the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes. Like the two previous chapters that inquired 
into the theoretical validity of the AU/ECOWAS intervention treaties, the present chapter is 
also focused on the legal validity from a theoretical perspective. However, unlike the 
previous chapters, the interrogation is undertaken within the framework of the two main 
sources of international law (treaties and customary law). The chapter is divided into two 
major sections. In section 1, I examine the legal validity of the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes 
under conventional international law. I ask three questions: since the AU/ECOWAS RHMI 
regimes are treaty-based, what is the impact of member states‘ consent on the validity 
question under the UN Charter? Have the conditions for states assuming Charter obligations 
in 1945 been met? If no, what are the legal implications for Charter obligations and the 
AU/ECOWAS validity question, particularly in relation to articles 53(1) and 103 under the 
principle of ribus sic stantibus? It is asserted that the AU/ECOWAS framework cannot be 
valid because they sanction use of force, arrogate the right of unilateral intervention to the 
AU/ECOWAS in violation of articles 2(4), 53(1) and 103. I advance three main arguments in 
reply: First, I argue that article 2(4) only prohibits aggressive use of force and the 
AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes deal with consensual use of force, which is not the same thing 
as aggressive use of force. Secondly, I argue that article 53(1) relates to ‗enforcement action‘ 
and since lack of consent is a fundamental requirement in enforcement actions, the 
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AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes do not constitute ‗enforcement action‘ within the meaning of 
Chapter VIII because consent was given via treaties and so do not violate articles 2(4), 53(1) 
and by implication article 103. Thirdly, I argue that treaties of intervention based on valid 
consent constitute an exercise of state sovereignty which the Charter did not take away from 
states. Therefore, treaties of intervention like the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes that are 
based on the valid exercise of sovereignty are legally valid. 
In section 2, I examine the validity question from a customary international law 
perspective. I ask whether the AU/ECOWAS RHMI treaties violate norms of jus cogens and 
if so, whether the treaties are null and void. Secondly, I ask whether there was a regional 
customary law of unilateral humanitarian intervention in Africa prior to the AU/ECOWAS 
RHMI regimes. And if so, do the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes constitute a codification of 
such regional customary law existing side by side with customary general international law 
and the UN Charter?  
7.2 AU/ECOWAS RHMI REGIME UNDER CONVENTIONAL INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 
 
One approach scholars have adopted in studying the legality of humanitarian intervention 
under the Charter is by examining the sources of international law.
2
 There is the classical 
view which emphasises the traditional sources of international law (primarily treaties and 
custom) and the Realists who prioritise a policy-oriented approach, insisting that the Charter 
law must be interpreted in the context of subsequent developments in international law.
3
 The 
controversy about whether international law is ‗law properly so called‘4 has as much to do 
with its decentralised system, lack of authoritative determinant in ascertaining its rules and 
how its sources are determined as with how its system of sanctions is organised.
5
 This 
controversy also implicates how some of its norms are determined, the nature of the rights 
and obligations they give rise to and their relationship with other norms in the system. For 
present purposes, since the Treaty of Westphalia and the emergence of the nation state as the 
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mode of organising the international system, consent has always been central to the making 
of international law, whether by treaty or custom.
6
 It is trite that, as a general rule, a treaty 
only binds states that are parties to it and only to the extent of the provisions of that treaty, 
just as a custom does not bind a persistent objector.
7
  
There is no doubt that part of what was at stake in 1945 at the negotiation of the UN 
Charter—particularly, article 2(4) & (7), 53(1) and 103 in relation to sovereignty—was how 
much sovereignty states were willing to cede to the new organisation by consenting to the 
Charter. As an attribute of sovereignty, the freedom of a state to bind itself by entering into 
agreement with other actors in the system has been circumscribed under the Charter. Article 
2(4), for example, limits the freedom to use force whether unilateral or in a multilateral 
agreement with others. Article 103 also limits the freedom of states to make treaties.
8
 Such is 
the fundamental nature of consent to international law-making that a treaty freely consented 
to by states should not be lightly discarded as invalid without thorough legal scrutiny to 
determine its validity.
9
 This is even more so in the case of treaties of intervention like the 
AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes.  
7.3 THE VALIDITY OF TREATY-BASED INTERVENTIONS UNDER THE UN 
CHARTER  
 
Leaving aside for the moment the question of the jus cogens character of article 2(4), it is 
pertinent to examine the right of a state to enter into treaties that authorise other states or 
organisation to use force within its territory, the limit to that right and the validity of such 
treaties under contemporary international law. It should be stated from the outset that the 
freedom of states to undertake treaty obligations is limited and governed by international 
law.
10
 Any use of force that falls short of the Charter paradigm under article 51, Chapter VII 
and article 53 is an infraction of the Charter.
11
 Invariably, any treaty arrangement to that 
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effect would also be illegal. As mentioned above, a state only assumes obligations under the 
treaty it consents to but that obligation arises not just from the mere act of consenting but 
from the principle of pacta sunt servanda, which states that treaty obligations must be 
fulfilled in good faith.
12
 Consequently, Simma argues that, as a rule of international law, 
states cannot contract out of the norm of nonuse of force at the regional level due to article 
2(4) of the Charter, which they consented to; and states are therefore under an obligation to 
refrain from the use of force.
13
 The question then is, can a state through a treaty, authorise 
another state, group of states or regional organisation to use force in its territory? Is such 
treaty valid in view of the provisions in article 2(4)? As shown in chapter 2, the current 
international legal order is based on the principles of state equality, sovereignty and non-
intervention.
14
 Therefore any answer to these questions necessarily implicates the concept of 
sovereignty of states. 
Two major approaches have been adopted in resolving the question of treaties of 
intervention: the ‗freedom to contract‘ model and the ‗jus cogens‘ model.15 The ‗freedom to 
contract‘ model states that inherent in the very idea of sovereignty of all states is the right to 
accept treaty-based restrictions on future exercise of that sovereignty and a state may limit its 
sovereignty in anyway or extinguish it altogether by treaty by merging with another state.
16
 
Such limitation of sovereignty may be by entering into a treaty of intervention so that 
although a state has a right to be free from intervention and other states owe it the obligation 
not to infringe this right, the state can actually release other states from this obligation.
17
 As 
Winfield succinctly put it long ago, ‗[i]f an individual must not commit suicide, a State 
may.‘18 In the S.S. Wimbledon Case, the PCIJ stated that while the mere fact that a state has 
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undertaken treaty obligations does not mean that it has surrendered its sovereignty, it only 
means ‗a restriction upon the exercise of the sovereign rights of the State, in the sense that it 
requires them to be exercised in a certain way. But the right of entering into international 
engagements is an attribute of State sovereignty.‘19  
By the same token, whenever a state assumes international treaty obligations in 
relation to the protection of human rights, it amounts to an exercise of its sovereignty.
20
 
Usually, the protection of human rights would require domestic legislations and accession to 
international treaties and if a state enters into a treaty that shapes her internal and foreign 
policy direction such as authorising external intervention by a regional organisation to protect 
human rights, even though such treaty impugns its sovereignty, the state has the legal right to 
do so. There is no doubt that such treaty of intervention would encumber a state‘s sovereignty 
and freedom of action, however, the treaty is not illegal.
21
 According to some commentators, 
if it is legal for a state to forfeit its sovereignty through integration with another state, then it 
would be odd to argue that a state cannot accept a ‗less drastic curtailment of its sovereignty 
by releasing its right of non-intervention, which is a right of each individual state flowing 
from sovereignty itself, … The view maintaining that such consent is illegal is not in accord 
with usage or with law.‘22 
Under classical international law, the right to intervene on the territory of another 
state by military force could be granted by treaty whether bilateral or multilateral.
23
 Such 
treaties reflected the relationship and interest amongst the parties, though often skewed in 
favour of a dominant party.
24
 It is noteworthy that while Winfield wrote prior to the UN 
Charter, Thomas wrote after the Charter entered into force, which suggests that this right 
existed prior to 1945 and arguably continues to exist even in the post-Charter era. Even 
today, there are still a couple of these treaties in force notwithstanding that their legal validity 
remains doubtful because of the apparent incompatibility with articles 2(4) and 103 of the 
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Charter. However, Brownlie maintains that a treaty of intervention would be void today if it 
has an illegal object (such a pact for aggression) or the state target of intervention is not a 
party to such treaty.
25
 Doswald-Beck contends that though intervention treaties were legal in 
the past, they would be illegal now for violating article 2(4) and article 103.
26
 Commenting 
on the Iranian-Soviet intervention Treaty of 1921, Reisman argues that whereas a treaty of 
intervention might have been legal in the League of Nations era in which it was made, the 
legality of that treaty is now in doubt because of the entering into force of the Charter, which 
introduced new ‗intertemporal principles‘ like articles 2(4) and 103 for assessing the 
continuing legal validity of existing norms.
27
  
Furthermore, in the wake of the US invasion of Panama in 1989 relying on the 
Panama Canal Treaty of intervention between the US and Panama, Louis Henkin argued that 
the US could not legally rely on the treaty to intervene in Panama and even if the said treaty 
existed, it was void for violating article 2(4).
28
 In the same vein, Wippman submits that any 
treaty that authorises another state or group of states to intervene on its territory without its 
‗contemporaneous consent‘ infringes article 2(4) as well as article 103 and is therefore void.29 
What is decisive in Wippman‘s argument is that regardless of the existence of a treaty of 
intervention, the existing government at the time of the proposed intervention must consent to 
an intervention for it to be legal. Such conclusion is hard to sustain because if that was the 
intention of the parties, of what use is the treaty of intervention? The essence of a treaty is to 
define and confer rights and obligations in advance. If contemporaneous consent is a 
requirement for intervention, a treaty of intervention would be unnecessary or at best 
redundant. In the absence of such express or implied provision, it is reasonable to conclude 
that a treaty of intervention confers the right of intervention in accordance with the terms of 
such treaty and contemporaneous consent is not required.  
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Besides, as a treaty, the UN Charter impliedly confers a right to interfere in the 
external affairs of states on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in pursuit of its 
function of maintaining international peace and security.
30
 Similarly, through practice, the 
UNSC has developed its power to intervene in the internal affairs of states in cases of 
humanitarian catastrophes by relying on Chapter VII of the Charter.
31
 There is some sort of 
implied consent by states when they joined the UN that the UN may intervene in their affairs 
under Chapter VII, thus limiting the future powers of the sovereign state to act freely. Article 
103 also limits the freedom of a sovereign state to act freely in the future by precluding states 
from assuming treaty obligations that are inconsistent with their Charter obligations. 
Therefore, the argument that the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes limit the freedom of action of 
member states and so is void, is problematic. If this is accepted as valid, it follows that states 
can bind themselves by permitting external intervention by regional organisations like AU 
and ECOWAS without the necessity of the contemporaneous consent of the incumbent 
government. Perhaps this explains why the argument about the legal validity of the 
AU/ECOWAS states seems to have shifted from the right of African states to enter into such 
treaties to the incompatibility of the treaties with the Charter. It can be safely concluded that a 
state can sign a treaty of intervention limiting its future freedom of action so long as it is 
signed by the de jure government.
32
 The relevant organisation can then rely on such treaty to 
intervene to protect human rights or for pro-democratic causes. 
 
 
From a state practice point of view, the use of treaties of intervention to protect 
human rights—especially the rights of religious minorities—is well established, at least since 
the later part of the seventeenth century.
33
 However, the Treaty of Guarantee of 6 August 
1960 between Cyprus, on the one hand, and Greece, Turkey and Great Britain, on the other 
hand, is the only one in the post-Charter era to have received significant attention from legal 
scholars and deserves some consideration here.
34
 Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee 
provides that: 
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[i]n the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey, and the 
United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures 
necessary to ensure observance of those provisions. In so far as common or concerted action 
may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take 
action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.
35
 
In 1974, when Turkey intervened in Cyprus relying on this provision, the legality was 
challenged by Cyprus who argued that the treaty was invalid because it authorised the use of 
force against another state in contravention of article 2(4) of the Charter.
36
 Turkey contended 
that intervention on the basis of article IV of the Treaty did not violate article 2(4) because 
military force was not used ‗against the territorial integrity or political independence‘ of 
Cyprus, but in fact, used to secure Cyprus‘s territory and independence in compliance with 
the condition for military intervention stipulated in the Treaty.
37
 For its part, the UK argued 
that where the occasion demands, the UK was entitled to undertake military intervention in 
Cyprus without UNSC authorisation based on the provisions of the Treaty.
38
 Hence Ronzitti 
concludes that article IV(2) of the Treaty of Guarantee is legally valid.
39  
The significance of this example lies in the fact that whereas the Iranian-Soviet Treaty 
was made in the League of Nations era and there could be doubts about its continuing validity 
under the Charter; the same cannot be said of the Cyprus Treaty which was made fifteen 
years after the Charter came into force. Obviously, the parties were aware that article IV of 
the treaty would conflict with articles 2(4) and 103 of the Charter and invalidate them if 
indeed that was the correct interpretation and effect of articles 2(4) and 103 on treaties of 
intervention. The UNSC, in the context of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, without expressly 
stating so, suggested that the treaty of intervention was legally valid.
40
  Thus, Brownlie 
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concludes that the right of military intervention on the territory of a state could be lawfully 
conferred by treaty.
41
 Arguably, this includes entering into treaties of intervention for the 
protection of human rights in circumstances predetermined by such treaties. When a state or 
group of states, enter into a treaty amongst them or under the aegis of a regional organisation, 
authorising intervention in their territories by that regional organisation, this is a valid 
exercise of sovereignty and is legal.    
7.4 AU/ECOWAS RHMI REGIMES AS TREATIES OF INTERVENTION 
 
The end of the Cold War ushered in new optimism about the prospect of the UNSC finally 
functioning in international law as envisaged in 1945
42—a type 4 global constitutive process 
with highly effective hierarchical institutions where the appointed authority (the UNSC) is 
able to respond to egregious human rights violations efficaciously and thus diminish the 
penchant for unilateral mechanisms.
43
 Since this did not happen, David Wippman‘s 
prediction that states may be persuaded to adopt Stanley Hoffman‘s proposal for a 
multilateral treaty regime under which signatory states would agree to intervention in their 
internal affairs if necessary, to end gross human rights violations, has been patently fulfilled 
in the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regime. It is possible that with the increasing interdependence, 
treaty systems like the Concert of Europe system, permitting states or organisations to 
intervene in the internal affairs of states to protect certain values could become prominent 
once again.
44
 Recently, calls for such treaty arrangements have resurfaced in the literature 
and it is against this background that I analyse the legal validity of the AU/ECOWAS 
regime.
45
  
The argument in favour of the validity of the AU/ECOWAS regime as treaty qua 
treaty law falls into two broad categories: the intervention by invitation argument and the 
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‗consent precludes wrongfulness‘ argument. Both of these arguments are intertwined and are 
separated here for convenience of analysis only.  
7.4.1 The AU/ECOWAS RHMI Regimes as Intervention by Invitation 
 
In international law, the legitimate government of a state can request the intervention of 
foreign forces in its territory.
46
 Although what constitutes ‗legitimate government‘ is 
unsettled, democratic credentials are fast becoming the criteria for both domestic and 
international governmental legitimacy.
47
 Brownlie distinguishes between the different 
situations in which the government of a state may lawfully request external intervention.
48
 
One such ground is to end an armed insurrection or to assist a people in their struggle for 
democracy as a manifestation of self-determination.
49
 Incidentally, these are two of the major 
causes of violent conflicts that often result in genocides, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity in Africa today and partly explain the necessity for the AU/ECOWAS RHMI 
regimes. 
In a recent study, Buchanan and Keohane called for intervention treaty regimes which 
they termed ‗precommitment regimes‘50 under which states would sign intervention treaties 
whether under a multilateral treaty arrangement comprising representatives of democratic 
states or under the auspices of regional organisations.
51
 The authors argued that such treaty 
arrangement should dispense with UNSC authorisation for intervention to halt genocide and 
other massive violations of human rights and this would not violate the Charter.
52
 Similarly, 
Farer contends that it is lawful for a group of democratic states to enter into agreement 
permitting intervention by the group in a member state in order to restore democracy.
53
 In the 
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same vein, some writers also construe the humanitarian intervention framework of the AU 
(and arguably ECOWAS too) as ‗precommitment regimes‘ or intervention by a priori 
invitation.
54
 Kuwali argues that the legal basis of the right of intervention under these treaties 
can be viewed as an invitation apriori.
55
 If this analysis is accepted, it is arguable that without 
necessarily examining the basis of the political authority or democratic credentials of all AU 
and ECOWAS member states, the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes will also qualify as a 
‗precommitment regime‘ or intervention by invitation, which permits intervention in the 
territories of AU/ECOWAS members without the necessity of UNSC authorisation. 
Generally, the purpose of article 2(4) is to regulate the recourse to use of force by 
states. My argument here is that when states by consent to a treaty enlarge the scope of the 
unilateral use of force beyond that contemplated under the Charter as it relates to such states, 
it falls outside the scope of article 2(4) and the UNSC can only act when such use of force 
threatens international peace and security.
56
 Similarly, in view of the invitation to intervene 
contained in the treaty, it is doubtful whether the UNSC, acting under its powers in the 
Charter, can purport to preclude AU/ECOWAS from intervening in member states except 
where such intervention can be viewed as constituting a threat to international peace and 
security. To argue otherwise is to stretch article 2(4) and 53 (1) too far. Just as the Treaty of 
Guarantee of Cyprus expands the reach of unilateral resort to force by the Guarantor Powers 
beyond article 51 of the Charter,
57
 the AU/ECOWAS intervention treaties extend the right to 
unilateral use of force by AU/ECOWAS beyond the scope of article 51 and therefore outside 
the ambit of article 2(4), 53 and 103.  
The UN Charter does not preclude the right of AU/ECOWAS states to enter into a 
treaty of intervention because that would amount to a violation of their sovereignty under 
article 2(7) since the matters sought to be regulated by the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes are 
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matters essentially within their domestic jurisdiction as outlined in several United Nations 
General Assembly Declarations.
58
 Arguably, human rights are now matters of international 
concern and states have assumed international obligations under human rights treaties. 
However, the policy framework, legal and institutional arrangements for human rights 
protection and enforcement at national level (to the extent that they do not violate any 
existing norm of international law), continue to be matters within the domestic jurisdiction of 
states in exercise of their sovereignty. This is why article 53(1) of the Charter does not apply 
to the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes if member states have entered into regional 
arrangements for the prevention of genocide and other mass atrocities. 
7.4.2 Consensual Intervention and the preclusion of wrongfulness under the AU/ECOWAS 
Framework 
 
An intervention would be lawful if, absent UNSC authorisation, it was consented to by the 
target state at the time of the intervention.
59
 This is because consent by the injured state 
precludes wrongfulness of the intervention.
60
 However, some writers argue that in such cases, 
the intervention is not a ‗humanitarian intervention‘ but ‗armed assistance‘.61 Whatever 
nomenclature is used to describe it, the important element is that the type of force proscribed 
by article 2(4) is ‗coercive‘ or ‗aggressive‘ use of force which means use of force without the 
consent of the target state and which is different to ‗consensual use of force‘.62 The 
consensual intervention argument states that since intervention treaties are based on the 
consent of states, intervention on the basis of such treaties are lawful because the Charter 
prohibition of use of force presupposes absence of consent of the territorial state.
63
 Summing 
up the argument in this respect, Wippman observes that 
consent may validate an otherwise wrongful military intervention into the territory of the 
consenting state is a generally accepted principle. When a government is both widely 
recognised and in effective control of most of the state, this principle affords a clear 
alternative to Security Council authorisation as a basis for justifying external intervention, 
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whether by states acting unilaterally, or by states acting under the auspices of the United 
Nations (U.N.) or a regional organisation.
64
 
According to the International Law Commission (ILC), ‗[v]alid consent by a State to the 
commission of a given act by another State precludes the wrongfulness of that act in relation 
to the former State to the extent that the act remains within the limits of that consent.‘65 
Where consent is involved, the wrongfulness of the act is a matter of law and not politics or 
morality.
66
 The legal effect of the operation of this rule actually is not to exclude the 
responsibility that would have resulted from the act but to forbid the act being labeled 
wrongful in the first place.
67
 It is the consent of the target state that precludes the intervention 
from falling into the realm of illegality and it does not matter whether the consent was given 
via a treaty or otherwise, provided it is a valid consent under international law.
68
  
However, the objection to the consent argument is that the prohibition of use of force 
by states is a value in which all states have an interest in safeguarding, thus giving rise to an 
obligation erga omnes.
69
 The implication of this is that when a state relies on a treaty of 
intervention to intervene in another state, whereas such intervention is not unlawful against 
the target state, it may nevertheless be unlawful against other states members of the UN to 
whom the obligation erga omnes is also owed except where they have consented to such 
intervention.
70
 Because in such intervention, it is not just the interest of the consenting state 
that is at stake but the entire international legal order.
71
 As already mentioned above, 
Wippman also argues that for consent to preclude the wrongfulness of an intervention, it must 
be given contemporaneously with the proposed intervention. Consent given in advance via a 
treaty would violate the freedom of a state to exercise its sovereignty in future and is 
therefore invalid.
72
 If one accepts this view, interventions based on the AU/ECOWAS treaties 
would be invalid because the consent given via the treaties was given in advance. But since 
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the freedom to consent and assume international treaty obligations is itself an attribute of 
state sovereignty, it follows that if a group of states sign a treaty that authorises one or more 
of them to use force against one of the signatory states, however incongruous this may 
appear, the treaty itself does not violate article 2(4) because the absence of consent is a 
condition for use of force in the first place and so a condition for wrongfulness.
73
 Abass also 
shares this view, arguing that when states, either through practice or treaties of intervention, 
consent to an international organisation intervening in their internal conflicts by use of force, 
such intervention is legal by virtue of article 20 of the Article on State Responsibility.
74
 It 
does not matter that such treaty of intervention, whether bilateral or multilateral, relates to the 
internal social, economic, cultural and political organisation of the state or that it may result 
in the limitation of the internal and external dimensions of her sovereignty.
75
   
 The above argument can be taken further when the legal effect of the consent to 
intervene given in a treaty is examined closely. As Roberto Ago rightly observed, when states 
consent to a treaty such consent operates to suspend the normal rules of international law that 
otherwise regulate their relationships.
76
 A state may give such consent in advance, though 
what constitutes valid consent depends on several variables governed by rules of international 
and municipal law.
77
 Arguably, this applies to intervention treaties as well. The use of force 
in the territory of a state on the basis of prior consent freely given in a treaty is valid under 
treaty law because such consent suspends both articles 2(4), 2(7) and 53(1) between the 
parties in that particular circumstance. It is apparent that the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes 
satisfy the criteria for consensual intervention. The only relevant question that may arise 
would be on the valid exercise of this right and that will require an objective assessment to 
determine at the time of the decision to intervene whether AU/ECOWAS complied with their 
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constituent documents and procedural requirements. So long as the AU/ECOWAS stay 
within the humanitarian objectives stipulated in the treaties, the consent of the target state 
will serve as circumstances precluding wrongfulness in any humanitarian intervention they 
might undertake without UNSC authorisation.
78
  
On the question of whether AU/ECOWAS would require UNSC authorisation when 
acting under the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes, I already pointed out that the ‗enforcement 
action‘ referred to in article 53(1) for which regional arrangements must obtain UNSC 
authorisation refers to use of force without the consent of the territorial state.
79
 When a state 
consents to the use of force on its territory, whether such consent was given 
contemporaneously or via a treaty, such use of force does not qualify as ‗enforcement action‘ 
within the meaning of article 53(1) for which UNSC authorisation is required.
80
 Echoing this 
point, Farer argues that when a group of states acting under a regional bloc enter into a treaty 
that permits members of the bloc upon express invitation or majority vote to intervene in a 
state, such intervention does not need UNSC authorisation because it is not an ‗enforcement 
action‘ within the ambit of Chapter VIII.81 Since member states have consented to the 
AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes, such interventions do not constitute ‗enforcement action‘ and 
fall outside the purview of article 53(1). Brownlie put it succinctly thus: ‗[t]he limitations on 
the resort to force in the Covenant, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the Charter do not relate to 
the case in which express permission to intervene is given.‘82 This is reinforced by the fact 
that the purpose of the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes is to avert or halt genocides and other 
mass atrocities. Ordinarily, states are under international obligations to prevent genocides and 
other mass atrocities in their territories and when a state consents to external intervention for 
that particular purpose, that state is merely acceding to and giving effect to its legal 
obligations.
83
 This is the case with AU/ECOWAS members and their intervention treaties. 
Another basis for contending that the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes be accepted as legally 
valid is what may be called the modification argument discussed below. 
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7.5 AU/ECOWAS INTERVENTION TREATIES AND THE MODIFICATION OF THE 
CHARTER 
 
The question addressed in this section was once summed up by a writer when he asked 
rhetorically, ‗[i]f the Charter ineffectively maintains the peace, when, if at all, may state 
practice in effect modify the Charter norms by providing an alternative customary law of 
public order?‘84 The unilateral use of force by states, ‗coalition of the willing‘ and regional 
organisations have led some writers to conclude that there has been a paradigm shift in the jus 
ad bellum of use of force under the Charter.
85
 This argument claims that since 1945, there 
have been series of unilateral uses of force contrary to article 2(4) and this constitutes state 
practice modification of the Charter rule on the use of force.
86
 This view hinges on the 
principle that a multilateral treaty could be modified by subsequent practice.
87
 Whether this is 
the case with the Charter is disputed. For example, Louis Henkin has consistently argued that 
despite violations of the Charter paradigm on the use of force, it remains the rule, and he 
doubts whether any ‗responsible voice‘ has advocated ‗that the failures of the organisation 
vitiated the agreement and nullified or modified the Charter‘s norms.‘88 
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Most scholars still agree that aggressive use of force violates the UN Charter, but the 
unilateral use of force by bodies like AU/ECOWAS to halt humanitarian catastrophes and 
maintain regional peace and security presents a complex problem. This is becauase such 
organisations comprise several states whose practice carry weight in terms of opinio juris and 
so raise questions of precedential value of such unilateral acts. Also, the usual objections 
raised against unilateral use of force by single states are often difficult to sustain in the case 
of regional organisations. These practices and the momentum towards regional peace and 
security arrangements creates the bases for arguing that without necessarily going through the 
formal processes of amendment under article 108, the Charter framework on the use of force 
has been modified.
89
 
The Charter was drafted to accommodate the veto-wielding permanent members (P5) 
in the structure of the UNSC as its collective security organ because of the realities of 
effective power prevailing in 1945.
90
 The idea was that given the power configuration in the 
UN, the collective security mechanism should be structured to mobilize the Great Powers for 
the common purpose of pursuing peace.
91
 Although it seemed to have succeeded in averting 
another world war so far, the Charter has been less successful in preventing genocides and 
other mass atrocities.
92
 Most, if not all the major wars, genocides and mass atrocities that 
have occurred since World War II have been stopped not by the UN (though it might have 
played some roles) but by unilateral acts of either single states or regional organisations 
(Tanzania in Uganda, India in East Pakistan, Vietnam in Kampuchea, ECOWAS in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone, NATO in Kosovo).
93
  
The problem, it seems, is the strictures inherent in the Charter normative and 
institutional frameworks in which change has been difficult. The attitude of some writers has 
been to treat the Charter as though it were an immutable world constitution, a status the 
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Charter itself does not lay claim to.
94
 Even if the UN Charter were regarded as a world 
constitution reflecting the agreement on institutions and functions amongst states, an 
explication of how those institutions have functioned in the past or will function in the future 
can only be gained through an understanding of the frame of reference of the ‗comprehensive 
constitutive process‘ that created those institutions.95 International law is not fabricated but it 
is the outcome of both conscious and sometimes inadvertent processes undertaken by people 
and calculated to create, change or recreate the fundamental organisational framework of  
‗community life.‘96 The Charter-based law and the system it supports must therefore reflect 
the ‗community life‘ of its members as they change. As Roscoe Pound pointed out long ago,   
… continual changes in the circumstances of social life demand continual new adjustments to 
the pressure of other social interests as well as to new modes of endangering security. Thus 
the legal order must be flexible as well as stable. It must be overhauled continually and 
refitted continually to the changes in the actual life which it is to govern. If we seek 
principles, we must seek principles of change no less than principles of stability.
97 
It is difficult to see how the Charter would meet the objective of the community of states if its 
amendment or modification is almost impossible. As a treaty, the Charter can be modified by 
subsequent state practice.
98
 The Charter can also be modified by subsequent practice of 
relevant UN organs both of which could result in fundamental changes in the original 
intention of the Charter.
99
 The ICJ has held that the subsequent practice of parties to a treaty 
is to be taken into account when interpreting the treaty.
100
 It is important to scrutinize practice 
to ascertain to what extent it reflects such modification.   
It is possible that practices that are seemingly incompatible with the Charter actually 
comply with such modifications rather than the anachronistic letters of the Charter.
101
 
Judging by the developments that have taken place since 1945—some of which are 
inconsistent with the Charter—but which nevertheless have persisted and in some cases, even 
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fulfil the fundamental purposes of the UN, it is arguable that such practice can be held to be 
valid modification of the Charter. An example is the changing state behaviour towards 
intervention and the use of force to protect human rights by the UN. The changing state 
behaviour, the increasing roles of non-state actors and the emergence of new shared global 
norms indicate that at the minimum, the global community accepts the protection of these 
universal values.
102
 The series of unilateral interventions show the extent to which states are 
prepared to go to protect these values regardless of what construction is placed on the UN 
Charter in relation to these changes.
103
 It is my aim to show that there have been 
modifications to the Charter and that the AU/ECOWAS RHMI treaty regimes that codify 
some of those modifications are legally valid. 
First, it is argued that though at inception the Charter, particularly article 2(4), had a 
huge impact on customary law, it did not ‗freeze‘ the development of international law 
afterwards.
104
 There continue to be the possibility that over time, consensus may evolve 
regarding certain practices and interpretations of the Charter which impose or create 
obligations different from those originally imposed when the Charter was drafted.
105
 In 
relation to article 2(4) D‘Amato argues that 
… the rule of Article 2(4) underwent change and modification almost from the beginning. 
Subsequent customary practice … has profoundly altered the meaning and content of the non-
intervention principle articulated in Article 2(4) in 1945. … Under the rules of interpretation 
of international treaties, the subsequent practice of states can modify and change the meaning 
of the original treaty provisions. Hence state practice since 1945—whether considered as 
simply formative of customary international law or as constituting interpretation of the 
Charter under the subsequent-practice rule—has drastically altered the meaning and content 
of Article 2(4).
106
  
Evidence of this modification is the construction now given to ‗threat to international peace 
and security‘.107 The meaning of ‗threat to international peace and security‘ as understood 
under the Charter in 1945 has since evolved from its traditional sense of inter-state and trans-
boundary aggressive use of force to now include internal strife, massive violations of human 
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rights and humanitarian catastrophes.
108
 In their assessment of intervention by ECOWAS for 
example, some writers observe the emergence through state practice, of a norm permitting 
unilateral intervention in extreme cases, thus constituting a modification of the Charter.
109
 In 
the same vein, it is on the basis of such implied modification that NATO‘s intervention in 
Kosovo was justified and interpreted by some writers as relaxing the strictures on the use of 
force and laying the foundation for the establishment of a new norm that permits unilateral 
intervention by regional organisations to halt mass atrocities.
110
 It is also on the basis of such 
modification that after assessing the UN response to several unauthorised interventions by 
states and regional organisations, that Reisman concludes that there are other criteria used for 
ascertaining the lawfulness of unauthorised interventions under international law other than 
article 2(4).
111
 Some writers therefore suggest that the NATO and ECOWAS interventions 
support the view that practice has modified the Charter, particularly article 53(1) to confer 
more powers on regional organisations to undertake humanitarian interventions without prior 
UNSC authorisation.
112
  
As the roles of regional organisations expand, I think there is an increasing tendency 
for them to view their roles in the maintenance of peace and security in their regions as 
autonomous.
113
 For example, in its policy thrust on human rights protection, peace and 
security in Europe, NATO restated its commitment to building legitimacy for its actions in 
the future, but nevertheless to stand ready to act when the UNSC is prevented from acting to 
maintain international peace and security; because the right to individual and collective self- 
defense includes the right to defend common interests and values when they are threatened by 
                                                          
108
 Ibid. 
109
 Jane Stromseth ‗Rethinking humanitarian intervention: The case for incremental change‘ in J L Hlzegrefe & 
Robert Keohane Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas (2003) 232-272 at 247 
(hereafter Stromseth ‗Rethinking humanitarian intervention‘). 
110
 Harhoff ‗Unauthorised humanitarian interventions‘ op cit note 59 at 119; David Wippman ‗Kosovo and the 
limits of international law‘ (2001) 25:1 Fordham Internal Law Journal 127 at 135-136 (Wippman ‗Kosovo and 
the limits of international law‘). 
111
 W Michael Reisman ‗Coercion and self-determination: Construing article 2(4)‘ (1984) 78 AJIL 642 at 643, 
645. Such criteria would include that the intervention was for humanitarian purposes, collectively carried out by 
a regional organisation, that there was timeous withdrawal without annexation of territory, and that it was 
supported by the international community. 
112
 Deen Racsmany Zsuzsanna ‗A redistribution of authority between the UN and regional organisations in the 
field of maintenance of peace and security‘ (2000) 13 Leiden Journal of International Law 297 at 330; Thomas 
Franck Recourse to Force: State Actions against Threats and Armed Attacks (2003) 113 (hereafter Franck 
‗Recourse to Force‘) Cf Christine Gray International Law and the Use of Force 2ed (2004) 318 arguing that 
there is no basis for reaching this conclusion. 
113
 Anthony Clark Arend ‗The United Nations, regional organisations, and military operations: The past and the 
present‘ (1994/5) 7 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 4 at 5. 
 
 
251 
humanitarian catastrophes such as war crimes and crimes against humanity.
114
 The evolving 
norm is not yet clear, but it suggests expanded latitude for regional organisations to use force. 
When we take this attitude of regional organisations elsewhere, the AU/ECOWAS RHMI 
regimes discussed in this thesis, and the recommendation by the ICISS that regional 
organisations could undertake unilateral intervention to implement R2P (if the UNSC is 
deadlocked), there seems to be a gradual shift towards a modification of Chapter VIII of the 
Charter.
115
  
To take the argument further, the concept of ‗peacekeeping‘ is not provided for in the 
Charter but the UNSC practice has modified the Charter to accommodate this principle.
116
 
Besides the consent of the target state, this modification is the reason the UNSC is able to 
authorise the use of force within the territory of a state in circumstances that would have 
amounted to a violation of article 2(7) back in 1945. Another evidence of modification of the 
UN Charter is the construction now given to article 27(3) of the Charter which provisions 
ordinarily requires that non-procedural matters of the UNSC must be adopted by nine 
affirmative votes including the ‗concurring‘ votes of the P5.117 However, through subsequent 
practice of the UNSC, it is now accepted that the affirmative vote of all P5 members is not 
necessary and that abstention is sufficient, provided there is no negative vote.
118
  
Some scholars view these changes as mere reinterpretations rather than modification 
of the Charter.
119
 While it is conceded that how the provisions of the Charter are interpreted, 
applied, change with changing circumstances and needs of the international community, it is 
also true that some of these changes are so far-reaching in their impact that they effectively 
pass off as ‗informal‘ amendments or modifications of the Charter. These nuances explain 
why the ‗most far-reaching departure‘ from the plain meaning of the provisions in the 
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constitutive documents of intergovernmental organisations is usually explained as 
interpretation rather than modification by subsequent practice.
120
 As Blum concludes, 
international legislators, while in fact engaged in the legislative activity of informal treaty 
modification, pretend to be engaged in treaty interpretation. They will thus endeavour to 
present their decisions, however innovative, as being in conformity with already existing law. 
Under the guise of interpretation treaty modification is taking place.
121
 
By their very nature, the constitutive documents of global governance institutions change 
with the dynamic conditions of international life developing through the practice of parties, 
and in this respect, members of the UN and its agencies and organs can be instruments of 
modification and change.
122
 The crucial element in the modification of the Charter through 
subsequent practice is whether there was consent by relevant UN organs and members to 
such practice by UN organs, states, and regional organisations.
123
 As a global body charged 
with the maintenance of international peace and security and prevention of genocides and 
mass atrocities, the capacity of the UN to discharge its functions and its continuing relevance 
depends on its ability to meet the demands of a changing international community.
124
 This, in 
turn, requires amendment to the Charter which has been difficult to achieve, despite the 
importance of such amendment to the continued effectiveness of the UN. In fact, the reason 
these ‗modifications‘ of the Charter had taken these ‗informal‘ means is because there was no 
way of addressing many subsequent developments after 1945 without amending the Charter. 
If the formal procedure for the amendment of the constitutive document of an international 
organisation is not adequately effective, ‗the incidence of informal modification will be 
high.‘125 What the absence of formal amendment to the Charter indicates is the difficulty of 
reform within the UN, but there have been modifications to the Charter in several aspects 
were this not so, the UN would have become an ‗obsolete and totally ineffective 
institutions—utterly in the backwater of world events‘.126 Obviously, these modifications have 
added value to the development and legitimacy of the Charter law and the UN.
127
 
In line with the foregoing analyses of modification through practice, there is an 
emerging norm that notwithstanding articles 2(4), 24, 53(1) and 103 of the Charter, in the 
interest of preventing or halting genocides and other mass atrocities, it is lawful that where 
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the UNSC is paralysed a regional organisation could launch humanitarian intervention 
without UNSC authorisation.
128
 If it is accepted that the Charter has indeed been modified by 
subsequent practice with reference to articles 2(4), 53(1) and 103, arguably treaties like the 
AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes that reflect the new development and practice must be legally 
valid because they merely embody existing principles. 
7.6 The AU/ECOWAS RHMI Regimes as a Modification of the Charter amongst 
AU/ECOWAS Members Inter se 
 
Generally, the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes only apply to members of the organisations and 
their relations with each other.  The AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes have only modified 
articles 2(4), 24, 53(1) amongst AU/ECOWAS members inter-se in so far as they are also 
members of the UN. Although article 103 appears to suggest that states cannot contract out of 
the Charter framework, it has been argued, and rightly so in my opinion, that in relation to 
inconsistent treaty provisions (such as those provisions of the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes 
discussed in chapter 4), states can actually modify the provisions of the Charter between them 
via a treaty.
129
 As a commentator observed,  
[a]ny fundamental deviation from the Charter by means of a treaty concluded between the 
Member States would amount to an amendment of the Charter inter se. The Charter does not 
explicitly prohibit such amendments; they are arguably permissible if in accordance with the 
general law of treaties.
130
 
According to Roberto Ago, when two or more states enter into a treaty that permits an act that 
would otherwise be wrongful under the Charter in apparent modification of the Charter in 
terms of their relationship, the agreement takes effect and the Charter obligation is only 
suspended as between the parties involved in that treaty.
131
 The act continues to remain an 
internationally wrongful act in relation to other states not party to the subsequent treaty or 
agreement.
132
 Such inter se amendment of the Charter provisions among only some of its 
members is permissible provided that it meets two conditions: that it does not alter the rights 
and duties of other states; and secondly, that the amendment is not inconsistent with or 
impedes the fufilment of the purpose and object of the Charter.
133
 It is not difficult to 
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establish the legal validity of the AU/ECOEWAS RHMI regimes on this basis. First, the 
treaties only bind the respective AU and ECOWAS member states that have ratified the 
instruments. Secondly, the treaties do not impede but actually promote the execution of the 
fundamental principles and purposes of the UN—maintenance of international peace and 
security, ‗save succeeding generations‘ by preventing or halting genocides and other mass 
atrocities.
134
   
Similarly, the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes affect their obligations under the Charter 
in view of article 103 of the Charter, it should be stated that article 103 only relates to 
‗conflict between the obligations of … Members‘ under the Charter and other treaties.135 In 
that sense, it is only the inconsistent obligations of AU/ECOWAS states arising from the 
RHMI regimes that should be in question and not the validity of the entire treaty. Secondly, 
article 103 provides that the Charter obligations would ‗prevail‘. This means that the Charter 
obligation merely takes precedence over other competing treaty obligations to be performed 
by the state in particular circumstances. When article 103 operates therefore, it does not 
terminate an inconsistent treaty permanently but merely takes precedence over the conflicting 
treaty obligation.
136
 In other words, it temporarily operates to allow the concerned state to 
perform its Charter obligations rather than the conflicting treaty obligations. Finally, as will 
be shown below, these treaties evolved from regional customary law and, as Levitt argues, 
article 103 does not apply to customary international law, so article 103 cannot prevail over 
the AU/ECOWAS RHMI treaty provisions that derive from customary law.
137
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7.6 AU/ECOWAS RHMI REGIMES UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Custom is recognised in article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute as one of the sources of 
international law. As a source of international law, custom has many drawbacks, particularly 
how its rules emerge—its process is elusive and uncertain and its normative outcomes often 
difficult to pinpoint.
138
 Nonetheless, since states are unlikely to be able to reach a consensus 
on updating the UN Charter,
139
 many scholars look forward to customary law as the only 
possible source of developing a clear right of humanitarian intervention deducible from an 
assessment of state practice to determine whether state practice indicates trends and needs for 
change in the law as it is.
140
  
Usually, an indication of whether a state intends its practice to generate a new rule is 
how such state rationalises its conduct.
141
 If a state or international organisation 
acknowledges the existing rule while insisting that its breach be excused, it apparently does 
not want the existing rule changed.
142
 However, if it justifies its action as a clarification of the 
application of an existing rule then this has the potential of generating a new rule depending 
on time and whether other states condemn or subsequently follow the practice.
143
 According 
to Farer, 
… every action by a consequential state for which it claims legitimacy will produce 
prescriptive implications beyond its peculiar facts, it will generate a modification of the 
principal norm if other consequential states follow suit (or even declare a readiness to) when 
the appropriate occasion arises. On the other hand, should most states reject the 
rationalization and condemn the act, they would drain out most of its legislative potential. Not 
quite all, however. If the behavior is repeated with some frequency and other states do 
gradually begin to replicate it, the initial act will begin to appear as a precedent rather than 
remain forever stigmatized as a delinquency.
144
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As already noted, rules of customary law relating to the use of force exist independently of 
the Charter.
145
 Therefore, besides article 51 and Chapter VII, a third exception to the 
prohibition of use of force includes development in customary international law.
146
 Under 
general customary international law, a state has a right to authorise future coercive use of 
force on its territory.
147
 Thus, in the Cypriot example, customary law allows the state to 
consent to a treaty of future intervention for the protection of the existence of the Cypriot 
Turkish minority without the specific consent of the incumbent Cypriot government but not 
for the prescription of its government or political affairs.
148
  
7.6.1 Practice Evidence of Validity of AU/ECOWAS RHMI Regimes under Customary 
International Law 
 
Apart from states, treaties and practice of international organisations are evidence of 
customary international law.
149
 Treaties and arrangements by regional organisations could 
also lead to new universal customary law norms on human rights.
150
 During the UNSC debate 
following the ECOWAS intervention, the Nigerian Representative stated ‗[t]he ―collective 
self-help‖ undertaken by ECOWAS is ―an important building-block in the new world order 
of shared responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security which we 
seek to establish.‘151 Since then, there have been other developments suggesting an evolving 
practice of shared responsibility and authority with the UNSC in the use of force and the 
maintenance of international peace and security. The President of the UNSC stated:  
Liberia continues to represent an example of systematic and effective cooperation between 
the United Nations and regional organisations, as envisaged in Chapter VIII. The role of the 
United Nations has been a supportive one. Closer contact and consultation have been 
maintained with ECOWAS which will continue to play the central role in the implementation 
of the [Cotonou] peace agreement.
152
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Some commentators have been willing to conclude from the Liberian and Sierra Leonean 
experience that the UNSC at least viewed these interventions as practice in the region that 
allows a regional organisation to fill the gap where the UNSC is deadlocked.
153
 The 
AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes represent a development of this theory and a codification of 
the resulting norms. Although the overall normative impact of these developments on general 
customary international law of humanitarian intervention is still unclear and less studied, it is 
arguable that the practice has created a norm of regional humanitarian intervention with a 
potential to influence the future development of general customary international law.
154
 
NATO‘s intervention in Kosovo is well documented and needs no rehashing here but its 
precedential value is disputed.
155
 Some commentators regard the intervention as ‗part of the 
establishment of a new and emerging principle of international law‘ creating a right of 
unauthorised intervention by regional organisations.
156
 For example, on the basis of such 
ECOWAS and NATO interventions, Garrett argues that as a matter of general customary law, 
regional organisations like the Organisation of American States (OAS) and the Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU) (AU) can now lawfully undertake unilateral intervention.
157
 Others 
reject this view arguing that non-condemnation of NATO‘s intervention in Kosovo at best 
could be taken to constitute ex post facto authorisation rather than the inception of a new rule 
of customary law.
158
 Cassese asserts that the statements of states after Kosovo suggest that 
the intervention was not intended to be a precedent or to generate a new rule of customary 
international law.
159
 The fact that the ECOWAS/NATO-style interventions have not been 
repeated ever since also corroborate this conclusion.  
Yet, developments in state and regional organisations‘ practice since the 1990s 
suggest the contrary. For example, in the elaboration of the EU‘s peace and security 
framework, there is no express declaration that the EU would only act with UNSC 
authorisation. In fact, there is suggestion that the EU reserves its decision making autonomy 
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in this respect.
160
 It is too early to say whether the EU/NATO will act along this line in the 
future, which would further support the conclusion about the existence of such norm in 
general customary law. A caveat should however be sounded in drawing on NATO‘s 
practice, because, unlike the AU/ECOWAS, NATO is not a Chapter VIII but article 51 
Organisation, with the implication that its use of force under the Charter rules should be for 
individual or collective self-defense, which does not ordinarily require UNSC 
authorisation.
161
 Secondly, NATO‘s attempt to create a new norm was taken outside its 
‗region‘ while AU/ECOWAS applies to Africa only.162 Thirdly, unlike NATO intervention 
which was a spontaneous response to a crisis and so far has not been repeated, the 
AU/ECOWAS rules evolved out of practice over a period of two decades before being 
codified. Thus, Levitt cites the examples of the Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the 
Bangui Agreement (MISAB) in Central African Republic, and ECOWAS interventions in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone, as evidence of this practice and a basis for concluding that regional 
organisations claiming a right of intervention in a member state is an exception to the rule of 
non-intervention under general customary international law.
163
  
7.6.2 AU/ECOWAS RHMI Regime as Regional Customary Law 
  
Customary international law consist of customary general international law and special or 
regional customary law.
164
 Whereas the former applies to all states, the latter only applies to 
states in a particular geographical region.
165
 This is of significance to the AU/ECOWAS 
RHMI regime.
166
 It means that a practice among a few states in a region like West Africa or 
Africa can constitute customary law for those states and regions only. Although often 
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neglected when compared to general customary international law, there still exists regional or 
special customary law that only binds a small number or group of states of a particular 
geographical region or subset of the world.
167
 Such rule need not be accepted by all 
countries.
168
 In the Right of Passage Case, the ICJ stated,  
 [i]t is objected on behalf of India that no local custom could be established between only two 
States. It is difficult to see why the number of States between which a local custom may be 
established on the basis of long practice must necessarily be larger than two. The Court sees 
no reason why long continued practice between two States accepted by them as regulating 
their relations should not form the basis of mutual rights and obligations between the two 
States.
169
 
The custom may develop from a rule of general customary law or conventional law but it 
must be proved and consent established.
170
 In other words, the states in the geographical 
region involved in the customary practice must give it express or implied recognition.
171
 
According to D‘Amato, ‗special custom evolves where particular states have developed rules 
that relate to them only showing their mutual agreement. Hence, special custom may reaffirm 
or deviate from the existing rule.‘172 The legality of regional customary law was affirmed by 
the ICJ in the Nationalities Case when it stated that the legal basis of regional customary law 
is traceable to article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute which lists as one of the sources of 
international law, custom as ‗evidence of general practice accepted as law.‘173 Although the 
defunct OAU had very few cases of actual intervention, when the totality of its practice is 
considered, it arguably suggests a gradual evolution of a regional customary law of 
humanitarian intervention.
174
 For its part, there can be little doubt about the existence of a 
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regional ECOWAS law of humanitarian intervention developed by ECOWAS practice and 
institutional law.
175
  
It is often the practice that when states find a rule of law unsatisfactory, they resort to 
treaty amongst them to change it.176 Not only do such treaties create instant obligations for 
parties, they could also bring about changes and modification of general customary law.177 
The same can be said of the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes.
178
 I will therefore submit that the 
AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes qualify as regional customary law, and if this is accepted, 
arguably they are legally valid under international law as well.  
Besides the ECOWAS practice already discussed here, elsewhere in the continent, 
there has been practice of humanitarian intervention by Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), which intervened in Lesotho in 1998.
179
 SADC‘s intervention in 
Lesotho was similar to the ECOWAS intervention except in two important ways. First, the 
intervention was widely criticised for exacerbating the conflict and for being a push to protect 
a particular party in power as well as maintain South Africa‘s economic interests in 
Lesotho.
180
 Secondly, the scale of violence and human destruction in Lesotho obviously was 
in no way comparable to that in the Liberian crisis.  
In the context of the present analysis it is significant to point out that SADC‘s 
intervention was not authorised by the UNSC nor was such authorisation necessary since the 
intervention was at the request of the legitimate government. However, there is still doubt 
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whether the intervention was a SADC-mandated intervention or a South African operation 
because as an author has pointed out, at the time of the intervention, the relevant organ of 
SADC which is responsible for intervention had already been suspended.
181
 The legal basis of 
the intervention has therefore remained a source of controversy. This is not surprising 
because similar questions about the legal basis of ECOWAS interventions and subsequently 
led to the development of the ECOWAS legal framework for humanitarian intervention 
where it claims a right of intervention without UNSC authorisation.
182
 However, in the case 
of SADC, whereas the Lesotho experience also led to the establishment of the SADC 
Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation, unlike ECOWAS and the AU, 
SADC‘s law states that SADC can only undertake interventions with UNSC authorisation.183 
In this respect, SADC follows the OAS and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, rather than ECOWAS and the AU practice.
184
  
The point being made here is that at different levels and to varying degrees, there have 
been practices of humanitarian intervention by regional organisations in Africa without 
UNSC authorisation giving rise to a regional customary law right of unilateral humanitarian 
intervention in Africa.
185
 Just as the AU has stated in the Ezulwini Consensus that article 4(h) 
represents a qualification of the Charter paradigm on the use of force, we could also witness 
similar developments in other regions—rules of regional customary law that could influence 
international law and become additional exceptions to article 51 and Chapter VII. As some 
scholars have argued, such practices would allow consensus to develop on the propriety of a 
legal framework for unilateral humanitarian intervention.
186
 The development of such 
regional customary law prior to codification would also allow the broader international 
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community to react to the various interventionist practices and come up with assessments of 
whether they meet the humanitarian intervention thresholds.
187
 Although the ECOWAS 
practice was initially a reaction to exigencies, its framework and subsequent codification was 
influenced by the reaction of the international community to those interventions and 
subsequent developments in general international law, all of which preceded the codification 
in the AU Constitutive Act. 
Furthermore, the AU is made up of 53 members and all have ratified the AU Act and 
the AUPSC Protocol. ECOWAS has 15 members and they all ratified the Revised Treaty and 
the ECOWAS Protocol. Besides, these states support and contribute troops to AU and 
ECOWAS missions in the implementation of the treaties and such conduct can be viewed as 
opinio juris for the existence of regional custom of humanitarian intervention in the region.
188
 
This further shows that such regional customary law existed and also suggests that the 
AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes originally derive their legality from regional customary law 
before they were codified and so would be valid under international law.
189
  If it is accepted 
that they existed as regional customary law and were valid, then the mere fact that they have 
now been codified in treaties should not render them inconsistent with the Charter or invalid. 
7.7 OBJECTIONS TO THE AU/ECOWAS RHMI REGIMES AS CODIFICATION OF 
REGIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW   
 
Long before the AU/ECOWAS RHMI treaties, there have been calls for the codification of 
criteria for humanitarian intervention by which any intervention could be appraised.
190
 The 
argument is based on first, the ever increasing need for humanitarian intervention, the 
inability of the UNSC to meet all the demands; the increasing rates of unilateral interventions 
and the controversy surrounding the universality of certain norms.
191
 Apart from being unable 
fully to restrain states from unilateral use of force, the current system does not effectively 
protect human rights and so undermines the legitimacy of international law by perpetuating 
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the lacuna between the lex lege lata and the lex lege ferenda.
192
 Accordingly, Stanley 
Hoffman had predicts a New World Order, arguing that in many respects, the ‗new‘ world 
order is essentially a continuation of the ‗old‘ except certain steps are taken, particularly in 
the area of humanitarian intervention.
193
  
Although the nature of threats changed from predominantly inter-state to intrastate 
conflicts and mass atrocities in Africa arising from human rights violations, the ‗defence of 
human rights‘ continue to be secondary to political considerations and national interests.194 
As a remedy, Hoffman argues that in such world order, an effective regional organisation 
capable of launching peacekeeping operations or enforcement mission is indispensable.
195
 
Given that internal conflicts would be a major source of threat to international peace and 
security, collective intervention by regional organisations (like AU and ECOWAS) would be 
a useful way to proceed when massive violations of human rights threaten regional peace and 
stability.
196
 Predicting how such potential violence that eventually engulfed many African 
states in the 1990s would eventually evolve and be tackled, Hoffman recommends that 
[f]our kinds of measures could limit such domestic violence. The boldest would be a treaty, 
open to (but unlikely to be signed by) all states, that would define rigorously the 
circumstances in which collective intervention for humanitarian purposes could be undertaken 
for purposes, for a limited period, by a group of states whose action would be authorised by a 
strong majority of the treaty‘s signers.197 
Such group of states should report its operations to the UNSC for scrutiny.
198
 However, 
critics doubt the utility of setting out the legal criteria for unilateral humanitarian intervention 
in advance through codification.
199
 They argue that such criteria would either be too narrow, 
permitting only crimes like genocide, or too broad and so susceptible to abuse.
200
 By its 
nature, humanitarian intervention in reality will require case-by-case analysis and balancing 
of competing values between non-use of force and protection of human rights, hence 
codification will lift the heavy ‗burden of justification‘ currently imposed on every 
intervener.
201
 Stromseth therefore suggests a gradual development of normative consensus on 
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a right of humanitarian intervention within the UN framework.
202
 According to her ‗[a]n 
international consensus on when humanitarian intervention should be deemed both legitimate 
and lawful is more likely to emerge over time from the international community‘s assessment 
of concrete interventions … than from an exercise in codification.‘203 Although Stromseth 
admits that codification of unilateral humanitarian intervention could minimise abuse by 
stipulating universally accepted criteria, the challenge would be how to reconcile such a 
treaty with state sovereignty because most states would not even agree to it.
204
 
While this argument reflects the current thinking, in my view it has one major 
weakness. It locates its search for a legal framework within the UN paradigm as the only 
feasible platform for codification. It overlooks the possibility of a development of regional 
custom and codification through a process of ‗evolution rather than revolution‘.205 As already 
noted above, the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes are examples of codification of regional 
customary law. The objection that the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes codifying humanitarian 
intervention cannot stand in view of its apparent incompatibility with the Charter-based law 
and sovereignty is predicated on the assumption that continental or regional international law, 
whether conventional or customary, must be subordinated to universal international law. 
However, this is not necessarily so because both are correlates.
206
 If a norm supposedly 
universal ceases to be applicable or acceptable in a continent, it means that norm is no longer 
universal and when a rule applied in a continent or region is not embraced by the rest of the 
world, it only means that rule is peculiar to that region or continent.
207
 It does not necessarily 
follow that the continental or regional law is illegal. It is in this context that one must 
understand the regional dimension to the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes. More so, because of 
the constant interaction between treaty and custom, regional and international law, provisions 
in treaties whether bilateral or multilateral, could generate rules of general international 
customary law.
208
 So it is possible that the codification could begin with a handful of states 
and gradually evolve and spread to other states.
209
 In the same way, the AU/ECOWAS 
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codification of the law of humanitarian intervention is an important contribution to the 
development of international law.  
7.8 AU/ECOWAS RHMI REGIMES AND USE OF FORCE AS JUS COGENS   
 
Those who object to the legal validity of the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes also rely on the 
jus cogens argument. In the main, their argument can be summed up thus: peremptory norms 
are non-derogable and any treaty inconsistent with a peremptory norm is invalid. The 
principle of non-use of force in article 2(4) is a peremptory norm; the AU/ECOWAS RHMI 
regimes authorise the use of force in violation of article 2(4) and are therefore invalid.
210
 
Where a Charter provision reflects a norm of jus cogens like article 2(4), any conflicting 
treaty (like the AU/ECOWAS RHMI) is invalid because such treaty violates articles 2(4), 53 
and 103 of the Charter and article 64 of the of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT).
211
 The core of this argument is that a treaty stipulating a right of intervention against 
the will of a future government cannot be a valid treaty because it is prohibited by a norm of 
jus cogens.  
At this stage it is pertinent briefly to examine the nature of jus cogens and how it 
emerges. The aim is threefold: first, is to show what is peremptory about article 2(4). 
Secondly, it is to demonstrate that the claim of non-derogability usually attributed to article 
2(4) as jus cogens is anything but absolute. Thirdly, I intend to show that to replace one norm 
of jus cogens with another norm of the same character in practice requires derogating from 
the existing jus cogens norm. If this is accepted, then the objection that the AU/ECOWAS 
RHMI regimes are invalid for infringing a norm of jus cogens is unsustainable.
212
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In order to be valid, a treaty, or its performance must not conflict with a norm of jus 
cogens.
213
 Also, states cannot derogate by consent from a jus cogens norm and a consensual 
arrangement for the aggressive use of force would therefore be illegal.
214
  However, there are 
problems with this iron-cast view of the nature, import and status of jus cogens whose content 
and scope is anything but clear and remains a source of controversy, especially in relation to 
the use of force. Since jus cogens is non-derogable, at least there ought to be clarity as to 
which norm qualifies as jus cogens and how it emerges. However, this is not so and there is 
debate about whether or not certain norms qualify to be in this category.
215
 According to 
Weisburd  
[a]s law, jus cogens fails. Its content is inevitably uncertain, reflecting intellectual confusion 
as to the core of the doctrine. Correspondingly, its claim to legitimacy in international law is 
murky. It is applied as a characterisation to rules which, if treated as though they really were 
non-derogable, would do more harm than good in many contexts. And the means most often 
suggested for determining its content lack both the authority and the capability to carry out 
the task.
216
 
This indeterminacy and ambiguity are some of the reasons critics continue to challenge the 
idea of a normative hierarchy and the status of jus cogens.
217
 However, it is conceded that to 
the extent that there is a category of legal norms called ‗jus cogens‘, the non-use of force 
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qualifies as one and this was confirmed in the Nicaragua Case.
218
 My response to the jus 
cogens objection is as follows: 
First, not every obligation created under article 2(4) is peremptory but the obligation 
to refrain from the aggressive use of force by states.
219
 Thus, as Orakhelashvili argues, and I 
agree, ‗[a] State may consent to the deployment or use of foreign armed forces on its 
territory. That would not necessarily involve a breach of jus cogens … .‘220 Such state 
consent as already argued in this thesis can be given a priori via a treaty. If this is accepted, 
arguably the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes do not violate the jus cogens norm in article 2(4) 
because as stated above the object of the treaties is not aggressive use of force but aimed at 
halting genocide and other mass atrocities.
221
  
A corollary of the above is the question of the contents of jus cogens and how those 
contents are determined. As Charney points out when we say that derogation from public 
order is not permitted on grounds of international public morality (jus cogens), this non-
derogation is determined by state consent and the interests of powerful states.
222
 Decisions in 
particular instances driven by effective interest and power begin to express the moral 
standards of the international community, and it is the directions of those decisions that then 
determine or consist of the content of the resulting peremptory norm.
223
 Charney points out 
that  
[t]he ideas for a new international public order, then, amount to political struggle among 
powerful States, coalitions of States, international institutions, and the elites that decide their 
actions. This struggle will pour content into the emptiness of jus cogens. Preserving the 
possibility of a functionally different order, the dissonance between the emerging supernorm 
not yet present backed by new power and the entrenched statist system might force revision of 
ordinary norms to accommodate the new order.
224
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History has several examples of how powerful states/coalition of states drove the emergence 
of certain jus cogens norms in international law and in this thesis, I have already cited the 
example of Great Britain in the creation of a jus cogens norm prohibiting slavery. Unlike the 
municipal system from where its lessons are largely drawn, it is argued, and rightly so in my 
opinion, that jus cogens in international law lack content.
225
 The ILC itself, in a subtle 
admission of this fact, refrained from characterising jus cogens and opted to leave its 
determination to states over time.
226
 The point being made here is that the somewhat 
nebulous character of jus cogens in content is sufficient grounds for arguing that it does not 
exclude the norm-making potential of a treaty of intervention like the AU/ECOWAS regimes. 
The third point to be made in this respect is about how an existing norm of jus cogens 
is modified or replaced by a new one. Since jus cogens is non-derogable, and cannot be 
changed except by a norm of ‗similar character‘ how then does the new norm of ‗similar 
character‘ emerge without violating the existing jus cogens? Taking use of force as an 
example, if use of force is jus cogens and non-derogable, how will the norm of use of force to 
halt mass atrocities emerge without first violating the existing jus cogens of non-use of force? 
The process presents a dilemma, but, according to Elias, ‗[a]ny notion of ordre public 
assumed to exist within the international community is to be deemed subject to changes from 
time to time according to the prevailing ideas of international morality and social justice.‘227 
This change ought to occur through a gradual process of ‗international practice and growing 
consensus.‘228 The other possibility relies on the practice of states often resorting to treaties 
amongst themselves to change a rule of law they find unsatisfactory.229 It appears this also 
applies to jus cogens. In its comments in its1966 Report, the ILC seems to suggest that states 
can change a norm of jus cogens through a multilateral treaty.
230
 
Whether pursued through a gradual process of customary law practice or multilateral 
treaty, what is clear from the foregoing analysis is that when we say a jus cogens norm cannot 
be changed except by a norm of similar character, it follows that the only way another jus 
cogens norm is going to emerge is by breaking the existing law. If the AU/ECOWAS regimes 
are charged with violating jus cogens, it is reasonable to argue that the only way a new jus 
cogens can emerge is by a new customary practice and if by customary practice we mean that 
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a state ‗must act in the same way that others have acted in the past, how can a new custom 
ever get started when by definition there has been no prior practice? Similarly, how can an 
existing custom be changed when any change or deviation from prior practice would appear 
illegal?‘231 The reality is that the change of jus cogens norm inevitably will involve some 
form of illegality.
232
 So, whether the change occurs through multilateral treaty or customary 
law practice, the emerging norm seeking to replace the existing jus cogens must reflect the 
prevailing precepts of the international community. I can argue that the norm in the 
AU/ECOWAS RHMI treaties (the use of force to halt genocide and other mass atrocities 
within states) is a principle shared not only amongst AU/ECOWAS member states but many 
states outside Africa even though codification of the norm in a treaty of humanitarian 
intervention is not yet possible at the global level. This is underscored by the practice of 
NATO and EU mentioned above, the report of the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty, the OAS and the emerging R2P norm.  One can conclude therefore 
that while a norm of use of force to halt genocide and other mass atrocities within states as 
contained in the AU/ECOWAS RHMI treaties may not have attained the status of jus cogens 
as of yet, it is already widely shared and has the potential to become a jus cogens norm. 
7.9 AU/ECOWAS RHMI REGIMES AND THE PRINCIPLE OF REBUS SIC 
STANTIBUS  
 
States accede to treaties for various reasons including assumptions, expectations of some 
future occurrence which are provided for in the treaty.
233
 However, if such expectation did 
not materialise subsequently, the basis on which the parties consented to the treaty is affected 
and could lead to the application of conventio omnis intelligitur rebus sic stantibus.
234
 The 
doctrine which literally translates to ‗every treaty is understood by the things then standing‘ is 
contained in article 62 of the VCLT.
235
 It is a rule of international law relating to treaty-
making that could take effect whenever the conditions for its operation are met.
236
 This 
condition is primarily a ‗fundamental‘, ‗substantial‘, ‗essential‘ or ‗radical‘ change in the 
circumstances of parties.
237
 In addition, two considerations are important in deciding the 
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lawful invocation of this principle: it should give effect to what the reasonable expectations 
of the parties would have been had they foreseen the change in circumstances; and secondly, 
to promote the fundamental purposes and objectives of the treaty.
238
 The rationale is to 
determine whether the construction or application of a treaty to a case is in tandem with the 
‗shared intentions, expectations and objectives of the parties.‘239 Thus, parties to a treaty may 
be discharged from their obligations when there has been a fundamental change in 
circumstances.
240
  The rationale is that ‗a treaty should not be applied in circumstances which 
are so different from those for which the parties sought to provide that its application would 
be contrary to the parties‘ shared expectations and would defeat their apparent objectives.‘241 
The consequence of the invocation of rebus sic stantibus is not automatic termination of 
treaty obligations but could be a range of other possibilities including limited performance or 
revision of the treaty.
242
  
As already noted, when states agreed to surrender their right to use of force in the 
proposed type 4 constitutive process under the Charter in 1945, the reasonable expectation of 
the parties was that the UNSC would be effective.
243
 This expectation was based on some 
assumptions. First, the creation of a military agreement between the UN and member states 
and the establishment of a standing army under article 43 as part of an international collective 
security mechanism was an obligation left to be performed. Till date, this condition has not 
been fulfilled by the UN. Secondly, article 24(1) that vests primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security on the UNSC predicated it on the condition 
that the UNSC would take ‗effective and prompt action‘ in appropriate circumstances for the 
maintenance of international peace and security in line with the purposes of the Charter.
244
 
However, as argued in chapter 3, though the UN is involved in many humanitarian crises in 
Africa, the glaring failure to ‗take effective and prompt action‘ in the genocide and mass 
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atrocities in Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Darfur support the view that that the UNSC has 
not met this condition.   
The non-realisation of these two material conditions and the resulting ineffectiveness 
of the UNSC maintaining peace and security in Africa qualify as fundamental changes in 
circumstances warranting the invocation of the principle of rebus sic stantibus.
245
 The legal 
implication of this is not only that it revives the pre-Charter rights of states as argued by 
Abass, but also that it leads to a systemic transformation resulting in a different constitutive 
process.
246
 Consequently, regional organisations like the AU and ECOWAS can now share 
this ‗primary‘ responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in Africa. If this is 
accepted, then the treaties adopted by the AU/ECOWAS to give effect to these 
responsibilities, though apparently incompatible with the Charter, would be valid since the 
UNSC no longer enjoys exclusive or ‗primary‘ responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security in the current constitutive process.
247
 The effect on articles 
24(1), 53(1) and 103 of the Charter vis-à-vis the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes is that it 
resolves the question of normative incompatibility in favour of the AU/ECOWAS RHMI 
regimes and supports the argument that in view of the fundamental change in circumstances 
since 1945, the AU/ECOWAS members can rely on the principle of rebus sic stantibus when 
their AU/ECOWAS obligations clash with their Charter obligations.  
The AU/ECOWAS do not seek a wholesale termination or suspension of articles 2(4), 
24(1), 53(1), and 103 of the Charter, rather, a modification of these provisions in scope and 
application to the AU/ECOWAS in the light of the changed circumstances, shared intentions 
and expectations of parties when the Charter was adopted in 1945, so that it takes cognizance 
of these changes. More so AU/ECOWAS states performing their obligations (intervention to 
prevent genocides and mass atrocities) under the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes will also 
further the purposes and principles of the Charter.  
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7.10 CONCLUSION 
 
I have argued here that the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes are valid under conventional 
international law because they do not violate articles 53(1) or 103 of the Charter. The basis of 
this conclusion is that article 53(1) applies to enforcement action by regional organisations. 
To amount to enforcement action, the use of force must have taken place without the consent 
or invitation of the target state. A state can consent to intervention in its territory and such 
consent could be given a priori via a treaty. The AU/ECOWAS right of intervention without 
UNSC authorisation is valid because member states have given their consent in the 
AU/ECOWAS RHMI treaty regimes. This means that article 53(1) does not apply to the 
AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes and consequently, there is no conflict in members‘ obligations 
under the AU/ECOWAS treaties and their Charter obligations under article 103. Furthermore, 
the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes do not violate the peremptory norms in article 2(4) 
because what is peremptory in article 2(4) is the prohibition of aggressive use of force. The 
AU/ECOWAS regimes do not provide for ‗aggressive use of force‘ but a consensual use of 
force and use of force by invitation via a treaty.  
The AU/ECOWAS have evolved a legal framework for humanitarian intervention 
through regional customary law and have proceeded to clarify these norms by codification as 
African regional or continental law.  The AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes therefore constitute 
regional customary law and valid under customary general international law. It is hoped that 
this could generate ‗ripple effects‘ that will influence and improve general international law. 
Already, article 4(h) of the AU Act and arguably article 10 of ECOWAS MCPMRPS 
Protocol influenced the evolution of R2P and in the following and concluding chapter of this 
study I examine and suggest ways the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes could serve as a model 
legal and theoretical framework for R2P under a doctrine of regional responsibility to protect 
RR2P.
 
 
273 
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION: AU/ECOWAS UNILATERAL INTERVENTION 
REGIMES AND THE OPERATIONALISATION OF R2P IN AFRICA: TOWARDS A 
THEORY OF REGIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
 
Although the Council still has constitutional authority on its side, by dint of the Charter and 
by reason of the peremptory rules of international law, as with other constitutional systems it 
is dependent upon issues such as legitimacy, authority and loyalty, and if the UN Security 
Council cannot uphold the fundamental principles of the Charter and of international law, 
then authority may pass elsewhere leading to a degradation on the most basic rules in any 
legal order, namely those governing the use of force.
1
 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
My analysis thus far has focused on testing the legal validity of the AU/ECOWAS RHMI 
regimes and the raison d‘etre for the AU/ECOWAS treaties. Being a theoretical inquiry, I 
have focused on interrogating whether these treaty provisions can be said to be valid in 
international law. Through a deconstruction of specific intervention provisions, I analysed the 
normative incompatibility between these provisions and the UN Charter and proceeded to 
subject them to legal validity tests under international law. However, establishing the legal 
validity of the AU/ECOWAS regimes will be of little utility if it does not in turn result in 
greater protection of human rights, which is the essence of the UN, the AU/ECOWAS RHMI 
regimes, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention and the emerging norm of responsibility to 
protect (R2P). This is even more so given the normative convergence of the AU/ECOWAS 
regional humanitarian military intervention (RHMI) regimes and R2P. Building on my 
analysis of the legal validity of the AU/ECOWAS regimes, the current chapter proposes a 
theory of ‗regional responsibility to protect‘2 for the implementation of R2P using the 
AU/ECOWAS framework.
3
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My thesis is that for Africa, the primary responsibility to protect rests with the state, 
when the state fails, that responsibility should pass to the relevant subregional organisation 
where there is one. Where there is no subregional organisation or where the sub-regional 
organisation fails or is incapable of acting, the responsibility should pass to the relevant 
regional organisation within a theory of regional responsibility to protect. When the regional 
organisation fails or is incapable or unwilling to act, the responsibility should pass to the 
broader international community acting through the UN. This proposal is based on the 
conclusions drawn from my conclusions in the preceding chapters that the AU/ECOWAS 
RHMI regimes are valid humanitarian intervention legal framework under international law. 
This framework can therefore be utilised for the implementation of this theory and though 
focused on Africa, it could also be adapted by other regions with modifications.  
However, as a theory, regional responsibility to protect will still require two important 
changes in the current legal order under the UN Charter and R2P paradigms. First, there 
should be a redistribution of authority between the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
and regional organisations for purposes of authorising the use of force to implement the 
responsibility to protect under Chapter VIII of the Charter. Such redistribution of authority 
should give regional organisations the legal authority to use force in accordance with a set of 
pre-determined criteria embodied in a regional treaty regime. Secondly, within the R2P 
paradigm, there should be a recalibration of the order of responsibility and how that 
responsibility shifts from national authorities to subregional and regional organisations, and 
finally, the UN. Rather than having two levels of responsibility, there could be three or four, 
depending on the particular region and whether there is a subregional or regional 
organisation.
4
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It is pertinent to emphasise that this theory only applies to the responsibility to react 
by military force under Pillar Three and not the entire pillars of R2P. My concern here is 
limited to a theoretical proposal for the operationalisation of the ‗responsibility to react‘ with 
focus on military intervention. I focus on this component of R2P for three reasons: first, 
many of the questions surrounding the legal validity of the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes 
touch mainly on the use of force and who authorises it. Secondly, the question of use of force 
for the operationalisation of R2P remains the most divisive within the UN framework and I 
hope that establishing the theoretical basis of the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes will 
contribute to the debate on the development of a theoretical framework at the global level. 
Thirdly, although the search for an acceptable and effective legal framework for the 
implementation of the use of force for R2P has been elusive; it is one area of normative 
convergence between R2P and the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes. For Africa, I hope a theory 
of regional responsibility can provide a theoretical framework for implementing the 
responsibility to react component of R2P by locating this implementation within the 
AU/ECOWAS RHMI legal framework. 
Besides proposing an underlying theory, the present chapter does not claim to be a 
framework for the practical implementation of R2P. It therefore focuses on the following 
questions: Why do we need a theory of regional responsibility to protect? What are the 
principles required for a theory of regional responsibility to protect? In what way will it 
enhance the implementation of R2P as against what is currently available? Regionalisation 
has always formed part of the academic debate on maintenance of international peace and 
security even at the San Francisco Conference on the United Nations.
5
 The discourse on 
regionalisation had then taken place at a time when there had not been so many changes in 
the international legal order as we have seen since the 1990s. One such change is the scope 
and content of the principle of sovereignty and non-interference which were once conceived 
as absolute.
6
 Both concepts have since been reconceptualised and even more so under the 
emerging R2P norm. Thus, the concept of regionalisation under R2P would not necessarily 
be the same as it had been under the UN Charter. This underscores the need for a new theory 
in this respect—a theory of regional responsibility to protect. Before outlining the contours of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
See United Nations The Role of Regional and Sub-regional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to 
Protect Report of the Secretary General (27 June 2011) A/65/977-S/2011/393. 
5
 See Michael Akehurst ‗Enforcement action by regional agencies, with special reference to the Organisation of 
American States‘ (1967) 42 British Yearbook of International Law 175 at 175-7; S Neil MacFarlane & Thomas 
G Weiss ‗The United Nations, regional organisations and human security: Building theory in  Central America‘ 
(1994) 15:2 Third World Quarterly 277 at 280. 
6
 See chapter 2 for a discussion of these principles. 
 
 
276 
this theory, it is necessary to explain why a theory of regional responsibility to protect is 
necessary in the first place. 
8.2 JUSTIFICATIONS FOR A THEORY OF REGIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT 
 
As pointed out in chapter 2, though the use of military force to halt genocides and other mass 
atrocity crimes may sometimes be inevitable, it is only to be deployed as a last resort in the 
R2P continuum.
7
 It is only the international community that can exercise this power through 
the UNSC.
8
 Perhaps, in line with historical objections, some of which date back to the 
drafting history of the Charter, regional organisations were not given any major role in this 
arrangement.
9
 The usual arguments against regionalising R2P are threefold. First, it is argued 
that the UN is the only universal body that provides a forum for political dialogue and 
creating alternative authority outside the UNSC would create more problems than it would 
solve.
10
 It may be true that failures by the UN to respond to mass atrocities in the past shows 
it is a fundamentally flawed organisation, but to open the door to regionalisation would create 
more problems and it is better to pursue alternative authorisation structures within the UN.
11
 
Secondly, it is argued that not all regional organisations have the capability to intervene 
though R2P has a wide spectrum of components where regional organisations could play 
                                                          
7
 See generally, Gareth Evans The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All 
(2008) (hereafter Evans ‗Responsibility to Protect‘); Michael Byers War Law: International Law and Armed 
Conflict (2005) 111; Kofi Annan We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the Twenty-first Century 
(2000) 35 para  219; Paul D Williams ‗Military responses to mass killings: African Union Mission in Sudan‘ 
(2006) 13:2 International Peacekeeping 168 at 168; International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty The Responsibility to Protect (2001) (hereafter ‗ICISS Report‘); United Nations A More Secure 
World: Our Share Responsibility, Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004) 
U.N. Doc A/59/565 (hereafter HLP ‗A More Secure World‘) available at 
<http://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf> (accessed 20 June 2010); In Larger Freedom, Towards 
Development, Security and Human Rights for All, Report of the Secretary General (21 March 2005) UN Doc. 
A/59/2005 available at <http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/contents.htm> (accessed 20 June 2010) (hereafter ‗In 
Larger Freedom‘); Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect ‗State by State position on the Responsibility 
to Protect at the 2005 World Summit‘ Available at: 
<http://www.reponsibilitytoprotect.org/files/Chart_R2P_11August.pdf> (accessed 25 June 2010) (hereafter 
‗State by State position on R2P‘).  
8
 See 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (GA Res 60/1) 24 October 2005 para 139 (hereafter ‗WSOD‘) 
available at <http://www.unrol.org/files/2005%20World%20Summit20Outcome.pdf> (accessed on 20 March 
2010) para 139. 
9
 See Jan Wouters, Philip Vincent & Marie De Mans ‗The Responsibility to protect and regional organisations: 
Where does the EU stand?‘ (June 2011) Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies Policy Brief No 18 at 3, 
9 available at <http://www.ghum.kuleuven.be/be/ggs/publications/policy_briefs/pd18.pdf> (Last accessed 
2/10/2012) (hereafter Wouters et al ‗The Responsibility to protect and regional organisations‘); Anthony Clark 
Arend ‗The United Nations, regional organisations, and military operations: The past and the present‘ (1994/5) 7 
Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 4 at 5. 
10
 Haugevik ‗Regionalising the responsibility to protect‘ op cit note 2 at 351. 
11
 Ibid at 351. 
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important roles.
12
 Third, either due to self-interest or ineffective decision-making procedures, 
regional organisations often lack the willingness even where they have the capability to act.
13
 
Fourthly, the problem of hegemonic aspirations and lack of capacity is often raised as 
obstacles to the utilisation of regional organisations in this regard.
14
 Finally, there is also 
concern about states‘ membership of multiple regional organisations and how to decide 
which will have the authority to intervene.
15
 Regional organisations have several other 
weaknesses including lack of funding, narrow mandates, poor training doctrine development 
and intelligence gathering capacity and so on.
16
 Although these are all valid arguments, they 
were advanced primarily in the context of regional maintenance of peace and security and 
humanitarian intervention doctrine and these are not necessarily coterminous with the 
responsibility to protect under which I propose a theory of regional responsibility to protect. I 
have already explained that one significant difference is the way the concept of sovereignty is 
now understood in relation to intervention and this should be borne in mind.  
There are several reasons for arguing for a more central role for regional organisations 
in the operationalisation of the responsibility to react under a theory of regional responsibility 
to protect. First, besides the territorial state, which bears the primary responsibility to protect, 
and the international community, which has a residual responsibility, it is not clear which 
agency in the R2P scheme is to do what and when.
17
 It is not also clear what should happen if 
such designated agency fails to act.
18
 Secondly, under R2P, when the state fails to discharge 
its responsibility to protect, the responsibility passes to the international community acting 
through the UNSC.
19
 Yet, we are not told who constitutes this ‗international community‘ for 
purposes of taking the decision to intervene to prevent or halt genocides and other mass 
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 Jane Boulden ‗United Nations Security Council Policy on Africa‘ in Jane Boulden (ed) Dealing with Conflict 
in Africa: The United Nations and Regional Organisations (2003) 11-33 at 22-23 (hereafter Boulden ‗United 
Nations Security Council Policy on Africa‘). 
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 See S Neil MacFarlane & Thomas G Weiss ‗The United Nations, regional organisations and human security: 
Building theory in Central America‘ (1994) 15:2 Third World Quarterly 277 at 284. 
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 Haugevik ‗Regionalising the responsibility to protect‘ op cit note 2 at 362. 
15
 Alex J Bellamy & Paul D Williams ‗The new politics of protection: Cote d‘Ivoire, Libya and the 
responsibility to protect‘ (2011) 87:4 International Affairs 825 at 846. 
16
 See Kwesi Aning & Samuel Atuobi ‗Application of and responses to the responsibility to protect norm at the 
regional and subregional levels in Africa: Lessons for implementation‘ in The Role of Regional and Subregional 
Arrangements in Strengthening the Responsibility to Protect (May 2011) 12-19 available at 
http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/report/RoleRegSbregArgmentsR2P.pdf  (access on 21 July 
2012). 
17
 Alex Bellamy ‗Conflict prevention and the Responsibility to Protect‘ (2008) 14 Global Governance 135 at 
147 (hereafter Bellamy ‗Conflict Prevention and R2P‘). 
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 Carsten Stahn ‗Responsibility to protect: Political rhetoric or emerging legal norm?‘ (2007) 101 AJIL 99 at 
117 (Stahn ‗Political rhetoric or emerging legal norm?‘). 
19
 See ‗WSOD‘ op cit note 6 para 138-9. 
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atrocities.
20
 For example, where the UNSC is deadlocked and the United Nations General 
Assembly is divided, who does this ‗international community‘ refer to and what can they 
lawfully do? Does it mean regional organisations, a coalition of states, a coalition of 
democratic states or a coalition of neighbouring states?
21
 Commenting on this issue with 
regard to Darfur in 2008, Bellamy observes that 
imprecision in this matter is, in the long run, more troublesome because the whole concept of 
responsibility is rendered meaningless without a related concept of where that responsibility 
resides. Thus, the world‘s response to the crisis in Darfur has been chacaterised by 
disagreements about where responsibility ought to lie—with the host government, the African 
Union, or the UN Security Council—and these disagreements themselves have served to 
stymie collective efforts to respond to the unfolding emergency.
22 
The issue of a vaguely defined ‗international community‘ has implications for R2P in other 
aspects, apart from location of authority. Another point is that it affects the scope of what can 
be done and the legality of such action. For example, can a regional organisation undertake 
unilateral intervention to implement R2P when the UNSC is paralysed or must such 
intervention be authorised by the UNSC?
23
 This issue also implicates the question of 
accountability for violations of international humanitarian law during such interventions.
24
 
For example, if a state takes unilateral action purportedly acting on behalf of the international 
community to operationalise R2P, the mechanisms required for accountability on how the 
mission is launched and the implications thereof would be different to those applicable in the 
case of UN missions or those carried out under the auspices of a regional organisation. Thus, 
it is important to clarify the ‗notion of international community‘ and the role of different 
actors as originally canvassed by the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS), but to which much confusion have been introduced by subsequent 
debates and documents on R2P.
25
 A theory of regional responsibility to protect will bring 
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 Bellamy ‗Conflict Prevention and R2P‘ op cit note at 147. 
21
 Id. 
22
 Id. 
23
 This issue has never really been resolved. From a legal point of view, paragraph 139 of the WSOD is the 
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clarity to the apparent confusion about the location of authority and responsibility to act on 
R2P. It does this by designating which agency constitutes the ‗international community‘ for 
purposes of the R2P scheme; and by recalibrating the R2P scheme, it predetermines which 
agency bears responsibility at what stage in the R2P continuum. 
Another justification for this theory is that several regional organisations now make 
compliance with mass atrocity crimes prevention criteria for membership.
26
 Furthermore, 
more states are signing on to more onerous regional community membership commitments 
and other intrusive human rights treaty obligations at the regional level, thereby creating 
opportunity for leveraging such frameworks for the operationalisation of R2P. Finally, 
members of regional organisations are more likely to subject themselves to rules they helped 
create and are more willing to contribute troops to organisations which they are a member of 
and have a say in or which is led by or in cooperation with a regional organisation to which 
they have affinity.
27
 For example, R2P has historical significance for the African continent 
because, as the normative convergence between the norms of R2P and the AU/ECOWAS 
norms shows, R2P was already well developed in Africa prior to the ICISS Report and 
WSOD.
28
  
8.3 THE CONTOURS OF A THEORY OF REGIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT (RR2P) 
 
My aim in this section is to sketch the contours of a theory of regional responsibility to 
protect. This theory makes two assumptions: the existence of authoritative structures in order 
to produce coherent policy,
29
 and secondly, that it would be easier to forge consensus for a 
treaty of intervention like the AU/ECOWAS regimes within regional blocs.
30
 The basis for 
these assumptions is that, as argued by Miller long ago, increasingly, groups of states seems 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
approaches see Jennifer Welsh, Carolin Thielking & S Neil MacFarlane ‗The responsibility to protect: 
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26
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to have realised that the myriad of common problems they confront require them to adopt 
cooperative approach for common solutions because such problems defy the frequent piece-
meal strategies adopted at global level.
31
 The result of these shared problems is a more 
intense regional solidarity and deeper allegiance to regional institutions in quest of regional 
peace and security.
32
 Hence, some commentators argue that regional organisations could be 
legitimate enforcement agents in this respect.
33
 If that is to happen, then they would benefit 
from a theory of regional responsibility to protect, which is delineated here. 
 
In constructing a theory of regional responsibility to protect, I propose that two things 
be done: first, a redistribution of authority between the UNSC and the AU/ECOWAS.
34
  
Chapter VIII of the Charter, particularly article 53, needs to be amended to give autonomy to 
regional organisations on the question of location of authority. There is consensus that in the 
interest of stability in the international legal order, the UNSC should retain the authority for 
the use of force under Pillar Three of R2P.
35
 Thus, all the major documents on R2P continue 
with the subsidiarity arrangement enshrined in Chapter VIII of the Charter that subordinates 
regional organisations to the UNSC in the authorisation of the use of force.
36
 However, there 
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33
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is no consensus as to what should happen where the UNSC is paralysed. Those who maintain 
that action cannot be taken without UNSC authorisation have not come up with an acceptable 
alternative proposal where the UNSC is deadlocked in the face of genocide or other mass 
atrocities.
37
 On the other hand, those who support the localisation of authority in different 
agents argue that the same factors that often paralyse the UNSC from taking action might 
also prevent it from authorising intervention by others, thus rendering this approach 
unhelpful.
38
 
  
The ICISS and the UN Secretary-General‘s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges 
and Change (HLP), attempted to circumvent this dilemma first by recommending a more 
responsible use of the veto through so-called ‗constructive abstention‘, whereby the five 
permanent members of the UNSC undertake to refrain from using the veto where their vital 
national interest is not at stake.
39
 Secondly, they also left open the possibility of other actors 
intervening and seeking ex post facto authorisation where the UNSC is deadlocked.
40
 But 
even these were rejected by the World Summit Outcome Document (WSOD) and states 
merely resolved to take ‗collective action‘ through the UNSC.41 The legal position therefore 
remains that even with R2P, where the UNSC is paralysed in a case of genocide or other 
mass atrocities, there is little R2P can do as a principle or that any other agent can do under 
the Charter. The broad consensus and support that made the WSOD possible in 2005 seems 
to have come at a price—R2P as conceived by the ICISS and adopted by HLP appeared to 
have been weakened in this regard.
42
  
 
A theory of regional responsibility to protect comes in here not to dislodge the 
existing international legal order but to complement it by providing an alternative platform 
for the operationalisation of the responsibility to react under R2P. Under the theory, the 
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40
 See Carsten Stahn ‗Responsibility to protect: Political rhetoric or emerging legal norm‘ (2007) 101 AJIL 99 at 
106; (hereafter Stahn Responsibility to protect). A More Secure World op cit note 5 para 272. 
41
 WSOD op cit note 7 para 139. Spencer Zifcak ‗The responsibility to protect‘ in Malcolm Evans (ed) 
International Law (2010) 504-527 at 516 (hereafter Zifcak ‗The responsibility to protect‘). 
42
 Ibid at 515. See also Thomas G Weiss ‗R2P after 9/11 and the World Summit‘ (2006) 24:3 Wisconsin 
International Law Journal 741 at 750. 
 
 
282 
UNSC remains the lawful agency to authorise the use of force. Hence regional organisations 
would ordinarily seek UNSC authorisation before they can legally use force to implement 
R2P. However, where the UNSC fails to authorise such intervention, the theory of regional 
responsibility to protect provides a legal basis for taking action by the relevant regional 
organisation on the basis of an existing regional intervention treaty, which does not ordinarily 
require UNSC authorisation. This is where the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes could be most 
useful in the implementation of R2P, because they provide a sort of dual-authority level 
which locate jurisdiction in both the UNSC via the Charter and regional organisations via a 
treaty of intervention. As stated above, the ideal would be an amendment of Chapter VIII of 
the Charter to redistribute authority between UNSC and regional organisations in this respect. 
However, it is still possible to apply the theory without such amendment. Without amending 
Chapter VIII of the Charter, a regional organisation can intervene if either of two conditions 
are met: if UNSC authorisation has been obtained or if there is an existing treaty of 
intervention. If the UNSC functions as it should by leading or authorising intervention in 
compelling cases, it goes without saying that such authorisation is a sufficient legal basis for 
a regional organisation‘s intervention. However, where the UNSC is paralysed, as is 
sometimes the case, the regional organisation can still intervene on the basis of the existing 
regional intervention treaty. In such situations, UNSC authorisation is ordinarily not a legal 
requirement.  
However, whereas the focus of this theory is the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes, the 
difficult cases would be regions without regional intervention treaties. Location of authority 
remains with the UNSC and action on R2P can only be taken through the UNSC. In such 
cases, a theory of regional responsibility to protect cannot offer anything more than what is 
currently available under the Charter paradigm and R2P framework. In regions where there is 
no intervention treaty, UNSC authorisation will always be a requirement, otherwise the 
theory can only be applied in such region if there is an amendment to Chapter VIII 
redistributing authority accordingly. 
 
The second change necessary for the construction of a theory of regional 
responsibility to protect is the recalibration of the R2P scheme, such that regional 
organisations can occupy an intermediate level in the sphere of responsibility. This dovetails 
with the call for redistribution of authority made above because neither can work effectively 
without the other. The reason for calling for a redistribution of authority is to provide the 
legal authority to back up the intermediate level duties regional organisations are called upon 
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to perform under a theory of regional responsibility to protect.
43
 Under the current R2P 
framework, whereas there is emphasis on states and the international community, none of the 
documents create any specific role for regional organisations like AU/ECOWAS in the area 
of use of force under Pillar Three, despite the strategic position they occupy.
44
 The WSOD 
states that when a state fails in its R2P responsibility, it passes to the ‗international 
community‘.45 In this ‗international community‘, there is the UNSC, subregional 
organisations, regional organisations and so on, that are authoritative agents recognised by 
the Charter.
46
 The ICISS seems to acknowledge this when it states in its report that the UNSC 
only has ‗primary‘ but not exclusive, responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security.
47
 It also referred to the fact that articles 11 and 52 of the Charter confer powers 
on the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and regional organisations though merely 
recommendatory in the former and limited in the latter.
48
 Many studies, including the major 
documents on R2P, suggest that regional organisations should have authority to intervene 
where the UNSC is deadlocked.
49
 In the Ezulwini Consensus which is the AU‘s official 
policy document on the R2P, the AU pointed out that  
 
[s]ince the General Assembly and the Security Council are far from the scenes of conflicts 
and may not be in a position to undertake effectively a proper appreciation of the nature and 
development of conflict situations, it is imperative that Regional Organisations, in areas of 
proximity conflicts, are empowered to take action in this regard. The African Union agrees 
with the Panel that the intervention of Regional Organisations should be with the approval of 
the Security Council; although in certain situations, such approval could be granted ―after the 
fact‖ in circumstances requiring urgent action. In such cases, the UN should assume 
responsibility for financing such operations.
50
 
However, states did not adopt the position of the ICISS and the WSOD therefore confers the 
responsibility to protect on two agents: first, the territorial state, which has the primary 
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responsibility to protect its citizens from mass atrocities, and the international community, 
which has a secondary responsibility to assist the territorial state and to step in when the state 
fails. Yet, between the territorial state and the international community, there is an 
intermediate level occupied by subregional and regional organisations. This is a vacuum 
which ought to be filled by subregional and regional organisations.
51
 In practice they fill this 
role but with respect to the use of force, their legal authority under the Charter does not 
reflect the kind of duty they are called upon to perform because they cannot act without 
UNSC authorisation. This has created a normative schism between practice and law.
52
 It is 
therefore necessary to reorder the R2P schema in order to place subregional and regional 
organisations at the intermediate level such that when the responsibility to protect passes 
from the territorial state, it goes to the sub-regional and then to the regional organisations 
before passing to the broader international community acting through the UNSC.  
 
This means that R2P has to be recalibrated to bring regional organisations to the 
second or intermediate line of action behind the territorial state. In other words, subregional 
and regional organisations would be the first agents in the international community that bear 
the responsibility to protect. When a state is manifestly failing or is unable or unwilling to 
discharge its responsibility to protect, the responsibility passes from the state to the relevant 
subregional or regional organisation. Where they too fail, the responsibility should then pass 
to the broader international community. However, in a region without a regional organisation 
or where the regional organisation apparently lacks the capability, the responsibility to 
protect should automatically pass from the territorial state to the broader international 
community acting through the UNSC.  
 
The above proposal will serve the purpose of assigning responsibility to specific, pre-
determined agents in the international community and avoid the situation described by 
Bellamy above. The proposal will also help in establishing accountability for failure by the 
international community at any material point on the different levels of the R2P spectrum. 
For example, with respect to Africa, it should be clear that under a theory of regional 
responsibility to protect, when the territorial state fails, the responsibility to protect passes to 
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SADC and ECOWAS in the Southern African and West African subregions respectively 
before passing on to the African Union and ultimately the broader international community 
through the UNSC. Thus, the particular agent can be readily identified and held accountable. 
There should be a flexible timeline within which each actor is expected to act before the 
responsibility passes, depending on the circumstances.  
 
This is not meant to be a watertight division of labour. As a multilateral approach, 
how the different agents (the sub-regional, regional organisation and the UNSC) interface 
with one another to apply the theory within the R2P spectrum depends on many variables, the 
most important of which is whether or not the sub-regional or regional organisation has an 
existing treaty of intervention. Following the AU/ECOWAS model, a theory of regional 
responsibility to protect (RR2P) makes the assumption that member states would partially 
surrender their sovereignty and accede to a treaty of intervention under a regional framework. 
Each regional organisation sets out its criteria and framework for intervention for the 
operationalisation of the responsibility to react and clearly defines legal parameters in 
regional treaties. It is recognised that not all regions have the capacity in this regard and each 
region will have to develop its own framework and mechanism along with its unique history 
and challenges.
53
 As we have seen, although there exist a plethora of legal norms in IHRL 
and IHL that could be useful in determining when the threshold have been crossed, there is as 
yet, with the possible exception of the Genocide Convention, no treaty that creates a clear 
legal obligation for intervention as in a case of genocide.
54
 The effectiveness of this theory 
depends on developing such regional treaty regimes. 
 
The AU/ECOWAS RHMI represents the first of its kind and though as a treaty among 
states in the post Charter era, it could be a useful model for other regions, it is doubtful 
whether such framework could be achieved under UN auspices. In fact, it is one of the goals 
the World Summit was supposed to achieve, ie that the international community must be 
under a duty to act on R2P when a pre-determined threshold has been crossed. But as it 
turned out, the WSOD failed to impose such positive obligation on the international 
                                                          
53
 See Lessons Learned Unit ‗Cooperation between the UN and regional organisations/arrangements in a 
peacekeeping environement: Suggested Principles and Mechanisms (March 1999) 12 available at 
<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
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ons.pdf> (accessed on 18 May 2011). 
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 With the possible exception of the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes discussed in this thesis, which do not even 
impose a duty to intervene on the respective organisations.  
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community due to concerns from certain states. A theory of RR2P has implications for the 
question of political will. Framed as a moral, rather than a legal obligation, states would be 
unlikely to act if what is at stake is moral rather than legal duty. It also has connotations for 
would-be violators. If a theory of RR2P is located within a regional treaty arrangement such 
as the AU/ECOWAS, it will be more difficult for a would-be violator to argue that there is no 
basis for intervention or that such intervention by the regional organisation constitutes an 
interference in its internal affairs and a violation of its sovereignty and international law, 
since it is bound by the RR2P treaties it signed and under which the region acts.  
 
To utilise the theory, each region will need an organisation where states can 
effectively pursue the common goal without becoming an instrument of domination by one 
state.
55
 But as an institution of global governance, the UN is likely to remain the forum for 
norm articulation and standard-setting, and even action—especially in areas with weak 
regional institutions—and also as a platform for mobilizing resources to support regional 
interventions that have received moral approval from the broader international community.
56
 
Under a theory of regional responsibility to protect, the responsibility of a regional 
organisations committed to the fundamental objectives of the UN Charter and expressed in a 
regional legal and theoretical framework like the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes should be 
seen as complementing rather than supplanting the international responsibility to protect 
borne by the community of states and exercisable through the United Nations. If the 
AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes can fulfill this in practice much as it has done in theory, the 
effort will have been worth the while in the number of genocides and mass atrocity crimes it 
will have prevented or halted. 
  
8.4 CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis had set out with one major objective: to provide a theoretical explanation for the 
legal validity of the African Union and ECOWAS humanitarian intervention treaty 
provisions. I began by providing a historical background of humanitarian intervention and 
other normative concept employed in the study while situating the evolution of the African 
approach in its regional and historical context through case studies. Nonetheless, there are 
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several apparent normative incompatibilities between these treaty provisions and the UN 
Charter-based paradigm on the use of force and humanitarian intervention. The task of 
reconciling them was approached in three ways.  
First, by employing Reisman‘s theory of transformations of world constitutive 
process, it was argued that the current global constitutive process is one that has not matured 
to the expected level with the effective hierarchical institutions that are able to prevent and 
halt genocides and mass atrocities and under which treaties of unilateral intervention would 
be illegal. This system therefore permits unilateral acts like those of AU/ECOWAS and their 
treaties providing the legal framework for those acts are arguably valid. I then proceeded to 
rely on Buchanan‘s theory of illegal international legal reform to argue that the 
AU/ECOWAS regional humanitarian military intervention regime actually qualify as an 
exercise in international legal reform. By examining what that concept means and the 
necessity for such approach to law reform in the international legal order, I offered 
justifications and reasons why the AU/ECOWAS treaties should be seen as an exercise in 
illegal international legal reform aimed at improving the law of humanitarian intervention. 
Finally, I subjected the treaty regimes to legal validity test under conventional international 
law and customary international law and considered the legal objection that the 
AU/ECOWAS treaty provisions in question violate the jus cogens norm of non-use of force. I 
argued that a proper understanding of what is peremptory in article 2(4) and the operation of 
the principle of consent in international law is sufficient ground to conclude that the treaties 
are legally valid because not only do they  not provide for aggressive use of force, they 
actually constitute intervention by invitation and consent.  
Thus, having concluded that the AU/ECOWAS RHMI regimes are legally valid under 
international law, I went on to propose in my final chapter that it be used as a theoretical 
basis for implementing the responsibility to react component of R2P. I argued for the 
adoption of a theory of regional responsibility to protect based on my conviction that the 
existing multilateral system can be better utilised by clearly defining the responsibility of 
agents in the international community within the R2P schema using the AU/ECOWAS 
regional intervention treaty approach. The theory relies on the redistribution of authority 
between the UNSC and regional organisations under Chapter VIII and a recalibration of the 
R2P schema. The proposal is that the territorial state continues to bear primary responsibility 
to protect but when that state fails, the responsibility should pass to the sub-regional 
organisation or regional organisation as the case may be. When the regional arrangement 
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fails, then it should pass to the broader international community acting through the UNSC. 
The aim of a theory of regional responsibility to protect is not necessarily to develop an R2P 
operationalisation mechanism outside the existing UN system but to provide a legal basis for 
action at the regional level that can complement the existing multilateral system and with 
both functioning within a mutually reinforcing arrangement that can be effective in 
preventing or halting genocide and other mass atrocities. Although a reform of the Charter 
would facilitate this proposal, a theory of regional responsibility can still be adopted in the 
absence of such amendment to the Charter. What is critical is the adoption at the regional 
level, of humanitarian intervention legal framework and it is hoped that this can be achieved. 
In this way, the theory is able to provide a complementary as well as an alternative platform 
for collective action to prevent or halt genocide when necessary. This thesis has tested the 
legal validity of the AU/ECOWAS humanitarian intervention regimes under international law 
at a theoretical level. It has also made some proposals for adapting them in the 
implementation of R2P in Africa. However, it is imperative that in the future, research 
focusing on an assessment of the effectiveness of these frameworks in practice should be 
undertaken.
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